Governance in Afghanistan

For a listing of organizations advancing the cause of governance in Afghanistan click on the link below:

http://www.afghanwarnews.info/governance.htm

Afghan History Books - Leaving out the Wars

A recent news article tells us how U.S. government funded history books provided to classrooms are leaving out the past 40 years of conflict.  Read more in "In Afghanistan, a new approach to teaching history: Leave out the wars", The Washington Post, February 4, 2012.

Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS) on Patrol in Laghman Province

An important aspect of transferring security functions from ISAF forces to the Afghans over the next few years will be partnering with Afghan ANA and ANP units and helping local village and community security forces defend their villages.  A recent patrol by the 179th Infantry, 45th Infantry Brigade is doing just that - by partnering with the Afghan National Army and members of the Community Based Security Solutions (CBSS) police organization while conducting operations supporting Operation Aluminum Python.

Learn more about Community Based Security Solutions or CBSS.

Members of 179th Infantry, Afghan National Army and Community Based Security Solutions police conduct a patrol in Laghman Province.  (U.S. Navy photo by MC1 Bill Steele, 7th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

 

Read the article that goes with the photo - "Operation Aluminum Python puts squeeze on insurgency", DVIDS, February 5, 2012.

Canada Looks Back on Ten Years in Afghanistan

Canada is assessing ten years in Afghanistan:

"Whether the 10 years of fighting and dying in Afghanistan was worth the Canadian blood spilled and bullion spent remains in doubt because Afghanistan’s future is so uncertain.

Yet now is a time for assessment, even if the moment is not being officially acknowledged: It was 10 years ago this week that Canadian troops landed in Kandahar, battle-ready and girded for combat, the first time since Korea the nation had sent ground troops to war."

Read the rest of the article in "A decade after going to war in Afghanistan, the wins are fading", The Globe and Mail, February 5, 2012.

A Case for Continuing America's Longest War

A college professor with significant fieldwork in Afghanistan has published an article that makes the case for keeping a force of approximately 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan after 2014. He claims that al Qaeda is still a viable and dangerous force and closely linked to the Taliban.  The danger of a total U.S. withdrawal is the Taliban will be able to keep their sanctuary areas in Pakistan, enlarge their control of Pashtun areas of Afghanistan, and harbor al Qaeda terrorists (and their training camps).  He also feels that if the Taliban regain control of part or all of Afghanistan it would reverse much of the hard work the coalition has done over the past ten years to help rebuild Afghanistan.  Read his online article entitled "Afghanistan: The Argument of Continuing America's Longest War", History News Network, February 2, 2012.

Brian Glyn Williams is an Associate Professor of Islamic History at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth.  He is the author of Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America's Longest War.  The book is adapted from a field manual he wrote for the U.S. Army based on fieldwork he conducted in Afghanistan.  His book can be purchased online at Amazon.com at the link below:

Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America's Longest War

Afghan Security Force Members Turning on Westerners

In recent years there have been numerous instances of individual members of the Afghan security forces turning on members of coalition military members.  The most recent event was the killing of four French military members in Kapisa Province, Afghanistan in January 2012.  The New York Times has a recent news article that explores this phenomenon.  See "Afghanistan's Soldiers Step Up Killings of Allied Forces", The New York Times, January 20, 2012.

The Taliban on al Qaeda, 1996-97 - Threat Matrix

The Taliban on al Qaeda, 1996-97 - Threat Matrix

The Threat Matrix, a blog on The Long War website cites some early examples on how the Taliban can be trusted during negotiations.  Something to keep in mind as the United States engages the Taliban in peace talks in an effort to bring about a political solution to the Afghan War.

Canadians Reflect on the War in Afghanistan

Canadians were (and are) staunch allies in Afghanistan.  They have operated across the full-spectrum of activities with civic action, aid workers, running a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), being responsible for one of the provinces and committing conventional combat troops and their special mission units to the fight. The Canadians lost over 150 of its Soldiers and suffered many more wounded.  Read some reflections on the war by some Canadians in "Was it worth it? Canadians reflect on the war in Afghanistan", The Globe and Mail, February 6, 2012.

Afghan Peace Talks Cause Rift Between Karzai and U.S.

