ISAF's Future Strategic Plan for Afghanistan

General Allen, in his testimony before Congress this past week, revealed parts of the "new" ISAF strategic plan for Afghanistan. Prior to President Obama's announcement that the U.S. would speed its withdrawal plans up from 2014 to mid-2013 the plan was supposed to be:

ISAF consolidates its hold in southern Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011. Then in 2012 (we are now at the beginning of the 2012 fighting season) US forces would be shifted to East Afghanistan to defeat (or disrupt) the insurgency along the Afghan-Pak border.

But . . . along came President Obama's "early withdrawal" plan. Instead of moving troops from Southern Afghanistan to Eastern Afghanistan - they are to come home.

So who does the fighting to secure the East of Afghanistan? According to General Allen - the new plan is for the Afghan security forces to accomplish this. So it appears that U.S. troops will concentrate on Southeastern Afghanistan - or the "Southern" RC-East area while the ANSF will be responsible for Northeastern Afghanistan - or the "Northern" RC-East area.

This new plan involves no small measure of "risk taking". In other words, leaving the "Northern RC-East" territory to the Afghans probably means that the insurgents (Taliban and Haqqani Network) will continue to maintain their grasp on this area and perhaps gain even more territory. The south of Afghanistan (where much progress has been made over the past two years due to the 30,000 troop surge) are to be handed over to the Afghan security forces as well (we shall see how that works out).

CJ Radin of The Long War Journal explains this more fully in his article "ISAF's new plan for Afghanistan" posted on March 22, 2012.  He has a handy map of Afghanistan depicting the areas of RC East as well.

UK to Pay Closer Attention to Aid Dollars for Afghanistan

The United Kingdom is striving to pay closer attention to where the aid dollars to Afghanistan end up. Corruption is a huge problem in Afghanistan and corrupt Afghan officials divert a lot of aid money to their bank accounts in Dubai. Afghanistan is one of the UK's top foreign policy priorities and see a lot of money coming its way from the UK; but many in the UK question where that money ends up. Britain's Department for International Development (DFID) is being urged to send more personnel with financial and contracting experience in order to ensure the money goes to the intended purpose. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact, a UK government entity, says that the UKs aid program is not performing well and needs significant improvements. Read more in "UK must tighten grip on Afghan aid programme - watchdog", Reuters, March 22, 2012.

ROLFSOs: Rule of Law Field Support Officers - Five Perspectives on Duties

The U.S. Navy JAG Corps is providing five posts on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan from the perspective of five different ROLFSOs or Rule of Law Field Support Officers. Read the first one in "ROLFSOs: One Individual Augmentation, Five Different Experiences", March 22, 2012.

Money Leaving Afghanistan in Millions Each Day

A recent news article reflects the growing concern that Afghan government officials have over the tremendous amounts of money leaving Afghanistan every month. Over $4.6 Billion dollars left through Kabul Airport during 2011. That was the "declared" sum; the amount of money that left through other airports or that was undeclared is not known. The entire Afghan government budget is $4.8 billion - so the amount of money that left the country is almost equal to the government's budget. Most of the money has found its way to Dubai bank accounts or real estate property. The money is estimated to be either drug money or money skimmed off of international aid donations by corrupt government officials.

Read the article in "Rampant Capital Flight Saw $4.6 Billion Leave Afghanistan In 2011", Economy Watch, March 19, 2012.

Afghans Want Veto Power over Night Raids

In formal negotiations set to begin Thursday, Afghan officials are expected to press their U.S. counterparts for veto power over controversial night raids on Afghan homes as well as warrants signed by a judge before the operations are carried out. Despite substantive differences, officials on both sides expressed confidence that they are heading toward an understanding on the raids that will allow them to complete within two months a broader accord governing the long-term military relationship between the countries.

These negotiations could lead us down the road to disaster. The night raids currently conducted by ISAF SOF, CJSOCC-A, and other organizations' have been extremely productive - keeping the insurgent mid-level and high-level leaders off-balance, running from house to house each night, and suspicious of informants within their ranks. Many insurgents have met their demise or have been captured during night raids. This is due to an extremely effective targeting procedure, good COIN intelligence, great ISR assets, and good working relationships with Afghan partner special operations units (PRC, ANASF, Commandos, and others).

