The Fight In Helmand Province, Afghanistan

A war correspondent spent several weeks with the Marines in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.  Read a news article he wrote for The New York Times (February 1, 2012) entitled "The Hard Way Out of Afghanistan".

Afghan Women Worry about Karzai Taliban Negotiations

Afghan women are apprehensive about the prospects of the Taliban becoming part of the government as a result of negotiations conducted by the Taliban, U.S., and Karzai.  Read more in "Afghan Women Fear Backsliding As President Karzai Negotiates with Taliban", The Daily Beast, February 19, 2012.

82nd Agribusiness Development Team to Deploy to Afghanistan

The Wisconsin Army National Guard 82nd Agribusiness Development Team will soon deploy to Afghanistan.  The members of the "Dairy State" were chosen because they have experience in agriculture-related fields to include crop management, veterinary science, hydrology, pest control, and food processing. Read more in "Guard unit to train Afghans about agriculture", Army Times, February 18, 2012.  Learn more about agriculture in Afghanistan.

APPF Recruiting Security Guards from Afghanistan's Private Security Firms

The leadership of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) is recruiting Afghans who are currently employed with private security firms in Afghanistan.  In accordance with a decree by President Karzai all private security firms will cease operations soon. The functions and responsibilities of the private security firms will be assumed by the APPF.  Many critics have weighed in on this change and not many believe it is a great idea. The track record of the Afghan government to run almost any program is horrible; with waste, ineffectiveness and inefficiency prevalent.  Security for the NGOs, international organizations, and ISAF will now become more expensive.  There is no confidence in the APPF to provide security at the level that the private security firms did.  And there is the corruption factor - many see the APPF as another avenue for Karzai and his cronies to skim more money off the top.  Read a "sunny" assessment of the APPF program provided to us by NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan in "Afghan Public Protection Force Leadership Engaging with Private Security Guards", NTM-A, February 18, 2012.

Way Ahead in Afghanistan - War According to the New York Times

On the Opinion Pages of The New York Times is an editorial providing guidance on the way ahead in Afghanistan. The piece provides the Times input for encouraging governance, training and financing the Afghan security forces, negotiating with the Taliban, support to the Afghan economy, leaving behind a residual American force (special operators), and how to deal with Pakistan.  Read "Beginning of the End", The New York Times Sunday Review, February 18, 2012.

Canadian Training Mission in Afghanistan

KABUL, Afghanistan — Cuts or changes to Ottawa's politically sensitive contribution to NATO's training mission in Afghanistan are probable after the alliance concludes a review next month of the number of advisers it needs and where it needs them. Adjustments to the training force's laydown, including the disposition and skill sets of some Canadian troops is "likely, but what the effect will be is undetermined as of yet," said Maj.-Gen. Mike Day, who commands the 920 Canadian trainers in Afghanistan and is double-hatted as the senior NATO officer responsible for training Afghan security forces.

Read the rest of the news article here "Afghan training force likely to shrink", The Montreal Gazette, February 17, 2012.

Charlatans abound in Afghanistan

Read an interesting article about Afghans who claim to be something more than they are in order to increase their prestige, acquire money, or to gather intelligence on behalf of the Taliban.  See "In Struggle With Taliban, on Guard for Charlatans", The New York Times, February 18, 2012.

Special Forces Mission to Increase in Afghanistan

As overall U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan lowers special operations forces will increase their activity.  This will be primarily in the training and advisory arena; for which Special Forces training makes them uniquely qualified for.  Read more in "Special Forces in Afghanistan: not just taking out terrorists anymore", The Christian Science Monitor, February 16, 2012.

Afghan Defense Minister Worried About Cut In Size of Afghan Security Forces

The Afghan Defense Minister, Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak, has expressed his concern about proposed plans to cut spending on Afghanistan's security forces and reducing the strength from 352,000 to 230,000.  Along with the withdrawal of ISAF combat formations over the next two years there will be a reduction in funds for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).  Read more in "Afghan general sounds alarm on US plan to cut local security forces", Fox News, February 18, 2012.  Gen Wardak's concerns are misplaced.  Instead of worrying about whether 230,000 personnel is enough to fight the insurgency perhaps he could do more to ensure that size force is managed and trained to do the job.  The first step would be to replace high-ranking officers who are holding positions based on political connections and loyalty to Karzai with trained officers who are willing to fight the insurgents.  A second step would be to curtail the wide-spread corruption within the ANSF - and learning to make do with the $4 billion year given to them by the international community.  Of course, there are more measures the general could take to correct the obvious inefficient and ineffective processes of the ANSF but . . . it would take a book to list them.

