Afghan War Blog

Wednesday, November 19, 2014

5:00 AM EST - Daily Afghan News

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Tuesday, November 18, 2014

Failure of COIN in South Vietnam and Afghanistan

Counterinsurgency (COIN) has gotten a black eye over the last few years. Some critics say that COIN doesn't work and we should stick to our traditional war fighting skills concentrating on a primary mission of defeating conventional armies on the battlefield. COIN advocates state that as long as insurgencies exist counterinsurgency forces will be needed. Many COIN advocates are looking hard at why COIN has not worked in Afghanistan.

A recent book review by Arnold R. Isaacs entitled "Why the US Needs to Learn the Counterinsurgency Lessons of the Vietnam War" (Business Insider, November 12, 2014) introduces us to a book that explores this topic. Isaacs reviews a new book out about the war in South Vietnam entitled Uphill Battle: Reflections on Viet Nam Counterinsurgency by Frank Scotton that will help in the examination of COIN in Afghanistan. The author of the book (Scotton) served in South Vietnam for over a decade and in his book he examines why the counterinsurgency effort failed. When one compares the South Vietnamese COIN effort with what is now happening in Afghanistan you find a lot of similarities. In the book review four main themes stood out for me:

1) Saigon Government. Scotton points out that the " . . . military-dominated Saigon government was never able to mobilize enough popular support or use its superior manpower and weapons effectively enough to meet the challenge of a far less well-armed but more disciplined, tenacious, and politically skilled enemy".

Popular Support. The Afghan government, like the South Vietnamese government, has not effectively mobilized popular support for its government to the extent necessary. The main source of discontent of the population with the government of Afghanistan is the corruption that exists from the district to national levels. There is a lack of competent government officials, professional police force, an Army that can provide security to all the people of Afghanistan (not just the major urban areas), district governmental offices that provide services, and signs of development in rural areas that show promise of a better life. Without good governance, development, security, and rule-of-law it is hard to generate popular support in the midst of an insurgency.

Superior Manpower and Weapons. Certainly the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), like the South Vietnamese Army, has superior manpower numbers and an abundance of modern weapons. The combined police and army personnel of the ANSF reaches almost 350,000. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) has over 100 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. The Afghan National Army has D-30 122-mm Howitzers, mortars, armored personnel carriers, tanks, modern facilities for housing troops and police, and a robust support structure for its corps, brigades, and kandaks. A common refrain among ISAF generals is that when the ANSF (supported by fires and close air support) meet the Taliban on the battlefield they can "overmatch" the insurgents. Of course they can; but those types of battles are far and few between. Insurgents fight a guerrilla war where they don't have to face the armor, artillery, and air power of a more modern army.

The ANSF are opposed by small, mobile insurgent units whose numbers countrywide might number 30,000. The insurgents have no helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, artillery, permanent structures, hospitals, tanks, or armored personnel carriers. While the ANSF is a robust force with lots of modern equipment it does not use its forces effectively. The ANSF is dismal at conducting small unit tactics necessary for an effective counterinsurgency campaign. For the counter-insurgent to win he must defeat the insurgent; for an insurgent to win he must survive. The Taliban have survived years of combat operations with ISAF and will likely survive for many more years in their fight against the ANSF.

2) Corruption of the Saigon Government and Military. Scotton says of South Vietnam that "there is a deadly correlation between corruption at high levels in an administrative system and the spread throughout the system of incompetence as higher-ups encourage and promote corrupt subordinates, and protect them from the consequences of poor performance of duty or direct disobedience of orders." Scotton continues with . . . the system doesn't only protect the corrupt but also "demoralizes and 'selects out' the able and the dedicated who do not play the game and thwarts any attempts at reform initiated at intermediate levels."

Afghan Corruption. A former commander of ISAF, General John Allen, once said that the biggest problem in Afghanistan is not the Taliban - it is corruption. The corruption in Afghanistan pervades all aspects of society. The Afghan police are notoriously corrupt. The judicial system is broke and the settlement of civil and criminal cases revolves around how much money passes to the judge. Provincial governors and district governors are political appointees of President Karzai who many times buy their positions so they in turn can manipulate the system for profit. Many of these provincial and district governors are incompetent and inept at administering within their provinces and districts. Many district governors do not live nor work in their districts due to a lack of security or lack of work ethic. For anything of consequence to happen (big or small) within some districts requires a bribe to the government official or servant. This huge problem of corruption impedes good governance, slows down or stops development, and diminishes security. This, in turn, sways members of the populace to non-support of the government security forces and in some cases to support of the insurgents.

3) U.S. Military. According to Scotton, the United States (even though it was a military powerhouse in the Vietnam era) ". . . never grasped the true nature of the war, consistently deluded itself about what it was accomplishing, and never found a way to remedy the host nation's (South Vietnam) fatal flaws".

Grasping the Nature of Afghan Conflict. The inability to grasp the nature of the conflict in Afghanistan is part of the problem of the United States involvement in Afghanistan. We continue to deploy leaders and advisors with a lack of understanding of Afghanistan's culture, politics, history of conflict, and no knowledge of the doctrine or concepts of counterinsurgency. Our selection and training process for the Security Force Assistance (SFA) advisor teams is hit or miss. For the most part the advisor selection isn't based on who is best for the advisor job but who is available. The U.S. military, except for SOF and a handful of conventional NCOs and officers, didn't really understand the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan from the lowest tactical level up to the highest echelons of leadership. To this day the U.S. military is concentrating on building a conventional Afghan National Army where "processes" and "systems" are developed and refined (see Functionally-based Security Force Assistance); instead of ensuring that infantry kandaks are proficient in small unit tactics and that Afghan army commanders are knowledgeable in how to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban.

