Paper - Hurdles to U.S. Stabilization Operations

A former defense analyst, Renanah Miles, writes a paper explaining why civilian agencies were unable to develop effective programs to assist the military in stabilization and counterinsurgency efforts in the Iraq and Afghan wars. The paper is entitled "The (Many) Hurdles to U.S. Stabilization Operations". You can read the paper posted on the Lawfare Blog here.

An Effective Drone Program for Targets in Pakistan

Michael McBride writes an article posted on the Small Wars Journal dated January 31, 2014 entitled "The Art of Restraining the Knife: Understanding the Limits of Drone Strikes in Pakistan".
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-art-of-restraining-the-knife

Harsh Report Points Out Miss-management of Funds by Afghan Ministries

A report by SIGAR says that 0 out of 16 Afghan ministries do not manage aid money correctly and all of the ministries are corrupt. See "Harsh Inspector General Report Says 0 out of 16 Afghan Agencies Can Be Trusted With U.S. Aid", AllGov.com, February 1, 2014.

Presidential Election Campaign Opens But With Violence

The presidential campaign in Afghanistan is now in full swing. The elections will be held in April 2014. The Taliban have vowed to disrupt the elections in an effort to discredit the results. The violence has started against the campaign workers - the most recent was the assassination of two workers for Abdullah Abdullah in the city of Herat in western Afghanistan. Read more in "Afghanistan presidential campaign opens, marred by violence", Los Angeles Times, February 2, 2014.

Lots of Roads - Little Maintenance

The United States and other international partners have built over 10,000 miles of roads in Afghanistan over the past decade. In 2001 there were only 50 miles of paved road. So a lot of money, time, and energy has been put into road construction. The massive build up of the road system was seen as a way to provide for more security, more economic growth, provide jobs, and join the various ethnically-diverse sections of the country together tying it to a strong, central government in Kabul. While billions have been poured into road construction there has not been much progress into the maintenance of these new roads. As a result of low maintenance, over use, poor construction, and the Taliban planting IEDs which leave large craters the roads of Afghanistan are quickly deteriorating. The international partners (along with the United States) would provide the Afghan Ministry of Public Works money to maintain the roads but the ministry has proven itself of disbursing the money to contracts for the repairs - much of the money goes to the Dubai bank accounts of the corrupt ministry officials. Read more in "U.S.-built roads in Afghanistan crumble for lack of care", Stars and Stripes, February 2, 2014.

Afghan Commandos Train with Afghan Helicopters

Afghan National Army commandos from the 8th Special Operations Kandak conducted tactical training with Afghan National Security forces helicopter aircrews in Pul-e-Alam district of Logar province in Afghanistan. The training was designed to sharpen skills needed while using Afghan helicopters. Tactics rehearsed included getting on and off the helicopters, providing security at helicopter landing zones, and employing helicopters to move from one location to another. Read more in "Afghan commandos, aviators perfect battlefield helicopter capability", DVIDS, February 2, 2014. (Photo by Bill Mesta, CJSOTF-A, January 20, 2014)

Planning for Resolute Support Mission Continues Despite Lack of Bilateral Security Agreement

It appears that NATO and the U.S. military are conducting parallel planning. One is for the "zero-option" of no troops in Afghanistan beyond December 2014. The second is for 10K of U.S. and 6K of NATO to be in Afghanistan beyond December 2014; providing the Bilateral Security Agreement is signed. This force of 16K would be conducting the Resolute Support mission providing Security Force Assistance in the form of advisers and trainers but also conducting counter terrorism missions against remnants of al Qaeda that remain in Afghanistan. Read more in "Military Plans Reflect Afghanistan Uncertainty", The New York Times, January 29, 2014.

Advisor to Karzai Says BSA Could be Signed

An advisor to Karzai (his national security advisor) is now hinting that the Bilateral Security Agreement could be signed by Karzai prior to him leaving office. Why bother. The April elections are around the corner. The newly elected president will most likely sign the BSA. ISAF should ignore Karzai, continue to parallel plan for either the "zero option" or leaving 10K in Afghanistan post-2014. How hard is that? (I do pity the LTC that has that job). So treat Karzai like the lame duck he is, ignore him, and move on. He shouldn't matter anymore.