Issues to Solve During Afghanistan Transition

There are less than three years until the fight in Afghanistan has been fully transitioned to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by the end of 2014.  There are many problems to be solved and issues to be faced during this transition.  Some of these include setting meaningful strategic goals for the war, developing an overall transition plan that will actually work, how to complete building up the ANSF in the face of upcoming cuts to the ANSF budget, what the end strength of the ANSF will be, what is the future of the Afghan Local Police (ALP), where will the peace negotiations with the Taliban leave us, how to reduce corruption within the Afghan government, how to resolve the difficulties with Pakistan (should we even try?), and how do we avoid a possible civil war between the Pashtuns and the ethnic groups of the old Northern Alliance (Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras)?  These questions and more are raised in an online piece entitled "The Real Issues in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond Undefined Policy Statements and Slogans", Defense Professionals, February 3, 2012.

Shifting to "Advise and Assist Role" in Afghanistan

Leon Panetta's recent announcement that the U.S. will move from a "combat' role to "advise and assist" role in Afghanistan in mid-2013 has caught some observers by surprise and spurred a flurry of commentary.  Read one online article entitled "US troops in Afghanistan: How big is shift from 'combat' to 'assistance'?", The Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 2012.

Taxis in Kabul - Life in the Fast Lane (or Slow Lane)

An enlightening article about catching a cab in Kabul, Afghanistan by a reporter who has spent some time there.  If you have spent any time driving through the city you will appreciate this piece for it's description of potholes, taxi driver, and lack of rules of the road!

Read "Fast and Furious cabs no match for Kabul's Mad Max roads", Stars and Stripes, October 4, 2011.

U.S. Intelligence Officials Not so Optimistic on Afghanistan

A recent news article indicates that U.S. intelligence officials are less optimistic than operational commanders about the how the war is going in Afghanistan.  Read "U.S. intelligence officials offer grim words on Afghanistan", Los Angeles Times, February 16, 2012.

Training for Security Force Assistance Teams for Afghanistan

The U.S. military will soon deploy to Afghanistan over 1,400 Soldiers who will be split into 18-person training teams.  These training teams will be much like the MiTT or training teams deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Their mission falls into the "advise and assist" world - attached to Afghan security forces to provide advise, access to enablers (air support, medevac), and provide battlefield situational awareness for ISAF. To prepare for the mission the Soldiers will complete a three-week training course at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La.  Hmmmmmm.  Is three weeks enough?  Read more in "Army Details Afghan Transition Deployment Plans", Military.com, February 17, 2012.

I wonder what the process is for selecting, training and organizing the advisors who will have an extremely important role in this advisory effort. The early Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) in Iraq and Embedded Transition Teams (ETTs) in Afghanistan were less than optimum as a result of poor selection and training of the advisors. Learn more about these advisory teams during the early years of the Iraq and Afghanistan War.

The U.S. military has a history of not selecting and training military advisors properly (outside of the Special Forces ranks).  This happened during the Vietnam War (although reportedly the Marines did better than the Army).  Many times advisors were assigned with little cultural training, very basic language skills (3 weeks language training), and with no regard to military occupational specialty.  Initially the language training for an advisor heading to Vietnam was three or four weeks of French, not Vietnamese.

During the Vietnam War some U.S. military advisors were sent to a training school at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, NC where they learned culture, language, how to call for artillery, air support, and medevac, and about the responsibilities, roles and duties of an advisor.  They would then be assigned to South Vietnamese Army units to aid in the counterinsurgency fight.  The Military Assistance Training Advisor course (MATA) course was established in 1962 and taught by Special Forces officers and NCOs. It was initially 4-weeks long and later increased to a longer course. In 1970 the Marines established a three-month long advisor course.

