Northern Initiative for Justice Advancement Training (NIJAT) in Afghanistan

A diverse group of organizations are coming together to provide law enforcement and justice training for select individuals in northern Afghanistan. 

"The 11- week training is a joint effort of USAID, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement of the U.S. Department of State, the German Police Project Team, and the European Police Mission. The training will provide substantive and practical lessons that enhance the participants' knowledge of investigative techniques, as well as trial and advocacy skills.
A total of sixty police officers, defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges will complete the training consisting of a criminal investigation phase, trial phase, and a specialized adjudication two-week phase for judges. The goal of the training is to improve the capacity of justice sector professionals to investigate, prosecute, defend, and adjudicate criminal cases." 

Read the rest of the article in "New Training Focuses on Advancing Justice in Afghanistan", ReliefWeb, February 19, 2011.

Providing Electricity in Afghanistan - A Daunting Task for Black & Veatch

There is much money being spent on reconstruction (a more correct term would be construction) in Afghanistan.  Most of these projects are not completed on time and run over on the projected costs.  In a no-bid environment where security is an illusion and corruption amongst Afghan government officials is rampart - this is expected.  U.S. construction firms had a hard time operating in that environment and are criticized for not finishing projects on time.  One example of this is the task of providing electricity to southern Afghanistan.  The firm Black & Veatch Corporation is very involved in that endeavor.  Read of the difficulties with major construction projects in Afghanistan in "Black & Veatch's fog-of-war contract in Afghanistan", The Kansas City Star, February 20, 2011.

Taliban Reintegration Program Faces Difficulties

"Despite Taliban threats against their lives, nearly 900 militants have quit the fight and enrolled in an Afghan government program luring insurgents off the battlefield, a NATO official said Monday.  The months-old reintegration program, which attracts fighters with promises of jobs, literacy and vocational training plus development aid for their villages, is slowly gaining acceptance but faces serious challenges, said Maj. Gen. Phil Jones, who tracks the reintegration effort at NATO headquarters in Kabul.  The Taliban has retaliated against some insurgents trying to switch sides in northern Afghanistan, Jones said. Some local Afghan leaders also remain unclear about the details of the program and many question whether those who align themselves with the government can be protected." 

Read the rest of the news article at "900 Afghan militants switch sides and join government, but reintegration program faces hurdles", Google Hosted News, February 8, 2011.

Book: "The Wrong War" by Bing West

Bing West, a noted writer and commentator on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, has wrote a book entitled The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan.  Mr. West is not without military experience, having served in combat with the Marines.  He has also spent considerable time in Afghanistan as an embedded reporter and seen the combat troops up close.  West is extremely complimentary of the Soldiers and Marines fighting the war on the ground.  He is critical of the current counterinsurgency strategy that strives to win over the population.  His speaks out against the effort to buy off the Afghan population with development funds - citing the creation of a "culture of entitlement".  His "way out of Afghanistan" includes down-sizing the footprint in Afghanistan and transitioning to an advisory role where highly-trained military advisers, unhampered by risk-adverse senior commanders, are embedded with Afghan Army and police units - where their principle task would be training and advising the Afghan security forces. 

To learn more about the book or buy it from Amazon.com click on the link that follows:  The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan.

USSF and 6th Commando Kandak Conduct Operations in Wardak Province

The 1st Company of the 6th Commando Kandak, U.S. Special Forces, and other units conducted an operation in Wardak Province in Afghanistan.  The intent of the operation was to clear the village of insurgent forces and return peace and stability to the area.  Read more in "ANA Commandos, USSF complete step towards peace in Perong Valley", CJSOTF-A Media Operations Center, February 18, 2011.

Video shows Australian 2nd Commando Regiment on Night Raid in Afghanistan

Diggers conduct a night-time raid in Afghanistan for members of the Taliban.  See the video of the Australian commandos in action.  See "Aussie special forces behind enemy lines", Herald Sun, February 19, 2011.

Afghan Local Police (ALP) working with Special Forces in Khas Uruzgan District

It took time and effort to get the various tribes in the Khas Uruzgan District to work together and agree to the establishment of an element of the Afghan Local Police (ALP).  But the ALP is up and running - thanks to the continuing efforts of U.S. Army Special Forces teams operating in the area.  The ALP is an Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) endeavor heavily supported by Special Forces that establishes local village community defense force or local police.  The program receives local support, its members are recruited from the local population and vetted by the tribal and community leaders, but it is also supported by coalition forces and the Ministry of Interior.  Read more on the establishment of the ALP in Khas Uruzgan - a district in Uruzgan Province of Afghanistan.  See "Turning the Tide", DVIDS - CJSOTFA Media Operations Center, February 19, 2011.