The maneuvering between the different parties (Taliban, Pakistan, Afghan government, and the U.S.) to future Afghan peace talks is providing cause for concern.  Afghan government and U.S. relations are somewhat strained since the U.S. and Taliban have started initial discussions about potential peace talks to be held in Qatar.  Karzai has responded by saying he will talk directly with the insurgents in either Saudi Arabia or Turkey. There are some folks that believe a political settlement is necessary with the Taliban if the Afghan government is to survive after 2014.  While the Taliban may be talking in private, publicly they are denying their readiness to sit at a peace table.  Read more in "Taliban deny they are ready for Afghan peace talks", USA Today, February 1, 2012.

Cultural Differences and Toilets in Afghanistan

An interesting article that anyone who has ever deployed to Afghanistan will appreciate.  See "Of Alexander, gods and bathrooms: Why the Afghans can't get their s*it together", The Best Defense Blog - Foreign Policy, January 19, 2012. This is a humorous but pertinent exploration of the cultural differences between American and Afghan Soldiers who work and live together in the same location.

Are We Writing Off Afghanistan?

A recent blogger has suspicions that the Obama administration is losing its commitment to win the war in Afghanistan.  Read more in "Writing off Afghanistan, too", by Kori Schake, The Shadow Government, Foreign Policy, February 2, 2012.

Army LTC Shares Dismal View of War with Congress

An Army LTC, having just returned this past fall from Afghanistan, has provided his views of how the war is going (not well) with Congress.  Read "In Afghan War, Officer Becomes a Whistle-blower", The New York Times, February 5, 2012.  LTC Daniel L. Davis has wrote an article about his experience and what he saw entitled "Truth, Lies and Afghanistan" published in the Armed Forces Journal, February 2012. His message is that the situation on the ground in Afghanistan is not as rosy as our senior military leaders would have us think - that they are not being entirely truthful with the war news. Once cleared by the military he intends to post a longer and more revealing article on his website - www.afghanreport.com.

Leaked NATO Report Provides Dismal Assessment of Afghan War

There has been a flurry of press activity concerning the leaked (and classified) NATO report providing an assessment of the Taliban.  The report says that NATO believes Pakistan is supporting the Taliban (you think?), that the Taliban are enjoying widespread support among the Afghan population, the Taliban are hopeful for the future role they will play after 2014, and that Afghan citizens prefer Taliban governance over the corrupt Afghan central government. The assessment is based on 27,000 interrogations of more than 4,000 captured Taliban and al Qaeda operatives.  Excerpts from the report are published by the BBC here and an analysis of the report is provided by Kate Clark posted on the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN).

Disaster in Afghanistan? An Early Withdrawal

Fred and Kim Kagan comment on the proposed early withdrawal announced by Leon Panetta in "Courting disaster in Afghanistan", American Enterprise Institute, February 1, 2012.

Solar Power Options for Rural Afghanistan

There are a number of non-government agencies, international organizations, and implementing partners engaged in activities to bring power to rural areas of Afghanistan. Solar energy is a viable option for Afghanistan. To learn more about the programs currently underway visit Solar Energy in Afghanistan.

War Plan Will Shift to Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan

A recent news article reports that the U.S. will shift the burden of the Afghan War to its Special Operations Forces or SOF.  Leon Panetta, the Secretary of Defense, recently surprised many with the statement that U.S. combat forces would start to transition from a combat role to an advisory and assist role in mid-2013 - at least one year earlier than scheduled. However, what was not said is that the nation's Special Operations Forces (SOF) would remain fully engaged in both a counterterrorism role and advisory role in Afghanistan. SOF has as a number of core missions and these include Direct Action (DA), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Counterinsurgency (COIN), and Counterterrorism (CT).  Because SOF trains for these mission sets it is well-suited for the "stay-behind" missions of providing advise and assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and yet still have a capability to hit selected high-value targets or terrorist threats.

More interesting bits of information are revealed in the news article.  The shift to SOF would still require some conventional forces to remain in Afghanistan - to include some transportation, medical care, communications, and intelligence units. The plan also calls for the creation of a two-star command to oversee the entire Special Operations effort in Afghanistan.  Currently the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) is headed by a one-star; while ISAF SOF and specialized direct action units have their own commanders.  In addition, ISAF Joint Command (IJC) currently commanded by a conventional three-star would be passed to a Special Operations officer.

