General Allen, the commander of ISAF, recently spent some time with the Brookings Institution during his recent visit to Washington, DC. (He was addressing Congress for a couple of days on the state of the Afghan War). Some important comments that General Allen made during the Brookings Institution event include:
By September 2012 the U.S. troop level will return to pre-surge levels or around 68,000 personnel.
The main counterinsurgency effort will shift from the southern provinces to the eastern provinces.
The main threat in the east appears to be the Haqqani Network.
The 2012 Afghan-ISAF campaign for Regional Command East (RC East) will increase Afghan troop strength in provinces along the border, bolster the Afghan Local Police or ALP, Village Stability Operations (VSO) and special operations in the region. There will also be a greater density of U.S. forces partnering with their Afghan counterparts.
Wednesday, March 28, 2012
BG McMaster From CJITF Shafafiyat to Fort Benning
Brig. Gen. Herbert R. McMaster Jr is being re-assigned to be the commanding general, U.S. Army Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Fort Benning, Ga. He most recently served as the Commander for the Combined Joint Interagency Task Force - Shafafiyat, International Security Assistance Force, Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan. Being head of Shafafiyat had to have been one of the most frustrating jobs ever in his career. Really? How do you fight corruption in Afghanistan when the country is headed by one of the most corrupt individuals in the country? Yes, that would be Karzai.
Myths About the Afghan War and the Way Forward (by David Rohde)
A columnist for Reuters, David Rohde, provides us his analysis of the way ahead in Afghanistan. First he debunks five myths about the Afghan War:
- the strategic unimportance of Afghanistan
- all Afghans want us to leave
- with an American withdrawal peace will come
- the Taliban won't compromise
- a faster withdrawal is better for Obama in an election year.
He then tells us what we should do:
- Hold steady on the strategic plan
- Deploy Afghans, not Americans
- Transfer Taliban commanders held in Guantanamo Bay
- Pressure the Pakistan military
Read his article in "5 Myths about the Afghan War", The Atlantic, March 16, 2012.
- the strategic unimportance of Afghanistan
- all Afghans want us to leave
- with an American withdrawal peace will come
- the Taliban won't compromise
- a faster withdrawal is better for Obama in an election year.
He then tells us what we should do:
- Hold steady on the strategic plan
- Deploy Afghans, not Americans
- Transfer Taliban commanders held in Guantanamo Bay
- Pressure the Pakistan military
Read his article in "5 Myths about the Afghan War", The Atlantic, March 16, 2012.
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
Gen. Allen and Afghanistan : Brookings Event
During his trip to Washington, DC General John Allen, the ISAF Commander, made the rounds before Congress and several news organizations. One of his stops was to Brookings for an hour-long discussion on Afghanistan. You can listen to the program here at "The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan", Brookings.edu, March 26, 2012.
Paper - Effectiveness of Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP)
The Small Wars Journal has posted a detailed paper about the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs that were initiated and are now supported by the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command - Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A). The paper explores the history and background of VSO and ALP. Read an abstract of the paper below:
This paper seeks to analyze and assess, to the extent possible, the efficacy of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) missions currently being carried out by U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) in Afghanistan. By examining security indicators for provinces where VSO/ALP operations are being conducted, scholarly research and assessments, and Congressional records, this paper finds that VSO/ALP is having a positive impact on security and governance at the local level in Afghanistan. In addition, this paper addresses areas of concern regarding VSO/ALP and makes some recommendations for improving the size and scope of these initiatives.The link to the paper can be found at "The Only Game in Town: Assessing the Effectiveness of Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police", by Seth A. Shreckengast, Small Wars Journal, March 27, 2012.
IMU Leader Killed in Afghanistan - Makhdum Nusrat
An operation in Shirin Tagab district, Faryab province resulted in the killing of Makhdum Nusrat, the senior Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader in Afghanistan. Several other IMU insurgents were also killed. Makhdum was the highest-ranking IMU insurgent operating in the country. He led attacks against Afghan and coalition troops throughout the northern provinces for the last eight months and was plotting the assassination of an Afghan Parliament member in Kabul.