Civil Military Operations Center in Marjah, Afghanistan - Improving Afghan Lives

The Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in Marjah, Afghanistan is improving the Marjah area through development and civic action projects. 

"CAMP LEATHERNECK, Afghanistan – Marines working at the Civil Military Operations Center in Marjah have improved Afghan lives during the few short months they have been in Afghanistan.  The Marines arrived in October 2010 and have created and implemented many projects within the Marjah area." 

Read the rest of the news release in "Marjah CMOC making a difference in Afghan's lives", DVIDS, February 5, 2011.  Click here to follow news stories about Marjah, Afghanistan.

A Call to End the War in Afghanistan

Two U.S. Congressman have wrote an opinion piece for The Washington Post calling for the departure of troops in Afghanistan.  They say there is no strategy that is working, our goals are undefined (or already met), we are supporting a corrupt government, and the war is costing too much in terms of human and economic expenditure.  Read "The solution in Afghanistan: Get out", The Washington Post, February 18, 2011.

Two Years Under Obama: Some Measurable Criteria in Afghanistan

The Huffington Post has provided online a simple table that shows how some of the dynamics of the war in Afghanistan has changed in the past two years under President Obama.  Some of the criteria include troop deaths, number of IED attacks, drone strikes in Pakistan, mobile phone use, and more.

"The Huffington Post completed a status update of the war in Afghanistan, including conditions in the impoverished country, comparing January 2009 to January 2011. As indicated, some of the statistics reflect available data from the previous year."

See "Obama's War: How Afghan Conflict Has Ramped Up in Last Two Years", The Huffington Post, February 17, 2011.

Interim Security Critical Infrastructure (ISCI) Program - Is it Working?

The Marines are pushing a program in Afghanistan called the Interim Security Critical Infrastructure (ISCI).  The ISCI was started (as best as I can determine) in the fall of 2010 - see "Marines, Afghans come together for way forward in Marjah", USMC.mil, October 23, 2010.  It has had a rapid growth in Marjah and some are keeping a close eye on it. The Afghans recruited into the ISCI units are paid $150 a month; the leaders a little bit more.  The ISCI units are a "neighborhood watch" group.  It is similar to what U.S. Special Forces units are trying to accomplish with the Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative; although the ALP has the backing of the Afghan government and is a more structured program.

Some Afghans are fearful that the ISCI program will turn a bunch of loosely organized and un-supervised militias on the local population.  There already is friction between some of the groups.  See "Afghans fear return of the warlords as anti-Taliban militias clash", Guardian UK, February 16, 2011.

Learn more about the Interim Security Critical Infrastructure.

Money as a Weapons System - Marjah, Afghanistan

A writer for McClatchy Newspapers reports that things are going well in Marjah, Afghanistan.  Of note is his description of how the economy is picking up - primarily jump-started by money being doled out by the Marines.  "Money as a Weapons System" would seem to be a favorite tactic of the Marines in Marjah and . . . for the time being (according to the report) it would seem to be working.  See "Tailor shops displace opium bazaar in Afghan town", McClatchy Newspapers, February 17, 2011.

For information about using money as a way of winning the war see "Commander's Guide to Money as a Weapons System Handbook", Handbook 09-27, April 2009 (posted on the United States Army Combined Arms Center here).  Some observers are not that convinced that the concept is a good one - see commentary by Andrew Wilder, a research director at Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, in "A weapons system based on wishful thinking", boston.com, September 16, 2009.  (the article is dated but . . . ).

Taliban Motorbike Assassins Still Active in Kandahar

Despite the increase in security around and in Kandahar Taliban assassination squads are still active in the city.  One of their favorite tactics is killing people while mounted or transporting themselves on motorbikes.  Read more in "Taliban assassins on motorbikes strike fear in Afghanistan", The Star, February 9, 2011.  Read more war news on Kandahar.

