A short (5 mins) video about the drug addicts in Afghanistan entitled "Redeeming Afghan addicts", posted by NATO Channel on YouTube, November 19, 2014. Reported by Jeff Holden and Samim Zalmi from Kabul.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=YTygl8anw3E
Thursday, November 20, 2014
Book - "Dead Men Risen"
A book review on Dead Men Risen: An Epic Story of War and Heroism in Afghanistan is provided to us by George Vlachnoikolis of the War on the Rocks Blog (November 19, 2014). The book is about the story of the 1st Battalion Welsh Guards (1WG) and their deployment to Afghanistan in summer 2009. The book reviews the recent history of the battalion (to include the Falklands); however the main part of the book is about Helmand province. Read the book review here in "The Lessons of the Dead in Helmand". Book can be bought on Amazon.com here.
Germany and Resolute Support
Germany will continue its presence in northern Afghanistan under the Resolute Support mission after December 2014. It will keep over 800 troops in Afghanistan as well as a few CH-53 transport helicopters. Read more in "Germany says to keep up to 850 soldiers in Afghanistan", Reuters, November 18, 2014.
Pakistan Taliban Group Pledges to ISIS
A splinter group of Pakistan's Taliban has pledged support to the Islamic State (IS). Read more in "Pakistan Taliban splinter group vows allegiance to Islamic State", Reuters, November 18, 2014.
COMISAF Visits Kandahar
General John Campbell visited the Train Advise Assist Command - South (formerly known as RC South) to gain an appreciation of the progress being made in the transition from the ISAF mission to the Resolute Support mission. He visited Kandahar Air Field as well as Camp Hero - the headquarters of the ANA 205th Corps. He also met with the provincial governor - Dr. Tooryalai Wesa. Read more in "COMISAF visits Kandahar", DVIDS, November 17, 2014.
More Afghan War News Snippets
The Marines of the Heavy Helicopter Squadron 366 have left Camp Bastion, Afghanistan and are now at home in Cherry Point, Virginia. The wing provided tactical combat support in Helmand province. Read more in "Closeout, HMH-366 Marines return, end Afghan mission", DVIDS, November 17, 2014.
President Ashraf Ghani recently completed a trip to Pakistan. He was warmly received by Pakistan (Central Asia Online, November 17, 2014). Perhaps the Pakistan intelligence service will cease its support of the Haqqani Network? (Probably not).
A two-week long Border Management Awareness Course was held at an OSCE security training event in November 2014 in Dushanbe. The Afghan policemen studied information collection techniques, reconnaissance, tactical patrolling, resource deployment and assessment, interview and interrogation, crime scene management, and more. (Central Asia Online, November 17, 2014).
An editorial on the Opinion Pages of The New York Times by Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. and Karl F. Inderfurth entitled "Afghan Aren't Giving Up" (November 17, 2014) states that most Afghans are impressed with the newly elected President Ashraf Ghani. They argue that Afghans have not given up on their country and that the international community should not give up on Afghanistan. Eliot is a former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan (1973-1978) and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Inderfurth was an assistant U.S. Secretary of State for South Asian affairs from 1997 to 2001 and is now a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
2014 was a year of great anxiety for Afghans. A new survey by The Asia Foundation found that 40 % feel the country is moving in the wrong direction. See a news report by DW.de (Nov 18, 2014).
UNESCO is teaming up with the Afghan Ministry of Information and Culture (using funding from Japan) for the establishment of a Bamiyan Cultural Centre (Architecture News Daily, November 18, 2014).
Germany has pledged $21 million in aid to improve infrastructure and capacity building in northern Afghanistan. (Central Asia Online, November 17, 2014).
The Los Angeles Daily News provides us with a report (November 17, 2014) on Afghan journalists who are touring the United States on a educational tour to learn more about journalism.