4) Bottom Up Security. In the book review the writer says of Scotton: "During that time, Scotton made it his mission to inspire a more effective South Vietnamese war in the hamlets, the center of gravity in the contest between the US-backed government and its Communist enemy. His concept at the outset was to form and support local defense units on the model of the Communists 'armed propaganda teams.' They would not just fight the enemy but put into visible practice a political alternative to the Communists' revolutionary vision - avoiding corruption and mistreatment of civilians, and winning support for the government by demonstrating that it could rule fairly and justly".

Afghan Local Defense Forces (LDF). U.S. military was (and is) skittish about support to Local Defense Forces. Attempts by U.S. Army Special Forces, Marines, and others to establish local security forces such as the CBSS, ISCI, CIP, LDI, CDI, AP3, and AGF met great resistance from the higher level officers of the U.S. military conventional forces. The Afghan government (Karzai) did not want local defense forces that he could not control through his politically appointed cronies - he was less interested in establishing governance, security, and development in the remote areas of Afghanistan contested by the Taliban than ensuring that his political power base was strengthened and he gained wealth through his corrupt style of governing. It was only in the later years of the conflict that progress was made in the establishment of competent and effective local defense forces through the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. Unfortunately, for many areas of Afghanistan, it was too little too late; and ultimately handed over to the Afghan Ministry of Interior where it will likely languish due to lack of support.

The book review and the book are well worth reading to understand how it took so long to get to where we are today in Afghanistan and how far we have yet to go.

Blog on the Afghan War!

The Afghan War News Blog and the Afghan War News website are constantly striving to keep its blog, daily newsletter, and website factual, current, and relevant. If you have a link to a website or document you feel should be shared with the greater community then please send it to us. In addition,we are looking for individuals with some knowledge, experience, and expertise in Afghanistan on a wide range of topics to contribute blog posts and articles to our blog and add content to our website. And naturally, if you see errors, outdated information, or broken links let us know.

staff@afghanwarnews.info

Start A.M. with Afghan War News

Monday, November 17, 2014

RAF Tornados Complete Mission in Afghanistan

The Royal Air Force has completed their final mission with the Tornado GR4 all-weather attack aircraft in Afghanistan. The Tornados took over the air support mission from the RAF Harriers in June 2009. The aircraft provided close air support and reconnaissance to ground troops. Read more in "RAF Tornados complete Afghan combat mission", airforce-techonology.com, November 12, 2014. (photo by MSgt William Greer, CENTCOM)

Korengal Valley - Heart of Darkness

The Korengal Valley holds a special place in the history of the Afghan War. Many of the U.S. military's fiercest fights took place in this area. The Korengal Valley is located in a remote part of Kunar province just south of the Pech River Valley in northeastern Afghanistan. A movie called "Restrepo" was filmed there by Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington. It has sometimes been called "the valley of death". (See maps, news articles, reports, and other information about the Korengal Valley). A recent news report provides some background about the Korengal Valley in "Heart of Darkness: Into Afghanistan's Taliban Valley", The Daily Beast, November 15, 2014.

Afghan Drug War Futile

A columnist examines the history of the drug war in Afghanistan and concludes that billions of dollars were spent with no progress in combating the drug trade. He suggests that the U.S. stop wasting money in a futile effort and concentrate on vital U.S. national interests instead; at the same time developing more effective anti-drug policies. Read more in "End the International Drug War to Control the Afghan Narco-State", The Huffington Post, November 15, 2014.

Suicide Bomber Attacks Women's Rights Leader

A suicide bomber attacked the car of a prominent Afghan women's rights leader and member of Parliament on Sunday (Nov 16, 2014). Three people were killed and 20 others wounded. The presumed target was Shukria Barakzai - she was wounded in the attack. She is an outspoken critic and has been quoted with this remark - "Our Parliament is a collection of lords. Warlords, drug lords, crime lords". Read more in "Suicide Bomber Attacks Car of Afghan Women's Rights Leader; 3 Killed", The New York Times, November 16, 2014.

Northeastern Afghanistan - Deadlock

The current situation in the north eastern provinces of Afghanistan (Kunar, Nangarhar, Laghman, and Nuristan) is in a state of deadlock - with neither the insurgents or the government security forces winning. A common axiom is that the counterinsurgent must defeat the insurgent to win; while the insurgent must merely survive. The Taliban have been able to move freely throughout much of this area and although they have been in numerous battles with the security forces they are not defeated. The insurgents have been able to mass their numbers and attack remote police checkpoints and district centers. Their ability to mass into larger units for combat is a direct result of the Taliban realizing that ISAF air support is being withheld or is no longer available. The mosaic that is north eastern Afghanistan is difficult to fathom for the ISAF advisor who deploys to the region for 9 months - the learning curve is great and once the advisor finally has his understanding of the region, its culture, history, politics, and human terrain - he departs (tour over!). Read a comprehensive report about the complexity of this four-province region in "Footsloggers, Turncoats and Enforcers" the fight along the eastern border", Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 18, 2014.

