Showing posts with label Afghan-Local-Police-ALP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghan-Local-Police-ALP. Show all posts

Sunday, October 1, 2017

Afghan Territorial Army

Members of the 8th Special Operations Kandak provide
training to a contingent of the Afghan Local Police (ALP).

Another Militia? It appears that the U.S. and Afghan military may be considering the establishment of an Afghan Territorial Army. The proposed force of 20,000 would be under the control of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and would be an army version of the Afghan Local Police (ALP). The purpose of the force is to provide security to isolated communities that are threatened by insurgents.

Read more:

"More Militias? Deja vu double plus with the proposed 'Afghan Territorial Army'", by Kate Clark, Afghan Analysts Network, September 21, 2017.

"More Militias? Part 2: The Proposed Afghan Territorial Army in the Fight Against ISKP", by Kate Clark and Borhan Osman, September 23, 2017.

"U.S. Plan for New Afghan Force Revives Fears of Militia Abuses", by Mujib Mashal, The New York Times, September 15, 2017.

Sunday, November 6, 2016

Afghan Security News

Kunduz CIVCAS Event. An airstrike took place during the recent attack on a Taliban position in Kunduz city where two American Special Forces Soldiers died. The airstrike hit a building(s) where senior Taliban leaders were in - and also some civilians (many children). Some estimates say over 30 civilians were killed. Read more in "U.S. general pledges investigation on Afghan air strike casualties", Reuters, November 5, 2016. See also "NATO and government forces are increasingly responsible for Afghan civilian deaths", The Washington Post, November 3, 2016.

Australian Woman Kidnapped. According to some initial reports (Tolo News) an Australian woman employed by an NGO was kidnapped at gunpoint on Saturday night (5 Nov 2016) in Kabul.

Hand-Holding at FOB Gamberi. Learn a little bit about what it is like to be an advisor to the Afghan National Army's 201st Corps in eastern Afghanistan. See "Texas troops aiding effort to advise Afghan military", My San Antonio, October 31, 2016.

Senior al-Qaida Ldr Killed by Airstrike. The US says that Farouq al-Qahtani, who had long-standing ties with Osama bin Laden, was killed in a precision air strike in October. (The Guardian, November 4, 2016).

ALP, Uprisings, and Militias. In the northern province of Takhar there is a mix of armed groups that exist in addition to the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Read more in "Afghanistan tries to clean up its militias, both legal and illegal",  LA Times, October 31, 2016.

Green-On-Green Attacks are Up. The occurrence of attacks by members of the Afghan security forces against other members of the Afghan army or police is rising. Read "Wave of Afghan-on-Afghan Insider Attacks Hits Afghan Army",,  October 31, 2016.

Army NCO Considered for MoH. An Army non-commissioned officer is being considered for the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions in eastern Afghanistan in 2012. Read "We weren't out there looking for awards", Stars and Stripes, November 4, 2016.

Former Serviceman Dies in Afghanistan. A former Navy SEAL - Brian Hoke - died in Afghanistan. Hoke was from the Leesburg, Virginia ara and a 1996 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. He left the military in 2002 and worked for the U.S. State Department with many deployments overseas. He is survived by his wife and three children. Info from "Virginia Serviceman Dies in Afghanistan", NBC, October 31, 2016.

Sunday, September 25, 2016

Bad ALP and Good ALP - It's All in the Vetting

Photo: PO Matthew Leistikow
ALP rifle training, Jan 2013
The Afghan Local Police (also referred to as the ALP) have a mixed record in Afghanistan. On one hand the ALP provide a local security force to communities that lack the benefit of a robust presence of the Afghan National Army or Afghan National Police. The ALP was designed to provide security in remote districts and communities to degrade the influence and control of insurgents. In many cases this was the case. However, there are many instances where the ALP also became the tool of local power brokers and warlords and adopted predatory practices - eroding support for the Afghan government at the local and national level. There was a robust methodology for the establishment of the Afghan Local Police, and when followed, it resulted in a properly selected, vetted, trained, equipped, and led local police force. However, when the vetting process was not adhered too, the results were far from satisfactory. Read an example of where the ALP first went bad and then good in Shah Joy district, Zabul province in an article entitled "How to replace a bad ALP commander: in Shajoy, success and now calamity", by Fazal Muzhary, Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 21, 2016.