Read an ISAF press release about the operation in "Senior Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader killed during operation", DVIDS, March 27, 2012. Learn more about the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan here.
Read an ISAF press release about the operation in "Senior Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan leader killed during operation", DVIDS, March 27, 2012. Learn more about the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan here.
Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Improving According to General Allen
During a press conference on March 26, 2012 Gen. John Allen briefed reporters on the situation in Afghanistan. Read a news account of the briefing in "Afghan Security Forces Improving Quickly, Allen Says", American Forces Press Service, March 26, 2012.
Billions of Cash Smuggled out of Afghanistan
The international community is pumping billions of dollars into Afghanistan each year to shore up the economy, fund development work, establish governance, and build the capability and capacity of the military. However the Afghans seem to be sending the money out of the country just as much. Corruption is widespread in the Afghan government and many international donor dollars do not find their way to the intended purpose. Read more in "Billions in cash smuggled out of Afghanistan every year", CNN.com, March 27, 2012.
Taliban Divided over Strategy?
A recent news article questions whether the Taliban are united or divided as to future strategy - especially in the area of negotiating in peace talks with the United States. See "In Afghanistan, Taliban seems divided at a key juncture", Los Angeles Times, March 25, 2012.
3G Network Launched in Afghanistan
Afghanistan has reportedly seen the launch of its first 3G network according to local news source Outlook Afghanistan. UAE-based Etisalat Afghanistan today announced the launch of its 3G network in a ceremony attended by the head of the nation’s telecoms watchdog, the Afghanistan Telecoms Regulatory Authority (ATRA) and the minister for communications and information technology. Etisalat is yet to reveal the coverage of the network, or specific plans or packages for 3G services.Read the rest of the news article here - "Etisalat launches 3G network in Afghanistan", TeleGeography, March 19, 2012. Learn more about telecommunications in Afghanistan.
Monday, March 26, 2012
SOF Troops Hold Village Stabilty Operations (VSO) Conference to Prepare for Afghan Mission
Representatives from different special operations forces recently gathered at a week-long conference in Orlando, Florida to learn more about Village Stability Operations or VSO. The SOF representatives will return to their units and pass on their new knowledge on VSO to other unit members in preparation for a deployment to Afghanistan. Read more in "Special ops forces trying to stabilize rural Afghan villages", Tampa Bay Online, March 26, 2012.
Afghan Women Improve Their Lot with Dairy Goat Project - News from ICARDA
A recent news release provides information about a dairy goat project that has provided substantial benefits to women in agricultural areas of Afghanistan. The women-orientated project has increased incomes, improved nutrition, and created new platforms for community development. Read more in "Dairy goat project improves women's welfare in Afghanistan", International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA), March 2012.
Negotiating a Political Settlement in Afghanistan - Report by International Crisis Group (ICG)
The International Crisis Group (ICG) based in Brussels has released a report that is very critical of the current negotiations being held (or not being held) with the Afghan insurgents. The ICG believes that peace talks are extremely important if there is to be "any chance of delivering sustainable peace in Afghanistan". The recent report is entitled "Talking about Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan", Asia Report No 221, 26 Mar 2012.
Read the ICG press release about the report here "Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan", ICG, 26 March 2012. The actual report can be read or downloaded here in Adobe Acrobat PDF format - "Talking about Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan". Learn more about the Afghan peace talks and read recent news articles on the Afghan reconciliation process.
Read the ICG press release about the report here "Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan", ICG, 26 March 2012. The actual report can be read or downloaded here in Adobe Acrobat PDF format - "Talking about Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan". Learn more about the Afghan peace talks and read recent news articles on the Afghan reconciliation process.
Security Force Assistance Team Training at Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, LA
As part of the transition of ISAF troops reducing combat operations and assuming the 'advise and assist' mission units preparing to deploy to Afghanistan are undergoing training at Fort Polk, LA. The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) has adapted its training environment for those units that are forming up the Security Force Assistance Teams (SFAT) that will deploy alongside Afghan ANA units over the next couple of years. Read more on the training in "Security Force Assistance Team nets 'high value' training", DIVIDS, March 25, 2012.