Afghanistan Has Hope for the Future

Afghanistan has some hope for the future. With the April 2014 presidential elections around the corner the country has the opportunity to elect a president who can lead Afghanistan into the future. That would require the elimination of corruption (to an acceptable level?), ensuring that foreign aid continues, tapping into the various mineral deposits, signing the Bilateral Security Agreement, reaching an agreement with the Taliban, and bringing measures to bear against Pakistan so that the Pakistanis will stop supporting the insurgents with money, explosives, and sanctuaries. Read more in "Can Afghanistan's Economy Stand on Its Own?", The Diplomat, January 30, 2014. Richard Ghiasy of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) in Kabul writes about the tremendous potential that Afghanistan can achieve.

Adviser to APPF Describes His Work

A member of the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) provides us insight into his duties and responsibilities as an adviser to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). Read more in "Analyst gets top honors for work in Afghanistan", Robins Air Force Base News Release, January 31, 2014.

Task Force Reaper Concludes Mission at Camp Marmal

Task Force Reaper has concluded its mission in Regional Command North. The members of the unit served a long deployment performing a diverse set of missions that included providing security to convoys and moving men and equipment throughout the regional command. The helicopters in the task force included Apaches, Black Hawks, and Chinooks. The busy OPTEMPO was due in part to the retrograde of troops from Afghanistan back to the states. Read more in "Task Force Reaper concludes successful tour at Camp Marmal", DVIDS, January 25, 2014.

CRS Report Not Optimistic on Afghanistan

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has provided a report to Congress (but not released to the public) that is very pessimistic on the outlook for Afghanistan even if the Bilateral Security Agreement is signed and the U.S. and NATO can leave 10K and 6K advisors in Afghanistan post-2014. The report is entitled "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", by Kenneth Katzman for CRS, dated January 17, 2014. Read more in "The Afghanistan Mess: Fed Report Says We'll Pay Up The Nose Long After Troops Return", New York Daily News, January 30, 2014.

Strike (2/101st) Returns to Afghanistan

2nd Brigade Combat Team (Strike) of the 101st Airborne Division will return to Afghanistan for another deployment. They recently deployed to the North of Kabul (NoK) area in Regional Command East in 2012 where they provided a number of Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs). During this upcoming deployment they will be a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) and also deploy some SFAATs as well. Read more in "Strike cases colors for sixth time since 9/11", Fort Campbell Courier, January 30, 2014.

Karzai Clan and the Taliban: Not That Far Apart

An interesting article is available for reading on Strategy Page. The author goes into great detail explaining how and why corruption works in Afghanistan and then ties the Karzai clan and Taliban into the overall narrative. Worth reading. See "Afghanistan: Why the Karzai Clan Supports the Taliban", January 31, 2014.

NATO and Afghanistan

Andrew A. Michta, a professor of international studies at Rhodes College, is interviewed about NATOs role in Afghanistan and what the future NATO mission looks like. Read "NATO's Post ISAF Challenges and the Danger of a Hollow Alliance", Small Wars Journal, January 23, 2014.

Army to Keep 162nd SFAB

The Army has decided not to shut down the 162nd Brigade at Fort Polk. The 162nd is the training brigade responsible for training up the Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs) that deploy to Afghanistan for the ISAF Security Force Assistance mission. There were plans to shut the brigade down at the beginning of 2014. It would have been interesting to know where the Army planned on training up their SFAATs for Afghan deployments if they had shut down the 162nd. Things that make you go "Hmmmm". Read more in "Fort Polk to keep 162nd SFAB for 2014", Leesville Daily Leader, January 31, 2014.

