Prospects of Regional Integration in Central Asia

Fatema Z. Sumar, Deputy Assistance Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, recently addressed a gathering at George Washington University (October 28, 2014) where she provided comments on Central Asia and Afghanistan. She highlighted a number of developments in the region that are having an impact on the political, economic, and security situation in Central Asia. She pointed out that Afghanistan is on the right path. The country recently held elections, elected a new president, signed the Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States, and that the United States has renewed its commitment to the train, advise and assist mission over the next two years. She also stated that the U.S. has "redoubled efforts to advance the New Silk Road initiative economically linking Afghanistan with Central and South Asia . . .". You can read all of her comments in "Prospects for Regional Integration in Central Asia", U.S. Department of State, October 28, 2014.

October 2014 DoD 1230 Report

One of the most informative unclassified reports about the state of the conflict in Afghanistan is published twice a year. The report, compiled by the Department of Defense, is mandated by Congress. Informally known as the "1230 report" - a name derived from the Section 1230 of Fiscal Year 2008 Public Law 110-181 (National Defense Authorization Act) - the report is formally know as Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan. It is 114 pages long and contains sections on security, the ANSF, governance, reconstruction and development, regional engagement, and more. The report covers the progress (and lack of progress) in Afghanistan from April 1 to September 30, 2014. If you need to know what is going on with the Afghan National Security Forces and don't have access to classified data this is an extremely useful report.

www.defense.gov/pubs/Oct2014_Report_Final.pdf

Afghan War News Glossary

The Afghan War has provided us with a wealth of new terms, phrases, and words that were not in our vocabulary prior to September 2001. Add to this terminology the large "military" vocabulary that already existed and it is easy to understand how the novice or non-military person may be confused. Even if you have years in the military, if you have not deployed to Afghanistan before (as in the new CSTC-A commander), then you have to learn certain words and phrases quickly. For instance, one common mistake is referring to Afghans as "Afghanis". A quick reference guide could be helpful. Fortunately, there is one available entitled the Afghan War Glossary. Enjoy.

Paper - How Has COIN Changed?

The Small Wars Journal has posted another paper about counterinsurgency. "How Counterinsurgency Has Changed Across the 20th and Into the 21st Century?" (October 26, 2014) is penned by Wayne Tyrrell - a member of the Irish Defence Forces who has served in Liberia, Lebanon, and Chad. His paper on counterinsurgency is focused on ". . . the modern doctrine crafted in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan, its foundational basis and its adequacy to cope with a new form of globally networked and ideologically based insurgency".

Good Taliban Killed; Pakistan Unhappy

Pakistan is very supportive of U.S. drone strikes (CIA I would think) striking the "bad Taliban". The "bad Taliban" would be the ones who are opposing the Pakistan regime. It seems that one of our drones hit the "good Taliban" (the ones that the Pakistan intelligence service arms, equips, trains, and provides sanctuary to and that attack the ANSF and ISAF) and Pakistan is somewhat dismayed. Read more in "Pakistan condemns drone strike that targeted 'good Taliban", Threat Matrix, a blog of the Long War Journal, October 31, 2014.

Afghan Oversight

A writer comments of the importance of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report provided to Congress on 30 October, 2014. See "A Big Week in Washington War Oversight", Just Security, October 30, 2014.

How Can Afghanistan Kick Its Drug Habit?

A writer, M. Ashraf Haidari, provides us an explanation of the poppy cultivation problem in Afghanistan and some recommendations on how to reduce Afghanistan's dependence on the drug trade. Read "How Afghanistan Can Kick Its Drug Habit", The South Asia Channel (Foreign Policy), October 24, 2014.

Senate Report - Aid to Afghainstan

The United States Senate will be supporting Afghanistan's future with billions of dollars but the aid is tied to human rights reforms and closer oversight on how Afghanistan spends its money. The United States is expected to provide between $5 and $8 billion annually for at least a decade. Read more in "Senate report outlines plan to keep tens of billions of dollars flowing to Afghanistan", The Washington Post, October 25, 2014.

DCGS - A Failure with Revolving Door

The Distributed Common Ground System - Army or DCGS-A has proven to be a money pit. The "pie in the sky" fix for all things intelligence has not worked to its expectations and certainly has not been worth the billions of dollars spent on it. A recent news report now states that there is a "revolving door" that allows contractors and DoD officials to work first for the government on DCGS related projects and then for the many firms that are sub-contracting on the DCGS program. Read more in "INSIDE WASHINGTON: Profiting from failure", AP The Big Story, October 27, 2014.