Bagram Detention Facility: Some Details about the MOU
The United States and the Afghan government reached a last minute deal on the proposed turnover of the Bagram detention facility where over 3,000 detainees are currently held under the control of the U.S. President Karzai has been strongly insisting that the facility be turned over to Afghan control. The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) recently signed transitions this control to the Afghans over a six-month long period. Read a note of concern on the proposed turnover by Kate Clark of the Afghanistan Analysts Network entitled "The Bagram Memorandum: Handing over the other Guantanamo", AAN, March 21, 2012.
The Fight for Eastern Afghanistan - Paper by Institute for the Study of War (Isaac Hock)
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has published a paper entitled "Fact Sheet: The Fight for Eastern Afghanistan". The author is Isaac Hock, a Research Analyst at the ISW. A summary of the fact sheet is below:
Security gains made by the addition of U.S. “surge” forces in southern Afghanistan have denied the Taliban its historical safe havens in Kandahar and Helmand. The campaign in Afghanistan must now focus on the East, which received few surge troops. The provinces surrounding Kabul are strategically important for controlling the capital and connecting the city with the rest of Afghanistan.
Sunday, March 25, 2012
173rd ABCT Completes Counterinsurgency Training in Preparation for Afghanistan
The 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team has recently completed three-weeks of counterinsurgency training in Hohenfels, Germany. The BCT is preparing for a deployment to Afghanistan. Read more in "173rd ABCT wrap counter insurgency training ahead of deployment", Stars and Stripes, March 24, 2012.
Afghan Force Package for 2013
In a recent interview (Friday, March 23, 2012) with Public Broadcast System's Charlie Rose program - General Allen, the ISAF Commander, provided insight for how troop levels in 2013 and 2014 will be determined. He said that a number of factors and considerations will provide input into his recommendation to President Obama.
Some of these factors include the state of the insurgency, the operational environment, level of partner nation troop levels in 2013 (could be around 40,000), the status of the partnership with the Afghan government,
Read more about Gen Allen's statements during the interview about Afghan force levels in 2013 in "Allen to Examine Afghanistan Force Package", American Forces Press Service, March 24, 2012.
View the hour-long interview on the PBS Charlie Rose website. Other topics in the interview include observations on Karzai, corruption, Koran burnings, Panjwai massacre, and night raids.
General John R. Allen bio on ISAF website.
Some of these factors include the state of the insurgency, the operational environment, level of partner nation troop levels in 2013 (could be around 40,000), the status of the partnership with the Afghan government,
Read more about Gen Allen's statements during the interview about Afghan force levels in 2013 in "Allen to Examine Afghanistan Force Package", American Forces Press Service, March 24, 2012.
View the hour-long interview on the PBS Charlie Rose website. Other topics in the interview include observations on Karzai, corruption, Koran burnings, Panjwai massacre, and night raids.
General John R. Allen bio on ISAF website.
Fake Afghan Village at JRTC (Fort Polk, LA) Helps Train Troops for Deployment
One of the training venues that U.S. troops use to prepare for deployment to Afghanistan is a fake Afghan village with Afghan role players located at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The village provides realistic training to troops who will have to interact with Afghans in a counterinsurgency role. Read more in "The Army Built A Fake Afghan Village In Louisiana So Soldiers Can Practice", Business Insider, March 24, 2012.
Alcohol on the Battlefield
The recent tragedy of the Panjwai massacre and the alleged shooters use of alcohol on the night before has people looking at the "no-alcohol" policy in Afghanistan. Some say that keeping Soldiers at a zero-level use of alcohol promotes binge drinking at a later time - usually just after redeployment. Many enjoy alcohol as a stress reliever and believe that rationed alcohol (as many ISAF partner nations adhere to) would relieve the stress that many Soldiers endure during a deployment. Read the comments of one military member in "When Booze Comes Off the Battlefield", At War Blog on The New York Times, March 23, 2012.