DynCorp to Train Up Afghan Engineers in ANA

DynCorp has won a contract to help train up the Afghan National Army Engineer Corps. The principle unit of the ANA engineer branch is the Corp Engineer Kandak or CEK. Read a news report on the DynCorp contract "DynCorp International to Provide Training to Afghan National Army Engineers", Herald Online, January 30, 2014.

Brits Worry Over Attacks During Withdrawal

The Brits are slightly concerned about the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan over the next year but figure they have things set to ensure no adverse actions take place. They recognize that the Taliban will try and attack as they withdraw and then make some public announcements about it. Read more in "Army chiefs draw up plans to fight their way out of Afghanistan if Taliban attack during troop withdrawal", Mirror News, January 26, 2014.

Dev Aid as Negotiating Tool for BSA Signing

Karzai continues to stonewall the United States on the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement. He insists that the signing will take place with the new president of Afghanistan who will be elected in the April 2014 elections. One writer thinks we should force Karzai's hand by putting a freeze on development and aid funds going into Kabul's coffers until the Bilateral Security Agreement is signed. The writer also thinks we need to 'track' the money to ensure it is spent on the intended purpose and to attach some 'conditionality'. He provides some recommendations that merit consideration. In addition to the conditionality, he recommends increasing funding through Afghan systems (isn't this part of the problem?), spending only where there already is security, consolidate donor funds, providing more assistance directly to the provinces, focus on fiscal sustainability, unleash the private sector, and get tough on corruption. Read "Changing the Game in Afghanistan", War on the Rocks, January 22, 2014.

NATO Leaders Say Afghan Forces Need More Training

At a NATO conference many of the leading officials of NATO have again pointed out the need for continued training of the Afghan forces. The officials state that although the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have come a long way and held their own during the 2013 fighting season there are some things that they still need assistance with. That assistance would be provided by 10,000 U.S. military and 6,000 NATO troops.Read more in "NATO leaders say Afghan troops need more training", Stars and Stripes, February 1, 2014.

Afghan Interpreters Still Getting Screwed Over by State Department

It appears that the State Department is not taking Congress and its critics seriously on the State Departments inability to process visas to deserving Afghan interpreters who have put their lives at risk to aid our military. The State Department has been heavily criticized the past year for not processing visas in a timely manner (if at all). One would think that with the heavy public pressure the State Department would respond to fix their failure but evidently they are so insulated from reality they are not aware of it - or maybe they just don't care about the Afghan interpreters. I have been told the problem resides within the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. Perhaps a little less time in the "Duck and Cover" and more time behind the computer would achieve better results. Read more on this topic in "U.S. backlog for visas leaves Afghan interpreters in limbo", Los Angeles Times, January 31, 2014.

The Great Game - 2014 Plus

An article entitled "Karzai's Great Game Gamble" by Gawdat Bahgat and Robert Sharp has been posted on The Small Wars Journal (January 24, 2014). The writers provide us a little history on "The Great Game" played by England and Russia and then apply that to current times (2014 plus) as it relates to the Central Asian nations development of oil and gas resources (and pipelines) and the U.S. "pivot" to a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Pacific. They then tie in the need for continued U.S. support to Afghanistan with the strategic picture and discuss the refusal of Karzai to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). They conclude with the thought that we need to wait out Karzai and recognize that signing the BSA later is better than not at all even though it will complicate the life of ISAF and Pentagon planners working the retrograde.

SIGAR and ISAF: Who Is Winning the IO Battle?

Warfare is more than just about fighting. It has a lot to do with the public perception of who is just and who is winning. One can study the Vietnam War and come to that conclusion. While the U.S. military won almost every tactical battle in Vietnam it lost the "strategic battle" - the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese population and of the United States public. Public sentiment against the war in the states rose steadily in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The military's use of the information and media world was woeful. A key ingredient was the "five o'clock follies" where military spokesmen would spout off the "party line" every afternoon in Saigon. Unfortunately, the information provided by the military spokesmen at the follies did not reflect the reality of what was happening on the ground, the reporters who had been on the ground knew it, and the U.S. military public relations machine lost all credibility.