Green Beret Dies in Kunduz Province

ISAF is reporting that a servicemember died as a result of an enemy forces attack in northern Afghanistan on Friday, November 14, 2014. According to a DoD news release and news accounts SFC Michael A. Cathcart, age 31, died from small arms fire during a dismounted combat operation in Kunduz province. He was assigned to 3rd Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In addition to five tours in Afghanistan with Special Forces he had served two tours of duty in Iraq (2003 and 2005) with the 101st Airborne Division. He was the tenth Soldier from Special Forces to lose his life in Afghanistan in 2014.

Video - Afghan Commandos Helmand

NATO Channel TV has released a 5-minute news video about the 7th Commando Kandak at Camp Shorabak, Helmand province. The video discusses the heavy fighting in the northern districts of Helmand province (Sangin district) and capability of the commando kandak. View Afghan commandos respond to call of duty, NATO TV, posted on YouTube, November 13, 2014.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFsGn5QQ27c

Costly Canadian Project Questioned

One of Canada's 'signature projects' in Afghanistan was the repair of irrigation canals in Kandahar province in an effort to improve the livelihoods of local farmers. The project was meant to restore water flow from the Dahla Dam by repairing a main canal and 60 secondary canals. The project has been completed but the results are less than what was hoped for. In addition, there is concern that the extensive project will slowly deteriorate as the Afghan government doesn't have the annual funds needed to keep the canal infrastructure functioning. Canada, having pulled out almost all of its personnel, will no longer be providing assistance with the irrigation project. The $50-million program was started by Canada in 2008 and was called the Arghandab Irrigation Rehabilitation Project. Read more in "Long-term future of signature Canadian project in Afghanistan at risk: report", CTV News, November 15, 2014.

More Afghan War News Snippets

The author, military commentator, and RAND senior international policy analyst Linda Robinson recently addressed the annual Army USA Conference in Washington, D.C. on October 14, 2014. Her presentation was about new research that distills lessons learned from the U.S. experience in the last decade of war. Read "7 Lessons from 13 Years of War", The RAND Blog, October 16, 2014.

Raytheon Company has been awarded a contract modification on the Warfighter Field Operations Customer Support (FOCUS) contract to add more pilots to the New Dawn training program. The change calls for an additional 24 fixed-wing and four rotary-wing Afghan Air Force pilots to be trained. The training will take place in the United Arab Emirates. Read more in "More Afghan pilots to receive Raytheon training", PR Newswire, November 10, 2014.

Photos of Afghanistan are an invaluable aid to the "fobbits" that inhabit the large Coalition FOBs in Afghanistan but who "never leave the wire". You can go online and visit Afghanistan and feel like you are actually in-country! Monique Jaques shares her photos with us on her website.
www.moniquejaques.com/

Warfare in mountainous operations sometimes means that pack animals are used to transport personnel, equipment, and supplies. There are remote outposts of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police that rely on pack animals (Kunar, Nuristan, etc.). U.S. Army Special Forces personnel receive training and instruction on the use of pack animals. A new publication on the topic has just been published. See ATP 3-18.13, Special Forces Use of Pack Animals, October 30, 2014.
https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_c?pdf/atp3_18x13.pdf

There are many challenges in front of President Ghani and the resources at hand are diminishing with the reduction of ISAF combat troops and decrease in international aid. Read "Afghanistan: New President and Old Pitfalls", Eurasia Review, November 10, 2014.

The drug trade poses numerous problems for Afghanistan to include the harmful effects of illicit drugs on Afghan people, organized crime, and corruption of the government and security organizations of Afghanistan. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is working with Afghanistan to reduce the drug trade. Read more in "In Afghanistan, UN crime chief pledges support to combat disastrous drug trade, corruption", UN News Centre, November 10, 2014.

A short documentary film is available on YouTube about the copper mine at Mes Aynak (Logar province) and the ancient Buddhist site under excavation. See The Buddhas of Mes Aynak by Brent Huffman (9 mins).
www.youtube.com/watch?v=kNK1ZsDktYc

Guest Bloggers Wanted

The Afghan War News Blog and the Afghan War News website are constantly striving to keep its blog, daily newsletter, and website factual, current, and relevant. If you have a link to a website or document you feel should be shared with the greater community then please send it to us. In addition,we are looking for individuals with some knowledge, experience, and expertise in Afghanistan on a wide range of topics to contribute articles to our blog and add content to our website. And naturally, if you see errors, outdated information, or broken links let us know.

staff@afghanwarnews.info

Coffee and Afghan War News in the Morning

Sunday, November 16, 2014

The Wakhan Corridor

Afghanistan is bordered by many countries. Some borders are extensive - as in the borders with Iran and Pakistan. Some borders - not so much. The border with China is not very extensive at all and it is found in a place very remote and far from the rest of Afghanistan. The Wakhan Corridor, the most eastern part of Badakhshan province, is where the border with China is found; as well as borders with Tajikistan and Pakistan. It is also a strategic area which huge potential for trade with China (see the New Silk Road) and ramifications for security (especially in light of the growth of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement). The people who live in this mountainous region (Wakhi and Kyrgyz) are mostly untouched by the war. The area is a harsh place for crops and agriculture so the people rely on livestock for most of their food and other needs. The inhabitants are uneducated and few know how to read. Health care is non-existent and the infant and maternal mortality rate is one of the highest in the world. A photographer has taken some awesome photos of the Wakhan Corridor. - See a collection of 21 photos "Welcome to the Gorgeous region of Afghanistan That Has Been Untouched by Decades of War", Business Insider, November 11, 2014.