Operation Moshtarak in Marjah, Afghanistan: An Analysis After One Year

A lot of folks are looking back one year to try to determine what was accomplished in The Battle of Marjah.  Last February 2010 one of the biggest operations of the Afghan War commenced when U.S. Army, U.S. Marines, British, Afghan and other coalition partners poured thousands of men into the area to wrest it from Taliban control.  The campaign did not go as quick or as well as planned.  It was a highly-publicized operation and was going to be a test bed for the later campaign in the battle for Kandahar and its surrounding area.  This week a lot of commentators and observers are focused on Marjah in an attempt to evaluate the accomplishments.  Some of those reports are provided below:

Marines of 1/6th choppered into Marjah at the beginning of the attack.  Read some of their recollections in "Their D-Day; Marjah veterans look back a year to where they were, lessons learned", marines.mil, February 16, 2011.

HBO is airing a documentary (on Feb 17, Thursday evening at 9:00 PM EST) called "The Battle for Marjah".  Read more on the documentary in "The Battle for Marjah, an Afghan War Film on HBO", The New York Times, February 16, 2011.

A former member of the "civilian surge" speaks out about what didn't go right with Marjah in "Memorials to Purposelessness", The Huffington Post, February 16, 2011.

The commanding general of Regional Command Southwest - where Marja is located - addressed Marjah in conversations with members of the media.  See "A year later, commander assesses progress in Helmand province", DVIDS, February 16, 2011.

An analyst of the war in Afghanistan, Joshua Foust, provides us with his insight to the Marjah campaign. See "Marjah one year on", February 15, 2011.  He ends his commentary observing that official press reports day Marjah was a success while public data indicates otherwise.

Canadian's in Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Finish Development Projects

The Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar has transferred its ownership of the PRT to the United States.  However, there are still some Canadian civilians working there completing development projects that were started earlier.  In addition, the Canadians are transferring some projects over to local Afghan officials - a task that PRTs were formed to do - start projects and then get the local Afghans to run them.  Read more in "As combat mission winds down, civilians in Kandahar rush to complete projects", The Vancouver Sun, February 9, 2011.  Read news about military operations and local governance in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

Afghan Perspective on Democracy Differs From Western View

What democracy means for an American is quite different than what democracy means for an Afghan.  A research team from the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) has been studying this topic for a few years.  For instance, to Afghans, the word "democracy" means much more than an elected government; they extend the meaning to encompass a vast range of Western ideals and liberalism far beyond representative governance. "Democracy" to many Afghans has a negative connotation - reflecting many of the perceived negative aspects of Western society such as immorality and secularism.  The authors observations are provided to us in an article posted on a blog at Foreign Policy Magazine.  Read the comments of Anna Larson and Oliver Lough in "Afghan perspectives on democracy", The AFPAK Channel, Foreign Policy, February 9, 2011.

Improving Afghan War Strategy - by Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institute - Feb 2011 (Report)

The Brookings Institute has published a report entitled "Improving Afghan War Strategy" authored by Michael E. O'Hanlon.  It is dated February 2011 and the report is a policy brief on Afghanistan.  The report

" . . . addresses the first challenge, improving the U.S./NATO counterinsurgency campaign.  The basic logic of the current strategy is accepted, but several new initiatives or ideas are explored to make it more promising and more effective".

Three main ideas are developed:
- promoting Afghan political organizations around ideas and platforms not ethnic groups or individuals
- tackling the problem of corruption from an international perspective instead of U.S. - Afghan view
- Offer a civilian nuclear deal to Pakistan in exchange for shutting down the Taliban sanctuaries

Read the report at the link below:

http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2011/02_afghanistan_ohanlon.aspx

COIN Training Center Increases NATO SOF Capacity in Afghanistan

"The Counterinsurgency Training Center – Afghanistan taught a five day Train the Trainer Course for NATO Special Operations Force instructors at Chievers Air Base, Belgium, 7-11 February 2011.  The purpose of the Train the Trainer Course was to show the NATO SOF instructors how to teach the Advanced COIN Leader Course to NATO SOF deploying to Afghanistan.  The Advanced COIN Leader Course is the same curriculum that is taught to senior Afghan Army and Police leadership, and coalition battalion and brigade commanders and staff at Camp Julien, Kabul.  This will enable NATO SOF to deploy into theater with the requisite COIN training to ensure success." 

Source: "COIN Training Center Increases NATO SOF Capacity", NTM-A, February 15, 2011.

Marc Grossman to be New AfPak Envoy

Retired diplomat Marc Grossman has been selected to be the new "AfPak" envoy.  Read more in "Clinton to announce new AfPak envoy", The Washington Post, February 15, 2011.