Sunday, December 6, 2015

Rise of ALP and Anti-Taliban Militias?

The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) have not quite been up to the task of finding, fixing, and finishing the Taliban and other insurgent groups across the country. The ANDSF has taken significant losses, suffered from high desertion rates, and seen many regions across the country fall under the control of the Taliban, ISIS, and other groups. The Afghan government has resorted to funding various local militia groups in Kunduz, Faryab, and other locations where the ANDSF has fallen short in providing security. In addition, GIRoA has indicated that it wants to increase the size of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) from 30,000 to 45,000. Read more in a report by Anuj Chopra in "Rise of Afghan anti-Taliban militias stokes instability fears"Yahoo! News, December 1, 2015.

SOF News

VSO, Gant, Water, Crops, and COIN. One writer, Doyle Quiggle, manages to combine a variety of topics (although related) into an essay on how to win a small war! He tells us of the failures of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program of U.S. special operations in Afghanistan, of how Jim Gant was doing VSO right, and the importance of water in counterinsurgency at the village level. Read "Small Farms and Small Wars: Planting The Garden in Village Stability Operations", Small Wars Journal, November 29, 2015.

Event - "Lessons from VSO and ALP". Dr. Corey Lofdahl is presenting a lecture on the topic of Implementing  Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: Lessons from Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police (VSO/ALP). He is a senior scientist with Charles River Analytics who worked in 2011 and 2012 at the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command - Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A). The presentation is on Thursday, December 10th in Washington, D.C. and is hosted by The Institute of World Politics. (Note: CFSOCC-A is now known as the Special Operations Joint Task Force - Afghanistan or SOJTF-A).

DoDIG Investigation on ANASOF TAA. The Inspector General for the Department of Defense intends on conducting an assessment on U.S. and Coalition efforts to Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip the Afghan National Army Special Operations Forces (ANASOF). The objective is to determine whether U.S. government and coalition goals, objectives, plans and resources to train the ANASOF are sufficient, operative, and relevant. Read the memo from DoDIG, November 25, 2015.

Joint U.S. - Afghan SOF Raid Frees 40 from Prison. A prison rescue mission successfully liberated at least 40 Afghan security personnel from a Taliban prison in Nawzad district of southern Helmand province in an operation that began on Thursday night. (Tolo News, Dec 4, 2015). See also an NBC News report dated December 4, 2015.

"Project Gray" - Fighting in the Gray Zone. Warfare has changed over the past few decades. The advent of Hybrid Warfare, Irregular Warfare (IW), and the use of Unconventional Warfare (UW) by our adversaries (Iran, ISIS, al Qaeda, Russia, and others) has forced the U.S. military to take a long look on how to operate in this new environment. The UW experts at Fort Bragg (that would be the Green Berets) are learning to fight in what is now being referred to as the "Gray Zone".  The initial Special Forces training that Green Berets undergo goes a long way to prepare its members for this kind of fight; yet the learning never stops. As part of this never-ending learning process the U.S. Army Special Operations Center of Excellence has started "Project Gray" and published a website that reflects the work in this area.

Advocating a "Human Warfighting Domain". One writer is strongly proposing that a Human Warfighting be established and that the proponent should be those in the U.S. Army who are the most proficient in counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare - that would be the 1st Special Forces Command. Read "Should There Be a Human Warfighting Domain?", by Thomas Doherty, Small Wars Journal, December 3, 2015.

5th Group Reviving Vietnam Era Flash. The solid black flash worn on the berets of members of the 5th Special Forces Group will be giving way to a bit of history. The new (or old) flash will be the one worn by 5th Group Soldiers while serving in Vietnam (and also stateside). Read more on the perplexing move by 5th SFGA and Special Forces Command in "Army's 5th Special Forces Group to Resurrect Vietnam-Era Beret Flash",, December 1, 2015.