Blogging Content Wanted for Afghan War News
The Afghan War News Blog and the Afghan War News website are constantly striving to keep its blog, daily newsletter, and website factual, current, and relevant. If you have a link to a website or document you feel should be shared with the greater community then please send it to us. In addition,we are looking for individuals with some knowledge, experience, and expertise in Afghanistan on a wide range of topics to contribute blog posts and articles to our blog and add content to our website. And naturally, if you see errors, outdated information, or broken links let us know.
staff@afghanwarnews.info
staff@afghanwarnews.info
Afghan War News - Daily Newsletter
You can receive the Afghan War News Daily Newsletter each day. It should arrive in your e-mail inbox at 5:00 am Eastern Standard Time. It is easy to subscribe. Send an e-mail to staff@afghanwarnews.info or go to www.afghanwarnews.blogspot.com and submit your subscription request in the "Follow by Email" dialogue box in the top of the right hand column. It is easy to unsubscribe. At the bottom of the newsletter click "unsubscribe" and you will be automatically unsubscribed
Wednesday, November 19, 2014
Report - Asia Foundation Survey
The Asia Foundation has published (November 18, 2014) its annual Afghan survey report. Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People is the longest-running public opinion poll in the country. In June and July, following the June presidential run-off election, 9, 271 Afghan citizens from all 34 provinces were interviewed on issues central to the country's development. This year's survey provides longitudinal data over ten years, including new questions on the election, migration, women's rights, access to health services, and disaster response.
Report - US Policy in Afghanistan after 2014
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1233
NATO Names Next SCR
JP 3-26 Counterterrorism, 24 Oct 2014
Laghman Province - ANSF Not Losing, Not Winning
A reporter provides us with a glimpse of the fight for Laghman province (home of the 201st ANA Corp headquarters). ISAF has two remaining bases in northeastern Afghanistan - FOB Fenty and FOB Gamberi. For the most part - ISAF combat troops have departed - only advisors, support personnel, "Guardian Angels", chopper support, and others remain. Laghman province, although quieter than Nangarhar and Kunar provinces, is an area that is contested by the Taliban. Read more in "Insurgents in Afghanistan's Laghman province may win by not losing", Stars and Stripes, November 15, 2014.
Public Affairs Shura - Nangarhar Province
Information Operations plays an important role in the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. Representatives of various Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) organizations held a provincial (Nangarhar) Public Affairs Shura at Operation Base Fenty on November 12, 2014. The Afghan representatives in attendance were public affairs officers from the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), the spokesman for the Nangarhar provincial governor, and other elements of the ANSF. In addition, U.S. advisors and Public Affairs Officers (PAO) were in attendance. The PAO shura provides an opportunity for the ANSF to synchronize messages and create more transparency among the different government, military, and police organizations. It is hoped that future media conferences (possibly held monthly) will provide a steady flow of information to the different media outlets (radio, TV, newspaper, social media, etc.) and provide a central location and/or organization for journalists to obtain information. One concern expressed during the conference was the transfer of a "Radio in the Box" to the control of Afghan information operation officers. This would seem to indicate a disconnect between the Afghan PAOs and the Afghan IO organizations in the region. Of course, this is not surprising as within our own military community there is a misunderstanding (at least to the outsider) of the different roles and responsibilities involving Public Affairs, Information Operations, Inform and Influence Activities, Military Information Support Operations, and Psychological Operations personnel. Read more in "Nangarhar public affairs shura includes ANSF pillars and provincial government", DVIDS, November 17, 2014.
Pakistan-Afghan Relations Improve?
President Ghani is optimistic about his recent trip to Pakistan. He says significant progress was made in developing close economic relations and strengthening joint efforts against terrorism. There was no mention in the news report about the Pakistan support to the Taliban. Read more in "Progress Declared in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations", Voice of America, November 15, 2014.
Stalemate in Afghanistan
A veteran diplomat who served as the State Department's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and is now a senior fellow at the RAND Corporation, provides his comments on the current stalemate in Afghanistan in "Afghanistan After America: A Fragile Stability", The RAND Blog, November 14, 2014.
Video - Postal Operations in Afghanistan
A short video (2 mins) by Armed Forces Network (AFN) Afghanistan provides us with some information on how the U.S. Army Post Office at Bagram Airfield conducts traditional postal operations as well as provides expeditionary mail services, such as postal rodeos for smaller outlying FOB's throughout Afghanistan.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4UzvOiuwKk
www.youtube.com/watch?v=V4UzvOiuwKk
Paper - Australian SOF
This paper explains the principles and consideration for the employment of Australian Special Forces. Read Australian Special Operations: Principles and Considerations, The Australian Army, by Ian Langford, 2014.