Marjah, Afghanistan - One Year Later

It has been about one year since the highly publicized battle for Marjah, Afghanistan commenced.  The battle didn't go as well or as quick as the coalition thought.  The Afghan "government-in-a-box" concept fizzled. The newly appointed officials put in place by Karzai turned out to be an unsatisfactory lot.  And the Taliban didn't just melt away.  However progress has been made.  The question is "Will it last?".  Read a one news commentators take on the situation in "One year after offensive, signs of progress in Marjah", Stars and Stripes, February 14, 2011.  Click here for more news about Marjah, Afghanistan.

3rd Commando Kandak and USSF Conduct Operation in Shah Wali Kot District, Kandahar Province, Afghanistan

KANDAHAR PROVINCE, Afghanistan – Afghan and coalition forces set out to provide security and assist the local population during a clearing operation in a remote village in Shah Wali Kot District, Kandahar province, Afghanistan, Feb. 8, 2011.

District Chief of Police Bacha Khan and his policemen, Afghan Commandos from 2nd Company, 3rd Commando Kandak, along with U.S. service members from Special Operations Task Force – South, searched the village throughout the day and detained 20 suspected insurgents.

Also found were 80 pounds of homemade explosives and various improvised explosive device making materials.

Leading a squad during the operation was Afghan Commando Sgt. Hafiz Rahman, a 28-year-old who has been in the Afghan National Army for seven years. He said this operation has shown him progress.

“The people are respecting us,” Rahman said. “They ask us if we want tea, or ‘do we want bread?’ They are thankful for the security.”

Children during the operation brought Commandos blankets in the evening, and offered them food throughout the day.

“Afghans are tired of the Taliban,” Rahman said. “We just want to live in peace.”

The operation took place without any civilian casualties, or any property damage. No shots were fired during the detention of the suspects.

Source:  "Afghan Police, Commandos, US Special Forces clear northern Kandahar", DVIDS, February 11, 2011.

Kandahar Battle Still Unresolved

The Taliban are continuing their attacks in the city of Kandahar and the surrounding region.  Although many gains have been made by coalition forces on the ground - a result of the troop surge - some critics worry these are temporary.  The status of who has won "the battle of Kandahar" may be revealed later this year once Spring approaches and the traditional fighting season in Afghanistan resumes.  In the meantime coalition troops continue to put pressure on Taliban fighters, IED networks, and the shadow government in the Kandahar region.  Read more in "Crucial test looms for key Afghan battleground", AFP Google, February 13, 2011.

Canadian Generals to Head Afghan Training Programs

Two Canadian generals will be heading up the training programs for the Afghanistan police and army.  As Canada transitions from combat operations in southern Afghanistan to a training role many of its troops will go home - probably in about one half year.  The training effort will require about 900 Canadian troops who will be stationed primarily in the Kabul area.  Read more in "Canadian generals to oversee critical Afghan training programs", The National Post, February 13, 2011.

Slovakia and US Special Forces to Work Together in Afghanistan

US Special Forces and members of the Slovakia Special Forces will soon be training and ultimately working together in Afghanistan.  MG Michael Repass of Special Operations Command Europe paid a visit to Slovakia to observe training of the unit and to discuss training and preparation for the joint mission.  Read more in "US special forces and Slovak 5th Regiment to cooperate in Afghanistan", The Slovak Spectator, February 9, 2011.

New Zealand Extends SAS Deployment in Afghanistan

New Zealand will keep SAS troopers in Afghanistan to continue its work with the Afghan Crisis Response Unit.  Read more in "New Zealand extends special forces deployment to Afghanistan", New Kerala.com, February 7, 2011.

Taliban to Target Afghan Leaders during Upcoming Spring Offensive

Coalition forces are predicting that the Taliban will target low- and mid-level Afghan government and tribal leaders during the upcoming spring offensive.  Read more in "Taliban's spring offensive to target Afghan leaders cooperating with government", The Washington Post, February 7, 2011.

Theories on Conflict Resolution and Afghanistan

The Afghanistan Analysts Network has published a document about theories on conflict resolution and how to apply it to Afghanistan.

"Despite the recent deployments of more troops and greater military resources to Afghanistan by the US-led Western coalition, there has been no abatement in the insurgency. It rather is increasing in lethality, territorial scope and mobilisation beyond their main base in the Pashtun ethnic group. As a result, doubts about the efficacy of conventional war-fighting, counter-insurgency and transition strategies grow and alternative means of mitigating the conflict come into sight.