7th Special Operations Kandak - Helmand Province

The United States Marines and British troops have departed Camp Leatherneck and Camp Bastion. However, the Afghan National Army will remain in Helmand province. One of the best ANA units that will continue to operate in the area is the 7th Special Operations Kandak located at Camp Shorabak. The commando battalion has been operating in Helmand for about five years. They serve as a quick-reaction force as well as perform night operations targeting insurgents and high-level criminals. The kandak suffers from a lack of consistent rotary wing support - which decreases their ability to conduct surprise raids and to MEDEVAC their wounded. Much of the commando's fight is in Sangin district - whose security affects the regions around Kajaki and Musa Qala. Enlisted commandos receive the equivalent of $300 US dollars a month. (This post is a condensation of a news story - "Afghan commandos respond to call of duty", Khaama Press, November 14, 2014).

Afghan Information Dissemination Operations (AIDO) Course

Some Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers from the 203rd Corps, 215th Corps, and Commando units recently graduated from the Afghan Information Dissemination Operations (AIDO) course. The course is a three-week program that teaches the principles of effective tactical and operational messaging. Information Operations or Inform and Influence Activities (pick your term) is an important aspect of strategic communications within the counterinsurgency environment of Afghanistan. For too long, developing the Afghan IO capability was ignored - started too late by ISAF and considered not important by the MoD. The soldiers who graduate from AIDO will provide an increased capability to their units by strengthening local understanding of, and support for, anti-insurgent missions and other tactical operations. While ISAF's Combined Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (CJPOTF) currently supports the AIDO course it remains to be seen what type of support will be offered under Resolute Support. Seeing how the Taliban insurgency has not been defeated and recognizing the importance of IO (IIA or PSYOP) to counterinsurgency one would hope that NATO maintains some type of residual mentoring, advising, and training for the AIDO course after 2014. One of the most productive programs in the IO field in past years was the introduction of the "Radio in a Box" or RIABs; perhaps this endeavor could be revitalized but under Afghan administration. Read more in "Afghan soldiers honored at graduation", ISAF News, November 11, 2014.

Audit of Counternarcotics Assistance to Afghanistan

The Office of Inspector General for the U.S. Department of State has recently released a report to the public (it was previously marked as FOUO) entitled "Audit of Bureau of Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Counternarcotics Assistance to Afghanistan", AUD-MERO-15-02, November 2014. The report has three findings. 1) INL has not fully developed performance measures to evaluate the effectiveness of its counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. 2) INL has not developed required sustainment plans for its counternarcotics initiatives. 3) Required documentation for direct assistance initiatives was missing. The report is available at the link below:

http://oig.state.gov/system/files/aud-mero-15-02.pdf

JTAC - A Tough Job

B-1B Bomber

Joint Terminal Attack Controllers or JTACs in the Air Force have a very demanding, complex, and important job. JTACs are Air Force personnel who are assigned to ground combat units to direct close air support. The Afghans have a similar job specialty called the Afghan Air Tactical Coordinator or ATAC. Over the past decade or more the Air Force has reserved the function of JTACs for Air Force only personnel - much to the dismay of the Army and Marines. The Air Force controls the selection, training, and assignments of JTACs but they fail to meet the needs of the Army combat units in terms of the number of JTACs (this has been true ever since 2001 in Afghanistan and 2003 in Iraq).

The JTACs have a high operational tempo - with frequent deployments overseas into combat zones. While they sign up for the Air Force they spend most of their time with the Army on combat operations. The frequent deployments have caused a high rate of attrition - many JTACs are opting out and leaving the service. This attrition rate causes a perpetual shortage of JTACs and a lowering of the overall experience level.

There are limited opportunities for personnel of other services to achieve a JTAC rating. One is the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course (SOTACC) which teaches special operations personnel from the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps the conduct of close air support missions and fully certify them as qualified Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC). However, the SOTTAC course has a limited capacity to train personnel - so most special operations teams must rely on a JTAC provided by the Air Force.

The latest 'friendly fire' incident in which five Army personnel were killed (mid-2014 in Zabul province) in a Special Forces operation is partly the result of a JTAC who had a mediocre record of performance. In addition, the B-1B crew has been grounded. Read more in "Attrition: A Rare Friendly Fire Incident Explained", Strategy Page, November 14, 2014.

Tajik Women Teach Life Skills to Afghan Women

Map of Darwaz District
Badkhshan Province

A cooperative venture between women of Afghanistan and women of Tajikistan has provided the Afghan women with some important life skills. In 2012 and 2013 as many as 410 women from Darwaz district, Badakhshan province have learned various life skills that will improve their standard of living. Up until the 19th century Darvaz was an independent principality but today its 50,000 live on both sides of the border of Tajikistan and Afghanistan. This educational program is supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the German foreign aid agency (GIZ). The program is facilitated by the Aga Khan Foundation's Mountain Societies Development Support Program (MSDSP). Read more in "Tajik women teach Afghan women life skills", Central Asia Online, November 14, 2014. (Map - Creative Commons on Wikipedia).