However, there was a lot going right in the Vietnam War but folks heard mostly bad news. The Nixon administration was able to conduct "Vietnamization" of the war by increasing the professionalism of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), providing modern equipment, and providing the logistics and supplies needed. By 1974 the South Vietnamese were doing the vast majority of the fighting and  the U.S. military was helping out with advisers and support efforts. The South Vietnamese government had a decent chance of surviving. Where the war was lost is when the U.S. Congress voted to cut off funding for the South Vietnamese government. Morale plummeted in South Vietnam and the ARVN lost the ability to fight because funding for fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts, etc. dried up. Those who could afford it fled Saigon for the U.S., Paris, and other destinations taking their money with them. The lack of funds for the Army and lower morale resulted in an inability of the South Vietnamese to fight a prolonged war. The North Vietnamese and its allies recognized victory served up by the U.S. Congress and quickly exploited it in early 1975.

Today's conflict in Afghanistan has some similar characteristics at play. We have turned over security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). According to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) the ANSF did a fair job in holding their own during the 2013 fighting season despite suffering horrendous casualties. While the ANSF didn't gain much territory it didn't loose much either. The ANSF is much more professional and capable. It is large enough to hold the major cities and main lines of communication (being able to conduct counterinsurgency is a different story, let's not go there). With continued advice and enabling assistance (and more money) the ANSF should be able to hold its own into the coming years (the results of the elections have a lot to do with this).

However . . . separate from the tactical successes on the battlefield is the fight in the "Information Operations" arena sometimes abbreviated to IO. IO is now referred to as Inform and Influence Activities. This is where the biggest danger lurks. The winning or loosing of Afghanistan may well pivot on who wins the info war. Since General Dunford took over he has been very attuned to this facet of the conflict. He wants to see the ANSF perceived as coming out of the 2013 fighting season as "holding their own". He wants the ANSF to be recognized as being "in the lead for the security of Afghanistan". He wants to see the Afghan ministries able to "sustain the ANSF" over the long-term and beyond post-2014. There are a lot of "wants" there. The "wants" have to have more than just good IO working for them to become reality; in some cases the facts on the ground have to back up the ISAF IO message.

General Dunfords' adversaries in the IO world are numerous.

The Taliban. First of all there is the Taliban who have simply out-matched the Afghan IO machine and the ISAF Public Affairs Office (PAO). While the Afghan government (and in some cases ISAF) has access to the Afghan media (print, TV, and radio) in the major cities, the Taliban have access to the rural areas where insurgencies historically thrive and where their support base happens to live. If you are a villager in a remote rural area of Afghanistan are you going to listen to a "voice" over the radio talking about government services and development that never arrives (unless it is in the form of corrupt payments to the District Governor and his cronies) or to the Taliban who comes to your local village armed with weapons and demands for food, shelter, and information about the ANSF? Night letters carry more impact than radio messages in rural Afghanistan.

Media. The press (all methods of TV, radio, Internet, and newspapers) carry a lot of weight. Historically the press looks for bad news. Reporters are always suspected by the military (as they should be). They are not the military's friend. The media is not hurting ISAF too badly as of late because Afghanistan is so rarely in the news these days. However the damage has been done. U.S. public support for the Afghan war is at the lowest ever.

International Community. There are some agencies and organizations out there that don't help the cause very much - and this is specifically true of some of the Non-Governmental Organizations or NGOs. Human Rights Watch comes to mind. While the NGOs provide a tremendous service to the Afghan people many of them will constantly deplore the military for civilian casualties or mismanagement of situations. This is not to disparage the bulk of the international community that is helpful to ISAF (EUPOL, European Community, NATO, NGOs, etc.). But organizations like Human Rights Watch (that slant the news) or Transparency International (that report the facts) hurt the ISAF IO effort.