Agreeing to Afghan approval of targets and moving to a warrant-base system is problematic. It slows down the targeting cycle, reveals intelligence sources, will be a bonanza of information for the Taliban infiltrators of the ANSF, tips our hand on targets who will be notified that they are at risk, relies on an ineffective and corrupt judiciary, and holds us hostage to Afghan politics.

Read more in "Afghan officials likely to press for veto power over night raids in formal talks", The Washington Post, March 21, 2012.

Exiting Afghanistan - Transit Costs of Material to Send Home

As the withdrawal from Afghanistan begins this fall many ISAF partner nations will be moving troops and equipment home. Routes home include Pakistan and the Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). With the on-again off-again relationship with Pakistan many NATO countries may opt for the northern land route instead of using the ports of Pakistan. Read more about which countries will benefit as a result of transit fees (can you say price gouging?) in "Neighboring Countries Scramble to be NATO's Exit Route from Afghanistan", Radio Free Europe, March 22, 2012.

Command and Control Structure in Afghanistan

The Foreign Policy blog known as The Best Defense has posted an article (with structural diagram) entitled "Annals of Command and Control (IV): Untangling the structure in Afghanistan", March 21, 2012. It is a good read for someone who wants to understand how we got the C2 structure that we now have in Afghanistan.

Report: Torture of Detainees in Afghan Prisons

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the Open Society Foundations recently released a report about the treatment of detainees in Afghan prisons. The report is entitled "Torture, Transfers, and Denial of Due Process: The Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghanistan", March 17, 2012 (Adobe Acrobat PDF file). Read more about this reports release in "Groups Report on the Continued Transfer of Detainees to Afghan Prisons", The New York Times, March 18, 2012.

General Jack Keane Comments of Afghanistan - Stay the Course

Citing military progress in southern Afghanistan in the last 18 months General Jack Keane (retired) says we need to stay the course in Afghanistan. He believes that withdrawing troops prematurely will weaken the chances of defeating the Haqqani Network in the east of Afghanistan and put into question the survivability of the Afghan government. Read more on this topic in "General Jack Keane: Staying the Course in Afghanistan", The Foundry of the Heritage Foundation, March 21, 2012.

British Advisors Say Afghan National Army is Improving

Soldiers with the British Advisory Group 3rd Kandak 215th Corps (Two Rifles Battle Group) have been spending their tour of duty in Afghanistan as advisors. They have seen a great improvement in the performance of the ANA. Read more in "Afghan National Army operations symbolizes success in Advisor's mission", DVIDS, March 21, 2012.

Karzai - Time to Dump Him? Some people think so!

Karzai's recent negative statements about the United States (and ISAF) are drawing comments from around the world. Some find it hard to understand why the State Department and military cave in to Karzai. We have agreed to allow Afghans to protect our bases, convoys, and development projects with the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), hand over supervision of the detention facilities, put restraints on our special operations forces that conduct night raids, and we have given him a pass on the corruption found everywhere in his government. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can't even protect themselves from the Taliban - never mind hoping the APPF can protect NATO and US personnel, facilities, and interests. The Afghans have no clue how to run a detention facility - have we forgotten the 500 Taliban that escaped from the Kandahar prison last year? Although the Afghan special operations forces (ANASF and Commandos) are getting more proficient - they still need the advise and assistance of ISAF SOF. If we agree, as may likely happen, to a warrant-based targeting system then we have major problems. Most recently Karzai has called for NATO to withdraw from the Afghan villages - an action that will certainly put a halt to the very sucessful Village Stability Operations (VSO) program and its associated Afghan Local Police (ALP). Read more about the discontent with Karzai in "Karzai The Ingrate", Investor's Business Daily, March 21, 2012.

22% of NATO Fatalities Caused by Afghan Army and Police

60 NATO troops have been killed this year in Afghanistan. 13 have been killed by Afghan security force personnel. That comprises 22% of the NATO casualties suffered thus far. Read more in "NATO fatalities in Afghanistan: 22 percent this year at hands of Afghan Army, police", The Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 2012.

Gen Allen to Speak at Brookings

General John Allen, the ISAF commander, will speak at Brookings event on March 26, 2012.  Read more on this in "The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan".