TAPI Pipeline

The Turkmenistan-Afghanistan- Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline will be a 1,800 kilometer long natural gas pipeline that will export up to 33 billion cubic meters of natural gas a year from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India for over 30 years. Turkmenistan has the world's fourth-largest proven gas reserves and will provide a key source of fuel for southern Afghanistan, Pakistan and northern India. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) was appointed the transaction advisor for the TAPI gas pipeline in November 2013. Read more in "Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India Establish Landmark TAPI Pipeline Company", Asian Development Bank, November 13, 2014.

Ghani Visits Pakistan

The new Afghan President has conducted a two-day visit to neighboring Pakistan in hopes of an enhanced political, security and economic cooperation. The Pakistan Army and its intelligence service (ISI) supports the Taliban insurgency that has sanctuary in Pakistan and operates in Afghanistan. Hopefully some progress will be made during Ghani's visit in this regard. Read more in "Afghan President Ghani Visits Pakistan", Voice of America, November 14, 2014.

Afghanistan - The Road to Peace

Tamim Asey, a fellow at the Asia Society, has penned an article presenting us with his thoughts on the way forward for peace in Afghanistan. He says the newly elected leaders of Afghanistan have an opportunity to "reset and reinvigorate the Afghan peace process" in a more organized and systematic way. He also identifies some issues to be considered - such as "Who are the Taliban?", the need for a clear roadmap, formation of a government commission with a clear mandate, the role of Pakistan, decrease funding from Gulf states, the role of China, Iran's support of insurgents, and other important issues. Read more in "Afghanistan's Complex Peace Calculus", The Diplomat, November 10, 2014.

More Daily Afghan War News Snippets

A discussion on the inaccuracy of the Clausewitz phrase "war is the continuation of policy by other means". Actually . . . the German version says "with" not "by" and that makes a difference. Read more in "Everything You Know About Clausewitz is Wrong", The Diplomat, November 12, 2014.

A writer comments on the use of "hate" while in combat by examining the French Foreign Legion in Afghanistan. See "Forgetting Hate: A quick lesson on battlefield conduct from the Legion Etrangere", The Kings of War Blog, November 10, 2014.

The opium trade is going well in Afghanistan - with dramatic increases in opium production in 2014. Read more in "Afghan Opium Increases, Despite Interventions", Military.com, November 13, 2014. See also "Why Putin Might Blame the U.S. for Russia's Drug Problem", Bloomberg News, November 14, 2014.

The commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is giving the troop drawdown schedule a second look. See "New commander in Afghanistan reviews drawdown plans", Army Times, November 14, 2014.

Violence against women in Afghanistan is still a major concern. Read more in "UN calls for protection of women's rights in Afghanistan", Jurist, November 13, 2014.

Afghan women have a national cycling team. (PRI's The World, November 13, 2014.)

Max Boot (a military commentator and historian) believes that our general officers should be evaluating their performance over the past decade of war. Certainly (Boot) says many early mistakes were made; however, he thinks that this self-criticism may go too far. Read more in "Veterans Day and Excessive Self-Criticism", Commentary Magazine, November 11, 2014.

After more than 12 years of fighting it is clear that the Taliban is far from vanquished. The Times of India has published an article entitled "War on terror: What has US achieved in Afghanistan", (November 14, 2014).

The A-10 has provided ground troops with dependable close air support for many years. The Air Force needs to retire the A-10 in order to fund its very expensive F-35. But . . . there are opponents to that plan. See "Congress Likely to Reject A-10 Partial Retirement Plan", Defense News, November 13, 2014. Another story, same topic in "TACP Association joins lawmakers in opposing A-10 cuts", Air Force Times, November 13, 2014.

The use of live animals to train medical personnel has always caused consternation among animal rights groups. See "Defense Department to reduce use of live animals for medical training", Military Times, November 13, 2014.

The U.S. Army has a new combatives course. Read "Combatives gets new master trainer course", Army Times, November 13, 2014.

The Pakistani army chief will be visiting the United States soon. Perhaps we can convince him to stop supporting the Haqqani Network. (The Washington Post, November 14, 2014).

A commentator writes about the importance of IO in "Drones vs. Snowball Fights: The Contested Battlegrounds of Information Warfare", E-International Relations, November 9, 2014.

Guest Bloggers Welcome

The Afghan War News Blog and the Afghan War News website are constantly striving to keep its blog, daily newsletter, and website factual, current, and relevant. If you have a link to a website or document you feel should be shared with the greater community then please send it to us. In addition,we are looking for individuals with some knowledge, experience, and expertise in Afghanistan on a wide range of topics to contribute articles to our blog and add content to our website. And naturally, if you see errors, outdated information, or broken links let us know.

staff@afghanwarnews.info

Coffee and Afghan War News at 5:00 AM

Saturday, November 15, 2014

Paper - "Blind Leading the Blind"

The United States is not the first nation that has attempted to wage a counterinsurgency campaign, train up a host nation army, and conduct nation-building in Afghanistan for a decade. The Soviet Union attempted this very feat from 1979 to 1989 - and were far from successful. The Soviets were quick to realize that the insurgency would not be defeated through military means alone; and that development and governance needed to improve to provide stability, popular support for the Afghan government, and pull support from the insurgents. The paper provides insight into the lack of training and preparation of Soviet advisor prior to deployment to Afghanistan; to include little cultural training, knowledge of the country's religion, and the aspects of the human terrain. Read The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, by Artemy Kalinovsky, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper #60, Cold War International History Project, January 2010.
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/WP60_Web_Final.pdf

MC-12W Liberty Aircraft to Army

The United States Air Force is getting rid of its MC-12W Liberty aircraft. These unique aircraft were extremely useful in providing intelligence for the Afghan counter-insurgency fight. The MC-12W was a key component of the F3EAD process and in "attacking the network". But since we have won (not) the counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan and it is hardly likely that the U.S. Air Force will never have to support U.S. ground forces in a counterinsurgency (supposedly COIN is dead!) the USAF is dumping these extremely useful aircraft that generated great intelligence for the Afghan counterinsurgency effort. Fortunately the Army is smart enough to get some of the MC-12W transferred to their inventory. (Now if we can just get a hold of the A-10s). Read more in "USAF outlines divestiture plans for MC-12W Liberty aircraft", IHS Jane's 360, November 10, 2014.

