Showing posts with label Afghan-National-Police-ANP. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghan-National-Police-ANP. Show all posts

Sunday, November 20, 2016

Gender Issues in the Afghan National Police (ANP)

The international community (NATO, donor nations, United Nations, etc.) has been pushing the Afghan government and senior officers at the Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) to recruit and integrate females into the army and the police. These efforts have not attained the results desired and much work needs to be done to realize the 'quotas' established by the international community. For their part, Afghan senior military and police members have a cultural aversion to women serving - although their 'spokesmen' say all the right things for international community consumption. The Afghan National Police (ANP) is doing much better in this regard than the Afghan National Army (ANA). (photo credit: Resolute Support HQs, 14 Nov 2016, 4 ANP female officers at graduation from C-IED course).

Sunday, October 23, 2016

Afghan National Police Code of Conduct

The European Union Police (EUPOL) is backing (that would be money) a campaign by the Afghan government to make the ANP police code of conduct common knowledge among the citizens of Afghanistan. The code of conduct is a guide on ethical behaviour in conducting police work and was approved in 2011. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) conducted a survey in May 2016 to gauge the Afghan public's knowledge and perception of the code of conduct. The results were disheartening and pointed to the need for a media campaign to change the limited awareness. It is hoped that the media campaign will bring positive change to police behaviour and improve transparency and integrity within the Afghan National Police. Read more in "To serve and protect: Media awareness campaign promotes ANP Code of Conduct", European Union External Action.

Sunday, October 18, 2015

Afghan Police News

Five New PCoPs. President Ghani has appointed five new Provincial Chiefs of Police. They will assumes posts in Laghman, Nooristan, Ghani, Badghis and Sar-e-Pul. Read more in a news report by Khaama Press, October 13, 2015.

Friday, March 6, 2015

DoDIG Report on ANP Log / Maintenance

The Department of Defense Inspector General's office has published a 100-page report entitled Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics and Maintenance Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Police. The report, DoDIG-2015-067 dated January 30, 2015, contains 11 observations and 29 recommendations.

Core deficiencies n the ANP logistics system
Afghan budget laws
MoI logistics policy
ANP requirements generation
ANP logistics asset availability
Sustainment of ANP facilities
ANP fleet management
Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs)
ANP transition to organic maintenance
ANP attendance at the ANA CSS School
Advisor resources

There were key logistics issues found in three areas - resources, policy implementation and enforcement, and emerging logistics processes. One observation is that there are insufficient numbers of skilled, experienced candidates available to Coalition forces to serve as ANP logistics advisors. One recommendation is that incoming advisors meet rank, skill-level, and experience requirements (good luck with that one - see info on historic problems with advisor selection). The report contains recommendations to the leads for EF 1, EF 4, and EF 5. The EFs - or Essential Functions - are the way Resolute Support HQs has organized its advisory effort. the DoDIG report can be found at the link below.

Thursday, March 5, 2015

ANP in Baraki Barak District - Logar Province

A very interesting and revealing news article about the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Baraki Barak district, Logar province. The author is Azam Ahmed, the Kabul bureau chief for The New York Times. He spent some time in the district hosted by the District Chief of Police (DCoP). This district is one where the Taliban control over 50% of the terrain depending on the time of day. At one time, as late as 2012, there was a U.S. infantry company, U.S. Special Forces detachment, many enablers (Intel, interpreters, LEPs, SFAAT, etc.), an ANA company, an ANASF detachment, the district police and an Afghan Local Police unit. Since that time the SF dudes, U.S. infantry company, SFAAT, enablers, and ANA company have departed. The Afghan police are on their own. As many observers of insurgencies realize the police are in the forefront in a counterinsurgency effort. This article provides us a glimpse of how the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan is going.
The " . . . war, by most accounts, has been lost. the nation is not pacified, the political future remains deeply uncertain and the death toll has never been higher. For the central government in Kabul, the real fight is to persuade the population, not to kill insurgents. And the police, local and national, are the only ones who can win it."
Read the article in "The Hardest Job in Afghanistan", The New York Times Magazine, March 4, 2015.

Tuesday, January 13, 2015

SIGAR - Problems with ANP Pay

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has released a report criticizing the oversight on the pay and personnel processes of the Afghan National Police (ANP). One of the targets of the report is the administration of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) administered by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Missy Ryan of The Washington Post writes about the report in a January 12, 2015 news report. Some of the problems highlighted include:

- There is little assurance that the funds are going to active police personnel (ghost policemen) or that the amounts are correct (skimming off the top of each policeman's pay).
- Electronic human resources systems still not successfully implemented.
- Twice as many ANP ID cards as there are policemen.
- Inflated police rosters, inflated salaries.
- UNDPs independent monitoring inflates figures of verified ANP personnel.
- Limited visibility over ANP data collection processes.
- Great risk of funds being diverted for corrupt purposes.

You can read the actual report at the link below.

SIGAR 15-26 Audit Report, Afghan National Police: More than $300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary Payments is Based on Partially Verified or Reconciled Data, January 2015.