Info on U.S. - Afghan Strategic Agreement

The United States and Afghanistan are in the process of fine-tuning the wording of the "Strategic Partnership  Agreement" that will define the relationship between the two countries over the next few years. The negotiations are on-going and recent events such as the Koran burning and Panjwai killings have been complicating the agreement's terms. In addition, Karzai has some "red lines" that have caused some reluctance on the part of the United States - elimination of night raids and turning over detention facilities to Afghan control. Read more on this agreement in "Fact Sheet: U.S.-Afghan Strategic Agreement", by Paraag Shukla, Institute for the Study of War, March 2012.

Fort Polk Trains 4th Infantry Division Soldiers for Advisory Role in Afghanistan

Teams of military personnel from the 4th Infantry Division are training for the Afghan advisory effort they will take part in at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk. They train on a number of scenarios at a mock Afghan village that has Afghan role players. Read more in "New advisor teams key to US exit from Afghanistan", News-Leader.com, March 21, 2012.

Torture in Afghan Prisons? The National Directorate of Security (NDS) Says No!

There are constant allegations of torture and inhuman practices taking place in the prisons and detention centers run by the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI). These allegations are rejected by the Afghan intelligence service - The National Directorate of Security (NDS). Read more in "Afghan intel service: No torture at our prisons", Boston Globe, March 20, 2012.

Rebuilding Trust in Afghanistan

The recent events in Afghanistan have sharpened the levels of mis-trust between Afghanistan and the United States. Karzai's erratic rhetoric and hard-line stances on negotiations for the strategic partnership have prompted many in the U.S. to decide that leaving Afghanistan sooner is better. Recent blunders by the U.S. such as the Koran burning, Panjwai killings, and other events have some in Afghanistan asking for a speedier transfer of security responsibilities, end of night raids, transfer of authority for running detention centers, and other moving ISAF forces from Afghan villages to the big bases.

Omar Samad, a Senior Afghanistan Expert at the United States Institute of Peace, has wrote a column that explores this mistrust and states that we have to rebuild mutual respect to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan. See "Facing the Afghan obstacle course", The AFPAK Channel on Foreign Policy, March 20, 2012.

MoI Continues to Sign Contracts in Transition from Private Security Companies to APPF

KABUL, Afghanistan – The Afghan Public Protection Force continues to make progress in taking over security for development work around the country. Over the last week, it has signed 10 contracts for security with companies executing development projects for the U.S. Agency for International Development. The APPF concluded six contracts with Development Alternatives International (DAI). These contracts will provide security for USAID projects including Regional Afghan Municipalities Program-East (RAMP-Up East), RAMP-UP West, RAMP-UP North, Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative-East (ASI-East), Agriculture Credit Enhancement (ACE), and Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives North, East and West (IDEA-NEW).

The Afghan Public Protection Program (APPF) got off to a slow start and has continued to fall behind on its timeline and reports of inefficiency, corruption, and difficult negotiations. But, according to the NTM-A article (see link below) it seems to be making progress. (Did you think that NTM-A would say the APPF was doing poorly?)

"APPF signs additional contracts to secure development projects", NTM-A, March 20, 2012.

Rampant Afghan Corruption Might Cause UK to Stop Funding

The massive corruption of the Afghan government is causing many leading UK officials to think about the amount of money that will be sent to Afghanistan to pay for it's security forces after 2014. See "Afghanistan corruption could see UK cut off security funds", Guardian UK, March 20, 2012.

Warrants May Be Required for Afghan Night Raids By U.S. Special Forces

President Karzai is pushing for an end to night raids by U.S. and ISAF special operations forces. Currently Afghan Commando and Special Forces units are working with coalition special operations forces with the Afghan units in the lead for night raids. Karzai is trying to limit ISAFs participation even further with the introduction of warrant-based raids. This didn't work well for coalition forces in Iraq and it will work even worse in Afghanistan. Hopefully the U.S. takes a hard line on this. See "Afghan Night Raids May Need Warrants Under U.S. Offer to Karzai", Bloomberg, March 20, 2012.

Warrant-Based Targeting and Law Enforcement Model for Afghanistan?

Are we moving to a warrant-based targeting and law enforcement model in Afghanistan? Indications are that we will be doing that soon. We did the same in Iraq and it significantly diminished the ability of our forces to operate there. The same can be expected in Afghanistan. Corruption is spread throughout the Afghan National Police (ANP). The judicial system is a joke. Rule of Law is a highly-sought after but elusive ideal. Hopefully the warrant-based targeting system will be introduced AFTER 2014 - because I don't see it working at all in Afghanistan. Read more on this in "Moving to Warrant-Based Targeting and the Law Enforcement Model in Afghanistan?", by Robert Chesney, Lawfare Blog, March 20, 2012.