Karzai. This guy needs to go. As one informed ISAF general once said when discussing the possible results of the Afghan election - "It can only get better". Karzai's info ops campaign is hurting ISAF's efforts. In addition, Karzai is hurting Afghanistan. The number one opponent to ISAF in the IO world is Karzai (not the Taliban, IC, or media). In addition, the number one source of support to the insurgents is corruption - and guess where that starts from (helpful clue: PoA)?

There are other IO opponents that ISAF has to contend with out there - too numerous to mention. Of late, one such organization has emerged to cause considerable damage to ISAF.

SIGAR. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has provided numerous (and very accurate reports) about some of the failures of the reconstruction effort. SIGAR has highlighted month after month cases of Afghan corruption or U.S. mismanagement of funds and programs that has cost the United States taxpayers billions of dollars. The reports by SIGAR are so accurate and damaging that ISAF decided to fight back against SIGAR with an IO effort to combat SIGAR. (You can read more about this in a USA Today news article).

For every report that SIGAR issues highlighting an ISAF failure - the ISAF PR folks issue a report saying how well ISAF is doing in that particular endeavor highlighting its successes. For example SIGAR recently reported on the mismanagement of the $200 million Afghan literacy program and ISAF sent out its "feel good" message on how the literacy program has seen improved oversight procedures implemented. So you can read the discouraging facts provided by SIGAR or "feel good" reading ISAF's press releases.

The ISAF effort to counter SIGAR probably came from an initiative called the "Audit Plan of Action" - which recommends ISAF releasing news of how the military has addressed problems cited by SIGAR before SIGAR releases its report to Congress and the media. The initiative was probably cooked up by the Commander's Action Group (CAG) or the ISAF IO (DCoS Communications) folks. SIGAR's position is that ISAF should spend less time writing miss-leading press releases and more time fixing the problems cited in the reports and audits. (see the USA Today article linked to above for more).

Unfortunately, armed with the facts, SIGAR has the ISAF IO machine outclassed and over-matched. ISAF would be better off taking the very detailed and astute recommendations in the SIGAR reports and implementing them. ISAF could then fix some of the problems instead of applying decorative window dressing and attacking the messenger. Congress, in the humongous budget bill recently passed, cut reconstruction and military aid funds for Afghanistan by a huge amount. Does 1975 come to mind?

I wonder who Congress was listening to? ISAF or SIGAR?

Learn more about SIGAR here at www.sigar.mil.

Rethinking Pakistan

Over the past twelve years our relationship with Pakistan has usually been in the context of "AfPak" - the lumping together of Afghanistan and Pakistan into one complex problem. There are some (see a report by the Council on Foreign Relations) who think we need to change this outlook and separate the two countries in our regional outlook. We are asked to rethink our Pakistan strategy; a revised approach to Pakistan would help the U.S. advance its interests in Asia. (I guess we are supposed to overlook the fact that Pakistan is supporting the Afghan insurgents and providing sanctuary to the Haqqani Network). Read more in "As Afghan Pullout Looms, U.S. Urged to Rethink Pakistan Ties", Inter Press Service, January 23, 2014.

No BSA Blow to Afghan Army

The lack of a Bilateral Security Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan could not only result in a "zero option" for foreign troops (mostly advisors) in Afghanistan after December 2014 but also put at risk further financial aid that would bankroll the Afghan security forces, governance, and development. If the foreign aid is reduced (just as Congress slashed funds for Afghanistan in recent budget talks) then it will be almost impossible for the MoI and MoD to pay for its police and Soldiers. Read more in "Lack of bilateral agreement would be blow to Afghan army, NATO chief says", Stars and Stripes, January 27, 2014.

Medical Supplies Turned Over to ANSF

A unique team of individuals have rescued expensive medical supplies and equipment destined to be destroyed or shipped back to the United States to sit in metal containers or in warehouses unused. MAJ Elizabeth Gum of the 1st Theater Sustainment Command and her team of medical logistic specialists are helping to provide needed training aides and supplies by salvaging medical supplies in theater. The team is finding medical material in good condition and reintroducing the materiel to support medical units, civilian entities, and the ANSF. The teams sort through the retrosort yards at Bagram and Kandahar to find the materials for the free issue program. Read more in "Life saving money", DVIDS, January 25, 2014.