Thunder Lab - Pilot Training in Afghanistan Overcoming Illiteracy and Corruption
KABUL — After more than 30 years of war, the few qualified pilots in Afghanistan are largely graying veterans of the old Soviet-backed military who haven’t flown a MiG in decades. Now, the U.S. Air Force is playing catch-up, with programs to develop young Afghan pilots, as well as rank-and-file airmen, called soldiers by Afghans. Long before pilots can get in the cockpit, mechanics under the hood or enlisted soldiers to checkpoints, there are two basic problems to address: literacy and, in the case of the pilots, the ability to speak English, which is the international language of aviation.Read the rest of the article in "Coalition troops hope to improve Afghan pilots' literacy and, eventually, aviation skills", Stars and Stripes, March 19, 2012.
Is General Allen In Tune with US Mood on Afghanistan?
Juan Williams, a Fox News commentator, has published an opinion piece about General John Allen's recent testimony before Congress. Williams says that Gen Allen is not reading US public opinion accurately and does not realize that the US population is overwhelmingly in favor of getting out of Afghanistan sooner rather than later. Read his article in "Could we leave Afghanistan early?", Fox News.com, March 23, 2012.
Saturday, March 24, 2012
Paper - Sustainable Governance in Afghanistan
The Civil-Military Fusion Centre has published a paper entitled "Towards Sustainable Governance: Funding & Capacity". The paper, dated February 2012, is authored by Stefanie Nijssen - a governance and rule of law desk officer. The paper discusses in detail governance in Afghanistan in the future under fiscal constraints as aid to that country decreases. The paper is available for reading or downloading through a link provided by ReliefWeb - http://reliefweb.int/node/485078. The introductory paragraph of the paper, seen below, provides a description of the paper contents.
The United States Institute of Peace’s (USIP) handbook on “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction” states that effective governance requires domestic capacity. This capacity comprises skills and capabilities as well as adequate financial resources. However, according to Deutsche Welle, the Afghan government may face significant challenges in financing its operations and its security services in the coming years if, as the World Bank predicts, aid to the country decreases significantly. This report examines various ways in which the Afghan government and the international community have responded to the dual challenges of fiscal sustainability and skills building.
Criminal Charges Preferred Against SSG Robert Bales (Panjwai Massacre, Afghanistan)
The Soldier alleged to have committed the killing of 17 civilians in Panjwai district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan has had criminal charges preferred against him by the military under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). SSG Robert Bales is currently being held in pretrial confinement at the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The next step in the military justice process is for the special court-martial convening authority at Joint Base Lewis-McChord to decide whether to direct an investigation of the charges under the UCMJ's Article 32. Read more in "U.S. Forces Afghanistan Prefers Criminal Charges Against Bales", American Forces Press Service, March 23, 2012.
Pakistan and US Discussing the Opening of Supply Routes Through Pakistan
Pakistan and the United States may soon reopen talks about reopening supply routes through Pakistan. The routes have been closed for a few months as a result of an airstrike that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers along the Afghan-Pak border in November 2011. Currently all supplies are transiting the northern route through the Central Asian countries to the north of Afghanistan. Read more in "US-Pakistan to discuss supply routes soon", Miami Herald, March 23, 2012.
UN Security Council Extends Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
The United Nations Security Council extended in an unanimous vote Resolution 2041 (2012). The vote extends the assistance mission in Afghanistan until 23 March 2013. As a result of the resolution the Security Council decided that the Mission would continue to lead and coordinate international civilian efforts in the country in accordance with the results of international conferences. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) "would continue to lead the international effort to strengthen the role of Afghan institutions in democratic governance, the rule of law, control of drugs, human rights, humanitarian assistance and related areas". Read the full text of the resolution here in a news release dated 22 March 2012.
