Thursday, January 20, 2011
Afghan National Police - Story on One Policeman in Afghanistan
An article has been published depicting the life of one member of the Afghan National Police (ANP). Interesting look at the motivations of an Afghan policeman. See "Afghan Police bring national pride, self-reliance to eastern Kandahar", DVIDS, January 17, 2011.
Negotiations Needed in Afghanistan
A columnist writes that we have lost the war and it is time to negotiate for peace. Read his critique of the Afgahan War in "Afghanistan: Killing Peace", The Berkley Daily Planet, January 19, 2011.
Winter Lull in Fighting Provides Opportunity for U.S. in Villages to Establish Afghan Local Police (ALP)
The lull in the winter fighting is going to provide an opportunity for U.S. forces to make inroads into the villages in rural areas that are under Taliban control. Many Taliban return to Pakistan or to their homes in Afghanistan during the winter months. This provides the U.S. military with more occasions to meet with village elders to reinforce the theme of local ties with the district sub-governors, Afghan National Police (ANP), to start or finish development projects, and to institute a local village defense force sometimes referred to as Afghan Local Police (ALP) or neighborhood watch groups. This is true in the village of Bangi, Afghanistan where military personnel recently met with village elders. Read more on this topic in "US troops hope for Afghan winter breakthrough", Google Hosted News, January 11, 2011.
Wednesday, January 19, 2011
A Culture of Business in Afghanistan
Deputy Undersecretary for Defense Paul Brinkley has as one of his tasks the building up of a business culture in Afghanistan. This task can lead one into many areas of endeavor as the article at the following link reveals. See "The US military is fighting to build . . . Afghan business culture?", The Christian Science Monitor, January 14, 2011.
Protective Eyewear in Afghanistan Saves Eyes
An embed reporter has wrote an article about the importance of protective equipment that Soldiers and Marines wear while on patrol in Afghanistan. In this article he specifically addresses protective eyewear. Read "The Gear That Saved a Marine Corporal's Eyes", The New York Times, January 14, 2011.
Afghan Reintegration Program - Not Quite Up and Running
The Afghan reintegration program, where Taliban are persuaded to rejoin their community and stop fighting against coalition and Afghan security forces, is having a slow start. The program started some months ago and has been heavily publicized but the crossovers have not occurred at the desired rate. The "reintegrated" Taliban will be provided jobs and monitored by their community leaders to ensure they do not resume fighting. The reintegration program was announced by Karzai and is supported by ISAF (see backgrounder notes entitled "ISAF Support to Reintegration and Reconciliation" - Adobe Acrobat PDF file). However, success has been limited. Read more in "U.S. military, Afghan officials put faith in underused reintegration program", Stars and Stripes, January 10, 2011.
Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Correspondent Reports on VSO and ALP in Southern Afghanistan
A correspondent has wrote a post on the Village Stability Program (VSO) / Afghan Local Police (ALP) implementation in a village in southern Afghanistan. A Field Artillery Battalion Commander is attempting to set up an ALP element in his sector. Read about the pitfalls and challenges he has in making this happen. See "Doping out how to do the VSO-ALP backburn", Foreign Policy, January 18, 2011. Read more about village stability operations and Afghan Local Police here.
9th Marines Conduct Operation Integrity in Marjah, Afghanistan
The battle of Marjah may now be over but the coalition forces are still conducting operations searching for remnants of the Taliban.
"On Jan. 15, 2nd Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment launched Operation Integrity, in Marjah, Helmand province, Afghanistan. The main purpose of the operation was to successfully cordon off a suspected hotspot for Taliban activity, search for weapon and IED caches, disrupt enemy logistical operations and gather census data on locals in the region of Sistani."Read the rest of the story in "Marines say insurgency weakening in northern Marjah", Marines.mil, January 18, 2011.