Watching COIN Fail in Afghanistan

A U.S. Marine Corps officer, who served as an advisor in Afghanistan, writes a contemplative piece on how we should help the Afghans conduct counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. He states that the United States has pushed a U.S. version of counterinsurgency on the Afghans that does not work for the Afghans and thus we have prevented the Afghans from making the necessary progress to defeat the insurgents. Our (the U.S. model) method of a strong centralized government exerting its control through the MoD and MoI into the rural Pashtun areas just doesn't work. The author proposes some novel changes to the current construct that are worth consideration. Read more in "Front Row Seat: Watching COIN Fail in Afghanistan", War on the Rocks, January 28, 2014.

Afghan Ministries Incapable of Managing Aid Money

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has issued a report stating that there are no Afghan ministries that are capable of managing the billions of AID dollars that are transferred directly into the coffers of the Afghan treasury. Two different well-known accounting firms have conducted audits and found the ministries wanting. We are probably several years late but our military would probably have been better off sending a few thousand accountants to Afghanistan to help with management of the money and less tactical advisors to help the Afghans fight battles on the ground. Read more in "Report: No Afghan ministry capable of managing aid", Stars and Stripes, January 30, 2014.

Book - "The Pomegranate Peace"

A new book has been published called "The Pomegranate Peace" by Rashmee Roshan Lall. The novel is about the failure of the United States reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan - how we threw money away on big and small projects with a lack of expertise and oversight. This story centers around a woman sent by the State Department to run a project that will increase the export of pomegranates to develop the economy, eradicate poppy cultivation, improve the lives of Afghans, and pull support away from the Taliban. The author spent some time in Kabul and relates the life of an American working the war effort on the development front. A recent book review has more "Book Review: The Pomegranate Peace", Fire Dog Lake.com, January 24, 2014. The book is available at Amazon.com - The Pomegranate Peace.

Book Review: "Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror", by Barnett R. Rubin

Barnett R. Rubin, a noted observer (and participant), of the nation building effort in Afghanistan has wrote a book entitled "Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror", Oxford University Press, April 2013. It is a good read (according to the book review linked to below) for those interested in the socio-economic and political history of Afghanistan. It also will be of interest to those who look at the effect foreign powers have on a state. Some of the essays in the book cover human rights, security, narcotics trade, and post-conflict state building. Read a book review here located on the London School of Economics Review of Books website (review by Samay Borom). You can learn more about the book from Amazon.com (or purchase it) at this link: Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror

Obama's State of Union Speech Says Little About Afghanistan

The State of the Union speech by Obama provided little new information about Afghanistan. In fact, Afghanistan was hardly mentioned at all. Read more in "For Afghans, Obama's SOTU message on troops was loud and clear", Stars and Stripes, January 30, 2014.

Interpreter Dodges Taliban and Waits Out State Department

Read the story of an interpreter who survived retaliation by the Taliban for his assistance to the U.S. Marines and who frustratingly waited for the State Department to get its act together so he could get a visa to the United States. The State Department has done a horrible job granting visas to Afghans who put their lives on the line for U.S. military personnel. See "Left Behind: Afghan translator dodges Taliban on long road to America", NBC News, January 23, 2014.

The Case for Optimism in Afghanistan

Sharif Azami, a Program Officer for the Fetzer Institute, writes "Afghanistan Can Use a Strong Dose of Morale Optimism", on The Huffington Post, January 23, 2014. He believes that the United States would be wrong to walk away from Afghanistan on the basis that President Karzai does not want to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement. He feels that Afghanistan has made too much progress and that there is a lot to lose if the international community cuts aid and military assistance to Afghanistan. He has an optimistic outlook (not shared by this blogger) on the future of Afghanistan if only the international community will stay on task.

Afghan Election Poll Funds Canceled by U.S.