Some handbooks were published to assist the advisors to South Vietnam units. One was entitled the MATA Handbook or FM 3-73 - also called the Advisors Handbook for Stability Operations.  There was also a MATA Handbook for Vietnam, ST 31-179, January 1966.  (Found here on Small Wars Journal). The Army also published FM 31-73, Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations. The current handbook for advisors is entitled TC 31-73, Special Forces Advisor Guide, 2008.

There were some lessons learned about the Vietnam War advisory effort. These are captured in a paper entitled "Lessons Learned from Advising and Training the Republic of South Vietnam's Armed Forces", by MAJ Thomas Clinton, USMC, 2007. Accessed here on DTIC.mil.

Those lessons learned from the Vietnam War advisory effort are briefly related here.  The careful selection of individuals to be advisors is extremely important. Some officers and NCOs are just not cut out for the job.  In addition, the training of the advisors is critical and should include:

Intensive language and cultural training
Training and certification in tactical communications equipment
Training and certification in controlling close air support
Training and certification in indirect fire support
Training in coordinating medical evacuation support
Training in how to be an effective liaison officer

Talking with the Taliban - Tips on Negotiations

Michael Hayden, former director of the CIA, has wrote a piece for CNN about negotiating with the Taliban. Some of his suggestions are to not dehumanize the Taliban, recognize that the Taliban have legitimate political interests, and realize that as we withdraw from Afghanistan our pressure to bear on negotiations diminishes.  Read his article in "Talking with the Taliban, making peace with the guilty", CNN Opinion, February 16, 2012.  Read more news articles about negotiations with the Taliban.

A Strategy for Defeat in Afghanistan

Many Afghan war critics are looking at how the next few years will unfold.  One of them believes that " . . . amid fiscal belt tightening, growing war-weariness and election-year politics, the international community is pursuing the exact policy it should not".  Read more in "How best to ensure defeat in Afghanistan", Afghanistan Analysis, February 4, 2012.

Baad or Baadi in Afghanistan - A Young Girl's Plight

File this story under "life is harsh if you are a woman in Afghanistan".  In the rural Pashtun areas of Afghanistan - mostly the south and east - the practice of baad or baadi is still occurring.  Baad is a traditional Afghan form of justice.  Young girls are taken as a form of payment for misdeeds committed or debt owed by a family.  The girls are entered into a force marriage or slavery.  Read more in "For Punishment of Elder's Misdeeds, Afghan Girl Pays the Price", The New York Times, February 16, 2012.

Reintegration of Taliban Fighters in Paktika Province Not Working

Reintegration is an attempt by the Afghan government to reach out to low- and mid-level Taliban fighters to get them to stop fighting and become part of Afghan society once again.  There have been various iterations of reintegration programs - none of them very successful.  Paktika Province is one of those areas where reintegration is not going well.  Read "Afghan Reintegration Drama", The Diplomat, February 7, 2012.  Learn more about reintegration in Afghanistan and read the latest Afghan reintegration news.

Financing Afghan Security Forces After 2014

Defense ministers of the NATO alliance met recently (February 2012) to discuss funding of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) beyond 2014.  There are plans to establish a multibillion dollar fund to help pay for the $6 billion annual Afghan defense bill - with the realization that donor nations will provide the bulk of the money.  In May 2012, the alliance will meet again to decide what a sustainable force size should be for the ANSF.  Although the ANSF will number more than 350,000 by 2014 it is doubtful that a force of that size will be funded by the international community.  The French Defense Minister, Gerard Longuet, has been quoted saying "A reasonable number would be 230,000".  This 230,000 personnel level of the ANSF would be charged with containing (if not defeating) an insurgency of 20,000 fighters.  Read more in "NATO ministers mull financing for Afghan security forces post-2014", The Washington Post, February 3, 2012.