One particular sentence in the article caught my attention:

"Senior Pentagon officials involved in the planning acknowledge that a military effort with a smaller force and a more focused mission could be easier to explain to Americans who have tired of the large counterinsurgency campaigns of Iraq and, previously, Afghanistan".

There are some in military circles who believe that the large counterinsurgency effort (or population-centric COIN) was not true counterinsurgency in the classic sense.  Rather they point to earlier counterinsurgency campaigns that required a smaller footprint but utilized specially-trained military units to "advise and assist" indigenous or host-nation units in the counterinsurgency campaign.  Some have also called this "combat FID".  This is probably the type of counterinsurgency that we should have been doing all along.

Read the news article by Thom Shanker and Eric Schmitt in "U.S. Plans Shift to Elite Units as It Winds Down in Afghanistan", The New York Times, February 4, 2012.

Casualties in Afghan War Drop in 2011

American casualties in the Afghanistan War dropped in 2011 as compared to 2010.  In 2010 there were 499 total deaths - in 2011 there were 415 total deaths.  Since the invasion of Afghanistan the 2009-2011 time frame has been the most costly in terms of U.S. deaths in Afghanistan. The below data is taken from "Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians", By Susan G. Chesser, Congressional Research Service, January 18, 2012.  This CRS report can be found on the website of the Federation of American of Scientists (FAS) at this link.

Year                     Deaths
2001                        11
2002                        49
2003                        45
2004                        52
2005                        98
2006                        98
2007                      117
2008                      155
2009                      311
2010                      499
2011                      415

Rule of Law in Afghanistan - Not so Much

Rule of Law (commonly abbreviated to ROL by Afghan observers) is severely lacking in Afghanistan. In fact, the Taliban have a better reputation for dispensing justice than the Afghan government - the judgements of its mobile courts are harsh and quick - and sometimes fair.  The Afghan government will dispense justice - but it is seldom fair and usually takes place once a bribe is paid. The dismal state of the rule of law in Afghanistan is one factor that drives people to support the insurgents.  In effect, an ineffective and corrupt Afghan government found in Kabul - and also at the provincial and district level - is a big factor in the help the insurgents receive. Read more in an online news article entitled "Afghanistan's injustice system", AFPAK Channel, Foreign Policy, February 1, 2012.

Women in Afghanistan - Mistreated by the Taliban . . . and Others as Well

Everyone knows that living under Taliban rule is harsh if you are a woman in Afghanistan.  Education and employment is usually not possible. Access to health care is severely restricted.  Just getting out of the house can be a problem if you don't have a male family member escorting you!  However, women are mistreated by a greater segment of Afghan society than just the Taliban - in fact, mistreatment (viewed through the lens of our Western eyes) is quite common in Afghanistan and pre-dates the Taliban era.  Read more on this topic in "Mistreatment of Afghan women caused by far more than Taliban", The Christian Science Monitor, January 31, 2012.

An Inside Threat: Numerous Reports of Afghan Security Force Personnel Killing ISAF Military Members

There have been many reports of members of the Afghan security forces killing members of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  This brings into the question the reliability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as an ally in Afghanistan.  Most recently (January 2012) four members of the French military were killed in Kapisa Province by an "insider".  This "insider threat" has been a major concern for ISAF and pressure is being applied to the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense to follow proper vetting procedures.

The Karzai administration has issued a decree stating that foreign private security firms will no longer be able to operate in Afghanistan (at some point in the future, the date keeps slipping). The private security firms will be replaced by the Afghan Public Protection Force or APPF.  So, at some point in time, the APPF will provide security for NGOs, governmental organizations (like USAID), convoy movement of war supplies, and even ISAF military bases.  The "insider threat" is a huge concern for ISAF and the numerous NGOs and other organizations that operate in Afghanistan.

Recent testimony on this "insider threat" was provided to the House Armed Services Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives on February 1, 2012 by members of the U.S. military.  The statement to the committee is entitled "Use of Afghan Nationals to Provide Security to U.S. Forces". Within the testimony can be found the definition of an "insider threat", the four types of threats, and vetting process for the APPF.  Also found is information about the FOB Frontenac incident where a Tundra security guard (an Afghan local hire) killed two U.S. military members and wounded several others in March 19, 2011.