More Afghan War News Snippets
Some of the tribal areas of Pakistan are a haven for Taliban (the good and the bad). Insurgents living and working in these areas are subject to drone attacks by the United States and attacks by ground and air from the Pakistani military. Most observers of the AfPak conflict misunderstand the politics, demographics, economy, social, and cultural aspects of people who live in the tribal areas. One news article provides us with a perspective on this misunderstanding. Read "Caught between drones and army raids, Pakistanis in 'tribal areas' feel betrayed", The Conversation, November 17, 2014.
The Taliban, a Cow, and Social Media. Only a small proportion of the Afghan population has access to the Internet. However, social media is growing rapidly. A lot of politics is discussed as well as fun stuff that brings enjoyment (as in the recent escapades of two Taliban having a romantic relationship with a cow in the northern province of Badakhshan). Read more in "How the Taliban and a cow prove Afghanistan loves social media", Global Post, November 16, 2014.
Over the past few decades the number of veterans in Congress has dropped dramatically. However, there may be a trend in an increased number of Iraq and Afghan War veterans being elected. Some of these veterans are applying their experience and lessons learned in the combat zones to their own electoral districts.See "Afghan War Veteran Elected to Congress Promises New Mosques, Civil Affairs Projects", Duffel Blog, November 17, 2014.
A video about a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA) serving in Afghanistan. A number of interviews of the SF team members explaining their jobs and the mission in Afghanistan. See "The Last Commando: A Modern Day Green Beret", circa 2014, (40 minutes), posted on YouTube.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JYQtV0zwvJQ
The 10th Sustainment Brigade of the 10th Mountain Division has returned home to Fort Drum, New York from its deployment to Afghanistan. During their 9-month long deployment the Soldiers were not allowed to go on rest and recuperative leave (R&R) so they were happy to be reunited with their families. (European Soldiers usually serve a 6-month long deployment with an R&R break after 3 months). There are still about 130 Soldiers from the unit still deployed but most of them should return prior to Christmas.
The retrograde operation in Afghanistan is a tremendous undertaking - sorting through equipment to be shipped home, transferred to the ANSF, destroyed, or sold to the Afghan civilian sector takes time and energy. One way of getting equipment off the books is through the Federal Excess Personal Property Program (FEPPP). One example of the FEPPP is the recent transfer of a fire truck to the ANSF at Bagram Air Field.
The Afghan drug trade is a booming industry and employs a lot of people. However, it is a major contributor to crime and corruption. Read more in "Afghan Opium Production Hits All-Time High", Eurasia Review, November 17, 2014.
Bloggers Wanted for Afghan War News
The Afghan War News Blog and the Afghan War News website are constantly striving to keep its blog, daily newsletter, and website factual, current, and relevant. If you have a link to a website or document you feel should be shared with the greater community then please send it to us. In addition,we are looking for individuals with some knowledge, experience, and expertise in Afghanistan on a wide range of topics to contribute articles to our blog and add content to our website. And naturally, if you see errors, outdated information, or broken links let us know.
staff@afghanwarnews.info
staff@afghanwarnews.info
5:00 AM EST - Daily Afghan News
You can receive the Afghan War News Daily Newsletter each day. It should arrive in your e-mail inbox at 5:00 am Eastern Standard Time. It is easy to subscribe. Send an e-mail to staff@afghanwarnews.info or go to www.afghanwarnews.blogspot.com and submit your subscription request in the "Follow by Email" dialogue box in the top of the right hand column. It is easy to unsubscribe. At the bottom of the newsletter click "unsubscribe" and you will be automatically unsubscribed
Tuesday, November 18, 2014
Failure of COIN in South Vietnam and Afghanistan
A recent book review by Arnold R. Isaacs entitled "Why the US Needs to Learn the Counterinsurgency Lessons of the Vietnam War" (Business Insider, November 12, 2014) introduces us to a book that explores this topic. Isaacs reviews a new book out about the war in South Vietnam entitled Uphill Battle: Reflections on Viet Nam Counterinsurgency by Frank Scotton that will help in the examination of COIN in Afghanistan. The author of the book (Scotton) served in South Vietnam for over a decade and in his book he examines why the counterinsurgency effort failed. When one compares the South Vietnamese COIN effort with what is now happening in Afghanistan you find a lot of similarities. In the book review four main themes stood out for me:
1) Saigon Government. Scotton points out that the " . . . military-dominated Saigon government was never able to mobilize enough popular support or use its superior manpower and weapons effectively enough to meet the challenge of a far less well-armed but more disciplined, tenacious, and politically skilled enemy".