COIN Theory: COIN Training Center in Afghanistan Teaches How to Succeed With Counterinsurgency
The Counterinsurgency Training Center in Afghanistan teaches Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and coalition partners about the basics of COIN. COL Chadwick W. Clark of the COIN Training Center has a small blog explaining their very basic COIN theory. He provides us with a basic guide called the three P's of Perception, Partnering, and Praxis. Read more in "COIN: Theory is Easy, Execution is Hard", NTM-A, January 5, 2011.
Critic Says "Hearts and Minds Campaign" Not Working
A critic of the war in Afghanistan, Bing West, says that the U.S. military should get back to fighting the enemy and spending less time on nation building and winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan populace. Read more in "Hearts and Minds Won't Get Us Out of Afghanistan", Newsweek, January 4, 2011.
Monday, January 17, 2011
Police Mentoring in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2009 | A Report by CNA
The CNA Strategic Studies research group has published a report entitled "Police Mentoring in Afghanistan 2007-2009". The report is wrote by William Rosenau, Ph.D. and is available for download on the CNA website (Adobe Acrobat file, 98 pages). A description of the report (text taken from website) is below:
"The role of the police is an important but largely overlooked aspect of contemporary counterinsurgency and stability operations. Although academic and policy specialists have examined the role of police in post-conflict environments, the question of how police should be organized, trained, and equipped for counterinsurgency campaigns has received little systematic attention.The following link will take you to the report.
Similarly, US military doctrine and the professional military literature, while not ignoring the subject entirely, do not consider it in any systematic way.2 This gap is particularly ironic, given the prominent role that soldiers and Marines have played in training indigenous police and other security forces in counterinsurgency campaigns from Vietnam to Afghanistan.
If the broader topic of police and counterinsurgency is under-examined, the subject of mentoring—that is, advising and training—foreign police forces is even more neglected. American Marines, soldiers, and other military personnel preparing to deploy to Afghanistan for the police mentoring mission have few sources of information and analysis available to them.
This monograph addresses that gap. Using a series of ten vignettes, this report examines in depth the experiences of individual American and British soldiers and Marines who served as mentors in Afghanistan during the 2007-2009 period."
Sunday, January 16, 2011
Report from Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Zabul, Afghanistan
Zabul Province in Afghanistan has recently deserved the attention it deserves from the military. It is an important province due to a number of factors. Highway 1 runs through Zabul Province (it connects Kandahar with Kabul). The province is home to leaders and members of the insurgency and neighbors Kandahar Province. Recent military operations have enhanced security which in turn helps with efforts to improve governance and development. The following news release paints a rosy picture of the Afghan government's efforts in Zabul Province. Let's hope it is true. See "Measurable progress made in Afghanistan's Zabul Province", The Reading Eagle, January 16, 2011.
Karl Eikenberry - U.S. Ambassador - Optimistic on Afghanistan
The U.S. Ambassador, Karl Eikenberry, has been quoted in a recent news article as being optimistic about Afghanistan. He says that as the U.S. begins to transition from a combat role to a support role over the next four years that things will improve. Eikenberry notes that sufficient resources have now been provided to the U.S. military for the first time since the invasion in 2001-2002. Read more in "U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan optimistic about reaching goals", Fayetteville Observer, January 16, 2011.
Afghan National Border Police Receives Contraband Training in Afghanistan
Members of the Afghan National Border Police received training in customs and border procedures recently in Afghanistan. A Military Police platoon of the 10th Mountain Division provided the training with assistance from the U.S. Customs Border Patrol. The training was for a Contraband Enforcement Team (CET). Read more in "Ready, CET, Go! A new training program begins at Afghan border", dvidshub.net, January 16, 2011.
Senator Webb Disagrees With Army Version of the Battle of Wanat, Afghanistan
Nine U.S. Army Soldiers died in the Battle of Wanat in July 2008. The Army has recently released the historical record (Adobe Acrobat file) of the battle but many are finding fault with its conclusions. This includes Senator Webb of Virginia. Read more on this in "Sen. Webb decries Army's flawed history of controversial Wanat battle", The Washington Post, January 7, 2011.