Gen Allen Testimony Before Congress

General Allen testified before Congress on Tuesday, March 20, 2012 (the first of three days of testimony). The top allied commander in Afghanistan covered a range of topics to include the time-table for departure, shifting focus from southern Afghanistan to eastern Afghanistan, Afghan sensitivities in regards to administration of prisons, night raids by ISAF special forces, and transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to Afghan security forces. In addition, he addressed the recent problems associated with the Koran burnings and the Panjwai killings. He acknowledged that insurgencies have seldom been defeated by foreign forces - that history shows indigenous forces accomplish this counterinsurgency task best. Thus he states that transition to the Afghans doing the fighting is both the exit means and the strategy for success after our departure. Read a news article about his testimony in "U.S. General Sees No Sudden Afghan Drawdown", The New York Times, March 20, 2012.

Is the Afghan Army Ready?

Many observers are wondering if the Afghan Army is ready to assume full responsibility for security in Afghanistan as the coalition troops reduce their numbers and transition from combat operations to an "advise and assist" role. The Afghan National Army (ANA) should have an end-strength of almost 200,000 personnel by the end of 2013. However, there are many questions to include will they show up for work, is their training good enough, how effective will they be, and will they fight? Read more in "How Ready Is The Afghan Army?", Voice of America, March 20, 2012.

Special Forces Task Force 10 in Afghanistan - ATVs, Beards, Secret Bases, and More

A correspondent recently had the opportunity to spend a week with a Special Forces element working for Task Force 10 in Afghanistan. Read his article entitled "Secret Bases, ATVs, Awesome Beards: Inside a Special Forces Team in Afghanistan", Wired.com Danger Room, March 20, 2012.

US Plan for Withdrawal from Afghanistan (2012-2014)

The plan for the US withdrawal is slowly taking shape. The goal is for the US and NATO to turn over all security responsilities to the Afghans by the end of 2014 if not sooner. The drawdown will start this spring. By fall of 2012 we should be down to 68,000 troops in Afghanistan. By late 2013 ISAF will stop conducting combat operations. Details of the withdrawal are available on the Long War Journal website. See "US withdrawal from Afghanistan: the plan for 212, 2013, and 2014", by CJ Radin, March 18, 2012.

Publication - "The Haqqani Network" by Jeffrey Dressler (March 2012)

Jeffry Dressler, of The Institute for the Study of War, has wrote a new publication entitled "The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat" dated March 2012. It is in PDF format and can be accessed here. Jeffrey Dressler is a Senior Research Analyst at the Institute for the Study of War and has conducted extensive research on the Afghan War.

The Haqqani Network operates in southeastern Afghanistan. Over the past several years the Haqqani Network has increased its operational capability. It enjoys sanctuary across the border in Pakistan. It also benefits from significant support from the Pakistan military and intelligence organizations.

1st Infantry Division to Command Regional Command East in Afghanistan

The 1st Infantry Division will take over command of Regional Command East in Afghanistan from the 1st Cavalry Division. The switch takes place in April 2012. RC East includes 14 provinces and a 450 mile border region with Pakistan. Even though ISAF is starting to withdraw forces the emphasis on the fighting is supposed to switch from RC South to RC East this fighting season. The commander of the 1st Infantry Division, MG William Mayville, is a very experienced Afghan hand - with three previous Afghan tours. His most recent tour was in 2009-2012 as the operations chief for Gen. Stanley McChrystal. RC East consists of five U.S. combat brigades and two ISAF brigades (one Polish and one French). Read more in "Storied Army unit moving into Afghanistan's east", Fox News, March 20, 2012.

General Allen to Brief Congress on Afghan War this Week

General John Allen and Defense Department Policy Undersecretary James Allen will brief both houses of Congress this week on the Afghan War. Read more in "The week ahead: Top commander to brief Congress on Afghanistan", The Hill Blog, March 19, 2012.