The paper briefly discusses seven such theories and draws conclusions from them for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan: ripeness theory, theories of mediation, theories of reconciliation, power-sharing theories, credible commitment theory, spoilers’ analysis and local peace-building. While such theories are not panacean, they can help to understand the conflict and point towards practical steps that can contribute to improve the prospects for peace. The authors point out, though, that as abstractions they must necessarily be adapted to circumstances."

Read or download the document (Adobe Acrobat PDF) at the following link:

"Peace offerings: Theories of conflict resolution and their applicability to Afghanistan", Matt Waldman and Thomas Ruttig, Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 2011.

More Criticism of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of Afghanistan

A commentator with experience in Afghanistan has provided us some insight about the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan.  He agrees with the recent Karzai statement that the PRTs should be dismantled and the money turned over to the Afghan government.  Joshua Foust writes this in "The AFPAK Channel" blog for Foreign Policy Magazine.  Hmmmmm.  So turn over the money to the Afghan government and let them head up development projects.  Sure . . . that will work.  Why don't we just wire the money to the Dubai and Swiss bank accounts of the corrupt Afghan officials and eliminate the middle man?  Read his commentary in "Actually, Karzai is right about PRTs", Foreign Policy, February 8, 2011.

New Zealand Rejects Karzai's Call for End of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan

The Minister of Defence of New Zealand has rejected calls by Karzai to dismantle the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. New Zealand has been running the PRT in Bamyan Province in central Afghanistan for several years. 

"Speaking to the BBC, Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai said the provincial reconstruction teams throughout the country are hindering the development of home-grown institutions. Mr Karzai said the teams are like an alternative system of government and threaten to undermine stability in Afghanistan.

There are 125 Defence Force personnel with New Zealand's Provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamyan province in central Afghanistan. The team has been based there since 2003 running regular security patrols and working with local companies to build bridges, schools and police stations." 

Read more in the news article "Minister defends work of NZ team in Bamyan", Radio New Zealand News, February 10, 2011.

Karzai Wants to End Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)

Karzai has called for the dismantling of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are scattered around Afghanistan at the province and district level.  The PRTs are organized to help provide medical care, development projects and dispense international aid (money) throughout the country - complementing and working with local Afghan government officials at the province and district level.  In many areas, the PRTs are the only sign that the Afghan government has any presence at all.  Karzai says the PRTs are a dual mechanism competing with the Afghan governmental structure.  Most observers are critical of Karzai's stance on PRTs and say he just wants to get the aid money to flow through Afghan government institutions in order to provide more opportunity for corruption and to gain more political clout throughout the country. This observer says keep the PRTs and keep the money out of the hands of Karzai's corrupt cronies.  This is one of the few things we are doing right in the country.  Read more about Karzai's criticism of the PRTs in "Karzai Seeks End to NATO Reconstruction Teams", The New York Times, February 6, 2011.

Canadian General Posted to NATO Training Mission

A Canadian general will become the Deputy Commander of NATO's training mission in Afghanistan.  Canada is shifting its support in the war from combat in the south of Afghanistan to training the Afghan security forces at a central location in or near Kabul.  Brigadier General Michael Day will be promoted to Major General before departing for Afghanistan.  Read more in "Canadian general appointed second in command of NATO Afghan training mission", Winnipeg Free Press, February 7, 2011.

Cultural Support Teams (CST) in Afghanistan

USSOCOM is forging ahead with fielding teams comprised of females that will interact with the local population in Afghanistan.  The Marine Corps fielded Female Engagement Teams (FETs) over two years ago with great success.  The U.S. Army is supposedly doing the same although the jury is out on how well they are implementing the program.  USSOCOM is quietly embarked in the same direction as the Marine Corps - calling their female engagement teams Cultural Support Teams (CST). 

Read more in "CST: Afghanistan", The Best Defense Blog, Foreign Policy, February 8, 2011.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/02/08/cst_afghanistan

See the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) website for more information about the CSTs and see the requirements for training, recruiting, and program specifications.

http://www.soc.mil/fet/fet.html

Abdul Raziq - Warlord of Spin Boldak, Afghanistan

Abdul Raziq has been described in various ways.  Some refer to him as a warlord and others think of him as a patriotic Afghan fighter.  The truth is somewhere in the middle no doubt.  He is the most powerful man in Spin Boldak and a firm ally of the NATO forces trying to root out the Taliban.  Read more on this colorful character.