Report on Maiwand District, Kandahar, Afghanistan

In mid-2010 the fight for Kandahar Province began.  Significant progress has been made (at a tremendous cost) but more work has to be done.  As the security gains are consolidated, moves to increase governance and development are underway in an effort to tie the local communities to the district and provincial government.  Kandahar Province is made up of many districts - one of these districts is Maiwand District. The Institute for the Study of War has recently published a report by Paraag Shukla entitled Battlefield Update: Task Force Dreadnaught in Maiwand District, Kandahar. The document is available online here.

Taliban May Be Willing to Talk Peace

Recent news reports indicate that the Taliban may be willing to conduct peace talks.  There is movement to establish a "Taliban Office" in Qatar and the Obama administration and Afghanistan High Peace Council seem intent to hold the talks.  Read more news on the Afghan peace talks. 

U.S. Military to Switch from Combat to Advisory Role in Mid-2013 in Afghanistan

The Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, stated on Wednesday (February 1, 2012) that the U.S. forces will move from a combat role to an "advise and assist" role by mid-2013.  The ISAF nations have all agreed to a timed withdrawal by 2014 - although France may pull out one year early. Read more in "Panetta Says U.S. to End Afghan Combat Role as Soon as 2013", The New York Times, February 1, 2012.  Currently there are about U.S. 90,000 troops in Afghanistan with 22,000 scheduled to return to the United States in the Fall of 2012.

A big question is if the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will be able to bear the brunt of the fighting.  So announcing mid-2013 as a fixed-time for this move from combat to advisory role is risky (see Fred and Kimberly Kagan's thoughts on this here).  Big advances have been made in the south of Afghanistan although the job is not finished there.  The north and west is under control as well - for right now. But lots of fighting remains to be done in the east and the southeast of Afghanistan.  It is questionable if the ANSF can do the hard work in these provinces alone over the next two years.

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) number about 320,000 as of February 2012 and will grow to 352,000 by the end of 2012.  It is unclear who will pay the bill to continue to support an Army of that size. The ANSF may have to downsize.  Downsizing the Afghan army has a couple of drawbacks - there are less security forces to keep the insurgency in check and you now have to "demobilize" an individual who has been trained to fight and now does not have a job or source of income.  However, we have to move towards transition.  This goes against the grain of many of our brigade commanders who want to do the job themselves rather than have the Afghans take the lead. See "Putting the Afghans in charge", by Roger Carstens, The AFPAK Channel - Foreign Policy, February 2, 2102 for more on how senior (O-6 level) commanders need to become the supporting unit instead of the supported unit.

The Afghan Local Police may be an option for downsizing the Afghan army.  Perhaps a plan could be devised to discharge Afghan soldiers from the Army but sign them up for the newly-formed Afghan Local Police or ALP. Prior to his discharge the soldier is enlisted into the ALP by the Ministry of Interior (MOI).  He undergoes police training (currently ALP members receive 3 weeks training) and then returns to his local village or community. The pay of an ALP member is significantly less and the logistical support required (food, housing, fuel, transportation, etc.) for the ALP member is very little - he lives at home and feeds himself.  His equipment consists of a uniform, AK-47, ammo pouches, radio, and some other inexpensive items.  Plus the ALP gets a trained and combat experienced infantryman who has been vetted with the national government.

If the U.S. combat forces are going to switch to an advisory role then now would be the time to train up the next few rotations on how to be advisors.  A certain amount of these advisors that would deploy in 2013 and 2014 should be allocated to an advisory role for the Afghan Local Police (ALP).  Currently a large proportion of the Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan are advising and training the Afghan Local Police under the Village Stability Operations (VSO) initiative.  Unfortunately there are only so many SOF teams and they are currently maxed out.  For the ALP to grow - especially if demobilized Afghan soldiers from a down-sized ANSF are integrated into it - more advisors will be needed. Advising a local police unit in remote and austere locations at the village level is very different than advising company or battalion sized units located on large compounds.