Popular Support. The Afghan government, like the South Vietnamese government, has not effectively mobilized popular support for its government to the extent necessary. The main source of discontent of the population with the government of Afghanistan is the corruption that exists from the district to national levels. There is a lack of competent government officials, professional police force, an Army that can provide security to all the people of Afghanistan (not just the major urban areas), district governmental offices that provide services, and signs of development in rural areas that show promise of a better life. Without good governance, development, security, and rule-of-law it is hard to generate popular support in the midst of an insurgency.
Superior Manpower and Weapons. Certainly the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), like the South Vietnamese Army, has superior manpower numbers and an abundance of modern weapons. The combined police and army personnel of the ANSF reaches almost 350,000. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) has over 100 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The Afghan National Army has D-30 122-mm Howitzers, mortars, armored personnel carriers, tanks, modern facilities for housing troops and police, and a robust support structure for its corps, brigades, and kandaks. A common refrain among ISAF generals is that when the ANSF (supported by fires and close air support) meet the Taliban on the battlefield they can "overmatch" the insurgents. Of course they can; but those types of battles are far and few between. Insurgents fight a guerrilla war where they don't have to face the armor, artillery, and air power of a more modern army.
The ANSF are opposed by small, mobile insurgent units whose numbers countrywide might number 30,000. The insurgents have no helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, artillery, permanent structures, hospitals, tanks, or armored personnel carriers. While the ANSF is a robust force with lots of modern equipment it does not use its forces effectively. The ANSF is dismal at conducting small unit tactics necessary for an effective counterinsurgency campaign. For the counter-insurgent to win he must defeat the insurgent; for an insurgent to win he must survive. The Taliban have survived years of combat operations with ISAF and will likely survive for many more years in their fight against the ANSF.
2) Corruption of the Saigon Government and Military. Scotton says of South Vietnam that "there is a deadly correlation between corruption at high levels in an administrative system and the spread throughout the system of incompetence as higher-ups encourage and promote corrupt subordinates, and protect them from the consequences of poor performance of duty or direct disobedience of orders." Scotton continues with . . . the system doesn't only protect the corrupt but also "demoralizes and 'selects out' the able and the dedicated who do not play the game and thwarts any attempts at reform initiated at intermediate levels."
Afghan Corruption. A former commander of ISAF, General John Allen, once said that the biggest problem in Afghanistan is not the Taliban - it is corruption. The corruption in Afghanistan pervades all aspects of society. The Afghan police are notoriously corrupt. The judicial system is broke and the settlement of civil and criminal cases revolves around how much money passes to the judge. Provincial governors and district governors are political appointees of President Karzai who many times buy their positions so they in turn can manipulate the system for profit. Many of these provincial and district governors are incompetent and inept at administering within their provinces and districts. Many district governors do not live nor work in their districts due to a lack of security or lack of work ethic. For anything of consequence to happen (big or small) within some districts requires a bribe to the government official or servant. This huge problem of corruption impedes good governance, slows down or stops development, and diminishes security. This, in turn, sways members of the populace to non-support of the government security forces and in some cases to support of the insurgents.
3) U.S. Military. According to Scotton, the United States (even though it was a military powerhouse in the Vietnam era) ". . . never grasped the true nature of the war, consistently deluded itself about what it was accomplishing, and never found a way to remedy the host nation's (South Vietnam) fatal flaws".
Grasping the Nature of Afghan Conflict. The inability to grasp the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan is part of the problem of the United States involvement in Afghanistan. We continue to deploy leaders and advisors with a lack of understanding of Afghanistan's culture, politics, history of conflict, and no knowledge of the doctrine or concepts of counterinsurgency. Our selection and training process for the Security Force Assistance (SFA) advisor teams is hit or miss. For the most part the advisor selection isn't based on who is best for the advisor job but who is available. The U.S. military, except for SOF and a handful of conventional NCOs and officers, didn't really understand the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan from the lowest tactical level up to the highest echelons of leadership. To this day the U.S. military is concentrating on building a conventional Afghan National Army where "processes" and "systems" are developed and refined (see Functionally-based Security Force Assistance); instead of ensuring that infantry kandaks are proficient in small unit tactics and that Afghan army commanders are knowledgeable in how to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban.