Commentary: Success in Afghanistan
Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Graham have penned an opinion piece that points out the U.S. national security interests at stake in Afghanistan and defines the path to success in the Afghan War. They state that "significant progress" has been made in Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have increased in capacity and capability, and that the U.S. should not abandon Afghanistan as we have in the past. Read the article in "Sustaining success in Afghanistan", The Washington Post, March 21, 2012.
TAPI Natural Gas Pipeline Not in Afghanistan's Future Soon
A recent article states that the proposed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India natural gas pipeline is not going to be built soon. This endeavor would entail a pipeline built and carrying natural gas from Turkmenistan, across Afghanistan and Pakistan, and into India for processing and shipment to customers. For Afghanistan, the pipeline would mean increased revenue for its national budget. However, the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan has put this very important project on hold. Read more in "Collateral Damage From Afghan Turmoil - - the TAPI Pipeline", Huffington Post, March 21, 2012.
Obama's War of Necessity - Not so Necessary
President Obama, in years past, has described Afghanistan as a 'war of necessity' - which, he was quick to point out, the Iraq War was not. The words 'war of necessity' are being used less now that we have a time-table for withdrawal (2014), a questionable outcome, and pressure is mounting within the United States for an accelerated departure. Obama is banking on negotiations with the Taliban (which the Taliban have temporarily withdrawn from) and the strengthening of the Afghan National Security Forces. Unfortunately, he has two very difficult problems - an ineffective and corrupt Afghan government without the support of the population and an insurgency with sanctuaries in Pakistan and support from the Pakistani military and intelligence services. Read more on this topic in "Obama's Retreat from his 'War of Necessity'", By Marvin Kalb, Brookings, March 19, 2012.
Gen Allen and Congress: Corruption and Insurgent Safe Havens in Pakistan
General Allen has been testifying before Congress the last few days. During his testimony he stated that two of the biggest problems in ending the Afghan War successfully are corruption in the Afghan government and the insurgents access to sanctuary in Pakistan. Read more in "Allen: Corruption, safe havens block Afghan success", The Washington Times, March 22, 2012.
Legal Path Ahead for SSG Bales (Panjwai Massacre)
The legal journey for SSG Bales, the accused killer in the Panjwai massacre, will be a long journey under the military judicial system. Read more in "Accused Sergeant Heads Down a Long Legal Road", NPR, March 21, 2012.
Friday, March 23, 2012
ISAF's Future Strategic Plan for Afghanistan
General Allen, in his testimony before Congress this past week, revealed parts of the "new" ISAF strategic plan for Afghanistan. Prior to President Obama's announcement that the U.S. would speed its withdrawal plans up from 2014 to mid-2013 the plan was supposed to be:
ISAF consolidates its hold in southern Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011. Then in 2012 (we are now at the beginning of the 2012 fighting season) US forces would be shifted to East Afghanistan to defeat (or disrupt) the insurgency along the Afghan-Pak border.
But . . . along came President Obama's "early withdrawal" plan. Instead of moving troops from Southern Afghanistan to Eastern Afghanistan - they are to come home.
So who does the fighting to secure the East of Afghanistan? According to General Allen - the new plan is for the Afghan security forces to accomplish this. So it appears that U.S. troops will concentrate on Southeastern Afghanistan - or the "Southern" RC-East area while the ANSF will be responsible for Northeastern Afghanistan - or the "Northern" RC-East area.
This new plan involves no small measure of "risk taking". In other words, leaving the "Northern RC-East" territory to the Afghans probably means that the insurgents (Taliban and Haqqani Network) will continue to maintain their grasp on this area and perhaps gain even more territory. The south of Afghanistan (where much progress has been made over the past two years due to the 30,000 troop surge) are to be handed over to the Afghan security forces as well (we shall see how that works out).
CJ Radin of The Long War Journal explains this more fully in his article "ISAF's new plan for Afghanistan" posted on March 22, 2012. He has a handy map of Afghanistan depicting the areas of RC East as well.
ISAF consolidates its hold in southern Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011. Then in 2012 (we are now at the beginning of the 2012 fighting season) US forces would be shifted to East Afghanistan to defeat (or disrupt) the insurgency along the Afghan-Pak border.