Saturday, January 15, 2011
The COIN Curve
Reading a recent news article this morning I was introduced to a new phrase - "The COIN Curve". It appears, based on the explanation provided in the article, that in a counterinsurgency the level of violence will increase before it gets better - meaning the violence level goes down. This is caused by a number of factors - and in Afghanistan can be attributed to two major factors (I am sure there are more than two but these come to mind right now). New troops - "the surge" - are introduced into traditional Taliban sanctuaries and the level of fighting increases. As the pressure mounts on the Taliban as a result of an increased optempo the level of violence increases across the board - more Taliban are being engaged more frequently. An example of the increase in violence, as the article points out, is the increase in security incidents during January - a month where the "winter recess" means the Taliban return to their safe havens in Pakistan or to their homes in Afghanistan.
Level of Security Incidents in January:
January 2008 - 100
January 2009 - 200
January 2010 - 400
January 2011 - 700 (this is just in the first week of January)
So, there you have it. "The COIN Curve" explained. Hopefully in January 2012 we will see the downward trend begin?
See "Petraeus blames 75% increase in violence on mild Afghan winter", The Examiner, January 15, 2011.
Level of Security Incidents in January:
January 2008 - 100
January 2009 - 200
January 2010 - 400
January 2011 - 700 (this is just in the first week of January)
So, there you have it. "The COIN Curve" explained. Hopefully in January 2012 we will see the downward trend begin?
See "Petraeus blames 75% increase in violence on mild Afghan winter", The Examiner, January 15, 2011.
Should We Leave the Pech Valley in RC-East?
A video is circulating around the blogs about the upcoming decision on whether to withdraw from the Pech River Valley in RC-East (Afghanistan). James Foley of Global Post interviewed members of a battalion from the 101st Airborne Division on the merits of the U.S. military staying in the Pech River Valley. Some members of the battalion believe that the presence of U.S. forces provide a common enemy for the various anti-government forces to come together against - giving them a unity of effort and a reason for existance. The Pech River Valley is sparsely populated and the value of "owning" the valley is in question. If the military were to secure the valley it certainly would be a modest military gain but would come at a high cost utilizing resources that might be more valuable elsewhere in Afghanistan. It would appear that much of the valley will be left to the Taliban as early as May 2011 when the battalion pulls out - putting into the question the work and effort (and lives) expended thus far by U.S. military members. It is possible that the Afghan security forces would remain to secure the valley - but . . . . Click on the link below to view the video.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/afghanistan/110103/afghanistan-war-video-pech-valley
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/afghanistan/110103/afghanistan-war-video-pech-valley
US Pushes Local Governance in Southern Afghanistan
The US military is trying to expand local government as rapidly as possible in southern Afghanistan during the winter months - traditionally a period where there is a decrease in fighting. Read more in "US rushes to build local governments in southern Afghanistan before expected spring offensive", Google Hosted News, January 13, 2011.
Marjah Now a Peaceful Farming Community
Marjah has been described by a high-ranking Marine officer as "a peaceful farming community". This is a long way from the fierce battle that was fought last February and over the past several months by the Marine Corps and other combat units. Read the news article in "Marine official: We're beginning to see a turn in Afghanistan", Jacksonville Daily News, January 13, 2011.
Kabul, Afghanistan Embassy to be Built by Montgomery, Alabama Firm
A Montgomery, Alabama construction firm has been awarded the contract to build the new U.S. embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan. Read more in "Montgomery firm set to build $416 million US Embassy in Afghanistan", Montgomery Advertiser, January 13, 2011.
Oil Contract Awarded for Northern Afghanistan
An oil development contract has been awarded to a local Afghan firm for an area in northern Afghanistan that is near the Afghanistan / Turkmenistan border. Read more in "Afghanistan Awards First Oil Deal", LogisticsWeek, January 14, 2011.