4) Bottom Up Security. In the book review the writer says of Scotton: "During that time, Scotton made it his mission to inspire a more effective South Vietnamese war in the hamlets, the center of gravity in the contest between the US-backed government and its Communist enemy. His concept at the outset was to form and support local defense units on the model of the Communists 'armed propaganda teams.' They would not just fight the enemy but put into visible practice a political alternative to the Communists' revolutionary vision - avoiding corruption and mistreatment of civilians, and winning support for the government by demonstrating that it could rule fairly and justly".
Afghan Local Defense Forces (LDF). U.S. military was (and is) skittish about support to Local Defense Forces. Attempts by U.S. Army Special Forces, Marines, and others to establish local security forces such as the CBSS, ISCI, CIP, LDI, CDI, AP3, and AGF met great resistance from the higher level officers of the U.S. military conventional forces. The Afghan government (Karzai) did not want local defense forces that he could not control through his politically appointed cronies - he was less interested in establishing governance, security, and development in the remote areas of Afghanistan contested by the Taliban than ensuring that his political power base was strengthened and he gained wealth through his corrupt style of governing. It was only in the later years of the conflict that progress was made in the establishment of competent and effective local defense forces through the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. Unfortunately, for many areas of Afghanistan, it was too little too late; and ultimately handed over to the Afghan Ministry of Interior where it will likely languish due to lack of support.
The book review and the book are well worth reading to understand how it took so long to get to where we are today in Afghanistan and how far we have yet to go.
Blog on the Afghan War!
The Afghan War News Blog and the Afghan War News website are constantly striving to keep its blog, daily newsletter, and website factual, current, and relevant. If you have a link to a website or document you feel should be shared with the greater community then please send it to us. In addition,we are looking for individuals with some knowledge, experience, and expertise in Afghanistan on a wide range of topics to contribute blog posts and articles to our blog and add content to our website. And naturally, if you see errors, outdated information, or broken links let us know.
staff@afghanwarnews.info
staff@afghanwarnews.info
Start A.M. with Afghan War News
You can receive the Afghan War News Daily Newsletter each day. It should arrive in your e-mail inbox at 5:00 am Eastern Standard Time. It is easy to subscribe. Send an e-mail to staff@afghanwarnews.info or go to www.afghanwarnews.blogspot.com and submit your subscription request in the "Follow by Email" dialogue box in the top of the right hand column. It is easy to unsubscribe. At the bottom of the newsletter click "unsubscribe" and you will be automatically unsubscribed
Monday, November 17, 2014
RAF Tornados Complete Mission in Afghanistan
Korengal Valley - Heart of Darkness
Afghan Drug War Futile
A columnist examines the history of the drug war in Afghanistan and concludes that billions of dollars were spent with no progress in combating the drug trade. He suggests that the U.S. stop wasting money in a futile effort and concentrate on vital U.S. national interests instead; at the same time developing more effective anti-drug policies. Read more in "End the International Drug War to Control the Afghan Narco-State", The Huffington Post, November 15, 2014.
Suicide Bomber Attacks Women's Rights Leader
A suicide bomber attacked the car of a prominent Afghan women's rights leader and member of Parliament on Sunday (Nov 16, 2014). Three people were killed and 20 others wounded. The presumed target was Shukria Barakzai - she was wounded in the attack. She is an outspoken critic and has been quoted with this remark - "Our Parliament is a collection of lords. Warlords, drug lords, crime lords". Read more in "Suicide Bomber Attacks Car of Afghan Women's Rights Leader; 3 Killed", The New York Times, November 16, 2014.
Northeastern Afghanistan - Deadlock
The current situation in the north eastern provinces of Afghanistan (Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, and Nuristan) is in a state of deadlock - with neither the insurgents or the government security forces winning. A common axiom is that the counterinsurgent must defeat the insurgent to win; while the insurgent must merely survive. The Taliban have been able to move freely throughout much of this area and although they have been in numerous battles with the security forces they are not defeated. The insurgents have been able to mass their numbers and attack remote police checkpoints and district centers. Their ability to mass into larger units for combat is a direct result of the Taliban realizing that ISAF air support is being withheld or is no longer available. The mosaic that is north eastern Afghanistan is difficult to fathom for the ISAF advisor who deploys to the region for 9 months - the learning curve is great and once the advisor finally has his understanding of the region, its culture, history, politics, and human terrain - he departs (tour over!). Read a comprehensive report about the complexity of this four-province region in "Footsloggers, Turncoats and Enforcers" the fight along the eastern border", Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 18, 2014.