Indiana Army National Guard Learns Blacksmithing for Deployment to Afghanistan

A group of Soldiers from the Indiana Army National Guard are attending a one-week long course for blacksmiths. The intent is to teach them skills that were used over a century ago by farmers to make agricultural tools. Once in Afghanistan they can help Afghan farmers set up village blacksmith shops that can make agricultural tools.  There is lots of scrap metal in Afghanistan as a result of thirty years of war.  Some of this scrap metal can be turned into tools that are useful for agriculture such as hammers, shovels, picks, chains, prongs, and plows.  The one-week long blacksmith course is being taught at the Conner Prairie Interactive History Park in Indiana. The park is affiliated with the Smithsonian Institute.  See www.connerprairie.org.  See the news article at "Soldiers Study at Conner Prairie For Afghanistan Assignment", Indiana News TV6 ABC, February 15, 2012.

Solar Energy Needs in Afghanistan - Heavy Demand by Military

With modern technology comes better equipment for Soldiers in the field. Unfortunately, all this new, modern equipment requires power. For a field Soldier that usually means a battery or generator. A battery is heavy to carry and doesn't last long, the generator isn't field transportable and needs fuel.  The military has been pushing solar energy initiatives for the last several years.  Read more in "Soldier Energy Needs Outpacing Technology, Policy", National Defense Magazine, March 2012.

Night Raids - Are the Afghans Ready to Take Over?

A constant source of friction between President Karzai and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are the frequent night raids that ISAF conducts.  Karzai continues to assert that the night raids are causing a drop of support for the central government and the coalition troops.  ISAF maintains that the night raids are necessary for the successful conduct of the operations and safety of the populace.  The vast majority of the night raids have been joint operations for some time.  One of the primary reasons for the joint operations is to train up the Afghan counterparts. Based on some accounts this training appears to be on track.  See "Afghan army's night raiders ready to take control", Reuters, January 25, 2012.

Village Shura in Afghanistan

Villagers and representatives from the Afghan National Police, Afghan National Army Commandos, and the Afghan Local Police conduct a shura in Pul-e Khumri district, Baghlan province, Afghanistan in February 2012.  (Photo credit CJSOTF-A Media Operations Center - Spc. Robin Davis).

Telemark Bataljonen - Norway Battalion Deployed to Afghanistan

There are over 42 nations with troops deployed to Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).  One of the most dependable partners is Norway.  A recent blog post tells a little about Norway's Telemark Battalion now deployed in Afghanistan.  See "Telemark Bataljonen Til Valhall", SOFREP, February 14, 2012.

The Telemark Battalion is a mechanized infantry battalion with a history of many deployments to include Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan.

More info on the Norway Telemark Battalion can be found here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telemark_Battalion

http://www.tmbn-veteran.no/

Billions Cut from ANSF Budget - Afghanistan Takes a Money Hit with Defense Budget

The proposed defense budget will drastically reduce the amount of money spent on training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) over the next few years.  Read more in "Scaling back on wars, spending elsewhere", Security Clearance Blog - CNN, February 13, 2012.

Publications about Governance in Afghanistan

The link below will take you to a website with publications about governance in Afghanistan.

http://www.afghanwarnews.info/governancepubs.htm

An Assessment of the Afghan Military

Strategy Page offers a "good news, bad news" assessment of the Afghan Army.  Read "Why Afghan Officers Prefer Heroin" published February 14, 2012.

Agribusiness Development Team Coordinates with MAIL to distribute Fruit Trees in Laghman Province

An Agribusiness Development Team works with MAIL
to distribute fruit tree samplings to Afghan villagers.
(NGB photo by SPC Leslie Goble)

The Kansas National Guard Agribusiness Development Team (ADT) that operates in Laghman Province, Afghanistan recently assisted the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) in the purchase and distribution of 2,400 fruit tree saplings for Alingar District.  The trees, after some years to grow and mature, will yield pomegranate, almond, and persimmon. The NG ADTs are in Afghanistan to assist the agriculture sector of the economy to rebuild itself after 30 years of war and conflict.  Read more in "Afghanistan: Kansas National Guard ADT gives Arbor Day gifts to locals", National Guard News, February 8, 2012.

Assessment of the Future of Afghan War After U.S. Departs Afghanistan

Two military officers with recent experience in Afghanistan wrote an article about a visit to Zabul Province where they spent some time with an Afghan infantry battalion operating "independently".  They detail the struggle that the Afghan battalion faces as it confronts both the enemy and an ineffective Afghan logistics and supply system.  While the battalion does not measure up to a U.S. infantry battalion in firepower, training, experience, and planning ability; it is getting the job done.