Marine Corps Female Engagement Teams
The Marine Corps has deployed Female Engagement Teams in their area of operations. Read more on these unique Marines in "Female engagement team refreshes their training", DVIDS Net, January 14, 2011.
Friday, January 14, 2011
Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan Climbs Despite Efforts
The anti-drug campaign in Afghanistan is not making progress. In fact, the situation has gotten worse. Coalition forces are focusing on fighting the Taliban, farmers are making money growing the crop, and warlords, corrupt government bureaucrats and the extended Karzai family continue to get rich. Afghanistan produces 85 % of the opium in the world. Stopping the poppy growing has been somewhat successful in the northern and eastern provinces where security is better than in the south and west of Afghanistan where the Taliban rule the countryside. Read more in "As opium prices soar and allies focus on Taliban, Afghan drug war stumbles", The Washington Post, January 14, 2010.
Afghanistan Amnesty Deals Not Successful in 2010
Amnesty deals (or reintegration) in Afghanistan have not been successful in the past year. The military would like to pull middle- and low-ranking Taliban fighters from the insurgency and reintegrate them into Afghan society but it isn't working as planned. Less than 800 fighters have signed up for the plan - just a fraction of the 30,000 Taliban fighting against the corrupt Afghan government and coalition military troops. Read more in "A Year in, Amnesty Deal Lures Only 3 Percent of Taliban", Wired.com Danger Room, January 3, 2011.
Thursday, January 13, 2011
Paedophilia - or "Bache Bazi" A Common Practice in Afghanistan
People from across the world are different. What is acceptable in one society is looked down upon in another. The liberal attitudes about women accepted in western societies are condemned in Muslim societies. Western films, pornographic materials such as Playboy magazines, and other instances where the nudity of women is freely displayed is widely disparaged in some Muslim nations. There are aspects of some cultures in the Middle East and South Central Asia that bother westerners - such as the treatment of women. One of the more upsetting instances of Afghan culture is that of the "Bache Bazi" sometimes called "boy play". Read more in "Paedophilia culturally accepted in south Afghanistan", The Telegraph, January 14, 2011.
Difficulties of Working with the Afghan Police
There are difficulties in working with the Afghan National Police (ANP). Many are illiterate and corrupt. Some are untrained and ill-equipped. Very few meet the standards of a western-style police force. Yet our troops are expected to train them, patrol with them, and get them to do their job. A difficult task at best. The link below takes you to a new report that shows just how frustrating this job can be. See "The Afghan Diaries: How to Get the Police to Respond", Time.com, January 13, 2011.
A Video Captures the Fog of War in Afghanistan
The Afghan populace gets caught in the middle. The Taliban intimidates them for money and support. Afghan government and coalition troops look upon the Afghans as either passive about the insurgency or supporters of the Taliban. Certainly there are instances where an innocent Afghan is killed by the coalition forces accidentally. This does not bode well for the support of that Afghan's family or village. See how the fog of war can lead to the killing of civilians. Check out "The Fog of War in Kandahar", CBS News, January 13, 2011.
Offensive in Kandahar (Operation Omid) Was Costly in Terms of Property of Afghan Villagers
The offensive in Kandahar over the past several months was costly in terms of property damage. The estimates of how much property damage is widely disputed. Read more on this in "Afghan Panel and U.S. Dispute War's Toll on Property", The New York Times, January 13, 2011.
Should General Petraeus Get a Fifth Star?
General Petraeus is recognized as the best-known and probably the most-respected general officer of the war on terrorism that has taken place over the past nine years. There are some that think he deserves a fifth star. Read more in "Current wars deserve a general ranking with the best from WWII, vets say", CNN Politics, January 13, 2011.