Green Beret Dies in Kunduz Province
ISAF is reporting that a servicemember died as a result of an enemy forces attack in northern Afghanistan on Friday, November 14, 2014. According to a DoD news release and news accounts SFC Michael A. Cathcart, age 31, died from small arms fire during a dismounted combat operation in Kunduz province. He was assigned to 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In addition to five tours in Afghanistan with Special Forces he had served two tours of duty in Iraq (2003 and 2005) with the 101st Airborne Division. He was the tenth Soldier from Special Forces to lose his life in Afghanistan in 2014.
Video - Afghan Commandos Helmand
NATO Channel TV has released a 5-minute news video about the 7th Commando Kandak at Camp Shorabak, Helmand province. The video discusses the heavy fighting in the northern districts of Helmand province (Sangin district) and capability of the commando kandak. View Afghan commandos respond to call of duty, NATO TV, posted on YouTube, November 13, 2014.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFsGn5QQ27c
www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFsGn5QQ27c
Costly Canadian Project Questioned
One of Canada's 'signature projects' in Afghanistan was the repair of irrigation canals in Kandahar province in an effort to improve the livelihoods of local farmers. The project was meant to restore water flow from the Dahla Dam by repairing a main canal and 60 secondary canals. The project has been completed but the results are less than what was hoped for. In addition, there is concern that the extensive project will slowly deteriorate as the Afghan government doesn't have the annual funds needed to keep the canal infrastructure functioning. Canada, having pulled out almost all of its personnel, will no longer be providing assistance with the irrigation project. The $50-million program was started by Canada in 2008 and was called the Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Project. Read more in "Long-term future of signature Canadian project in Afghanistan at risk: report", CTV News, November 15, 2014.
More Afghan War News Snippets
Raytheon Company has been awarded a contract modification on the Warfighter Field Operations Customer Support (FOCUS) contract to add more pilots to the New Dawn training program. The change calls for an additional 24 fixed-wing and four rotary-wing Afghan Air Force pilots to be trained. The training will take place in the United Arab Emirates. Read more in "More Afghan pilots to receive Raytheon training", PR Newswire, November 10, 2014.
Photos of Afghanistan are an invaluable aid to the "fobbits" that inhabit the large Coalition FOBs in Afghanistan but who "never leave the wire". You can go online and visit Afghanistan and feel like you are actually in-country! Monique Jaques shares her photos with us on her website.
www.moniquejaques.com/
Warfare in mountainous operations sometimes means that pack animals are used to transport personnel, equipment, and supplies. There are remote outposts of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police that rely on pack animals (Kunar, Nuristan, etc.). U.S. Army Special Forces personnel receive training and instruction on the use of pack animals. A new publication on the topic has just been published. See ATP 3-18.13, Special Forces Use of Pack Animals, October 30, 2014.
https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c?pdf/atp3_18x13.pdf
There are many challenges in front of President Ghani and the resources at hand are diminishing with the reduction of ISAF combat troops and decrease in international aid. Read "Afghanistan: New President and Old Pitfalls", Eurasia Review, November 10, 2014.
The drug trade poses numerous problems for Afghanistan to include the harmful effects of illicit drugs on Afghan people, organized crime, and corruption of the government and security organizations of Afghanistan. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is working with Afghanistan to reduce the drug trade. Read more in "In Afghanistan, UN crime chief pledges support to combat disastrous drug trade, corruption", UN News Centre, November 10, 2014.
A short documentary film is available on YouTube about the copper mine at Mes Aynak (Logar province) and the ancient Buddhist site under excavation. See The Buddhas of Mes Aynak by Brent Huffman (9 mins).
www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNK1ZsDktYc
Guest Bloggers Wanted
The Afghan War News Blog and the Afghan War News website are constantly striving to keep its blog, daily newsletter, and website factual, current, and relevant. If you have a link to a website or document you feel should be shared with the greater community then please send it to us. In addition,we are looking for individuals with some knowledge, experience, and expertise in Afghanistan on a wide range of topics to contribute articles to our blog and add content to our website. And naturally, if you see errors, outdated information, or broken links let us know.
