ANSF and Transition - Entering the Spin Zone

Anthony H. Cordesman of the Center for Strategic & International Studies has conducted a study entitled "Afghan Forces on the Edge of Transition" (November 18, 2014) that summarizes the key policies and metrics on the transition of the Afghan National Security Forces since August 2014. The study ". . . provides considerable insight into the success of the Taliban to date, the seriousness of probable Afghan capability to contain and defeat the Taliban and other insurgents and the seriousness of the fighting". The study also shows that there is

". . . a critical lack of transparency, and what often seem to be serious gaps in the planning for the future. In many cases, there seems to be a growing emphasis on "spin" and public relations efforts to sell progress at the expense of realism and objectivity - often by simply ceasing to report metrics that have proved to be embarrassing in the past".

The study is divided into four different parts:

1. US Policy, and Cuts in US Forces and Spending.
2. Sharply Contradictory Data on Levels of Violence.
3. Measuring the Transition from ISAF to ANSF.
4. Progress in Afghan Force Development.

Report - "Afghanistan in Transition"

The Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate has published a report entitled Afghanistan in Transition: U.S. Civilian Presence and Assistance Post-2014, dated October 27, 2014. The report is 31 pages long and consists of three sections: "Enhanced Accountability for U.S. Assistance", "A Refined U.S. Civilian Assistance Approach", and "Robust U.S. Diplomatic Posture and Civilian Presence". Topics include TMAF as a mechanism for incentivized assistance, improving Afghanistan's capacity to budget and collect revenue, enhancing women's rights, stemming corruption, sustainability of U.S. investments, lessons learned, interagency information sharing, monitoring program implementation, and the New Silk Road Initiative.

The report can be viewed and downloaded at the link below:
www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/89860.pdf

ANSF is Winning

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is winning. So says LTG Anderson, ISAF Joint Command leader. Ummm, okay. Read about LTG Joe Andersons's thoughts on how the war is going in "Lt. Gen. Joseph Anderson gives update on Afghanistan mission", Fayetteville Observer, October 31, 2014.

October 2014 DoD 1230 Report

One of the most informative unclassified reports about the state of the conflict in Afghanistan is published twice a year. The report, compiled by the Department of Defense, is mandated by Congress. Informally known as the "1230 report" - a name derived from the Section 1230 of Fiscal Year 2008 Public Law 110-181 (National Defense Authorization Act) - the report is formally know as Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. It is 114 pages long and contains sections on security, the ANSF, governance, reconstruction and development, regional engagement, and more. The report covers the progress (and lack of progress) in Afghanistan from April 1 to September 30, 2014. If you need to know what is going on with the Afghan National Security Forces and don't have access to classified data this is an extremely useful report.

www.defense.gov/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf

Afghan Oversight

A writer comments of the importance of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report provided to Congress on 30 October, 2014. See "A Big Week in Washington War Oversight", Just Security, October 30, 2014.

Questions on Classification of RASR

The media has picked up on the story about ISAF classifying a previously unclassified portion of the RASR. Read more in "U.S.-led forces rebuked for making Afghan troop evaluations secret", Reuters, October 30, 2014.

SIGAR Quarterly Report October 2014

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has released its Quarterly Report to Congress dated October 30, 2014. The ". . . report provides a summary of SIGAR's oversight work and an update on developments in the three major sectors of Afghanistan's reconstruction effort from July 1 to September 30, 2014. It also includes a discussion of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. During this reporting period, SIGAR published 31 audits, inspections, alert letters, and other products assessing the U.S. efforts to build the Afghan security forces, improve governance, and facilitate economic and social development." 

www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-10-30qr.pdf

Afghan War - What Went Wrong

As the commitment to Afghanistan subsides, U.S. troops leave Afghanistan, and our focus changes from Afghanistan to the Pacific, eastern Europe, and the Middle East some observers are reflecting on Afghanistan. Peter Tomsen is one of those observers. Read more in "The Good War? What Went Wrong in Afghanistan - - and How to Make it Right?", by Peter Tomsen in Foreign Affairs, November / December 2014 issue.

Interview - Former Foreign Minister Lafraie

The former Foreign Minister of Afghanistan between 1992 and 1996, Professor Najibullah Lafraie, was interviewed recently and provided his assessment of the political and security situation of Afghanistan. An interesting look from an Afghan statesman's perspective. Read "US Troops Surge in Afghanistan, Repetition of  Mistake Committed in Iraq", Eurasia Review, October 19, 2014.