Thursday, January 8, 2015

ANP & AAF Conduct MEDEVAC Training

Rotary wing air evacuation training was recently conducted for members of the Afghan Border Police (ABP) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Nangarhar province. The one-day training event held in December 2014 covered aircraft familiarization, ambulance procedures around the aircraft, movement of patients and loading and unloading litters. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) had a Mi-17 on hand for the training. U.S. aviation and medical advisors were on hand to observe the training and provide insight with their training and experience. Read more in "Police Advisory Team, Afghan National Police, and Afghan Air Force complete air evacuation training", DVIDS, January 1, 2015. (Photo by Capt Matthew Kukta, 3d Cavalry Regiment Public Affairs Office).

Tuesday, December 30, 2014

ANP doing ANA's Job

The outgoing head of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) had some insightful comments about the current state of security in Afghanistan. Karl Ake Roghe (Sweden) has led the EUPOL mission for over 2 1/2 years. He stated that the main problem for Afghanistan is how the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is dividing the responsibilities for fighting the insurgency. He states that the police are bearing the brunt of the counterinsurgency fight; more so than the Afghan National Army. Afghanistan has 157,000 police that were created, trained and funded (partially) by the European Union. These police are under attack every day from the Taliban; especially in remote districts centers, outlying checkpoints, and in rural areas. The police receive little backup from the army and do not enjoy air support, medical evacuation, and hospitals. The emphasis given to police training is almost insignificant when compared to the money, training, and equipment provided to the Afghan National Army.

Of course, everyone familiar with counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures knows that the police are in the lead in a counterinsurgency effort (read FM 3-24 if you didn't and see note 1 below). Unfortunately, the Ministry of Interior was terribly corrupt and incompetent for many years (probably still is), and the Afghan National Police ill-trained, under-equipped, and also very corrupt. ISAF's efforts (as opposed to EUPOL) in improving the MoI and Afghan National Police (ANP) suffered from over emphasis on the Afghan National Army (ANA) and less than effective police training programs (see note 2 below). Read more in "Head of Afghan police training says high casualties are deadly cost of doing the army's job", Fox News, December 28, 2014.

Note 1: According to FM 3-24, para 6-90, page 6-19, (15 Dec 2006) "The primary frontline COIN force is often the police - not the military" . . . "Because of their frequent contact with populace, police often are the best force for countering small insurgent bands supported by the local populace." However, the police need the support of other government institutions (judicial, prosecutors, government officials, etc.) and the army. In Afghanistan, these institutions were poorly developed or corrupt.

Note 2: In the 2012-2013 period the United States deployed hundreds of Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs). Some of these teams were tasked with advising police district centers. The SFAATS advising the police were supposed to have a senior U.S. Army Military Police NCO on the adviser team - but rarely did this happen. In addition, the police advisor teams were supposed to be augmented with four Embedded Police Mentors (EMPs) - contract civilian policemen from the U.S. - but the contract for the EPMs was not amended in a timely manner to provide the required number of EPMs. The experience level of some EPMs left a lot to be desired. In addition, the SFAATs received very little training in police operations in a COIN environment and knew very little about the ANP prior to deploying to Afghanistan. In effect, the U.S. Army's attempt to professionalize the ANP was not at the level needed; the U.S. Army expended a lot of time, money, effort and personnel on the police training effort but not in a coherent and wise manner.

Life of an ANP EOD Specialist

A news account details the life of an Afghan specialist in defusing improvised explosive devices (IEDs). He works for the Afghan police in Helmand province - and according to some accounts has defused over 6,000 IEDs. Simply amazing. "The war in Afghanistan is over, but the battle against the Taliban - and their IEDs - goes on"The Independent, December 29, 2014.

Tuesday, December 23, 2014

Kandahar PCoP & Cross-Border Opns

The Provincial Chief of Police (PCoP) for Kandahar has authorized his forces to respond to insurgent attacks from across the Afghan-Pakistan border. He states that insurgents will fire there weapons within 100 meters of Pakistani forces. The Ministry of Interior says that the support PCoP Raziq's actions. Read more in "MoI Backs Raziq to Respond to Cross Border Attacks", Stars and Stripes, December 22, 2014.

Thursday, November 27, 2014

French RAID Unit Trains ANP

A unit of the French RAID has been training and advising elements of the Afghan National Police (ANP). RAID is short for Recherche Assistance Intervention Dissuasion - learn more about RAID on Wikipedia. Read about the training efforts of RAID with the ANP in "As casualties soar, Afghan police taught how to stay alive", Mail Online, November 26, 2014.

Wednesday, October 8, 2014

Millions $ Missing from Afghan Police Trust Fund

Millions of dollars are missing from an Afghan police trust fund that is used to pay Afghanistan's police force. The United Nations agency in charge of the funds seems to be unclear as to where the money went. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has conducted an investigation and has some pointed questions about "irregularities" - and possible mismanagement and corruption. (Corruption in Afghanistan? A shocker!). There is some concern that some of the money is being used to pay 'ghost employees'. Read a news story for more info on this topic - "Millions of dollars go missing from Afghan police trust fund", MSNBC, October 6, 2014. Read a letter sent by SIGAR on September 17, 2014 to the head of the Combined Security Transition command - Afghanistan Ministerial Advisory Groups concerning this matter. It is not a pretty picture. The Afghan's are taking us for a ride!