The Longest War by Peter Bergen
"At nearly a decade and counting, and with tens of thousands of American troops still at war in Afghanistan and Iraq--and with Osama bin Laden still at large--we remain well within the post-9/11 era, almost to the point where we take its conditions for granted. Many of the aspects of the ongoing, often indirect battles between America and al-Qaeda have been well covered, but there hasn't until now been a full overview of the conflict, and few are more qualified to write it than Peter Bergen, the print and television journalist who, as a CNN producer, arranged bin Laden's first interview with the Western press in 1997. He has been on the story ever since, as the author of Holy War, Inc., and The Osama bin Laden I Know, but in The Longest War he synthesizes his knowledge for the first time into an insightful portrait of both sides in this asymmetrical struggle between superpower and shadowy scourge. Readers of reporters like Lawrence Wright, Thomas Ricks, and Bob Woodward will be familiar with much of the story, especially on the American side, but Bergen's rare understanding of bin Laden's world--often based on personal interviews with present and former jihadists--along with his sharp assessments of each side's successes and failures (he considers the 9/11 attacks to have been more of a failure than a success for their perpetrators), make it necessary reading for anyone wanting to understand our times."The book is available at Amazon.com. The link below will take you to more information about the book and provide you the ability to purchase the book online.
The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al-Qaeda
Critics of Arbakai (or ALP) in the North of Afghanistan
Segments of the media continue to post stories of abuse by militia groups operating in the north of Afghanistan. The target of their criticism are the militias or "arbakai" that are abusing the population and running amok with no accountability to government authorities. Some critics state that the new Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative is nothing more than a government-funded militia program. While the coalition forces see the ALP as a method of gaining security in rural areas there is great concern that private militia armies will grow out of the program instead. Read more in "How to Gauge Victory (in the North)", Registan.net, January 12, 2011.
Experienced Afghan Inspector General for SIGAR Desired by U.S. Lawmakers
Lawmakers are looking for a competent Inspector General to oversee the billions of dollars spent in Afghanistan.
"The White House has not started floating candidates to lead the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction office, but lawmakers and aides already are devising a list of qualifications for the high-profile post vacated on Monday by Arnold Fields.Read the rest of the article in "Lawmakers seek more experienced Afghan inspector general", Government Executive, January 11, 2011.
Fields, a former Marine Corps two-star general who had led the office since its creation in 2008, resigned amid a push by a bipartisan group of senators who have blasted him for nearly two years for incompetence and mismanagement.
As the SIGAR, Fields was the top government official charged with investigating waste, fraud, and abuse in Afghanistan. With pressure mounting for his resignation, Fields last week made major changes to his office, including firing two officials who oversaw investigations and audits."
Canadians Prepare for the Big Move out of Afghanistan
Canada is withdrawing from Afghanistan. The huge task is the subject of a recent news article. See "Afghan pullout like moving a very large village, Canadian official says", The Gazette, January 9, 2011.
Wednesday, January 12, 2011
Counterinsurgency Manual FM 3-24 (December 2006)
For those of you who are interested in the field of counterinsurgency (and if you are deployed or deploying to Afghanistan you certainly would be) the Army has its field manual online and accessible. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (or MCWP 3-33.5) was published in December 2006. See the link below:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FM_3-24.pdf
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/repository/FM_3-24.pdf
Literacy Program on Radio Targeted for Afghan Women
A unique literacy program is being launched in Afghanistan that will offer reading lessons over the radio. This, of course, is a novel approach; however, the people putting it together seem to have a good method of delivering the lessons. Read more in "New radio program to help Afghans learn to read", Stars and Stripes, January 11, 2011.
Soldier Provides Insight to Operations in Charikar, Afghanistan - 194th Field Artillery
The commander of the 1st Battalion, 194th Field Artillery (Iowa Army National Guard) has provided info via letter to a local newspaper on the type of work his unit is doing while deployed to Afghanistan. Among other duties his unit assists the Parwan Operational Coordination Center Provincial (OCC-P) in the coordination of the Afghanistan Security Forces (ANSF) in that region. Read more in "Iowa soldier offers Afghanistan update", Messenger News, January 9, 2011.
Some British Forces Now Working in Maiwand District of Kandahar Province
The Household Cavalry are now working in Maiwand District of Kandahar Province in Afghanistan. Read more in "British troops move out of Helmand", The Guardian, January 7, 2011.