The U.S. has cancelled the funding to conduct some pre-election polling prior to the Afghan elections. Relations between the U.S. and Karzai have been deteriorating and now it appears that Karzai (among other things) is accusing the U.S. of trying to influence the Afghan elections through the polls. Read more in "U.S. cancels funds for Afghan polls ahead of election", Reuters, January 30, 2014.

Ad Village - Karzai Stops the Airing of Ads Encouraging Him to Sign BSA

President Karzai has stopped the ads bought by ISAF (or USAID) and provided by a little-known firm called "Ad Village" (website now unavailable) and aired on Afghan television and radio. The ads were designed to encourage President Karzai to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement. Read more in "Afghanistan Cracks Down on TV Campaign Promoting U.S. Troops Presence in Country", The Huffington Post, January 22, 2014.

Post-2014 10K Force to be SOF Heavy

The residual force to remain in Afghanistan post-2014 (if the Bilateral Security Agreement is signed) will be very special operations heavy. Learn more in "Special ops key in Afghanistan presence, local members say", The Tampa Tribune, January 30, 2014.

Human Rights Report 2104 - Afghan Women

A recent report by Human Rights Watch (2014) states that there is great concern that women's rights in Afghanistan will back-slip due to the withdrawal of ISAF troops post-2014. The report cites that there was declining respect for human rights in the country over the past year (2013). It cites attacks on women's rights, growing internal displacement and migration, and weakened efficacy of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). According to the report, opponents of women's rights have seized the opportunity to begin rolling back the progress made since the end of the Taliban rule. This has happened due to the waning international interest in Afghanistan. Read Human Rights Watch Report on Afghan Women.

2-15 Field Artillery Wins Award for Afghan Deployment

A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division won the Henry A. Knox award. The U.S. Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma recognizes the best active-duty artillery battery in the Army with the award. During their nine-month deployment to Paktika province, Afghanistan in 2013 the Soldiers performed with distinction as a Security Force Assistance Advisory Team (SFAAT) and provided artillery fires in support of maneuver operations. The SFAAT Red 1 Team provided advisory assistance to Afghan National Army artillery units in the employment of the Afghan 122-mm D-30 Howitzers.

Congress Cuts Military and Development Aid for Afghanistan

Congress has cut military and development aid for Afghanistan. The reduction in money is something that happened quietly without a lot of discussion in Congress and no opposition from the Obama administration. Our general officers are strangely quiet as well (do they know it is a losing battle or have they too given up on the Afghans?). Development aid was cut in half and the military saw some significant cuts as well. This could be war fatigue, disappointment in the rampart corruption in the Afghan government, or displeasure with Karzai's antics in regard to his not signing the Bilateral Security Agreement. Read more in "Congress cuts U.S. military and development aid for Afghanistan", The Washington Post, January 24, 2014.

Schoolhouse Construction in Afghanistan - Lacking Oversight

Schoolhouse in MeS - photo SIGAR Jan 14

A schoolhouse being built in Afghanistan has turned into a glaring example of how an aid project can go wrong in Afghanistan. The school has turned into a money pit - the project lasting five years and a number of contractors. The school still is yet completed with USAID in search of yet another contractor to finish the job and correct the deficiencies. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) recently published a report on this project. Unfortunately, the example in this report is not the exception but probably the rule. USAID has had some big problems in oversight of its projects. Corruption in Afghanistan is rampart and we have not seen the return we should have on the many billions of dollars pumped into Afghanistan - whether military aid or reconstruction dollars. Read a recent news article on the school in Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan entitled "5 years and 3 contractors later, Afghanistan school still deemed unsafe", Fox News, January 22, 2014. Read the SIGAR report.