Wednesday, October 1, 2014

Australian SF Advise Afghan GCPSU

Along with the rest of ISAF the Australians have pulled many of their troops out of Afghanistan. However, there still are some working on the ISAF staff and advising some Afghan security force units. Australia's Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) - made up of elements of the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), 2nd Commando Regiment, and other support units withdrew from Afghanistan at the end of 2013. Only a small number of SF types remain in Afghanistan - some doing VIP protection work and others advising the headquarters of the "General Command of Police Special Units" or GCPSU. This hqs unit, formerly known as GDPSU), coordinates Afghan Special Police units across the country. Read more in "Afghan work continues for Aust SF",, September 28, 2014.

Tuesday, January 14, 2014

Afghan Police Not Paid Since November 2013

It appears the over 150,000 police in Afghanistan have not been paid since November 2013 - with some not receiving money since October. The cause of the non-payment (according to Ministry of Interior spokesmen) is that the proper forms were not filed by the Ministry of Interior and passed to the Ministry of Finance. This is indicative of weak government institutions that do not have the ability to run large operations and perform important functions. For this reason, the ISAF commander, General Dunford, wants to retain a small number of advisors and mentors in Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond to work with the Afghan ministries in a functionally-based Security Force Assistance role. Read more in "Afghan Police, Often Derided, Face Another Drawback: Missing Pay", New York Times, January 12, 2014.

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Video - Hawaiian Advisory Team Helps Afghan Police in Counter-IED Techniques

A video has been released by DVIDS which features a SFAAT from the Hawaiian National Guard deployed in Afghanistan assisting the ANP in counter-IED training. The advisory team was assisting the Qalat Reserve Kandak of Zabul province. View the video, produced March 16, 2013, here.

Wednesday, February 6, 2013

Kabul, Cars, Police, Inefficiency, . . . . and, of course, Corruption

A recent story in The New York Times provides insight into the corrupt police of Kabul, Afghanistan and the inefficiencies found in a society and government that just recently has emerged from the 13th century. Kabul is a city designed for less than one million residents and 30,000 automobiles but dealing with 5 million residents and almost 650,000 vehicles. So traffic at best is problematic. Pile on top of that an inept and corrupt city police and you face a host of problems if you are driving a vehicle in Kabul. Read more in "In Kabul's 'Car Guantanamo', Autos Languish and Trust Dies" published on February 17, 2013.

Monday, February 13, 2012

Special Forces and Afghan PRC

With the departure of over 100,000 troops from Afghanistan taking place in 2014 special forces units from a variety of countries will take on the burden of advising and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).  A war journalist (David Axe) describes a recent mission of a Special Forces unit working with the Laghman Provincial Response Company (PRC). See "Afghan Cops and Special Forces", The Diplomat, February 12, 2012.

Saturday, February 5, 2011

Survey Finds Afghans Are Positive about Police

A survey conducted by the Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has found that most Afghans have positive feelings about the Afghan police.  This is according to the Police Perception Survey of 2010.  The results of the survey are surprising given the dismal reputation of the Afghan National Police (ANP).  Then again, the Ministry of Interior (whom the ANP come under) was partially responsible for th survey.  So  . . . read more in "Majority of Afghans positive about local police, survey shows", United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, February 3, 2011.

Thursday, January 20, 2011

Afghan National Police - Story on One Policeman in Afghanistan

An article has been published depicting the life of one member of the Afghan National Police (ANP).  Interesting look at the motivations of an Afghan policeman.  See "Afghan Police bring national pride, self-reliance to eastern Kandahar", DVIDS, January 17, 2011.

Monday, January 17, 2011

Police Mentoring in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2009 | A Report by CNA

The CNA Strategic Studies research group has published a report entitled "Police Mentoring in Afghanistan 2007-2009".  The report is wrote by William Rosenau, Ph.D. and is available for download on the CNA website (Adobe Acrobat file, 98 pages).  A description of the report (text taken from website) is below:
"The role of the police is an important but largely overlooked aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency and stability operations. Although academic and policy specialists have examined the role of police in post-conflict environments, the question of how police should be organized, trained, and equipped for counterinsurgency campaigns has received little systematic attention.

Similarly, US military doctrine and the professional military literature, while not ignoring the subject entirely, do not consider it in any systematic way.2 This gap is particularly ironic, given the prominent role that soldiers and Marines have played in training indigenous police and other security forces in counterinsurgency campaigns from Vietnam to Afghanistan.

If the broader topic of police and counterinsurgency is under-examined, the subject of mentoring—that is, advising and training—foreign police forces is even more neglected. American Marines, soldiers, and other military personnel preparing to deploy to Afghanistan for the police mentoring mission have few sources of information and analysis available to them.

This monograph addresses that gap. Using a series of ten vignettes, this report examines in depth the experiences of individual American and British soldiers and Marines who served as mentors in Afghanistan during the 2007-2009 period."
The following link will take you to the report.