Task Force ODIN Afghanistan an ISR Asset

(Photo by SSG Jack Carlson DVIDS)

Task Force ODIN Afghanistan will be busy even though most of the U.S. military is departing Afghanistan over the next two years. ODIN stands for Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize. The unit was first established in Iraq. Task Force ODIN is an Intelligence and Security Command forward-deployed unit. TF ODIN consists of four aviation and intelligence companies and several detachments. TF ODIN operates a variety of fixed-wing airplanes and UAS vehicles. Read more about TF ODIN in "Task Force ODIN contributes to future Army aviation operations", DVIDS, March 17, 2012.

President Obama Leading the Afghan War Effort

One observer of the Afghan War says that despite recent PR setbacks (Koran burning, Panjwai killings, and more) that President Obama is doing the right thing in Afghanistan. He states that by holding firm in the face of calls for a quick departure in Afghanistan that Obama is showing the leadership needed for the Afghan solution. Read more in "The President finally leads the war effort", Foreign Policy, March 16, 2012.

Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) Revises Implementation Schedule; Extension Approved

The implementation of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is being slowed down once again. The negotiations are taking more time than expected and the transition is not going as quickly as the Afghan government wants. Some sources have said the process is "chaotic". The entire transition to APPF for security was supposed to have been completed by March 21, 2012. However, the Afghan government just provided an extension of 30 to 90 days depending on the company, organization, or activity.

Thus far (as of March 18, 2012) the APPF has signed 16 contracts with companies for security services and has licensed 14 Risk Management Companies or RMCs. It has been reported that there are a total of 75 companies that need to sign contracts for a larger number of development projects. Corruption is playing its usual part in the contract signing and licensing procedures.

Many private development companies said the transition to the APPF is putting the projects and the employees at risk. They say that the APPF will not be able to provide an adequate level of security and they worry that they have little control over the training and the procedures.

Read more in "Afghan government gives private security firms more time before ban", The Washington Times, March 18, 2012. For more on the poor implementation of the APPF see "Afghan private security handover looking messy", The Washington Times, February 12, 2012.

DoD Confirms Identity of Afghan Shooter - SSG Robert Bales

The Army has confirmed the identity of the Panjwai massacre shooter as SSG Robert Bales.  See the news release below:

Army Identifies Afghanistan Shooting Suspect

By Cheryl Pellerin
American Forces Press Service 

WASHINGTON, March 17, 2012 – The Army has identified the U.S. soldier accused of killing Afghan civilians in a March 11 rampage as Army Staff Sgt. Robert Bales, according to a statement released here last night.

Bales, from Fort Jensen Beach, Fla., is accused of leaving his base in Kandahar province in the middle of the night and shooting Afghans in their homes nearby. Afghan officials say 17 were killed.

The infantryman, who Army officials say completed sniper training and held three good conduct medals, was flown from Afghanistan March 14 to a military detention facility in Kuwait, Army Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed during an interview last night during an interview with Charlie Rose in New York.

From Kuwait, Bales was transferred to Fort Leavenworth, Kan., and is being held in pre-trial confinement there at the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility, a state-of-the-art, medium/minimum custody facility, Army officials said.

That facility provides pre- and post-trial confinement for U.S. military inmates sentenced to up to five years of confinement. It has 464 beds but the number of inmates in pre-trial confinement at any given time typically is around 12, Army Col. James Hutton, chief of media relations, said.

Also at Fort Leavenworth is the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, which houses military inmates sentenced to more than five years of confinement. Bales is being held in special housing in his own cell. He will be able to go outside the cell “for hygiene and recreational purposes,” Hutton said, and will be allowed religious support if he asks for it.

According to the Army release, Bales enlisted two months after 9/11 on Nov. 8, 2001, and was with the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division at Joint Base Lewis-McChord in Washington state.

According to Bales’ service record, he had an associate’s degree from a 2-year college and his military training included warrior and advanced leaders courses, sniper training and combatives levels 1 and 2.

He was deployed three times to Iraq -- in 2003 for 12 months, in 2006 for 15 months and in 2009 for 10 months. He was deployed to Afghanistan on Dec. 1.

Besides three good conduct medals, Bales’ awards and decorations include two Iraq Campaign Medal Campaign Stars, the National Defense Service Medal, combat and expert Infantry Badges, six Army Commendation Medals, the Army Achievement Medal, two Meritorious Unit Commendations and an Army Superior Unit Award.

Learn more about the Panjai shootings here.