The two officers recognize that the upcoming departure of the coalition forces and the shift to an advisory role for those coalition troops that stay after 2014 will put the Afghan Army in the forefront of the battle against the insurgents. Their article provides some insight on how Afghan battalions will fare when left on their own.  In addition, they discuss what type of individual is best suited for "advisory work" in Afghanistan after 2014.

Some info on the two writers; one officer is American and the other Afghan. The U.S. officer is a Special Forces Soldier who is in the AfPak Hands program and was working for the Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team (CAAT) in Afghanistan. The Afghan officer, a major in the Afghan Special Forces, is now attending U.S. military schools in the United States.

You can read their article here - "Two Officers Counter Bleak Assessment of Afghan War", by Fernando M. Lujan and Khosal Sadat, At War Blog, The New York Times, February 13, 2012.

A Critique of the National Solidarity Program (NSP) of the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD)

The president of the Afghan Youth Initiative, Inc., Matiullah Amin, has wrote a critical piece about the National Solidarity Program (NSP) of the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Rural Development (MRRD).  The NSP has set up over 28,000 Community Development Councils (CDCs) that help establish a list of development priorities at the local level.

He states that program lacks focus on long-term development and relies on rural citizens lacking skills to carry out development projects - causing inefficiency in the program. Amin is also concerned about the vulnerability of these locally-run programs to embezzlement by program officials.  Amin says that time has come to overhaul NSP and he offers some specific recommendations in his article.

See "Leaving Afghan Development in the Wrong Hands", Foreign Affairs, February 13, 2012.

Read more news about development in Afghanistan.

Local Micro Enterprise Solutions for Afghan Women

Western humanitarian organizations (NGOs and governmental) have a difficult time getting the Afghan government to come around and support programs that provide aid to the women of Afghanistan.  One humanitarian worker - Lael Mohib - suggests a bottom-up, locally-focused approach to improving the lot of women in Afghanistan. She believes that home-based enterprises that are started with micro-finance grants is a more viable approach - from a practical and cultural standpoint. Read more in "Afghan solutions for Afghan women", The AFPAK Channel, Foreign Policy, Friday 13, 2012.  Learn more about women in Afghanistan.

Coalition Troops Prepare for 2014 Departure - As do the Rich Afghans

The U.S. will withdraw thousands of its troops during 2012 in preparation for the final withdrawal of combat troops in mid-2013. The other coalition countries are doing the same - developing plans for their disengagement as well.  With the withdrawal of foreign troops comes the end of the money supply from donor nations - or at least a significant drop in money going into Afghanistan.  The rich Afghans are also planning their withdrawal - of their money, much of it acquired from corruption, from Afghanistan to their foreign nation of choice, the United Arab Emirates.  In the UAE they can enjoy a lavish life style and sink their money into property investments. Read two news articles on the topic:

"Afghanistan's rich and their cash prepare for exodus", The National, February 12, 2012.

"Afghan cash buyers target Palm Jumeirah", Arabian Business.com, February 14, 2012.

Afghan COIN Instructors Provide Training in Counterinsurgency to Other Afghan Units

An instructor with the 8th Commando
Kandak provides range commands
during training. (U.S. Navy Photo
by MCS 2nd Class Jacob Dillon)

In the process of transition to Afghans taking the lead in planning operations and doing the bulk of the fighting it is important to yield training duties to the Afghans as well. At the Counterinsurgency Training Center this path is now traveled.  A recent news release by the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM-A) we see an example of this "training transition".  See "205th Afghan National Army Corps Receives COIN training from Afghan Instructors", NTM-A, February 12, 2012.

Afghan Army in the Lead in Northern Helmand

ISAF forces are now transitioning from doing the majority of the fighting to having the Afghan forces take the lead in operations.  Here is a report on how that transition is going in Northern Helmand province.

"Can the Afghan army take the lead in the battle?", BBC News Asia, February 13, 2012.