So what is a possible solution?  As we move towards the end of 2014 the Afghan security forces of 350,000 (which we can't afford) should enlist a significant amount of their force (100,000?) into the Afghan Local Police.  A portion of the U.S. units scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan in 2013 and 2014 should start training now to be advisors to the Afghan Local Police here in the states (learn language, culture, police functions, etc); and the future ALP advisors training should have oversight from SOF teams that have conducted this ALP advisory and training mission on their rotations over the past few years.

The Road to Peace in Afghanistan

There is much talk about the best way to transition our way out of Afghanistan.  Many experts say we need to drastically increase our advisory and training efforts to get the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) ready to handle their own security.  Others want us to establish a couple of permanent bases from which our counterterrorist forces can hit terrorist and al-Qaeda targets (supported by intelligence, UAV, medical, and air assets).  There are many who say that we need to come to an agreement with the Taliban leadership. Some endorse all three courses of action.

One observer, Anatol Lieven, has provided us a lengthy and comprehensive article on the topic entitled "Afghanistan: The Best Way to Peace". He examines the parallels between the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan over twenty years ago and the withdrawal that will soon begin by the coalition forces that currently support the Karzai government.  It is a good read with an excellent perspective on the road to peace.

Read more news about peace talks and reconciliation in Afghanistan.

Corruption in Afghanistan

Corruption is one of the most significant threats to Afghan society. Polls suggest that many in the Afghan population see corruption as the biggest single impediment to building popular support for the government. In addition, the Taliban gain a lot of support from the population because of the corrupt actions of the Afghan government. Bribes are necessary to get almost anything done from the top of the Karzai regime all the way to the lowest official at community, city, or district level. Most Westerners, military members, NGO workers, contractors, and others who are not Afghan do not get exposed to bribes very often. For the most part it is the Afghans who must deal with the problem.

On my way out of Afghanistan I had an experience that I found disturbing. My flight out on Safi Airlines was proceeding smoothly. I got through security, got my ticket, checked my luggage, and was on my way to the seating lounge before boarding the aircraft. However, there was the small matter of immigration control where a uniformed fellow checks for ticket, passport, and visa. All my paperwork was in order but he felt the need for some cash. The official made several attempts to get me to cough over some money with hints like a wink (did he find me cute?), rubbing his forefinger and thumb together (a sign for some money I suspect), and rearranging my ticket and passport on the desk in front of him several times while haaarrrummmphing (are all civil servants the same?).

To be fair I have been told by others to have a $20.00 bill in my pocket for just this circumstance. My friends said it will ease your way out of the country. All I had to do was reach in my pocket, pull the bill out, and slide it across the window counter. However, I started thinking of all the lives that have been lost and all the money squandered on this country and I just got pissed off. And I remembered friends lost in the fight recently and in years gone by. I returned the silent treatment I was receiving. Eventually I got my passport back - stamped and moved on to the last security checkpoint before the waiting lounge. The $20.00 would buy me lunch and a beer at The Irish Village at the Dubai airport.

Learn more about corruption in Afghanistan.

Return from Afghanistan

I have returned from my long trip to Afghanistan.  Once again, it was a learning experience.  The war in Afghanistan changes over time. What was seen and experienced in 2002 is vastly different than what happened in 2006 and what is happening now in 2012.  Once I get settled in I will resume my blogging. 

Temporary Break in Blogging

There will be a lapse in posting on the Afghan War News Blog.  I have started a contract position in Afghanistan and for security reasons my employer has asked me to refrain from blogging during my time here.  My stay in Afghanistan will end in the fall and I will resume blogging at that time.  For news about the war in Afghanistan click on the link below:

http://www.afghanwarnews.info/

Bomb Disposal Tactics in Afghanistan to Be Changed by British Forces

United Kingdom forces are changing their tactics when it comes to disposal of IEDs in Afghanistan.  Instead of disarming the IEDs and retrieving the components to study the bombs and extract DNA evidence for later prosecution of the IED network the bombs will now be destroyed in place.  The decision whether to disarm or destroy will be left up to the bomb disposal technician on the ground.  The Taliban have increased the number IEDs this past year and recent deaths of highly-skilled bomb disposal experts have caused the UK military to relook how IEDs are treated.  Read more in "Commanders to change bomb disposal tactics", The Telegraph, February 12, 2011.