Report - Afghan Politics, Elections, and Government (CRS Sep 2014)

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has published a report entitled Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance, by Kenneth Katzman, RS21922, dated September 17, 2014. Topics include the historic patterns of Afghan authority and politics, post-Taliban transition and political landscape, Afghan governing capacity and performance, and more. In its summary it states ". . . the government remains rife with corruption and ethnic and political tensions among its major factions are ever present."  It further concludes "The United States has helped establish anti-corruption institutions, but these bodies have faltered from lack of support from senior Afghan leaders who oppose prosecuting political allies". You can read the report online or download at this link - http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/232516.pdf.

CNA Assessment of ANSF

The Center for Strategic Studies of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) was tasked by the United States Congress and directed by the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) to conduct an independent assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces. This report, dated January 2014, was conducted by a group of CNA analysts who have considerable experience with Afghanistan's security situation.

This comprehensive report provides an executive summary, a summary of assessments, summary of conclusions, threat assessment, ANSF force-sizing framework, assessment of ANSF size, structure, capabilities, posture, and capability gaps. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) are assessed for their respective capabilities. There are several appendixes that provide organizational charts, matrix of authorities, model law for Afghan authorities post-2104, acronyms, bibliography, tables, figures, and more.

"The CNA report concludes that the security environment in Afghanistan will be more challenging after the draw-down of international forces in 2014; that the Taliban insurgency will become a greater threat to stability than now; and that a small group of al Qaeda members will remain active in remote valleys of northeastern Afghanistan. We also conclude that the ANSF will require a security force (Afghan National Army and Police) of 373,400 people - smaller than their present size but significantly larger than was envisaged at the 2012 NATO summit in Chicago. A force of lesser size than 373,000 would, in our assessment, increase the risk of instability of Afghanistan and make success less likely for the U.S. policy goal for Afghanistan".

The report, Independent Assessment of the Afghan National Security Forces, is an Adobe Acrobat PDF, 4 MBs big, and 378 pages long. It can be accessed on the CNA website at this link.

Dempsey Says Afghan Forces "Surprisingly Positive"

General Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the past year for the Afghan National Security Forces has been surprisingly positive. He says the Taliban failed to achieve their state objectives of the 2013 fighting season. Read more in "Dempsey: Past Year 'Surprisingly Positive' for Afghan Forces", American Forces Press Service, February 25, 2014.

A Look at 'Operational Assessments' in Afghanistan

Commander's (and staffs) are continually trying to assess how well the fight is going in Afghanistan. This quest for answers to their questions covers a broad spectrum of areas. For instance, how well is the information operations structure of ISAF forming the perceptions of the Afghan National Security Forces, what does the population think of the legitimacy of the Afghan government, how well is the Afghan National Army doing in recruiting and retention of its soldiers, are the Afghan security forces winning the fight against the insurgents, and so on. An article about the assessment process in southern Afghanistan provides us with detailed information about how an assessment process can have too much data and be irrelevant. Read "Recognizing Systems in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned and New Approaches to Operational Assessments", by William P. Upshur, Jonathan W. Roginski, and David J. Kilcullen, Prism 3, No. 3, page 87-104. An Adobe Acrobat PDF posted on website of Caerus Associates located at this link.

ANSF Assessments - CUAT and RASR

One of the critical functions of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is to conduct assessments of the capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to perform their mission across a variety of functional areas to include manning, equipment and training. For a number of years ISAF used the Commander's Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT). In July 2013 ISAF Joint Command (IJC) replaced the CUAT with the Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR). IJC says the RASR replaced the CUAT because the ISAF senior leadership found the CUAT to be "difficult to read, inconsistently applied, and not useful". However the usefulness of the RASR will be called into question as time goes on. When the RASR was implemented in 2013 there were over 50,000 U.S troops in Afghanistan - many of them conducting the Security Force Assistance mission as Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams or SFAATs. Currently (as of February 2014) there are 32,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. If the Bilateral Security Agreement is signed then there will likely be about 10,000 troops available for the counter-terrorism mission and to continue the Security Force Assistance mission past December 2014. However, the advisory footprint would be small concentrating on the ANA corps and ministries (MoI and MoD). An accurate assessment of the ANSF will be problematic at that point. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has provided a report on the RASR and has some recommendations to ensure a adequate ANSF assessment process is in place for the post-2014 environment. You can read the report entitled "Afghan National Security Forces: Actions Needed to Improve Plans for Sustaining Capability Assessment Efforts", SIGAR 14-33 Audit Report, February 2014 at this link.