Afghan Taliban Spring Offensive Announced

As they do almost every year the Afghan Taliban have announced their "spring offensive". This years offensive will start on Friday, April 24th. The main targets will be 'foreign occupiers' and the 'stooge regime'. The Quetta Shura has called this year's spring offensive 'Azm' - which means resolve or determination. Sort of similar to 'Resolute Support'. Learn more about the spring offensive in "Afghan Taliban announces new 'spring operations'", The Long War Journal, April 22, 2015.

Taliban Make Gains in Kapisa Province

A recent online post by the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) highlights two districts of Kapisa province that are experiencing greater instability. The map to the left shows the outline of Kapisa province in relation to the rest of Afghanistan (map courtesy of Wikipedia). The province, located 80 kilometers northeast of Kabul, has always been an area of conflict. The security situation has gotten worse with the departure of Task Force Lafayette (France) and its supporting aviation unit - Task Force Musketeer. The author, Obaid Ali, reports that the Afghan government is losing its grip on Kapisa. Kapisa, due to its geographical location, serves as a crossroads for the Taliban and as a support zone for insurgent attacks into Kabul. A variety of insurgent and local armed militia groups exist in Kapisa as well as a mix of ethnic groups consisting of Tajiks, Pashtuns, Pashai, and Kuchi.


Two of the districts, Alasai (pink in the map to the left) and Kohband (yellow in the map to the left) are presented as examples of how the Afghan government is failing in Kapisa. (map courtesy of Wikipedia). In the Alasai district, for the past two years, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) - this includes the police and the army - are only allowed out of their bases, camps and offices for one hour per day - and only to go to the district center's bazaar. The remainder of the district is controlled by the Taliban. The Taliban's district government, in effect, runs the district with a legal system, security council, finance department, and district prison. A second district - Kohband - is plagued by a variety of illegally armed groups that fight among each other. Both of these districts are in mountainous areas of the province with little agricultural activity and a shortage of education and medical resources.

Read the article by Obaid Ali, Fire in the Pashai hills: A two-district case study from Kapisa, Afghanistan Analysts Notebook (AAN), April 6, 2015.
www.afghanistan-analysts.org/fire-in-the-pashai-hills-a-two-district-case-study-from-kapisa/                               

CIVCAS - Afghanistan in Free Fall

An observer of the Afghan conflict writes about the increase in violence in Afghanistan - pointing to the departure of international combat troops as a contributing cause. Read more in "Blood and horror surge in our absence in Afghanistan", The Star World, February 19, 2015.

News Report - Who Are the Taliban?

So just who are the Taliban? There are lots of opinions out there but one that comes closest to the truth is reflected in an article by Ankit Panda - "Afghanistan's 'Complex' Insurgency", The Diplomat, February 19, 2015. The group has lost its monolithic identity. The various Taliban groups have differing types of ideology and various degrees of religious viewpoints. Many are looking more and more like regional criminal networks. This provides opportunities and challenges. On one hand, it becomes more difficult to conduct peace talks with Taliban representatives who don't really represent the various insurgent groups. On the other hand, the fractured nature of the Taliban is a benefit for the ever-increasingly competent Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and for the possibilities of reintegrating small groups at a time back into Afghan society.

"Taliban's Foot Soldiers" - Foreign Policy

James Weir and Hekmatullah Azamy write about the Taliban's rank and file and what motivates them to take part in the insurgency. They state that the three prime motivators in priority is 1) money, 2) local grievances, and 3) ideology. The authors believe there is a vast difference in motivation between the Taliban leaders in the Quetta or Peshawar Shuras and the foot soldiers of the various local Taliban groups. The existence of the Taliban has more to do with making money than changing the Afghan government. Read more in "Afghanistan's 'Transformation Decade' Depends on the Taliban's Foot Soldiers", Foreign Policy, March 2, 2015.