'Targeting Force' to Iraq / Syria. In testimony before Congress SECDEF Carter stated that more U.S. military forces will be headed to the Middle East to fight against ISIS. The number of airstrikes will increase as well as on-the-ground intelligence gathering and special operations raids. Carter also said that a "specialized expeditionary targeting force" will assist Iraqi and Kurdish peshmerga forces fighting the Islamic State. Sounds very JSOC-like! Read more in "DoD to deploy 'targeting force' to hunt down ISIS leaders"Military Times, December 1, 2015. See also Kim Dozier's article - "Obama Unleashes Hunter-Killers on ISIS", The Daily Beast, December 1, 2015.

USSF Fighting with Kurds for Months. Kurdish fights say that US Special Forces have been fighting ISIS for months in northern Iraq. The Obama administration continues to maintain that there are 'No Boots on the Ground"; however, perhaps that is because the SF dudes (in another era they were referred to as "Sneaky Petes") are all wearing sneakers. (The Guardian, Nov 30, 2015).

SOCOM Cdr Likely Choice for CENTCOM. General Votel is a top candidate to succeed General Austin for command of Central Command. Given the importance of the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria he is a good choice. Read more in "SOCOM's Votel is Top Choice to Take Over CENTCOM", Defense One, December 3, 2015.

How Does SOCOM Feel about the Gender Integration Order? - He is all for it! The commander, General Votel, seems to think it is a good idea. (The feedback I hear from those on the SF teams is quite different.) Listen to a 8-minute long video of the leader of SOCOM justifying his decision to support the SECDEF in the full integration of women into all special operations organizations. (USSOCOM, December 3, 2015).

How Do SOF Operators Feel about Women in SOF Units? Not So Much! The RAND Corporation conducted a study that special operations leadership commissioned on the integration of women into SOF units. 85% of the rank and file said "NO!, Don't Do IT". But with the proper 'career guidance', 'gender integration seminars', 'focus groups', 'safe space discussions', and more I am sure the steely-eyed combat veterans with multiple deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere will come around. Read "Special Ops Survey Showed 85% Opposed Serving With Women", Defense One, December 4, 2015.

Book - Relentless Strike. I just finished reading Sean Naylor's recent book about the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Very informative read with perhaps more information than USSOCOM would have wanted published. I am sure there was more than one former 'operator' talking out of school. The book is available on

Sunday, November 1, 2015

Afghan Local Police (ALP)

ALP and SIGAR Report. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has published a report entitled Afghan Local Police: A Critical Rural Security Initiative Lacks Adequate Logistics Support, Oversight, and Direction, SIGAR 16-3 Audit Report, October 2015. The report cites a number of factors that limit the effectiveness of the ALP and provides several recommendations to improve the capability of the

Profile of a Strongman. The Afghan government is considering the expansion of the Afghan Local Police or ALP to counter the resurgent Taliban. While the ALP provides security in areas where the Afghan National Police are weak and the Afghan National Army is scarce; the ALP also comes with some baggage. Local warlords sometimes co-opt these local police forces and use them for their own purposes. Read more - "In Afghanistan, a strongman rises in battle against a resurgent Taliban", Stars & Stripes, October 29, 2015. Warlords in Afghanistan are considered by many to be a huge problem - but some see they as a source of stability where government rule is ineffective or not yet established. One author believes that areas under the control of a warlord are not exactly 'ungoverned space' (Defense One,  Oct 29, 2015).

Former Kandahar PRT Member & ALP. A former political director of the Kandarhar Provincial Reconstruction Team, Abdullah Sharif, thinks expanding the ALP is a bad idea. Read "Afghan Security Woes Continue Unabated", The Huffington Post, October 29, 2015.

Sunday, October 18, 2015

Growing the Afghan Local Police (ALP)?