But . . . along came President Obama's "early withdrawal" plan. Instead of moving troops from Southern Afghanistan to Eastern Afghanistan - they are to come home.
So who does the fighting to secure the East of Afghanistan? According to General Allen - the new plan is for the Afghan security forces to accomplish this. So it appears that U.S. troops will concentrate on Southeastern Afghanistan - or the "Southern" RC-East area while the ANSF will be responsible for Northeastern Afghanistan - or the "Northern" RC-East area.
This new plan involves no small measure of "risk taking". In other words, leaving the "Northern RC-East" territory to the Afghans probably means that the insurgents (Taliban and Haqqani Network) will continue to maintain their grasp on this area and perhaps gain even more territory. The south of Afghanistan (where much progress has been made over the past two years due to the 30,000 troop surge) are to be handed over to the Afghan security forces as well (we shall see how that works out).
CJ Radin of The Long War Journal explains this more fully in his article "ISAF's new plan for Afghanistan" posted on March 22, 2012. He has a handy map of Afghanistan depicting the areas of RC East as well.
UK to Pay Closer Attention to Aid Dollars for Afghanistan
The United Kingdom is striving to pay closer attention to where the aid dollars to Afghanistan end up. Corruption is a huge problem in Afghanistan and corrupt Afghan officials divert a lot of aid money to their bank accounts in Dubai. Afghanistan is one of the UK's top foreign policy priorities and see a lot of money coming its way from the UK; but many in the UK question where that money ends up. Britain's Department for International Development (DFID) is being urged to send more personnel with financial and contracting experience in order to ensure the money goes to the intended purpose. The Independent Commission for Aid Impact, a UK government entity, says that the UKs aid program is not performing well and needs significant improvements. Read more in "UK must tighten grip on Afghan aid programme - watchdog", Reuters, March 22, 2012.
ROLFSOs: Rule of Law Field Support Officers - Five Perspectives on Duties
The U.S. Navy JAG Corps is providing five posts on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan from the perspective of five different ROLFSOs or Rule of Law Field Support Officers. Read the first one in "ROLFSOs: One Individual Augmentation, Five Different Experiences", March 22, 2012.
Money Leaving Afghanistan in Millions Each Day
A recent news article reflects the growing concern that Afghan government officials have over the tremendous amounts of money leaving Afghanistan every month. Over $4.6 Billion dollars left through Kabul Airport during 2011. That was the "declared" sum; the amount of money that left through other airports or that was undeclared is not known. The entire Afghan government budget is $4.8 billion - so the amount of money that left the country is almost equal to the government's budget. Most of the money has found its way to Dubai bank accounts or real estate property. The money is estimated to be either drug money or money skimmed off of international aid donations by corrupt government officials.
Read the article in "Rampant Capital Flight Saw $4.6 Billion Leave Afghanistan In 2011", Economy Watch, March 19, 2012.
Read the article in "Rampant Capital Flight Saw $4.6 Billion Leave Afghanistan In 2011", Economy Watch, March 19, 2012.
Thursday, March 22, 2012
Afghans Want Veto Power over Night Raids
In formal negotiations set to begin Thursday, Afghan officials are expected to press their U.S. counterparts for veto power over controversial night raids on Afghan homes as well as warrants signed by a judge before the operations are carried out. Despite substantive differences, officials on both sides expressed confidence that they are heading toward an understanding on the raids that will allow them to complete within two months a broader accord governing the long-term military relationship between the countries.These negotiations could lead us down the road to disaster. The night raids currently conducted by ISAF SOF, CJSOCC-A, and other organizations' have been extremely productive - keeping the insurgent mid-level and high-level leaders off-balance, running from house to house each night, and suspicious of informants within their ranks. Many insurgents have met their demise or have been captured during night raids. This is due to an extremely effective targeting procedure, good COIN intelligence, great ISR assets, and good working relationships with Afghan partner special operations units (PRC, ANASF, Commandos, and others).