UN Report - Taliban and Drugs

A recent report for the United Nations Security Council states that the Taliban are now engaging more and more in drug trafficking and criminal activities. According to the report there is a new "scale and depth" to the Taliban's integration with criminal networks. Read more in "Afghan Taliban now smuggle drugs and gems like mafia: U.N. report", Reuters, February 11, 2015.

Fighting Season Not Quite Over

The Taliban have continued their attacks this winter. Usually attacks go down significantly when the cold weather and snow approaches. But last year and again this year the pace of the fighting has not decreased as much as in past years. Some of these attacks are highly effective - such as the attack against the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Pul-i-Alam, Logar province. Just 50 miles south of Kabul, this provincial police station suffered a devastating attack by four Taliban suicide bombers dressed as police officers. They killed at least 20 people and wounded many more. Read about the attack in "Taliban bombers kill at least 20 in Afghan attack", Stars and Stripes, February 17, 2015.

Paper - Taliban Movement

A new paper by Michael Semple on the Taliban has been published. Semple is a peace practitioner and scholar who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. He is currently a visiting professor at the Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice at Queen's University Belfast. He previously worked as a political officer for the UN mission and the European Union for Afghanistan. In addition, he was a fellow at Harvard with the Kennedy School's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy.

His report offers insights into the Taliban movement's doctrine, organization, and rhetoric and is intended to inform efforts to end the Taliban violence. This report examines the evolution of the Taliban case for armed struggle and the adjustments the Taliban rhetoricians made to cope with the impending political change in Afghanistan in 2014. It considers how the Taliban might make a case for peace, should they take the political decision to engage in negotiations.

Read "Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement", United States Institute of Peace (USIP), January 5, 2015.

Who are the Taliban?

Azam Ahmed writes about how unruly factions hurt the Taliban's bid to capture Afghan hearts and territory. (New York Times, Jan 2, 2015). Kidnappings and robberies hurt the Taliban's cause in Helmand province. Article examines what happened to the senior leaders of a decade ago and who the Taliban are now.

Afghan - Pak Deal on Taliban

It is common knowledge that Pakistan harbors, supports, and aids the insurgent groups that attack U.S., ISAF, and Afghan security forces in Afghanistan. Some speculate, and Pakistan accuses, that Afghanistan returns the favor. In effect, Pakistan's military and intelligence service supports the Afghan Taliban (so-called "good Taliban") while (supposedly) Afghanistan's National Directorate of Security (NDS) provides support (or at least turns a blind eye) to the Pakistan Taliban (so-called "bad Taliban"). The terms "good" and "bad" are from the Pakistani perspective. There is hope that with a new Afghan President and new leader in Pakistan (and the end of the ISAF mission) that this situation will improve. Read more in "An opening in Afghanistan: Kabul's deal with Pakistan", New York Post, December 28, 2014.

Backgrounder: Taliban

Zahid Hussain provides us with a backgrounder on the Taliban's re-emergence since 2001 on both sides of the Durand line. Hussain is the author of Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam and several other books and journal contributions. He is currently a columnist for Pakistan's daily Dawn newspaper and is a former correspondent for the Times of London and the Wall Street Journal. From 2011 to 2012 he was the Pakistan Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. His extensive and informative article is entitled "The Taliban Question", The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, October 19, 2014.

Taliban Camp in Faryab Province

The Taliban have released a video showing their members training in a camp in the northern province of Faryab. Faryab is located in the Train, Advise, and Assist Command - North (TAAC-N) area of operations. The video, released on December 18, 2014, is one hour long. In the video Taliban fighters are shown undergoing weapons training to include firing weapons from a vehicle. Read more in "Taliban publicize training camp in northern Afghanistan", The Long War Journal, December 21, 2014.

New Afghan Control Center to Coordinate Security

A new security control center has been (or will be?) established to coordinate security forces and stop the upsurge in insurgent attacks in Kabul. The new control center will have the authority to command and coordinate a joint response by Afghanistan's army, police, and intelligence organizations in the event of an attack. Read more in "New control center to fight rise in attacks in Afghan capital", Reuters, December 18, 2014.