staff@afghanwarnews.info
staff@afghanwarnews.info
Coffee and Afghan War News in the Morning
You can receive the Afghan War News Daily Newsletter each day. It should arrive in your e-mail inbox at 5:00 am Eastern Standard Time. It is easy to subscribe. Send an e-mail to staff@afghanwarnews.info or go to www.afghanwarnews.blogspot.com and submit your subscription request in the "Follow by Email" dialogue box in the top of the right hand column. It is easy to unsubscribe. At the bottom of the newsletter click "unsubscribe" and you will be automatically unsubscribed
Sunday, November 16, 2014
The Wakhan Corridor
7th Special Operations Kandak - Helmand Province
The United States Marines and British troops have departed Camp Leatherneck and Camp Bastion. However, the Afghan National Army will remain in Helmand province. One of the best ANA units that will continue to operate in the area is the 7th Special Operations Kandak located at Camp Shorabak. The commando battalion has been operating in Helmand for about five years. They serve as a quick-reaction force as well as perform night operations targeting insurgents and high-level criminals. The kandak suffers from a lack of consistent rotary wing support - which decreases their ability to conduct surprise raids and to MEDEVAC their wounded. Much of the commando's fight is in Sangin district - whose security affects the regions around Kajaki and Musa Qala. Enlisted commandos receive the equivalent of $300 US dollars a month. (This post is a condensation of a news story - "Afghan commandos respond to call of duty", Khaama Press, November 14, 2014).
Afghan Information Dissemination Operations (AIDO) Course
Some Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers from the 203rd Corps, 215th Corps, and Commando units recently graduated from the Afghan Information Dissemination Operations (AIDO) course. The course is a three-week program that teaches the principles of effective tactical and operational messaging. Information Operations or Inform and Influence Activities (pick your term) is an important aspect of strategic communications within the counterinsurgency environment of Afghanistan. For too long, developing the Afghan IO capability was ignored - started too late by ISAF and considered not important by the MoD. The soldiers who graduate from AIDO will provide an increased capability to their units by strengthening local understanding of, and support for, anti-insurgent missions and other tactical operations. While ISAF's Combined Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (CJPOTF) currently supports the AIDO course it remains to be seen what type of support will be offered under Resolute Support. Seeing how the Taliban insurgency has not been defeated and recognizing the importance of IO (IIA or PSYOP) to counterinsurgency one would hope that NATO maintains some type of residual mentoring, advising, and training for the AIDO course after 2014. One of the most productive programs in the IO field in past years was the introduction of the "Radio in a Box" or RIABs; perhaps this endeavor could be revitalized but under Afghan administration. Read more in "Afghan soldiers honored at graduation", ISAF News, November 11, 2014.
Audit of Counternarcotics Assistance to Afghanistan
http://oig.state.gov/system/files/aud-mero-15-02.pdf
JTAC - A Tough Job
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| B-1B Bomber |
The JTACs have a high operational tempo - with frequent deployments overseas into combat zones. While they sign up for the Air Force they spend most of their time with the Army on combat operations. The frequent deployments have caused a high rate of attrition - many JTACs are opting out and leaving the service. This attrition rate causes a perpetual shortage of JTACs and a lowering of the overall experience level.
There are limited opportunities for personnel of other services to achieve a JTAC rating. One is the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course (SOTACC) which teaches special operations personnel from the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps the conduct of close air support missions and fully certify them as qualified Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC). However, the SOTTAC course has a limited capacity to train personnel - so most special operations teams must rely on a JTAC provided by the Air Force.
The latest 'friendly fire' incident in which five Army personnel were killed (mid-2014 in Zabul province) in a Special Forces operation is partly the result of a JTAC who had a mediocre record of performance. In addition, the B-1B crew has been grounded. Read more in "Attrition: A Rare Friendly Fire Incident Explained", Strategy Page, November 14, 2014.
Tajik Women Teach Life Skills to Afghan Women
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| Map of Darwaz District Badkhshan Province |
TAPI Pipeline
Ghani Visits Pakistan
The new Afghan President has conducted a two-day visit to neighboring Pakistan in hopes of an enhanced political, security and economic cooperation. The Pakistan Army and its intelligence service (ISI) supports the Taliban insurgency that has sanctuary in Pakistan and operates in Afghanistan. Hopefully some progress will be made during Ghani's visit in this regard. Read more in "Afghan President Ghani Visits Pakistan", Voice of America, November 14, 2014.