APPF is Expanding its Role in Taking over Private Security Company Functions and Responsibilities

Photo by USAF SSgt Terri Barriere

Afghanistan is steadily progressing in the transition from private security firms to the Afghan Public Protection Force or APPF for the security of development projects. This is in accordance with Karzai's presidential decree number 62. See a related story - "APPF assumes security responsibility for Tarakhil Power Plant", ISAF News Release, March 15, 2012.

Karzai's View of the United State's Approach to the War in Afghanistan

Karzai has recently demanded that NATO troops pull out of Afghan villages, stay on large bases, and hand over control of Afghan security in 2013 rather than 2014. In addition, he has been very vocal on ISAF discontinuing night raids, handing over control of the prisons and detention facilities, and closing down private security firms in favor of the Afghan Public Protection Program. Many observers feel that Karzai is out to lunch, crazy, and biting the hand that feeds him. Others would call him corrupt, ineffective, and erratic. One columnist attempts to explain Karzai's behavior. See "Why Karzai is fed up with the U.S. mission in Afghanistan", by Joshua Partlow in The Washington Post, March 16, 2012.

Negotiations: The Only War To End the Afghan War?

One noted observer of the Afghan War, Stephen Biddle - a Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, believes that negotiations with the Taliban may be the best option to disengage from the conflict in Afghanistan. See "Ending the Afghan War", Council on Foreign Relations, March 16, 2012.

Afghanistan: Descent Into Chaos

Read an online posting by Jeff Smith on the failure in Afghanistan. Smith is the Director of the South Asia Program at the American Foreign Policy Council and author of numerous articles on Asian security affairs.

Smith believes that Afghanistan is intent to return to a state of chaos and ethnic conflict. He puts much of the blame on Pakistan for allowing the Taliban sanctuaries and providing aid and assistance to the Taliban. He then says the U.S. leadership should have recognized that the war could not be properly prosecuted unless Pakistan cooperated; and without that cooperation we should have withdrawn our troops from Afghanistan.

Read the post in "Afghanistan Seems Fixed on a Return to Chaos", U.S. News and World Report, March 16, 2012.

US Army Smartbook on Afghanistan Available for Download as Smartphone Application

The US Army now has a Smartbook that is available as a smartphone download on Afghanistan. Topics include history, political, relevant country data, military operational environment, religion and culture, ethnic groups, and more. It is written by the Army's TRADOC Culture Center and is entitled Afghanistan Smart Book. Learn more about the US Army smartbook as an app here "US Army smartbook now a smart app", Circling the Lion's Den, March 15, 2012. The Afghanistan Smart Book by the TRADOC Culture Center, 3rd Edition Jan 11 is available in PDF format for download at the following link: http://info.publicintelligence.net/AfghanSmartBook.pdf.

Should the U.S. Speed Up Its Withdrawal from Afghanistan?

Over the past month - since the Koran burnings, shootings of NATO troops by Afghan security personnel, and the Panjwai massacre - there have been calls for an accelerated withdrawal from Afghanistan from across the political spectrum. This topic is explored in a recent National Public Radio (NPR) broadcast with two opposing views. One view held by Jon Soltz -is the current counterinsurgency is not working. Another view, by Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, is that if the U.S. pulls out now the Afghan civil society will suffer grave consequences. Read the transcript here in "Should the U.S. Speed Up Afghanistan Withdrawal?", NPR, March 16, 2012.

Worries on Transfer of Parwan Detention Facility to Afghan Control

President Karzai has made the transfer of the Parwan detention facility located at Bagram Air Field (just north of Kabul) one of his central themes during the talks on the strategic agreement with the U.S. to be signed soon. The U.S. caved on this issue agreeing to transfer the facility to Afghan control within six months. Many observers have grave concerns about the ability of the Afghans to run a prison effectively, and to ensure the detainees actually stay detained. In 2011 over 500 Taliban detainees escaped from a prison in Kandahar. In the past the Ministry of Justice ran the prison system in Afghanistan; however the prisons now come under the control of the Ministry of Interior. Unfortunately the Ministry of Interior does not seem to be doing a better job. The Afghans run the Pol-i-Charki prison with money, equipment, and mentorship from the U.S. - but they are often accused of human rights abuses and misconduct. Numerous abuses occur especially with the illegal body cavity searches of women visitors.