Hundreds Killed at Pakistan School

Over one hundred people, mostly children, were killed by Pakistani Taliban in a school in Peshawar. Some reports say that as many as 126 people were killed. There were about 500 people in the school when the attack began. Reports indicate that there were five or six attackers. A spokesman for a faction of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) said that the attackers were ordered to shoot older students. The attack was initiated with two explosions.

High Ranking Court Official Killed

A high ranking member of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan was killed early on Saturday in Kabul while he was on his way to work. The head of the secretariat of the Afghan Supreme Court was shot and died while being transported to the hospital. The Taliban claimed credit for the attack (Tolo News, Dec 13, 2014).

Khamyab District Now Controlled by Taliban

Afghanistan's Khamyab district in Jowzjan province is now controlled by the Taliban. Attempts by government forces to re-take the district with the assistance of local militias have failed. High-ranking police officers of the district have been killed. The population of the district now lives under 'Taliban rules'. Read more in "Taliban Takes District on Turkmen Border", Qishloq Ovozi Blog (Radio Free Europe), December 11, 2014.

India, Pakistan: Secret War for Afghanistan

Parviz Azizi has wrote an interesting column entitled "Pakistan, India, and the Secret War for Afghanistan", Geopolitical Monitor, December 2, 2014. He outlines Pakistan's and India's interests in and perspectives on Afghanistan. In addition, he provides us with his view of the future outlook.
www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/pakistan-india-secret-war-afghanistan/

Video - Taliban Rehearsed for Bastion Attack

The recent attack by the Taliban against Camp Bastion (the former British base in Helmand province vacated last month) was well rehearsed. The rehearsal was captured on video and posted to the Internet. It can be viewed here: "Taliban video shows training and planning for Camp Bastion attacke", The Threat Matrix - Blog of the Long War Journal, November 29, 2014.

Critic - "We Can't Defeat the Taliban"

A critic of the war and author of a recent book on the conflict, Jack Fairweather, has penned an opinion piece stating that we have ignored the Pushtun tribes in the east and south to our detriment. He states that the Taliban support within the tribes is well-entrenched and is not going to go away. And neither are the Taliban. He believes that the United States needs to learn to live with the tribes to prepare Afghanistan for long-term stability. Read more in "Stop trying to destroy the Taliban", New York Daily News, November 30, 2014.

Paper - "The Taliban in 2024"

Micheal Semple has provide us with his assessment of the future of the Taliban in a recent article posted in Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, November 18, 2014. An abstract of the paper, "The Taliban in 2024", is provided below:

"Reacting to corruption and oppression in the Kandahar of 1994, the Taliban is seen as working with Sunni clerics to foster a shariat movement for advancing economic justice and (corporal) punishment. Before long, the organization began substantially rewarding joiners, arming for jihad, and resisting international forces in Afghanistan. Now, with less foreign resources to fight the Taliban, the Kabul central government has unfinished business with its still-robust challengers. In the face of recent modernization in sectors such as education and media, the author details three plausible scenarios for the Taliban to maintain its core shariat mission. One scenario is for the Taliban to re-secure (through continued force) its initial goal, viz., overall state power to promote and enforce shariat across urban as well as rural areas. Another possibility projects Afghanistan as operating a dualist system of separate zones, one for the Taliban's ‘liberated territory,’ the other for the rest of Afghanistan as governed by Kabul. Achieving scenario three would be formidable: it posits that Taliban leaders may be persuaded that their armed jihad has run its course and can profitably be disconnected from the Middle East's broader Islamic conflict. Conceivably, then, through accommodations with a shariat-accepting Kabul government, Taliban might be able to win buy-in for peace from its own military and its own fighting priests with their strong ties to Afghan communities in Pakistan."