Blog Post on PRTs and Our Goals in Afghanistan

A blogger - who also works for an NGO in Helmand Province - provides his perspective on whether we should have Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.  He also goes at length discussing what our aims and objectives are.  See the blog post here at "Ride for the Brand", Free Range International (Outside the Wire, Inside the Loop), February 11, 2011.

More Criticism of ALP

There are supporters and proponents of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program.  Read some negative comments here. "Is U.S. Legitimizing Warlords and Criminals in Afghanistan?", AllGov, February 25, 2011.

CIA Drone Attacks in Pakistan Seen as Less Effective Than Thought

Recent reports indicate that the CIA drone attacks in Pakistan have not been as effective as some had thought.  Very few high-level targets are being taken out and pressure is mounting to restrict the level of drone attacks.  Read more in "Increased U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan killing few high-value militants", The Washington Post, February 21, 2011.

Senator Carl Levin Provides His Perspective on the Afghanistan War

Senator Carl Levin of Michigan visited Afghanistan in early 2011.  He recently delivered a speech to the World Affairs Council of Western Michigan at the Grand Rapids Community College about his trip.  Read his perspective on the state of affairs in Afghanistan in "Prospects for Success in Afghanistan", February 21, 2011.

PSYOP Used against Visiting Officials? Military Says No

The military command in Afghanistan says it is investigating claims that LTG Caldwell used psychological operations personnel (Lt.Col. Michael Holmes) to prepare briefings for visiting lawmakers.  However, initial reports indicate that this investigation that will not reveal much.  The United States Army Special Operations Command says that the primary officer asked to prepare the briefs did not receive any training in this PSYOP from the United States Army JFK Special Warfare Center. There are other reports that indicate he received training in PSYOP at other military locations; but probably as part of a Information Operations course. It does appear that the officer is an "Information Operations Officer" or FA30.  The story was first broke by Michael Hastings writing for The Rolling Stone magazine.  See "Another Runaway General: Army Deploys Psy-Ops on US Senators" - February 23, 2011.

Several news media outlets are commenting on the story.  The general consensus appears to be that the article was a hatchet job.  Others have indicated that the article contained a number of inaccuracies - one being the confusion between Psychological Operations and Information Operations.  Then again - was it inappropriate to use an IO team to research info on visiting CODELs?  Hmmmmmm.

 "Army: Gen. Caldwell's Accuser Had No Psy-Ops Training", The Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2011.

"Army manipulated visiting VIPs in Afghanistan", Afghanistan Crossroads, February 24, 2011.

Comments on Withdrawal from Pech Valley in Kunar

The decision to vacate the Pech Valley in Kunar Province has many scratching their heads.  Why did we fight so hard for it and why are we now leaving it for the Taliban?  Read some commentary on this topic at "US begins withdrawing forces from Kunar's Pech Valley", The Long War Journal, February 25, 2011.

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Debate Continues in Afghanistan

Karzai's call for dismantling the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) has prompted a lot of debate.  At the following link are more articles on this topic.  "Debate on the Future of PRTs in Afghanistan Continues", Afghanistan Conflict Monitor, February 8, 2011.

Oxfam Says Aid Funding Should Not Be Used to Attain Short-Term Military Goals

Oxfam, an international aid agency, has issued a report saying that aid used to further military objectives has a dangerous effect on aid workers.  It accuses donor nations of spending money foolishly on expensive and unsustainable projects. 

"Billions of dollars in aid have been spent on projects that are expensive, unsustainable and sometimes even dangerous, because donor governments are increasingly using the money to support their short-term military and security goals, international aid agency Oxfam said on Thursday.

The neutrality and safety of aid workers is compromised if local people see humanitarian and development funding as a tool of the military, the charity says in a report. It notes that 225 aid workers were killed, kidnapped or injured in attacks during 2010, up from 85 in 2002, partly reflecting a rise in politically motivated violence." 

Read the news report in "Aid Increasingly Wasted on Security Aims: Oxfam", AlertNet, February 10, 2011.