It appears that the government of Afghanistan is looking to grow the size of the Afghan Local Police or ALP. The Taliban's recent success in Kunduz City and their overall success on the battlefield across the country has the Afghan government worried. The Taliban control or contest almost 25% of the 398 districts of Afghanistan. It is quite clear that the corrupt and unprofessional Afghan National Police (ANP) are ill suited for quelling the insurgency and that the Afghan National Army is unable to defeat the insurgency. Afghanistan has been (and probably always will be) a country of regional strongmen (call them warlords if you will) and of local militia forces sometimes loyal to the central government but usually owing allegiance to local power brokers. Enter the Afghan Local Police. The government would like to increase the size of the ALP by quite a few thousand members - way beyond the current 30,000 that is funded by the United States. This has put the Europeans into the HP mode and got them frothing at the mouth - they equate the ALP with militias. It will be interesting to see how this works out. Read more in "Afghan Plan to Expand Militia Raises Abuse Concerns", The New York Times, October 16, 2015. Learn more about the Afghan Local Police and read news reports about the Afghan Local Police.

Sunday, October 4, 2015

Bacha Bazi, the ANDSF, and U.S. Advisors

SFC Martland Speaks Out. SFC Charles Martland is being involuntarily separated from the Army for beating up an Afghan Local Police (ALP) commander who was raping a young Afghan boy repeatedly. Unless SecDef gets involved and reverses the decision Martland is out of the Army come November 1st. This is an issue that is not going away. Read more in "Green Beret discharged for beating alleged child rapist speaks out"CNN,  September 28, 2015.

Letter of Reprimand. The then commanding general of Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command - Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) - which is now designated as SOTF-A - wrote a letter of reprimand accusing Martland and his team leader (CPT Quinn) of "flagrant departure from the integrity, professionalism and even-tempered leadership" expected of Special Forces soldiers. No double a letter artfully crafted by the CFSOCC-A lawyer(s). See "U.S. Soldiers Told to Ignore Sexual Abuse of Boys by Afghan Allies", by Joseph Goldstein, The New York Times, September 20, 2015.

Kunduz - A Problem Area for ALP. The province of Kunduz has seen its share of problems from militias - whether those supported by the National Directorate of Security (NDS), local warlords, or the U.S. sponsored and advised Afghan Local Police or ALP. Part of the current security problems of Kunduz city and the province are attributed to these militia groups and ALP that have been above the law and victimizing the local population - thus providing more support to the insurgents. The 1st Special Forces Group was providing assistance to the Afghan Local Police in Kunduz (as part of their wider Village Stability Operations program). Attempts by SFC Martland and his SF team leader to rein in the ALP backfired on them and they were kicked out of the country. Read more in "One of the best" Defenders show support for ousted Green Beret", Army Times, September 30, 2015.

Due Process? Matthew Weybrecht provides his viewpoint on the legality of two U.S. Soldiers beating up a commander of the Afghan Local Police (ALP). He seems to believe that the Soldiers received due process and got off lightly with a reprimand and not a court marital for their alleged assault. Oh Matthew . . . really? I know you got combat time and served in the Rangers (read your bio); but based on your opinion piece it is readily apparent you will make a good lawyer. Good luck with your studies at Harvard Law School! Read the article in "The U.S. Military and Due Process in Afghanistan", Lawfare, September 29, 2015.

Gen Campbell Speaks Out. The current Resolute Support (RS) mission commander, General John Campbell, has come out strongly against allegations that U.S. forces ignore (or ignored) reports of sexual abuse of young Afghan boys by Afghan police or military members. Read his response in "Gen. Campbell: Any abuse is reprehensible", USA Today, September 28, 2015. Hmmm. While there was 'no such theater policy' there was certainly widespread knowledge of "Man Love Thursday" activities among the Afghan security forces. In addition, there were varying degrees of intervention by U.S. forces from turning a blind eye to trying to fire the offending ANDSF members. However, the leverage that U.S. commanders had at the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense in regards to firing bad Afghan commanders was dismal. So, there's that . . .

Sunday, September 13, 2015

Mobile Money Plan for ALP

A plan to pay the Afghan Local Police or ALP in Kapisa province by electronic transfer is working out well (at least according to Resolute Support HQs). The mobile money pilot program registration is complete and will supposedly bring a safer, transparent payment process to the province. If this works out well it may be expanded throughout Afghanistan. The mobile banking services are expected "reduce opportunities for leakages" - a different way of saying corruption, I suppose.The mobile money program allows policemen to receive salaries through their mobile phones and use cash withdrawals without having to step foot in a traditional bank - banks not always available in remote and unsecure areas of Afghanistan where the ALP are based. Cell phone use has grown significantly in Afghanistan since 2001 so the use of mobile banking is possible.