"NATO bullish, Canadians wary of Afghan warlord Raziq", CTV News, December 27, 2010.

"The master of spin Boldak", Harper's Magazine, December 2009.

Book: My Life With the Taliban - Autobiography by Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef

A new book just released is an autobiography by a former high-level Taliban leader called Abdul Salam Zaeef.  Zaeef held various important positions in the Taliban organization and was once the Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan.  The book was originally wrote in Pashto by Zaeef and has been translated and edited by Alex Strick van Linschoten - a researcher who lives in Kandahar, Afghanistan.  The author describes his life including his early years, the time fighting the jihad against the Russians, his time with the Taliban and connections with the Pakistan intelligence services.

To learn more about the book or buy it online from Amazon.com click on the link below:

My Life with the Taliban

$41 Million Spent by Canada on Security Contractors and Warlords

Canadian officials are digging into the records to research how much money went to security contractors (and warlords) in Afghanistan.  Read more in "Defence department hunts for record of payments to Kandahar warlord", The Star, February 7, 2011.

Plan for Literacy Success for Afghan Security Forces

"NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan military leaders and officials from the Afghanistan Ministry of Education and U.S. Agency for International Development reviewed their efforts to progressively raise literacy and educational levels among Afghan security forces – and Afghan society – at a Literacy Summit here Feb. 7. The Summit encouraged closer collaboration and cooperation among NTM-A literacy partners working to sustain a new system of life-long education for the Afghan National Security Forces that is expected to transform Afghan society as a whole." 

Read the rest of the article in "NTM-A and partners plan for literacy success at Kabul Summit", NTM-A, February 8, 2011.

Karzia Critical of US Dispensed Aid in Afghanistan

President Karzai of Afghanistan has publicly stated that military and other international organizations that dispense aid in Afghanistan are undermining his government.  The US and ISAF have a number of programs in place that provide aid at the local level and help to establish local governance and village security.  The programs are administered by a variety of means - usually through USAID, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), CERP funding projects, or other programs.  The funding stream is passed from the US government down to the local level bypassing the corrupt Afghan central government that would take its usual 30 to 50 % off the top to buy villas in Dubai, fancy automobiles, and plush houses in Kabul for its high-level officials and family members.  Read more in "Karzai critical of aid bypassing Afghan government", The Washington Post, February 6, 2011.

Report Says Taliban May be Open to Negotiations and Break with al Qaeda

A recent news article states that the Taliban may be willing to break with al Qaeda and conduct negotiations for a peace settlement. Read more in the links below:

"Afghan Taliban would be open to talks: report", Yahoo News, February 7, 2011

"N.Y.U. Report Casts Doubt on Taliban's Ties with Al Qaeda", The New York Times, February 6, 2011

The report, sponsored by New York Univeristy's Center on International Cooperation, can be found on the website of the Human Security Report Project.  See "Separating the Taliban from al-Qaeda: The Core of Success in Afghanistan", February 1, 2011.

Afghan Local Police (ALP) in Baghlan Province - Special Forces Working with Locals to Establish Security

In Shahbuddin, Afghanistan (Baghlan Province) a U.S. Special Forces team is working with villagers to establish a small local fighting force that will stand up to the Taliban.  This force is called the Afghan Local Police (ALP).  The ALP is a new program approved by Karzai last summer and instituted this past fall by Special Forces as a counter to the shadow Taliban government, the lack of connectivity of rural areas to the district and provincial centers of the central government, and the absence presence and influence of Afghan security forces in these rural areas.  There are about 3,000 Afghans under arms in at least 14 sites across the country.  It is hoped that many more sites are established by spring before the fighting season begins once again. 

There are critics of the ALP program - within the U.S. military, the international community, the Afghan central government and at the provincial and district level.  Some members of the ALP are former Taliban fighters who promised to switch sides.  Some are protrayed by critics as no more than local bandits or the militias of local warlords.  One criticism is that if an ALP element is composed of members of one tribe or community then that tribe or community is strengthened and its influence grows - at the expense of other tribes or communities.

To read more about the ALP in Baghlan Province read "U.S. initiative to arm Afghan villagers carries some risks", The Washington Post, February 6, 2011.  To learn more about the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and village security efforts see Village Security and Stability in Afghanistan.