SIGAR: ANSF Literacy Program Needs Oversight

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has published a report (January 2014) entitled Afghan National Security Forces: Despite Reported Successes, Concerns Remain about Literacy Program Results, Contract Oversight, Transition, and Sustainment, SIGAR 14-30 Audit Report. SIGAR has found a number of implementation and oversight issues with the ANSF literacy program. You can read the report at the following link. www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR_14-30-AR.pdf

ISAF Improves Oversight of Literacy Contracts and Training Programs for ANSF

The International Security Assistance Force announced it has implemented new literacy and language training contracts for the Afghan National Security Forces to improve delivery and oversight of the services purchases. The new contracts were awarded as ISAF has identified shortfalls in the terms and conditions of the initial service contract. Under the new contracts, metrics for service delivery and performance are more stringent. The scope and duration of the contracts are narrower which will lead to efficiencies in delivery and performance.

Read more in "Coalition improves oversight of literacy contracts and training programs", DVIDS, January 27, 2014.

Literacy Program - Not Quite Shock and Awe

Read one bloggers comments about the failed Afghan literacy program and how it is reflective of the many other programs where money has gone down the drain. See "Shock & Awe: Afghan literacy program fails" by Afghan Good Enough.

http://afghanright.wordpress.com/2014/01/28/shock-awe-afghan-literacy-program-fails/

US Denounces Release of Detainees by Afghans

The U.S. military is not happy with Karzai on a number of issues. One of these is Karzai's insistence on releasing insurgents that were under U.S. control and then transferred to the Afghans. Many of the detainees to be released are considered by the U.S. to be "legitimate threats to security". Read more in "US military denounces release of 'dangerous' Afghan prisoners", Stars and Stripes, January 27, 2014.

ANSF Hobbled by Illiteracy

According to a recent news article the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are 'hobbled' by illiteracy. More than half the numbers of the Afghan military and police don't know how to read or write and those that do are at the 3rd grade level. Despite millions of dollars provided by the United States to improve literacy (currently there is a $200 million contract to three different firms to implement the program) the ANSF still has a low literacy rate. This partly stemming from the huge churn of personnel. The many recruits that do join the ANSF don't stay very long; so they arrive illiterate and some receive training - and promptly depart for better jobs in the civilian sector. Read more in "Afghan Forces Hobbled by illiteracy, U.S. Inspector Says", Bloomberg News, January 28, 2014.

Karzai Continues to Demonize the U.S. Forces

The Karzai verbal onslaught against the U.S. military in Afghanistan continues. He now says that we are aided in or conducted insurgent-style attacks to undermine his government. Folks are trying to figure out what is driving his insanity - appeasement to the Taliban, improving his legacy of standing up to a superpower, hedging his bets and casting blame on the U.S. for failure after December 2014? No one really has a handle on his motivation. (Perhaps just too much drug use? A secret plant of the Taliban?). Read more in "Karzai suspects U.S. is behind insurgent-style attacks, Afghan officials say", The Washington Post, January 28, 2014.

Expat Recalls La Taverna Restaurant in Kabul

A former member of the expat community in Kabul recalls with fond memories the recently bombed restaurant in Kabul - La Taverna du Liban. Her recollection is of a safe place with good food that allowed expats to get away from the war. Read "Afghan bombing stirs memories", Sedalia Democrat, January 24, 2014.

Article - 21 Most Corrupt Nations in World: Guess Where Afghanistan Is on the List?

On the top of the list! Of course. Our friend President Karzai is the most corrupt world leader at present time and the corruption extends from the presidents office, through the ministries, all the way down to the district level. See who else is on the corruption list in "Investors Beware: The 21 Most Corrupt Nations", Forbes.com, January 22, 2014.

Flat Tires in Kabul - Good Police Work?

There has been a rash of flat tires in Kabul. Turns out it is the Afghan police enforcing a parking ban against parking on the street. Read more in "Punctured Tires in Kabul are the Work of Police, not Punks", NPR Parallels, January 20, 2014.

Briefing on Functionally-based Security Force Assistance

A video entitled Functionally-based Security Force Assistance (SFA) by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The briefing is on the ISAF shift in mission focus from combat-oriented, unit-based Security Force Assistance to functionally-based, multi-echelon Security Force Assistance. The video can be viewed at the below link:

https://youtu.be/DfwHQiKyxVs