'Trusted Agents' are used where the mobile banking scheme is not yet employed. Trusted agents are Ministry of Interior appointed personnel that physically deliver salaries in cash to remote areas where banks are not available. This method - using the trusted agent - is dangerous (for the trusted agent) and subject to corruption by police commanders. Read more in "Mobile money pilot program bringing safe, transparent pay to Afghan police", DVIDS, August 31, 2015.

Sunday, August 16, 2015

Confusing ALP with Illegal Militias

A recent news article by Carlo Munoz in Stars and Stripes (August 8, 2015) informs us about militias in northern Afghanistan.
 "The re-emergence of government-backed local militias in northern Afghanistan outweighs the benefits for the fight against the Taliban because those armed groups could turn into "hired guns" for warlords and bandits once the insurgent threat subsides, coalition military officers say."

The author of this article, manages to insert a comment about the Afghan Local Police or ALP in his writing - which lumps the ALP in a grouping with illegal or informally government-supported militia's - a common mistake that leads to confusion about militias and the ALP.

Sunday, July 26, 2015

The Good and Bad about Militia Forces

ALP Graduation in Shah Joy District
Militia forces have had a mixed performance in Afghanistan. Many of the attempts to establish local militia forces by the United States and its coalition partners have failed while some have succeeded. The outcomes have been mixed. Some militia programs have helped secure local communities from the Taliban while a few of them have degenerated into armed criminal bands that terrorize the local population. Vanda Felbab-Brown, a senior fellow in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, explores the security and political effects of militia forces in Afghanistan. In her paper she provides a good historical background on the Afghan Local Police as well as mentioning earlier militia programs such as ANUP, APPP, LDI, and CDI. She compares and contrasts the militias of Afghanistan with the popular local uprisings in Mexico and draws some conclusion and provides some recommendations for future support of prosecuting security policy through proxies. Read her article The dubious joy of standing up militias and building partner capacity: Lessons from Afghanistan and Mexico for prosecuting security policy through proxiesJuly 21, 2015.

Wednesday, April 8, 2015

Report - VSO and ALP

From 2010 to 2013 the special operations forces in Afghanistan dedicated a significant part of their manpower and resources to the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs. ODAs, SEAL teams, and MARSOC teams were aligned against key districts with the dual-role of implementing the VSO program and establishing, training, and advising ALP units at the community or district level. In this 95-page long paper Dr. Mark Moyar outlines the history of the VSO and ALP programs. He covers the history of the two programs from their inception to the end of the VSO program and the transition of the ALP program to the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI). He notes the complementary role that VSO/ALP played to the counterterrorism effort - using the 'indirect approach' to employ population mobilization and other counterinsurgency techniques to secure the Afghan populace. He describes how the two programs, VSO and ALP, provided not only security for some key districts in Afghanistan but also governance and development. Read his paper "Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police", JSOU Report 14-7, October 2014.

Wednesday, November 26, 2014

More on Suicide Bombing in Paktika Province

The tragic suicide bombing of the volleyball tournament in Yahya Khel district, Paktika province killed over 61 people. In addition, the Afghan government is taking some heat from members of the district for not providing enough security to the district. Threats were made by villagers to support the Taliban to Abdullah Abdullah, the country's new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) when he visited the district to meet with villagers to offer condolences. The district had formed a unit of the Afghan Local Police three years ago and pushed the Taliban from the district. The suicide bombing was seen as retaliation against the district population for supporting the ALP and staging a local uprising against the Taliban;. Several members of the ALP were killed in the attack. Read more in "As Bombing Toll Rises, Afghan Villagers Direct Anger at Government", The New York Times, November 24, 2014.