Afghan Elections Marred by Corruption and Meddling - Report by AAN

The Afghanistan Analysts Network - a think tank on Afghanistan - has released a report on the elections that took place this past fall.  It cited the country's election governing bodies as being one of the biggest problems in the parliamentary election results.  The 2010 parlimentary vote was mired with controversies.  This report provides data, information, and maps on the election.  The report attempts to draw conclusions based on what electoral information was available for study. 

Read more in "Report: Afghan elections crippled largely by governing bodies", The Stars and Stripes, February 19, 2011.

The report can be viewed on the Afghanistan Analyst Network website at the link below:
http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1505

Afghan Special Forces Continue to Grow and Mature

The Afghan Special Forces is continuing to mature as a capable fighting force.  Learn more about them in "Culture Can Be A Killer", Strategy Page, February 23, 2011.

Marjah, Afghanistan: Lots of Money as a Stabilization Tool

The Marines are spending lots of money to secure the Marjah, Afghanistan area.  While the strategy seems to be working at the moment there is worry about what happens in Marjah when the Marines - and their money - leaves.  Read more in "More please, sir", The Economist, February 24, 2011.

Businesses Succeed in Building Afghanistan Infrastructure

International businesses are fully engaged in building an infrastructure (irrigation, electrical power, etc.) in Afghanistan that never existed.  These firms come under a lot of pressure when they fall behind in their project time lines or experience cost overruns. The security situation impacts the costs and schedules immensely.  Read an article that explores the difficulty of conducting business in Afghanistan and why we need to more fully support these firms.  See "Like No Place on Earth: How U.S. Businesses Are Succeeding in Afghanistan", Forbes.com, February 9, 2011.

Troop Cuts Could Set Back Gains in Afghanistan

An international organization has recommended that troop levels remain the same in Afghanistan until July 2012.  The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) has released a report stating that an early withdrawal would set back gains made in southern Afghanistan.  Read more in the links below:

"U.S. troop cut could set back Afghan gains - thinktank", Reuters, February 10, 2011.

"Afghanistan Transition: Dangers of a Summer Drawdown", International Council on Security and Development Press Release, February 9, 2011.

Here is an abstract of the report:

"This report looks at the current dynamics in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, southern Afghanistan, in the context of the United States' announced plan to begin drawing down military forces in Afghanistan in five months. The surge of 30,000 additional US forces has changed the security dynamics on the ground significantly, with the additional troops making major gains in clearing districts previously held by the Taliban.

The total troops on the ground in Afghanistan have gone from approximately 89,000 NATO- ISAF troops and 215,000 Afghan security forces in March 2010, to a current total of 131,000 NATO-ISAF troops and 266,000 Afghan police and army, an overall increase of 93,000. The Afghan security forces are also more visible and arguably more professional and better equipped than before.

This progress at the military level will hopefully create an enabling environment for analogous improvement in the fields of aid, development, governance and counter-narcotics which still require significant work. Without that, the military gains will be undermined and unsustainable. The urgent needs of people displaced by the fighting, the chronic grinding poverty and unemployment, and the grassroots political dynamics are not being addressed in southern Afghanistan. It is not at all clear what strategies will be used to tackle these vital issues."

The report can be downloaded at the link below.  It is an Adobe Acrobat PDF file.

http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/afghanistan_dangers_drawdown.pdf

Human Rights Groups Condemning Taliban for Abuses Against Civilian Population

Human rights groups in Afghanistan are condemning Taliban targeting of civilians in Afghanistan.  The human rights groups have been a long-time critic of coalition air strikes that have killed civilians - but measures have been taken to reduce these loses over the last few years.  The Taliban, however, have increased their indiscriminate targeting methods causing more civilian casualties.  Read more in "Afghan Rights Groups Shift Focus to Taliban", The New York Times, February 9, 2011.

Afghan Government Seeks Control of Women's Shelters - A Recipe for More Corruption and Less Protection for Women

The Afghan government is now seeking control of the many women's shelters that are set up in Kabul and other parts of the country.  The government ministries are more conservative than the people running and supporting the women's shelters - and there lies the rub. Shelters administered by the government will be less likely to protect women who run away from abusive husbands and families and more likely to return these young girls to the communities for punishment, disfigurement, and possibly death.  Currently, most shelters are privately run and supported with money from the United Nations and other independent charitable organizations.  A draft law currently under consideration in Afghanistan will ask that the international community shift all funding to the Afghan Finance Ministry which would then transfer the money to the Ministry of Women's Affairs who would pass money on to the shelters.  This, of course, is just one more ploy for the corrupt central government of Karzai to get their hands on more of the international funds so that it can be diverted to Swiss and Dubai bank accounts.  Read more in "Kabul Seeks Control of Women's Shelters", NPR, February 21, 2011.