Agreeing to Afghan approval of targets and moving to a warrant-base system is problematic. It slows down the targeting cycle, reveals intelligence sources, will be a bonanza of information for the Taliban infiltrators of the ANSF, tips our hand on targets who will be notified that they are at risk, relies on an ineffective and corrupt judiciary, and holds us hostage to Afghan politics.
Read more in "Afghan officials likely to press for veto power over night raids in formal talks", The Washington Post, March 21, 2012.
Exiting Afghanistan - Transit Costs of Material to Send Home
As the withdrawal from Afghanistan begins this fall many ISAF partner nations will be moving troops and equipment home. Routes home include Pakistan and the Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). With the on-again off-again relationship with Pakistan many NATO countries may opt for the northern land route instead of using the ports of Pakistan. Read more about which countries will benefit as a result of transit fees (can you say price gouging?) in "Neighboring Countries Scramble to be NATO's Exit Route from Afghanistan", Radio Free Europe, March 22, 2012.
Command and Control Structure in Afghanistan
The Foreign Policy blog known as The Best Defense has posted an article (with structural diagram) entitled "Annals of Command and Control (IV): Untangling the structure in Afghanistan", March 21, 2012. It is a good read for someone who wants to understand how we got the C2 structure that we now have in Afghanistan.
Report: Torture of Detainees in Afghan Prisons
The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the Open Society Foundations recently released a report about the treatment of detainees in Afghan prisons. The report is entitled "Torture, Transfers, and Denial of Due Process: The Treatment of Conflict-Related Detainees in Afghanistan", March 17, 2012 (Adobe Acrobat PDF file). Read more about this reports release in "Groups Report on the Continued Transfer of Detainees to Afghan Prisons", The New York Times, March 18, 2012.
General Jack Keane Comments of Afghanistan - Stay the Course
Citing military progress in southern Afghanistan in the last 18 months General Jack Keane (retired) says we need to stay the course in Afghanistan. He believes that withdrawing troops prematurely will weaken the chances of defeating the Haqqani Network in the east of Afghanistan and put into question the survivability of the Afghan government. Read more on this topic in "General Jack Keane: Staying the Course in Afghanistan", The Foundry of the Heritage Foundation, March 21, 2012.
British Advisors Say Afghan National Army is Improving
Soldiers with the British Advisory Group 3rd Kandak 215th Corps (Two Rifles Battle Group) have been spending their tour of duty in Afghanistan as advisors. They have seen a great improvement in the performance of the ANA. Read more in "Afghan National Army operations symbolizes success in Advisor's mission", DVIDS, March 21, 2012.
Karzai - Time to Dump Him? Some people think so!
Karzai's recent negative statements about the United States (and ISAF) are drawing comments from around the world. Some find it hard to understand why the State Department and military cave in to Karzai. We have agreed to allow Afghans to protect our bases, convoys, and development projects with the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF), hand over supervision of the detention facilities, put restraints on our special operations forces that conduct night raids, and we have given him a pass on the corruption found everywhere in his government. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) can't even protect themselves from the Taliban - never mind hoping the APPF can protect NATO and US personnel, facilities, and interests. The Afghans have no clue how to run a detention facility - have we forgotten the 500 Taliban that escaped from the Kandahar prison last year? Although the Afghan special operations forces (ANASF and Commandos) are getting more proficient - they still need the advise and assistance of ISAF SOF. If we agree, as may likely happen, to a warrant-based targeting system then we have major problems. Most recently Karzai has called for NATO to withdraw from the Afghan villages - an action that will certainly put a halt to the very sucessful Village Stability Operations (VSO) program and its associated Afghan Local Police (ALP). Read more about the discontent with Karzai in "Karzai The Ingrate", Investor's Business Daily, March 21, 2012.
22% of NATO Fatalities Caused by Afghan Army and Police
60 NATO troops have been killed this year in Afghanistan. 13 have been killed by Afghan security force personnel. That comprises 22% of the NATO casualties suffered thus far. Read more in "NATO fatalities in Afghanistan: 22 percent this year at hands of Afghan Army, police", The Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 2012.