Aid for Afghanistan? Will it continue?

A commentator presents his thoughts on the withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan, the utility of providing aid to Afghanistan after 2014, how ISIS has diverted the attention of the world from Afghanistan (as did the 2003 Iraq invasion), the significance of the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement and the Afghan elections, the linkage of security and development within a counterinsurgency model, and the differences in the framework of aid provided by the European Union and the United States. Read more in "Assisting Afghanistan: Will Aid Progress, Adapt, or Wither?", by James Flint, E-International Relations, November 4, 2014.

Special Operations Glossary

For those unfamiliar with the Special Operations Forces world there is help in understanding how the special operators communicate! You can visit the Special Operations Glossary for assistance. Words and acronyms like ARSOTF, blood chit, CARVER, Det 101, ESAT, JCET, and others are explained.

China as Negotiator?

China has been slowly taking a more active role in the affairs of Afghanistan. It has some vital interests in the establishment of a secure and stable Afghanistan. Its pursuit of an economic corridor (call it the New Silk Road?) from China, across Central Asia, and into the Middle East and Europe is seen as good for the export of Chinese goods. It is experiencing problems with a jihadist insurgent group (East Turkestan Islamic Movement) in its most western province of Xinjiang (which shares a border with Afghanistan) and China wants to preclude this group from enjoying sanctuary in Afghanistan's remote and ungovernable regions. To that end China appears to be willing to take an active role in the conduct of peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Read more on this topic in "Could China Broker Talks Between the Afghan Government and the Taliban?", The Diplomat, November 12, 2014.

Women's Empowerment Program

An article with information on the USAID Promote program to empower women. Read "Largest USAID Women's Empowerment Program in World Launched in Afghanistan", Ms. Magazine, November 11, 2014.

Afghans Find Love Online

Afghan culture is sometimes confusing to westerners. In our open western societies interaction with the opposite sex is very easy; but in Afghanistan . . . not so much. The world of telecommunications and technology is eroding the restrictions a little bit. Read more in "Young Afghans go online to find friendship and love", Reuters, November 12, 2014.

Peace Talks with Taliban

A writer provides his opinion on holding peace talks with the Taliban. Jack Fairweather seems to think that holding talks with the Taliban and letting them rule parts of the rural south would be a good thing. Learn more in "Give the Taliban a Chance", New York Times Opinion Pages, November 11, 2014.

Election Had Effect on Opium Production

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan stated that the election period in 2014 had an adverse effect on drug eradication. The election pulled police and army units away from counter-drug activities. In addition, candidates running for office at the national and provincial levels sought money to run their campaigns from drug warlords. Read more in "Afghan Elections Cited as Factor in Record Levels of Opium Production", The New York Times, November 12, 2014.

More Afghan War News Snippets

A writer discusses the lack of news awareness among the American public on Afghanistan; believing that it is consumed by the rapid rise of ISIS in the Middle East. He warns that this could lead to dire consequences - the U.S. taking its eye off the ball once again (as it did in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq). See "The Next ISIS Moment: Afghanistan's Impending Catastrophe", Brown Political Review, November 11, 2014.

The Special Immigrant Visa program for Afghan interpreters expires in December 2014. Thousands of loyal Afghan interpreters are now going to be denied visas. Learn more in "Congress Helping Afghan Translator", Roll Call, November 10, 2014.

The Marines recently celebrated the U.S. Marine Corps' 239th birthday at a ceremony on Bagram Air Field. Check out the photo - looks like a lot of fun.

Canada has significantly downsized its forces in Afghanistan - but some stragglers who have not gotten the word still remain scattered among the various ISAF, IJC, and TAAC staffs. You can learn more about Canada's continued presence in Afghanistan at their Facebook page.
www.facebook.com/afghanistan.canada

The 3rd Infantry Division will soon send some troops to Afghanistan. Learn more in "3rd ID commander readies his troops for Afghanistan", Army Times, November 10, 2014.

The Special Forces of Australia has seen extensive service in Afghanistan. Learn more in "2nd Commando Regiment are the lesser-known warriors waging war on terror", news.com.au, November 9, 2014.

Sketches of war are provided by Richard Johnson of The Washington Post in "Drawing up the drawdown" (October 6, 2014).

Have you ever wondered what the average Afghan National Army soldier eats? You can see for yourself in "Afghan forces revert to more familiar menu on former US bases", Stars and Stripes, November 9, 2014. While food on an Afghan army base is most times delicious and abundant (guests almost always are treated to the best food) the kitchens are a sight to behold. If your going to eat - don't look at the kitchen. (Note: comments from personal experience; lots of it).