Worries about the CIA and SOF in Afghanistan Over the Long-Term

Not everyone thinks that keeping special operations forces and a strong CIA element in Afghanistan past 2014 is a good idea.  Kate Clark, a blogger for the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) and long-time Afghanistan resident, has wrote an article expressing her concerns.  She worries about the history of the CIA being a secret  organization and of US Special Forces not being entirely transparent about their operations (Hmmmmm  . . . .really?).  Read her blog post in "War Without Accountability: The CIA, Special Forces and plans for Afghanistan's future" posted on February 10, 2012.

Special Forces and Afghan PRC

With the departure of over 100,000 troops from Afghanistan taking place in 2014 special forces units from a variety of countries will take on the burden of advising and assisting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).  A war journalist (David Axe) describes a recent mission of a Special Forces unit working with the Laghman Provincial Response Company (PRC). See "Afghan Cops and Special Forces", The Diplomat, February 12, 2012.

3rd Infantry Division Learns about Village Stability Operations (VSO)

The U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry Division recently spent two weeks at Fort Irwin's National Training Center (NTC) learning about the Village Stability Operations (VSO) mission they will be conducting in Afghanistan.  Upon reaching Afghanistan the Soldiers will be split up into small units - squad or platoon sized elements - and attached to special operations forces detachments (Special Forces, SEALs, and MARSOC) conducting Village Stability Operations.  This has been successfully done with two other infantry battalions over the past year with great results - allowing SOF to expand their footprint in key areas of Afghanistan as they set up VSO sites and establish local units of Afghan Local Police or ALP. Read more in "Fort Irwin training creates new sort of soldier", The Sun, February 12, 2012.

Gambling on Special Forces in Afghanistan

Many have commented on the new shift in strategy in Afghanistan - pulling out conventional troops and relying more on special forces units that will hit high-value targets and build up local security forces.  Some see it as a chance to fail - read more in "US gambles on special forces in Afghanistan strategy", Google Hosted News, February 12, 2012.

New Zealand Police Officer Finds Corruption Endemic in Afghanistan

A New Zealand police officer, in Afghanistan on secondment with a European Union police training mission, provides some insight the corruption running rampart in Afghan society and its Afghan National Police (ANP).  Read "Where family ties matter more than the law", Nelson Mail, February 13, 2012.

President Karzai Meets Anti-Corruption Monitoring Committee

The text below is from the Voice of America (February 12, 2014).

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has met with members of the Monitoring Evaluation Committee whose job it is to monitor corruption in carrying out projects funded by the international community.

The committee, which also is responsible for the development of clear and objective benchmarks in fighting corruption, briefed the president on its findings.
Mr. Karzai reminded the committee members “it is their responsibility to evaluate the international assistance in Afghanistan and bring transparency.”

He urged the members to continue working in close coordination with other relevant anti-corruption agencies, including the High Office of Oversight. That office coordinates and monitors the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Strategy

Text from "Afghan President Meets Anti-Corruption Monitoring Committee", Voice of America, February 12, 2012.

I wonder if the Monitoring Evaluation Committee informed President Karzai that he was the biggest part of the corruption problem?  Learn more about corruption in Afghanistan.

Will Afghan Peace Talks Divide the Taliban?

It appears that not all Taliban are happy with the prospects of peace talks with either the Americans or the Karzai regime. Some of the mid-level and lower-level fighters are trying to figure out the high-level Taliban leaders game-plan.  Read more in "How Afghan Peace Talks Are Splintering the Taliban", The Daily Beast, February 13, 2012.

Organizations Doing Development Work in Afghanistan

There are many organizations engaged in development work in Afghanistan.  Click on the link below to see a list:  http://www.afghanwarnews.info/development.htm

Thirty Years of Afghan Conflict - Anti-Government Mobilisation (AREU Paper Jan 2012)

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) has published a paper that examines "  . . . the structural factors driving anti-government mobilisation in Afghanistan in each successive phase of the country's thirty years of conflicts".  The paper also looks at the Taliban as a political organization enabling and driving conflict. 

Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of Anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan 1978-2011
Dr. Antonio Giustozzi
January 2012

Learn more about the roots of insurgency in Afghanistan.