Gen Allen to Speak at Brookings
General John Allen, the ISAF commander, will speak at Brookings event on March 26, 2012. Read more on this in "The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan".
Info on U.S. - Afghan Strategic Agreement
The United States and Afghanistan are in the process of fine-tuning the wording of the "Strategic Partnership Agreement" that will define the relationship between the two countries over the next few years. The negotiations are on-going and recent events such as the Koran burning and Panjwai killings have been complicating the agreement's terms. In addition, Karzai has some "red lines" that have caused some reluctance on the part of the United States - elimination of night raids and turning over detention facilities to Afghan control. Read more on this agreement in "Fact Sheet: U.S.-Afghan Strategic Agreement", by Paraag Shukla, Institute for the Study of War, March 2012.
Fort Polk Trains 4th Infantry Division Soldiers for Advisory Role in Afghanistan
Teams of military personnel from the 4th Infantry Division are training for the Afghan advisory effort they will take part in at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk. They train on a number of scenarios at a mock Afghan village that has Afghan role players. Read more in "New advisor teams key to US exit from Afghanistan", News-Leader.com, March 21, 2012.
Wednesday, March 21, 2012
Torture in Afghan Prisons? The National Directorate of Security (NDS) Says No!
There are constant allegations of torture and inhuman practices taking place in the prisons and detention centers run by the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI). These allegations are rejected by the Afghan intelligence service - The National Directorate of Security (NDS). Read more in "Afghan intel service: No torture at our prisons", Boston Globe, March 20, 2012.
Rebuilding Trust in Afghanistan
The recent events in Afghanistan have sharpened the levels of mis-trust between Afghanistan and the United States. Karzai's erratic rhetoric and hard-line stances on negotiations for the strategic partnership have prompted many in the U.S. to decide that leaving Afghanistan sooner is better. Recent blunders by the U.S. such as the Koran burning, Panjwai killings, and other events have some in Afghanistan asking for a speedier transfer of security responsibilities, end of night raids, transfer of authority for running detention centers, and other moving ISAF forces from Afghan villages to the big bases.
Omar Samad, a Senior Afghanistan Expert at the United States Institute of Peace, has wrote a column that explores this mistrust and states that we have to rebuild mutual respect to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan. See "Facing the Afghan obstacle course", The AFPAK Channel on Foreign Policy, March 20, 2012.
Omar Samad, a Senior Afghanistan Expert at the United States Institute of Peace, has wrote a column that explores this mistrust and states that we have to rebuild mutual respect to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan. See "Facing the Afghan obstacle course", The AFPAK Channel on Foreign Policy, March 20, 2012.
MoI Continues to Sign Contracts in Transition from Private Security Companies to APPF
KABUL, Afghanistan – The Afghan Public Protection Force continues to make progress in taking over security for development work around the country. Over the last week, it has signed 10 contracts for security with companies executing development projects for the U.S. Agency for International Development. The APPF concluded six contracts with Development Alternatives International (DAI). These contracts will provide security for USAID projects including Regional Afghan Municipalities Program-East (RAMP-Up East), RAMP-UP West, RAMP-UP North, Afghanistan Stabilization Initiative-East (ASI-East), Agriculture Credit Enhancement (ACE), and Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives North, East and West (IDEA-NEW).The Afghan Public Protection Program (APPF) got off to a slow start and has continued to fall behind on its timeline and reports of inefficiency, corruption, and difficult negotiations. But, according to the NTM-A article (see link below) it seems to be making progress. (Did you think that NTM-A would say the APPF was doing poorly?)
"APPF signs additional contracts to secure development projects", NTM-A, March 20, 2012.
Rampant Afghan Corruption Might Cause UK to Stop Funding
The massive corruption of the Afghan government is causing many leading UK officials to think about the amount of money that will be sent to Afghanistan to pay for it's security forces after 2014. See "Afghanistan corruption could see UK cut off security funds", Guardian UK, March 20, 2012.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)