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

Gizab District - 80% Owned by Taliban

A few years back Gizab district in Uruzgan province was the showcase of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as an example of a local uprising against the Taliban. The Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command - Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) introduced the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program and Afghan Local Police (ALP) to Gizab district to capitalize on the revolt against Taliban rule. The VSO program and associated ALP spread throughout the country. Since then, along with the withdrawal of conventional U.S. forces, Special Operations Forces teams have been scaled back and they do not advise and assist ALP units at the district level. In fact, the program has been taken over by the Ministry of Interior (MoI) as the ALP is now part of the MoI. A recent news report indicates that Gizab district is now 80% controlled by the Taliban and the ALP is but a shell of its former self in this district. Read more in "Taliban return to Afghan town that rose up and drove out its leaders", The Guardian, October 27, 2014.

Tuesday, February 25, 2014

ALP Program Continues to Grow

The Afghan Local Police or ALP continues to extend its reach throughout Afghanistan. The ALP has been recognized as one of the more successful programs that provide security to the Afghan population and that limits the ability of the insurgents to gain more territory and influence in the rural areas of Afghanistan. Recently a village in Logar province - Babus - conducted a shura where it selected a new ALP commander for its local community. Read more in "Afghan Commandos introduce new ALP chief", DVIDS, February 19, 2014.

Friday, December 20, 2013

Report on ALP by USIP (Dec 2013)

The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has published a report entitled Counterinsurgency, Local Militias, and Statebuilding in Afghanistan dated December 18, 2013. The report is less than complimentary on the Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative started a few years back by the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). The study centers on the ALP in three provinces in Afghanistan - Wardak, Baghlan, and Kunduz - and concludes that the ALP program should not be expanded and instead, it should be absorbed into the Afghan National Police (ANP). Obviously, the study has to be somewhat flawed as it examined the three provinces where the ALP has been most problematic and not where it has been very successful. You can download the USIP report at the link below:

Sunday, March 24, 2013

Insider Attacks Affect Afghan Security Forces As Well

Insider attacks were a common occurrence last year (2012) in Afghanistan and garnered a lot of attention from military and government officials among the ISAF troop contributing nations (TCNs). There have been some attacks against ISAF in the early part of 2013 (most recent were in Jalrez district). However, it is sometimes not noted in the media that the Afghan security forces also experience insider attacks. The most recent one was by a member of the ALP in Badghis province. Read more in "Afghan Local Police Member Kills 5 Colleagues",, March 22, 2013.

Saturday, March 23, 2013

District Stability Operations (DSO) In Afghanistan

The concept of Village Stability Operations or VSO has been around for a year or two. VSO is a very successful program run by the Special Operations Joint Task Force - Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) - with the lead agency being the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A). VSO integrates the parallel and complimentary efforts of security, development, and governance to further the reach of the Afghan government and security organizations at the district level. The implementation involves committing a special operations team (SFODA, MARSOC, or SEAL) against a village to first establish security (primarily through the ALP) and then governance and development.

To assist the ODA (or Marines or Seals) SOJTF-A usually assigns one or two individuals to work as a District Augmentation Team (DAT) or Provincial Augmentation Team (PAT) to help coordinate and facilitate the governance and development lines of operations. The DAT or PAT works within the framework of the district or province headquarters coordinating with Afghan governmental, ministry, and security officials as well as other enablers present such as the State Department, DEA, NGOs, and others.

One Special Forces Warrant Officer presents the case that Special Forces should transition from Village Stability Operations (VSO) to District Stability Operations (DSO). His suggests that in certain regions of Afghanistan (RC East) DSO would be more effective. Read his online article in "VSO versus DSO", Small Wars Journal, March 19, 2013.

Monday, March 18, 2013

Video - ALP Aids in Development and Stability in Baraki Barak

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) have provided a measure of stability and security in Baraki Barak district of Logar province, Afghanistan. With this increased security Afghan government officials have been able to introduce development and agricultural programs to help the residents of the district improve their lives through agricultural assistance programs. See the video here:

"Security Increases Lead to Development Initiatives in Baraki Barak"
CJSOTF-A DVIDS, March 16, 2013

Sunday, March 17, 2013

Panjwai District ALP Increasing in Strength

The Afghan Local Police (ALP) is growing in Panjwai district, Kandahar province. A recent graduation ceremony was held in Belambai Village in February celebrating the recent graduation of ALP members from a three-week long training course. Read more here about the new ALP members.