Agriculture in Afghanistan - USDA Resource Page

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has a resource page on agriculture in Afghanistan.  It provides an overview of agriculture in Afghanistan and other information such as job opportunities, Afghanistan agriculture fact sheet, links to other agriculture resources, Agribusiness Development Teams (ADT), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), current news, and videos.  Click here to visit the USDA Agriculture page.

Learn more about agriculture in Afghanistan.

Corruption & Anti-Corruption Issues in Afghanistan - Report by the Civil-Military Fusion Center (Feb 2012)

The corruption in Afghanistan is horrendous.  President Karzai may be the most corrupt leader in the world.  Many organizations, like Transparency International, rate Afghanistan somewhere in the top five of the most corrupt nations in the world.  In 2011 Transparency International rated Afghanistan as one of the four most corrupt countries in the world, tied with Myanmar and beat only by North Korea and Somalia. Looks like "Karzai the Crook" is in good company!

The Civil-Military Fusion Center has released a new report about corruption in Afghanistan.  The report is posted on the ReliefWeb.int website and can be accessed at the link below:

Corruption & Anti-Corruption Issues in Afghanistan
Civil-Military Fusion Centre
February 2012

Reintegration of Taliban Fighters in Afghanistan - Is it Really Working?

While the Karzai regime and the United States pursue high-level peace talks with the Taliban leadership the Afghan government is also continuing efforts on reintegrating lower-level members of the insurgency.  However, the reintegration program is being questioned by some observers who point out some problem areas. In the province of Helmand where much of the fighting has been over the past three years there have been very few reintegrees.  Many reintegrees have come from the north but critics say many of these supposed returned fighters are merely looking for a monthly paycheck and vocational training provided by the program.  Some of these "returnees" are cronies of corrupt district and provincial Afghan officials who pass out old AKs to local men (who are not insurgents) and tell them to turn themselves in to the government. Read more in "The truth about Taliban reintegration", The Telegraph, February 11, 2012.

Contractors Paying a Heavy Price in Afghanistan

There are more civilian contractors working in Afghanistan than there are American Soldiers serving there.  More civilian contractors working for American companies than American Soldiers died in Afghanistan in 2011.  These contractor deaths do not get much press for a couple of reasons.  Many of the contractors are Third Country Nationals (TCNs).  Those firms that do lose contractors with U.S. citizenship do not have the same reporting requirements as when a military member dies.  Read more in "Risks of Afghan War Shift From Soldiers to Contractors",  The New York Times, February 11, 2012.

Afghan Women Concerned about Taliban Negotiations

Afghan women are alarmed about the possibility of a return by the Taliban as a result of either negotiations or victory after 2014.  The women of Afghanistan have enjoyed substantial gains in freedom of expression, ability to work, greater access to health care, educational opportunities, and even playing a role in the government under the constitution.  However, these gains could evaporate with a power-sharing deal with the Taliban at the negotiation table. Read more in a recent news article entitled "Afghan women fear Taliban return", AFP, February 12, 2012.  Learn more about women in Afghanistan.

Negotiating with the Taliban

There are many who say the only way to conclude the Afghan War (or at least our involvement with it) is by negotiating a settlement with the Taliban.  Some initial negotiations are underway at the moment.  Going into these negotiations, our administration is insisting on some up-front agreements such as Taliban statements indicating support for the peace process and renouncing support for terrorist organizations.  A former State Department official - Karl Inderfurth - has some experience negotiating with the Taliban.  Inderfurth offers some caution in an online article entitled "A Taliban Rope-a-Dope Strategy", The AFPAK Channel Blog, Foreign Policy, January 25, 2012.

District Development Plans - USAID in Afghanistan

In an attempt to prioritize and coordinate infrastructure repairs at the district level in Afghanistan the Afghan government prepares District Development Plans (DDP).  Unfortunately, the Afghan government does not have the money or the capacity to implement these plans.  The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), using implementing partners such as the Central Asia Development Group (CADG), collaborates with district and provincial leaders to identify and fill gaps in the DDP. Typical projects might include drainage ditches, road construction or improvement, or erosion protection.  Read more about how USAID's support of District Development Plans support governance and development in Afghanistan in "Bringing Government Plans to Life", USAID, February 9, 2012.