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
How to Leave Afghanistan? The Answer According to Ahmed Rashid - Negotiate with Taliban
A interesting article by Ahmed Rashid has been posted on The New York Review of Books website on how to end the war in Afghanistan. Rashid is the author of a few books about the Afghan conflict to include Taliban
and Descent into Chaos.
In his article Rashid addresses the impact of the recent parliamentary elections, the rise of influence of the non-Pashtun ethnic groups, and the growing wealth and independence of the north of Afghanistan from the central government. He also presents the challenges to resolving the war citing problems associated with an un-trained Afghan army and police force, lack of government presence in some provinces (especially at the district level), the drug trade, a corrupt central government, the influence of Pakistan and Iran, and negotiations with the Taliban. He concludes his article amplifying the last point - how to conduct negotiations for an end to the Afghan conflict with ten recommendations. Read the article at "The Way Out of Afghanistan", The New York Review of Books, December 16, 2010.
and Descent into Chaos.In his article Rashid addresses the impact of the recent parliamentary elections, the rise of influence of the non-Pashtun ethnic groups, and the growing wealth and independence of the north of Afghanistan from the central government. He also presents the challenges to resolving the war citing problems associated with an un-trained Afghan army and police force, lack of government presence in some provinces (especially at the district level), the drug trade, a corrupt central government, the influence of Pakistan and Iran, and negotiations with the Taliban. He concludes his article amplifying the last point - how to conduct negotiations for an end to the Afghan conflict with ten recommendations. Read the article at "The Way Out of Afghanistan", The New York Review of Books, December 16, 2010.
Members of Afghan Local Police (ALP) Working With Special Forces Team Killed by NATO Airstrike
Three members of an Afghan Local Police (ALP) element were killed when targeted by a NATO airstrike this past Sunday. The members of the ALP were on a patrol with the intent of linking up with a local Special Forces team when they were targeted by the airstrike. Read more in "NATO Strike Kills 3 Afghan Policemen", The New York Times, January 11, 2011.
Netherlands to Provide 545 Personnel for Afghan Police Training Mission
The Netherlands will provide a contingent of 545 personnel for an Afghan National Police (ANP) training mission. Read more in "Netherlands agrees Afghanistan training mission", Google Hosted News, January 7, 2011.
Monday, January 10, 2011
Afghanistan - Cultural and Political History - Book by Thomas Barfield
Here is a description of the book (as seen on the Amazon.com website):
"Afghanistan traces the historic struggles and the changing nature of political authority in this volatile region of the world, from the Mughal Empire in the sixteenth century to the Taliban resurgence today.Click on the link below for more information about the book:
Thomas Barfield introduces readers to the bewildering diversity of tribal and ethnic groups in Afghanistan, explaining what unites them as Afghans despite the regional, cultural, and political differences that divide them. He shows how governing these peoples was relatively easy when power was concentrated in a small dynastic elite, but how this delicate political order broke down in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Afghanistan's rulers mobilized rural militias to expel first the British and later the Soviets. Armed insurgency proved remarkably successful against the foreign occupiers, but it also undermined the Afghan government's authority and rendered the country ever more difficult to govern as time passed. Barfield vividly describes how Afghanistan's armed factions plunged the country into a civil war, giving rise to clerical rule by the Taliban and Afghanistan's isolation from the world. He examines why the American invasion in the wake of September 11 toppled the Taliban so quickly, and how this easy victory lulled the United States into falsely believing that a viable state could be built just as easily.
Afghanistan is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand how a land conquered and ruled by foreign dynasties for more than a thousand years became the "graveyard of empires" for the British and Soviets, and what the United States must do to avoid a similar fate."
Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics)
Counterinsurgency Training Center in Afghanistan to Change Focus
The Counterinsurgency Training Center in Afghanistan has a new focus - shifting training directed at coalition troops to Afghan security forces.