Read more in "US aid cutoff fails to end Afghan prison searches", Boston Globe, March 17, 2012 and "Afghan Prison's Invasive Searches of Female Vistors Stir Fear of Slipping Rights", The New York Times, March 16, 2012.

Counterterrorism vs. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

There are lots of folks out there who think we should be using a counterterrorism vice counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Add the columnist Fareed Zakaria to those folks. Read "Afghan counterterrorism strategy needed", CNN World, March 16, 2012.

Mining Marble in Herat, Afghanistan (USAID)

"Home to an estimated 400,000 people, the city of Herat lies on the ancient trade routes of the Middle East and Central and South Asia—just 50 miles from the Iranian border. The province bearing the same name is the largest and most significant urban area in western Afghanistan. Mining has occurred throughout Afghanistan for thousands of years. More than 60 known deposits of valuable stone are found nationwide, representing 35 varieties in more than 40 colors, including fine-grained white marbles.

The Herat region boasts many of the country’s largest and best-quality marble quarries. In a country struggling with widespread unemployment and poverty, the marble sector has the potential to generate thousands of jobs and millions of dollars of revenue for the region.Yet, despite these significant mineral deposits, the mining sector has been unable to meet even domestic demand, let alone the significantly larger demand from international markets."

Read the rest of the story here in "Hard Rock in Afghanistan", USAID Frontlines, March/April 2012.

Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) Starts Train-the-Trainer Course

KABUL, Afghanistan — More than 60 new lieutenants began the train-the-trainer course at the Afghan Public Protection Force Training Center this week.

The group includes 36 officers who recently graduated from a Turkish police officer training course; the other 27 are graduates from the Afghan National Police Academy.

They will undergo a six-week program of instruction at the training center. The course of instruction consists of the basic static guard course, the convoy operations course and the personal security detail course. About half the officers will then disperse around Afghanistan as part of mobile APPF training teams and the others will be sent to the various APPF zone headquarters to help manage APPF operations around the country.

The APPF is creating mobile training teams in order to increase its overall training capacity, according to Richard Power, senior education and training advisor for the APPF Advisory Group. The APPF training center is currently able to train about 220 guards per month at a time. When renovations are completed at the training center and mobile training teams are up and running, the APPF will have the ability to train up to 1,500 guards per month, said Power.

Story source:  "APPF Lieutenants Start Train-the-Trainer Course", Allied Command Operations NATO, March 14, 2012.  Learn more about the Afghan Public Protection Force here.

Soldier Who Allegedly Killed 16 Civilians in Panjwai, Afghanistan Massacre Identified as SSG Robert Bales

Fox News has released the name of the Soldier who allegedly committed the killings of 16 civilians in the Panjwai massacre earlier this month. His name is Staff Sergeant Robert Bales. Bales is being flown to a military prison at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  See "Sources ID soldier suspected in Afghan massacre", Fox News, March 16, 2012. Learn more about the Panjwai massacre here.

Recruiting Continues for Afghan Local Police (ALP) Program in Afghanistan

Members of the Combined Joint Special Operations Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) and their Afghan National Army (ANA) counterparts (typically the ANA Special Forces and ANA Commandos) are continuing their efforts to expand the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program into new villages and communities. The photo seen here shows members of U.S. special operations and the 8th Commando Kandak in a village in Zabul discussing the ALP program with villagers. (Photo: Petty Officer 2nd Class Jacob Dillon - CJSOTF-A Media Operations Center).

Karzai Wants ISAF Out of Afghan Villages

In a reaction to the Panjwai massacre President Karzai wants all NATO troops to withdraw from Afghan villages to large bases. He has stated that Afghan security forces are now ready to take over all security responsibilities now. This will have an adverse effect on ISAF's plans for an orderly transition to Afghan security forces over the next few years. Part of that transition includes the use of special operations forces working in Afghan villages with the Afghan Local Police or ALP as part of the Village Stability Operations or VSO program. Read more in "Karzai Urges NATO Withdrawal From Afghan Villages", Voice of America, March 15, 2012.

Things Our Military Generals Talk About with Each Other but Can't Say in Public about the Afghan War

What are some true things that our generals can't say in public about the Afghan war?

1.  Pakistan is now an enemy of the United States.
2. We don't know why we are here, what we are fighting for, or how to know if we are winning.
3. The strategy is to fight, talk, and build.  But we're withdrawing the fighters, the Taliban won't talk, and the builders are corrupt.
4. Karzai's family is especially corrupt.  (see corruption in Afghanistan).