The Taliban Shadow Government in Ghazni, Afghanistan

A lengthy news article provides a glimpse of how the Taliban set up and run its shadow government in Afghanistan's rural areas where the central government of Karzai does not exert influence.  Read "In Eastern Afghanistan, at War With the Taliban's Shadowy Rule", The New York Times, February 6, 2011.

Security Companies Hired by Canadian Military for Afghanistan Under Question

"OTTAWA — Canada spent more than $41 million on hired guns in Afghanistan over four years, much of it going to security companies slammed by the U.S. Senate for having warlords on the payroll. Both the Defence and Foreign Affairs departments have employed 11 security contractors in Kabul and Kandahar since 2006, but have kept quiet about the details. Now documents tabled in Parliament at the request of the New Democrats provide the first comprehensive picture of the use of private contractors, which have been accused of adding to the chaos in Afghanistan."

Read the rest of the article in "Canada's hired guns in Afghanistan slammed in U.S. report", CTV Ottawa, February 6, 2011.

Kabul Bank - A Story of Afghan Corruption at the Highest Level

The level of corruption in Afghanistan is astounding.  A recent article explores the corruption of the Kabul Bank - a financial institution that controls much of the money sent to Afghanistan in the form of aid.  Money was diverted to Karzai's election campaign, bribes to government and Parliament members, and to support the lavish life style of senior Afghan officials in Dubai.  There is reportedly over 900 million dollars missing in loans to fictitious corporations.

Read a discouraging article about corruption in the Kabul Bank and the Afghan government in "The Afghan Bank Heist", The New Yorker, February 14, 2011.

Assessment of the Security of Kandahar

A recent news article has provided an assessment of the apparent state of security in Kandahar and around the city. Read more in "Kandahar: Safer for good or just safer for now?", Stars and Stripes, February 3, 2011.

Survey Finds Afghans Are Positive about Police

A survey conducted by the Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has found that most Afghans have positive feelings about the Afghan police.  This is according to the Police Perception Survey of 2010.  The results of the survey are surprising given the dismal reputation of the Afghan National Police (ANP).  Then again, the Ministry of Interior (whom the ANP come under) was partially responsible for th survey.  So  . . . read more in "Majority of Afghans positive about local police, survey shows", United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, February 3, 2011.

Descripton of IED Attacks in Afghanistan

A recent news article from an Australian newspaper describes the IED threat to troops conducting operations in Afghanistan.  Read more in "IED poses greatest threat in Afghanistan", The Sydney Morning Herald, February 3, 2011.

Seabees Helping CJSOTF-A with Construction in Oruzgan Province

Seabees from a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion are building work and living areas in Oruzgan Province for members of an infantry battalion attached to the CJSOTF-A.  Read more in "NMCB 3's Det. 4 Builds Shelters for US Forces to Brave the Afghan Cold", DVIDS, January 31, 2011.

2/9 Marines Depart Marjah, Afghanistan

"MARJAH, Afghanistan - Nearly one year ago, Marjah was the scene of some of the deadliest fighting since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. Now, after the persistence of 2nd Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, the area is lauded as proof that counterinsurgency operations can work."  Read the rest of the news article in "2nd Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment leaves Northern Marjah a safer place", DVIDS, January 30, 2011.

Learn more about the battle for Marjah at the link below:
http://www.securityinfonet.com/afghanistan/battle-for-marja.htm

British IED Disposal Soldiers in Afghanistan

Disposing of IEDs in Afghanistan is a dangerous job and it takes special men to do it.  The British have specialized teams that receive extensive training in this area.  Read about them in "Afghanistan: the Bomb Hunters", The Telegraph, February 2, 2011.

Taliban Weapons in Ghazni Province

A blogger provides insight on the types of weapons that the Taliban are using in Ghazni Province.  Read his interesting article on the small arms used by the insurgents in "Taliban Gun Lockers: The Rifles of Rural Ghazni Province", At War Blog, The New York Times, January 31, 2011.

Afghans Worry About Afghan Local Police (ALP) Program

Many Afghans are concerned about the building up of local Afghan police forces in rural areas.  They are concerned that they will not be accountable to local or district authorities and in many cases will turn into bands of armed bandits.  Read about the reluctance of village elders in RC-East from the Bangi area in the following news report.  "Afghans Wary of Building Up Local Policing Forces", National Public Radio (NPR), January 13, 2011.  View the following web page for more information about the Afghan Local Police (ALP).