"Established May 2007, the Counterinsurgency Training Center Afghanistan focused on training coalition forces in Afghanistan. The CTC-A held a monthly Counterinsurgency Leaders Course to train coalition forces in COIN. The CTC-A would also send out Mobile Training Teams to train a two- to four-day COIN Priority of Instructions to groups out in the regions, when requested. Effectively the CTC-A was training 75 percent coalition forces and 25 percent Afghan National Security Force.
Curriculum was developed and adapted using an observe, learn and adapt method. The CTC-A observed International Security Assistance Force guidance, ANSF numbers, and in-theatre training requirements. The CTC-A learned what the Afghan National Army Training Center was doing and conducted after action reviews with former trainees to see what parts of the CTC-A’s training were useful. With this knowledge the CTC-A then adapted what they were training to who and where they were training them. The CTC-A functioned this way until September of 2010, when the commander of ISAF instructed the CTC-A to start focusing more on ANSF as opposed to training coalition forces".Read more of the article in "New Focus for Counterinsurgency Training Center Afghanistan", NTM-A, January 8, 2011.
Work Schemes Help Keep Zahri District of Kandahar Safe
Along with military operations to clear the Taliban forces operating in rural areas - the coalition is using work schemes where the local population can work on development projects and earn money. It is hoped that this will help turn the tide in the counterinsurgency fight. Read more about this work scheme in Zahri District of Kandahar in "US troops wage war with cash in Afghanistan", Google Hosted News, January 10, 2011.
Taliban Joining ALP in Northern Afghanistan
Recent reports indicate that the Taliban are being allowed to join the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in northern Afghanistan. Reports vary on the actual numbers - depends on which news article you read. A recent military press conference indicates there is less than a handful - but other press reports are more critical of the situation. Here is one online posting that is critical of the plan of reintegration of Taliban into local militias or ALP. See "For a Handful of Dollars: Taleban allowed to join ALP", Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 9, 2011.
Sunday, January 9, 2011
The Battle for Marjah - A Documentary by HBO to Air February 17, 2011
The Battle for Marjah is a documentary that will air on HBO on Thursday, February 17, 2011 at 8:00 p.m. EST. The feature will run 84 minutes and highlights the fierce battle for the Taliban stronghold of Marjah in southern Afghanistan. Learn more about the battle of Marjah.
Heroes of the Age by David B. Edwards - a Look at Afghan Society and Culture
Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier (Comparative Studies on Muslim Societies)
U.S. Special Forces Team Provides Safety to Mixed-Marriage Couple in Oruzgan Province
A recently-married couple from different tribes (Pashtun and Hazara) of the Oruzgan Province area has sparked an ethnic conflict that has caused two deaths, families leaving their homes under threats, and the attention of the Karzai government and a Special Forces detachment in the local area. The relatives of the Pashtun bride are displeased with the marriage and the bride feels her family wants to kill her to restore the families "honor". Read more in "Please save us, say blood-feud lovers", Sunday Herald Sun, January 9, 2011.
Private Security Firms Still on Chopping Block in Afghanistan
The Afghan government is still trying to limit the number of private security companies operating in Afghanistan. The official stance is that the Afghan security forces should be performing these duties and that the private security outfits are many times just local militias. Unfortunately, the Afghan police are just not trained for the job, are corrupt, and will not do an adequate job of protecting the coalition bases and aid projects that require security. Read more in "Afghan officials discuss private security firms", Forbes.com, January 6, 2011.
Alokozia Tribe of Sangin Area Responding to Tribal Engagement Efforts
Much is being made of the recent overtures of the Alokozia tribe of the Sangin area of southern Afghanistan to start working with the Afghan government and coalition forces. On the surface this might seem like a great idea and a remedy for some of the conflict in the area; however, it gets complicated real quick when you look at the historical context and inter-tribal relations of the past. Read an enlightening article on this topic in "Watershed tribal engagement in Sangin?", The Long War Journal Blog, January 6, 2011.
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