Questions on Classification of RASR

The media has picked up on the story about ISAF classifying a previously unclassified portion of the RASR. Read more in "U.S.-led forces rebuked for making Afghan troop evaluations secret", Reuters, October 30, 2014.

Afghan War Amputees - A Harsh Future

The land of Afghanistan is scattered with mines from past conflicts - although many have been policed up there are still thousands lying beneath the surface waiting to be stepped on. In addition, one of the highest casualty producing methods employed by the Taliban is the use of IEDs or Improvised Explosive Devices. IEDs cause injuries among the civilian population as well as among members of the Afghan National Security Forces and International Security Assistance Force. Those Afghans who are wounded by IEDs usually suffer one or more amputations. Read more on this topic in "War amputees in Afghanistan face harsh lives of discrimination and poverty", The Washington Post, October 26, 2014.

Army Is Downsizing Too Fast

Manpower officials within the United States military are concerned that the U.S. Army may be downsizing too quickly. Assumptions were made in 2012 about what the Army size should be based on the Iraq conflict ending in 2011 (at least for the U.S.) and the Afghan War ending in December 2014. However, events have turned those expectations into dashed dreams. The Taliban are as strong as ever in Afghanistan and Iraq is a mess. Couple that with Russia's intervention in the Ukraine and potential hot spots in Asia and you have a gloomy picture of the world. Read more in "Personnel chief: Army may be drawing down too fast", Army Times, October 26, 2014.

Rula Ghani May Play Decisive Role

The wife of the new President of Afghanistan, Rula Ghani, has generated some excitement within the "gender crowd" of expats, international aid workers, and development advisors. They see Rula Ghani has a modern women who will lift the status of Afghan women. Mrs. Ghani is a Lebanese-American who is highly educated. Read more in "Afghanistan's New President Thinks His Wife Can Play a Decisive Role", History News Network, by Ali A. Olomi, October 27, 2014.

AVATAR - SOCOM Data Mining

AVATAR is an open-source data-mining program to be run by Special Operations Command (SOCOM) at the tactical, strategic, and operational levels. AVATAR stands for "Automated Visualization for Tailored Analytical Reporting". The objective of AVATAR is to filter and display open-source information that is specific and timely to the needs of Special Operations Forces. Read more in "SOCOM Wants to Start Data Mining the Open Web", Defense News, October 25, 2014.

Daily War News About Afghanistan

You can receive the Afghan War News Daily Newsletter each day. It should arrive in your e-mail inbox at 5:00 am Eastern Standard Time. It is easy to subscribe. Send an e-mail to staff@afghanwarnews.info or go to   www.afghanwarnews.blogspot.com and submit your subscription request in the "Follow by Email" dialogue box in the top of the right hand column. It is easy to unsubscribe. At the bottom of the newsletter click "unsubscribe" and you will be automatically unsubscribed.

SIGAR Quarterly Report October 2014

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has released its Quarterly Report to Congress dated October 30, 2014. The ". . . report provides a summary of SIGAR's oversight work and an update on developments in the three major sectors of Afghanistan's reconstruction effort from July 1 to September 30, 2014. It also includes a discussion of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. During this reporting period, SIGAR published 31 audits, inspections, alert letters, and other products assessing the U.S. efforts to build the Afghan security forces, improve governance, and facilitate economic and social development." 

www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-10-30qr.pdf

NATO Promises Afghans Air Support After 2014

The A-29 Tucano was supposed to be in the AAF by
now but Congressional meddling held up the program.

The international military coalition says it will continue to provide air support to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after the last combat troops leave Afghanistan in December 2014. According to General Zahir Azimi, a spokesman for the Afghan Defense Ministry, there was a recent agreement between Afghanistan and NATO on continued aviation support until the Afghan Air Force (AAF) has the sufficient capacity - likely to occur at the end of 2016. Some observers might make note that this is a bit of a reversal by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). During the past two years (2013 and 2014) ISAF's stand was that the Afghan security forces need to be able to conduct operations without air support (close air support, movement of equipment and personnel, and MEDEVAC) and that the Afghan Air Force would be able to support the ANSF by itself after ISAF departs (December 2014). A few factors have probably altered that stance. The Afghan Air Force is taking a lot longer to stand up. The AAF has been plagued by misuse drug running, corruption and illiteracy, and mismanagement by the United States Air Force. One of the few bright spots has been the Special Mission Wing (SMW). Despite the promise of air support many feel that it is a hollow promise; the lack of a robust ISAF air support presence will limit ISAF's ability to provide the air support needed by the ANSF. (See "NATO Defense Spending Cutbacks May Hurt Afghanistan As Air Support Dwindles", International Business Times, October 29, 2014).