The IJC commander speaks on the importance of getting the Afghan leadership up to speed. See a video on this topic.

The Army is having problems reporting inventory losses in Afghanistan. A report entitled "The Army Needs to Improve the Processes for Inventory Losses in Afghanistan", Inspector General U.S. Department of Defense, October 30, 2014. provides more information. CAUTION: Document is located on the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), is classified FOUO, and may not be accessible because DoD doesn't want you to read it.
http://fas.org/man/eprint/losses.pdf

The author of Dispatches from the Kabul Cafe, Heidi Kingstone, writes on the future of women in Afghanistan in "Life in Kabul: Will Afghan women finally stop being seen as a freak show?", The Telegraph, November 7, 2014.

Photos of Afghanistan usually revolve around the war. But some photographers shoot photos about general life in Afghanistan away from the conflict. See "The beauty of everyday life in war-torn Afghanistan", The Week, November 6, 2014.

The 663rd Engineer Company (Horizontal Construction) recently returned from Afghanistan in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). They hail from Sheffield, Alabama and are an Army Reserve unit. Read more in "663rd Engineer Company returns with vast experience", DVIDS, November 6, 2014.

The British commitment in Afghanistan has been reduced considerably with its departure from Camp Bastion. Now is the time for some reflection on the mission and the cost in terms of money, energy, and blood. Read more in "Britain's Fourth Afghan War", Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), October 28, 2014.

Rebecca Frankel of Foreign Policy Magazine is interviewed by Peter Bergen of New America on her new book War Dogs: Tales of Canine Heroism, History, and Love. The interview is 42 minutes long. View the video at the link below.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=URjWcIfRl9s

A short video about force protection being handed over to the Georgian Army at Bagram Air Field. See "Georgians take over security at Bagram", NATO TV, November 9, 2014.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=lVGEKOVjax0

There are lots of folks drawing parallels with the situation in Iraq (rise of ISIS) and the departure of ISAF in Afghanistan - worries about the collapse of the Afghan National Security Forces. One such commentator, Paul Shinkman, provides his thoughts in "What Afghanistan Must Learn From Iraq", U.S. News & World Report, November 12, 2014.

A UK human rights activist expresses her concerns about Afghanistan in this article in NEXUS.

The story of a female Afghan policewomen is highlighted in "The Real Sheriff in Afghanistan", The Huffington Post, November 12, 2014.

The Danish foreign minister visits Afghanistan meeting the country's new president (Ghani) and CEO (Abdullah) in preparation for the Denmark commitment of military assistance to NATO's Resolute Support mission that will provide non-combative assistance in a training and consulting role. (The Copenhagen Post, November 14, 2014).

A book review of Why We Lost by Daniel P. Bolger is provided by The Wall Street Journal (November 13, 2014.).

Many observers are tracking the words and deeds of the newly elected president. View "Ghani on path to fulfill campaign promises", Central Asia Online, November 14, 2014.

Despite all the gains made in the medical sector in Afghanistan over the past decade some work still remains in the field of malnutrition. Read "Afghan malnutrition - the search for solutions", IRIN, November 11, 2014.

The Telegraph reports (November 14, 2014) that around 100 British special forces and military intelligence experts will remain in Afghanistan after 2014. Their primary mission will be to hunt for senior Taliban and al Qaeda leaders. They will also stand by to conduct personnel recovery missions for British nationals and service members as well as force protection (Guardian Angel) duties. Three RAF Chinook helicopters will also provide transport. The SAS troops will likely be based at Bagram Air Base. A total of 500 Brits will remain in country after 2014.

The Russians are unhappy with the United States's inability to reduce the opium production of Afghanistan. Much of the drug finds its way to Russia. Read more in "Afghan opium inflames US-Russia tensions after failed drug war", Stars and Stripes, November 14, 2014.

Guest Bloggers Welcome

The Afghan War News Blog and the Afghan War News website are constantly striving to keep its blog, daily newsletter, and website factual, current, and relevant. If you have a link to a website or document you feel should be shared with the greater community then please send it to us. In addition,we are looking for individuals with some knowledge, experience, and expertise in Afghanistan on a wide range of topics to contribute articles to our blog and add content to our website. And naturally, if you see errors, outdated information, or broken links let us know.

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Friday, November 14, 2014

Donor Fatigue for Afghanistan

The international community has pumped billions of dollars into Afghanistan to support security, development, governance, and social services since 2001. In December 2014 the British government will host another international donors conference for Afghanistan in London. The representatives of the many governments will discuss and present their countries plans for the continuance of foreign aid to Afghanistan. One of the primary topics will be corruption and how to institute oversight processes that will reduce the corruption so that the aid will reach its intended recipient. Another huge subject will be the reduced amounts of aid to be provided; the attention of western nations is being diverted elsewhere to trouble spots in the Middle East, Africa, and eastern Europe.

Tamim Asey is a fellow at the Asia Society and a Fulbright scholar at Columbia University. He was also a former government of Afghanistan official and taught at the American University of Afghanistan (AUAF). He provides us with some insight and analysis of the donor fatigue that Afghanistan has to contend with at the upcoming December 2014 international donor conference and in the long months ahead. Read "The Other Drawdown - Why Donor Fatigue is Threatening to Derail Afghanistan", The South Asia Channel - Foreign Policy, November 10, 2014.