Afghanistan - The Road to Peace
Tamim Asey, a fellow at the Asia Society, has penned an article presenting us with his thoughts on the way forward for peace in Afghanistan. He says the newly elected leaders of Afghanistan have an opportunity to "reset and reinvigorate the Afghan peace process" in a more organized and systematic way. He also identifies some issues to be considered - such as "Who are the Taliban?", the need for a clear roadmap, formation of a government commission with a clear mandate, the role of Pakistan, decrease funding from Gulf states, the role of China, Iran's support of insurgents, and other important issues. Read more in "Afghanistan's Complex Peace Calculus", The Diplomat, November 10, 2014.
More Daily Afghan War News Snippets
A discussion on the inaccuracy of the Clausewitz phrase "war is the continuation of policy by other means". Actually . . . the German version says "with" not "by" and that makes a difference. Read more in "Everything You Know About Clausewitz is Wrong", The Diplomat, November 12, 2014.
A writer comments on the use of "hate" while in combat by examining the French Foreign Legion in Afghanistan. See "Forgetting Hate: A quick lesson on battlefield conduct from the Legion Etrangere", The Kings of War Blog, November 10, 2014.
The opium trade is going well in Afghanistan - with dramatic increases in opium production in 2014. Read more in "Afghan Opium Increases, Despite Interventions", Military.com, November 13, 2014. See also "Why Putin Might Blame the U.S. for Russia's Drug Problem", Bloomberg News, November 14, 2014.
The commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is giving the troop drawdown schedule a second look. See "New commander in Afghanistan reviews drawdown plans", Army Times, November 14, 2014.
Violence against women in Afghanistan is still a major concern. Read more in "UN calls for protection of women's rights in Afghanistan", Jurist, November 13, 2014.
Afghan women have a national cycling team. (PRI's The World, November 13, 2014.)
Max Boot (a military commentator and historian) believes that our general officers should be evaluating their performance over the past decade of war. Certainly (Boot) says many early mistakes were made; however, he thinks that this self-criticism may go too far. Read more in "Veterans Day and Excessive Self-Criticism", Commentary Magazine, November 11, 2014.
After more than 12 years of fighting it is clear that the Taliban is far from vanquished. The Times of India has published an article entitled "War on terror: What has US achieved in Afghanistan", (November 14, 2014).
The A-10 has provided ground troops with dependable close air support for many years. The Air Force needs to retire the A-10 in order to fund its very expensive F-35. But . . . there are opponents to that plan. See "Congress Likely to Reject A-10 Partial Retirement Plan", Defense News, November 13, 2014. Another story, same topic in "TACP Association joins lawmakers in opposing A-10 cuts", Air Force Times, November 13, 2014.
The use of live animals to train medical personnel has always caused consternation among animal rights groups. See "Defense Department to reduce use of live animals for medical training", Military Times, November 13, 2014.
The U.S. Army has a new combatives course. Read "Combatives gets new master trainer course", Army Times, November 13, 2014.
The Pakistani army chief will be visiting the United States soon. Perhaps we can convince him to stop supporting the Haqqani Network. (The Washington Post, November 14, 2014).
A commentator writes about the importance of IO in "Drones vs. Snowball Fights: The Contested Battlegrounds of Information Warfare", E-International Relations, November 9, 2014.
Guest Bloggers Welcome
The Afghan War News Blog and the Afghan War News website are constantly striving to keep its blog, daily newsletter, and website factual, current, and relevant. If you have a link to a website or document you feel should be shared with the greater community then please send it to us. In addition,we are looking for individuals with some knowledge, experience, and expertise in Afghanistan on a wide range of topics to contribute articles to our blog and add content to our website. And naturally, if you see errors, outdated information, or broken links let us know.
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Saturday, November 15, 2014
Paper - "Blind Leading the Blind"
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/WP60_Web_Final.pdf
MC-12W Liberty Aircraft to Army
Aid for Afghanistan? Will it continue?
A commentator presents his thoughts on the withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan, the utility of providing aid to Afghanistan after 2014, how ISIS has diverted the attention of the world from Afghanistan (as did the 2003 Iraq invasion), the significance of the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement and the Afghan elections, the linkage of security and development within a counterinsurgency model, and the differences in the framework of aid provided by the European Union and the United States. Read more in "Assisting Afghanistan: Will Aid Progress, Adapt, or Wither?", by James Flint, E-International Relations, November 4, 2014.
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