Report on Counterinsurgency Efforts in Helmand Province, Afghanistan

Jeffrey Dressler, a research analyst with the Institute for the Study of War, has penned a report entitled "Counterinsurgency in Helmand - Progress and Remaining Challenges" dated January 2011.  Topics in the report include counterinsurgency in Helmand, Afghan National Security Forces in Helmand, counternarcotics, governance, reconstruction and development, and a conclusion.  Various maps and illustrations help provide clarity to the report.  The report is almost 40 pages long and well-documented with endnotes.  The document is an Adobe Acrobat PDF file and can be found at the link below:

http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Afghanistan_Report_8_web.pdf

Camp Leatherneck - Gretal Kovach Reports from Afghanistan

A reporter from the Sign On San Deigo News, Gretel C. Kovach, is visiting Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan and will be reporting on a regular basis.  Click here for her first two stories "Afghanistan war diary: the flight in", Sign On San Diego, February 19, 2011 and "Welcome back to Camp Leatherneck", Sign On San Diego, February 20, 2011.

Renewed Effort to Stop Opium Production in Kandahar Area

There is a renewed effort to stop the cultivation of poppies in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan.  Read more in "Afghan-Canadian governor orders eradication of opium farms in Kandahar", The Globe and Mail, February 20, 2011.

Operation Hamaghe Shay - Afghan Troops in the Lead

Operation Hamaghe Shay is currently underway in the Kandahar area of Afghanistan.  The operation is an Afghan-led, Canadian-supported mission designed to clear areas of munitions and arms that the Taliban can use in the upcoming spring offensive just weeks away.  Hamaghe Shay - which means "same team" in Pashto is one of the first large operations planned and conducted by the Afghan military in this area of Afghanistan.  Read more in "Massive operation seen as key test for Afghan planning, logistics skills", The Vancouver Sun, February 20, 2011.

Reflections on the Czech Republic PRT in Logar

Karzai's wish to transition the work (and money) of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan to the Karzai government is not getting much support among the nations that provide the money and the countries that run the individual PRTs.  The Czech Republic is one of the international donors that also provides personnel for the PRT - in this case in Logar.  Read a Czech viewpoint on PRTs in "Rules of disengagement in Afghanistan", The Prague Post, February 16, 2011.

Vetting of Afghan Security Force Members

On a rare occasion we will read about an Afghan security force member turning his weapon on members of the coalition (American, German, French, etc.) and trying to kill them.  The possibility of the Taliban trying to infiltrate the Afghan security forces for this purpose is troublesome and it would appear that ISAF is taking steps to mitigate the threat through a vetting process.  Read more in "Afghan forces undergo stricter vetting by NATO commanders", USA Today, February 18, 2011.

A Discouraging View of How Military Operations Hinder Development from Occuring in Afghanistan

There is lots going wrong in Afghanistan - one of which is the inability to get development to occur at a faster rate.  As a part of the counterinsurgency strategy - providing services (electricity, schools, roads, irrigation, medical clinics, etc.) through new development projects is supposed to tie the local populace in the rural areas to the district and provincial governments - thereby generating support for the central government (you know, the one run by Karzai and his corrupt cronies).  There are many reasons cited for development not progressing as fast as it should.  Security is the main reason - it is hard to build roads if the roads are mined with IEDs and the workers threatened, kidnapped, or killed.  These development projects sometimes have to provide for their own security so private security firms are contracted for - using a good portion of the development funds.  Corruption is another problem.  The Afghan governmental system is rife with corrupt officials from Karzai down to the lowest level.  One particular journalist, Mark Curtis, writing for the British newspaper - The Guardian - lays the blame on the military and military operations.  Read his view in "Afghanistan is being stifled by military operations",  The Guardian, February 19, 2011.