My favorite is below:

18.  We are ignoring the advisory effort and fighting the "big war" with American troops, just as we did in Vietnam. And the U.S. military won't act any differently and work with the Afghan forces seriously until American politicians significantly draw down U.S. forces in country - when it may be too damn late.

Read the rest in "19 true things generals can't say in public about the Afghan war: A helpful primer", The Best Defense Blog, November 9, 2011.  Although dated Nov 2011 all 19 are still true today!

DoD Announces Upcoming Afghanistan Unit Deployments for Spring 2012: 76th Inf Bde, 173rd BCT, 12th CAB

The Department of Defense today identified three major units to deploy as part of the upcoming rotation of forces operating in Afghanistan. The Spring 2012 scheduled rotation involves one brigade combat team headquarters with more than 70 personnel; one brigade combat team with more than 3,600 personnel; and a combat aviation brigade with more than 2,400 personnel to include:

Headquarters unit (rotation began last month):

76th Infantry Brigade Combat Team Headquarters, Indiana Army National Guard

Brigade Combat Team and Combat Aviation Brigade:

173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, Vicenza, Italy

12th Combat Aviation Brigade, Katterbach, Germany

To read the entire story see:
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15118

MG Mark Gurganus: What I meant to say!

Our general officers have brought the art of doublespeak to a high level of expertise.

An incident took place while Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta's plane was landing at Camp Bastion, Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Camp Bastion is run by the British. An Afghan man stole a truck (Toyota Hi-Lux), drove it onto the runway while the plane was landing, and headed down the runway toward the reception party at a high rate of speed. He crashed the truck in a ditch. The truck either caught fire or the driver set the truck on fire. The end result is the driver caught fire as well and later died.

MG Mark Gurgnaus, the new head of Regional Command Southwest (RC Southwest) - where Helmand Province is located - was in the reception party as were other high ranking officers. The general said in a press conference shortly after the incident that there were no repercussions in his area of operations due to the Panjwai massacre - not even a two-man demonstration.

The real story? The Afghan man, an interpreter employed on the base, came close to running over the general and the reception party for the Secretary of Defense. The general and his party took evasive action to avoid the attack. Just 30 minutes prior to the attempt attack, the Afghan man drove over a British military member - who is now in stable condition. The plane carrying Panetta was diverted to another area. "See Top Marine targeted in vehicle runway crash", Fox News, March 16, 2012.

Later in the day Marines were assembled at Camp Bastion to listen to a speech by the Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta during his recent visit to Afghanistan. What was unusual about this appearance was that the Marines were instructed to leave the hall, go outside, stack their weapons, and then return to their seats. This is the first time that anyone has ever heard of this happening in any war. Seems the general in charge of RC Southwest - MG Mark Gurganus - gave the order. Looks like the general doesn't trust his own Marines. See "Marines told to disarm before Panetta speech", CNN, March 14, 2012.

Things that make you go "Hmmmmmm". For more behind the story news on this incident see "Afghan interpreter targeted top US Marine general, officers in Helmand", Threat Matrix, The Long War Journal, March 16, 2012.

Deciphering Karzai's Rhetoric

Karzai has just recently announced that ISAF should withdraw its forces from Afghan villages and put them on large bases. He has also said that the Afghan security forces are ready to take over the security responsiblity for the country. The first statement flies in the face of logic and the second is wishful thinking. Does he really mean it or is it meant for the domestic audience? Read one commentators thoughts on this topic in "Afghan President Karzai's angry ultimatums have parallels in post-colonial Africa", The Christian Science Monitor, March 15, 2012.

Canadians Look at Usefulness of Continuing Afghan Mission

For the most part, Canadian combat troops have now left Afghanistan; however, there are over one thousand deployed there in support, staff, or training positions. The Canadians, as other NATO partners have, are looking at the usefulness of "sticking it out" to 2014. Considering the Afghan "insider killings", recent black eyes suffered by ISAF (Koran burning, Panjwai killings, etc.), Karzai's zaniness, Afghan government corruption, and more the Canadians cannot be faulted for re-evaluating the Afghan mission. Read more on this topic - "Perhaps Canada has done what it can in Afghanistan", The Vancouver Sun, March 15, 2012.