TAAC East Recovery Team Stands Ready

The Train Advise Assist Command - East recovery team stands ready to extract personnel and equipment off the battlefield. Should an aircraft go down the "Red Team" will be called upon to rescue or extract personnel in need. Read more in "Pathfinders remain vigilant as forces draw down in Afghanistan", DVIDS, November 13, 2014.

Turkmen in Fight Against Taliban

The Taliban have grown in strength and capability in northern Afghanistan. Allied with fighters from the IMU, Pakistan, and other foreign nations the local Taliban threaten a number of districts in Kunduz. Northern Afghanistan is home to ethnic Turkmen and they are in a constant battle with the Taliban to defend their villages and homes. The 209th ANA Corps (based across northern Afghanistan) have been unsuccessful in finding and defeating the Taliban except on some rare occasions. The Taliban generally enjoy freedom of movement in much of northern Afghanistan Read more in "Turkmen-Afghans in Kunduz reject the Taliban's ways", Central Asia Online, November 5, 2014.

Power Struggle in Afghan Government

The Afghan cabinet has yet to be named because of a power struggle between President Ghani and the Chief Executive Officer Abdullah. It has been a couple of months since the "National Unity Government" has been formed but not much headway has taken place in naming cabinet positions. Of the upmost importance is selecting the Minister of Interior and Minister of Defense. Read more in "Afghan power struggle seen delaying formation of new government", Reuters, November 13, 2014.

Retrograde - What the Afghans Get

It is impossible for the military to take all the supplies and equipment home from Afghanistan. Some does come back - especially the expensive stuff that is easy to transport. Some stuff is passed on to the Afghans. A lot of material and equipment is sold to Afghan contractors for removal. Read more in "Marine pullout offers preview of what U.S. leaves behind for Afghan troops", The Washington Post, November 12, 2014.

Hope for Afghanistan

The new leaders elected in Afghanistan have provided a glimpse of hope to the people of Kabul. President Ghani is bringing some sorely needed changes to the Afghan government that are welcomed by the city's residents and others throughout the country. Read more in "A new government brings hope of change in Afghanistan", BBC News Middle East, November 10, 2014.

Multi-Ethnic Coalitions Key to Governing Afghanistan

Karzai was good at two things while he was president. 1) He knew how to maintain his multi-ethnic coalition (ensuring that his rivals enjoyed influence and power thus continuing their loyalty to him) and 2) he was extremely successful in reaping the vast wealth generated by the corruption machine that he so expertly administered. The new president (Ghani) is coming out against corruption - this will make new enemies and chip away at support bought through the patronage networks. Thus it is even more important that Ghani knows how to build and maintain a multi-ethnic coalition. Learn more in "Are Ethnic Politics Afghanistan's Great Hope?", The South Asia Channel - Foreign Policy, November 11, 2014.

ABP- "Masters of Corruption"

General John Allen, a former commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) once said that corruption is the top threat in Afghanistan; that in comparison, the Taliban are "an annoyance". The Afghan government has difficulty in generating revenue to provide services, pay its police and soldiers, and run the government. If the corruption at the borders would subside a bit then more money would be available. Unfortunately most of the revenue that the border crossings generate does not go to the government but into the hands of corrupt provincial governors and police officials. One of the most corrupt organizations within the Ministry of Interior is the Afghan Border Police or ABP. The ABP maintains security and work with the corrupt customs officials to facilitate the activities at the border crossings. Read more in "At Afghan Border, Graft Is Part of the Bargain", The New York Times, November 11, 2014.

Critique of "Army Operating Concept" (AOC)

The Army recently published TRADOC Pamphlet 535-3-1 (7 October 2014) entitled "The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World". Since its publication a lot of folks have taken the time to read the document, analyze it, and then comment upon it. Joshua Jones, an operations research analyst with the Center for Army Analysis at Fort Belvoir, Virginia is one of the latest to provide his thoughts. He holds a PhD in international relations, a masters' degree from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and did some time in the Army with a tour in Iraq. Read his comments in "Wisdom in Doctrine? Success, the Role of Force, and the Unknowable", War on the Rocks, November 12, 2014.

Analysis of Australian SOF

A LTC in the U.S. Army who is currently a visiting fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has penned an article that provides an analysis of the Australian Special Operations Forces. Very interesting reading on Australian SOF and their ability to conduct special operations and special warfare. See "Australian SOF: enthusiasm and talent don't equal capability", ASPI Blog, 11 November 2014.

SAGE - Works with DCGS-A

The Distributed Common Ground System - Army (DCGS-A) is an expensive and troubled program. Intelligence analysts have complained about the complexity of the system as well as its glitches. Proponents of DCGS-A point to the variety of software applications that can "piggy back" off the DCGS-A system - which provides an integration of a number of ways to analyze, package, and distribute intelligence products. One of these applications is called "Situational Awareness Geospatially Enabled" or SAGE. It is a geospatial tool supporting DCGS-A. SAGE helps intelligence analysts to rapidly identify the landscape and environments that could be factors in relevant operational factors, like estimates of how quickly the enemy can march through a designated area due to terrain. SAGE was developed by the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center's Geospatial Research Laboratory which is co-located at the U.S. Army Geospatial Center. The SAGE tool is resident in DCGS-A, which is the Army's intelligence foundation program. The SAGE tools are available for download through the Army Geospatial Center website. Learn more about SAGE at "Geospatial analysis tool built to support Army intelligence analysis", Army.mil, September 17, 2014.