Transport Capability of AAF. The Mi-17 helicopter program is just now coming up to the 87 ship strength but the crews (flying and maintenance) are still not able to conduct all-weather and night-flying operations (only a few can, like the SMW) and maintain the aircraft. In addition, the U.S. Congress is hot about the use of Russian helicopters in the AAF. The Afghans are still not able to maintain their own helicopters to a sufficient degree and will need help in the future years in this area. The C-27A program of 20 light transport aircraft has been an extreme embarrassment to the U.S. Air Force - 16 of the 20 were recently scrapped for 6 cents a pound; four are still at an airbase in Germany yet to deploy to Afghanistan. Plans to replace the 20 C-27As with four C-130s have fallen into question - the first two delivered had a utilization rate of 48% because of the lack of Afghan crews. The third was just delivered and delivery of the fourth C-130 is now on hold.

Close Air Support. The ability of the AAF to support the ANSF is very limited. There are about 11 Mi-35 Attack Helicopters of which only a few can fly; and those crews are not very experienced. The Mi-35s are to be replaced by the A-29 Tucano but that deployment was stalled for two years by Congressional members who favored a U.S. built aircraft from a competing company. The first Tucano arrived at Moody Air Force Base in September 2014 to start the initial training. Recent news reports indicate that the U.S. is going to "weaponize" the MD 530F helicopters currently in the AAF; good news but a little late.

2014 Fighting Season. In addition, the ANSF had its worst fighting season ever in terms of numbers of casualties and the Taliban threatened some districts with fighter formations in the hundreds. ISAF was forced to assist the Afghans during August and September 2014 with a significant number of air sorties; a large increase over support provided over the past two years. So . . . we now see a reversal on the decreased use of air support which is the right thing to do; we should never had withheld the air support in 2013 and 2014. We do want the Afghans to win; don't we?

ISAF Now Classifying ANSF Assessments

According to recent news reports the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is now classifying assessments of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). ISAF uses the Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR) to rate the various elements of the Afghan National Security Forces. The RASR is a monthly report that provides an update on the readiness, long-term sustainability, and associated shortfalls of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Local Police (ANP). The RASR executive summary provides a high-level overview of the ANSF corps-level units across several operational effectiveness pillars and up until now has been unclassified. The bulk of the RASR that deals with units at the operational and tactical level was always classified.

The ANSF has some serious capability gaps (intelligence, close air support, logistics, aviation, MEDEVAC, aerial ISR, etc.). ISAF feels that sharing information about those capability gaps and vulnerabilities could harm the operational effort. Of course, the classification of the reports (capability ratings of the ANSF) denies the United States public an accurate picture of what is really going on with the development of the ANSF. There are many ongoing assessments of the ANSF that are available, but the ISAF assessments generally are more revealing and accurate.

Whether the classification of the general high-level overview is truly warranted is hard to determine. It seems that the general shortfalls of the ANSF are well-known so what "classified" information is ISAF really trying to protect? Sometimes the protection of information is truly warranted on an intelligence and operational basis and sometimes it is part of the "information operations" campaign of ISAF. Hard telling not knowing.

Read more in "U.S. Military Classifying Assessments of Afghan Military", Bloomberg Businessweek, October 30, 2014. See also "The Capabilities of the Afghan Military are Suddenly a Secret", Time.com, October 30, 2014.

ISAF Legal Advisors Meet Afghan Counterparts

The Legal Advisors for ISAF met with their Afghan counterparts at a conference in Kabul. Read more in this ISAF News release (October 30, 2014).

Germany and Uzbekistan Base Negotiations

Uzbekistan is squeezing Germany hard for allowing the use of the Termez Air Base in Uzbekistan. Germany uses the base as a transit point for personnel and equipment going into and out of Afghanistan; principally Camp Marmal located just outside the city of Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. Germany has committed itself to participation in the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan that begins in January 2015. One would think that Uzbekistan would be interested in a secure Afghanistan especially in light of the threat that the IMU poses to its southern border but . . . not so much. Looks like the bank account balance is the driving issue for Uzbekistan; and they will worry about that jihad thing later. Read more in "Helicopter Crash Complicates Germany-Uzbekistan Base Negotiations", The Bug Pit (Eurasianet.org), October 28, 2014.