Senator Levin Issues Warning on Afghanistan

The outgoing chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin, says that "public disillusionment and disengagement with Afghanistan threatens the fragile progress taking root amid the United States' longest war". He made his comments during a speech to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) earlier this week. Read more in "Outgoing Armed Services chair warns about waning support for Afghanistan", Stars and Stripes, October 15, 2014.

Small Steps to Help Afghanistan's Future

Three writers have collaborated on an opinion column posted in The Washington Post providing some suggestions for the way forward in Afghanistan. Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ronald Neumann (former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan), and David Sedney (former Deputy U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan) believe that success is within reach but only if ". . . we capitalize with small investments that can enable significant payoffs" and adopt some minor policy changes. A major push is needed to prod our allies to provide 2,000 additional personnel to augment the U.S. contingent to deploy on Resolute Support (post Dec 2014 mission). A slight modification of the timetable for the withdrawal of troops could provide additional space and time for our European allies to fully commit to the long-haul. Critical support to the Afghan National Security Forces is needed in the area of air support, intelligence, and institutional development. Major mistakes in contracting by the United States have led to a capability gap in the Afghan Air Force; the U.S. Air Force should be provided more time to get it right. Read more in "The small steps to save our gains in Afghanistan".

Gen Zinni Comments on Modern Battlefield

General Anthony Zinni (USMC Ret) is the former Commander in Chief of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM). He provides, in an interview by Octavian Manea of the Small Wars Journal, some excellent commentary on modern warfare in today's environment and looks back on our Iraq and Afghan experiences. His focus in this interview is on the lack of strategy which is tied to military operations. Zinni offers some enlightened analysis of how the United States lacks an understanding of the political context of war. Although his remarks are concentrated on the Middle East in general he has some interesting comments on Afghanistan. These include taking our eye off the ball to invade Iraq, inability to deal with Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan, building up host nation conventional armies instead of a military that is capable of fighting a counterinsurgency, lack of resources for a whole-of-government approach to quelling insurgencies, and using metrics to show progress (body counts, attrition of enemy, etc.) instead of measuring the support of the population.  You can read "Reflections on the Modern Battlefield: A Discussion with General Anthony Zinni", Small Wars Journal, September 12, 2014 at this link.

Taliban's New War Fighting Strategy

Many observers have commented on what appears to be new strategies adopted by the Taliban in 2014. The first is the massing of large numbers of insurgents to attack formations and bases of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) located in small detachments in some remote district centers. The second new strategy is the targeting of intelligence officials of the National Directorate of Security (NDS).

The first, massing of large forces, is now possible because the ISAF airplanes (and choppers) that provide close air support (CAS) have dwindled and the lack of ISAF JTACs on the ground to direct the airstrikes. The Afghan Air Force (AAF) is far from able to provide close air support. The AAF has just a few aged Mi-35 HIND Attack Helicopters (export model of the Mi-24) and will not receive the Super Tucano until 2016. Another limiting factor is the minimal amount of Afghan Tactical Air Controllers (ATAC). In the past the insurgents would be hammered by CAS if they massed or attacked installations; however, that threat is no longer there.

Everyone knows that (well, . . . almost everyone) intelligence drives operations in a counterinsurgency. The ISAF ISR structure has, like its CAS capability, dwindled. The brigades that used to share the battlespace with the ANSF have gone home, and what little intelligence assets remain behind sometimes have trouble sharing information with their Afghan counterparts. The best Intel that the Afghans can provide is HUMINT - and that means the NDS. So the Taliban targeting the NDS is a good strategy (for them) as it diminishes the most important Intel asset that the ANSF can count on.

Read more in "Taliban Devise New Strategy in Afghanistan: Territorial Control and War on Afghan Intelligence Headquarters", The Jamestown Foundation, September 26, 2014.

White House Releases Updated Fact Sheet on Afghanistan

The White House Office of the Press Secretary has updated it's "Fact Sheet: Afghanistan" page to reflect recent decisions by President Obama and a look at the future involvement of the United States in Afghanistan. Topics explained include Afghans in the Lead, Planning for post-2014, the Security Transition Process, Supporting Political Transition, and The U.S. Role after 2014. The fact sheet was updated on February 12, 2013.  You can view it at the link below:

 www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/fact-sheet-afghanistan

Recommendations for Long Term Afghan Strategy

Michael O'Hanlon, a researcher and writer of foreign policy, has provided President Obama (and others) with four recommendations for long-term strategy in Afghanistan.

1. Force levels should remain at 65,000 through the 2013 fighting season.
2. Post December 2014 force levels should be closer to 20,000 rather than 10,000.
3. Improve Afghanistan's governance by concentrating less on the President and more on other Afghan political and government institutions.
4. Reinvigorate the reconciliation process with the Taliban - and including Pakistan in the process.

Read his recommendations in "The Strategy for Afghanistan", Brookings Institute, February 11, 2013.

RC East to Go on Offensive

A recent news report provides information on the upcoming offensive that will soon take place in Regional Command East in Afghanistan. Read about it in "Details emerge on coming U.S. offensive in eastern Afghanistan", Government Executive, April 4, 2012.

Short-Term Thinking about a Long-Term War

Someone once said that Vietnam was a war fought one-year at a time for ten years. The same could be said of the Afghan war. Commanders (and Soldiers) deploy to Afghanistan for one year and then move out to their next assignment. Many do more than one tour in Afghanistan - which from an experience point of view is a good thing as Soldiers have a clue during those subsequent tours. During the time between those tours the Soldiers are not usually preparing for their next trip to Afghanistan. Most do a brain-dump and proceed on to mastering their next job - most likely very unrelated to Afghanistan or counterinsurgency. Unless of course they are a member of Special Forces or the very small AFPAK Hands program. Read more on this topic in an article by Joshua Foust entitled "How Short-Term Thinking Makes the U.S. Worse at Fighting Wars", The Atlantic, March 31, 2012.

The Fight for Eastern Afghanistan - Paper by Institute for the Study of War (Isaac Hock)

The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has published a paper entitled "Fact Sheet: The Fight for Eastern Afghanistan". The author is Isaac Hock, a Research Analyst at the ISW. A summary of the fact sheet is below:

Security gains made by the addition of U.S. “surge” forces in southern Afghanistan have denied the Taliban its historical safe havens in Kandahar and Helmand. The campaign in Afghanistan must now focus on the East, which received few surge troops. The provinces surrounding Kabul are strategically important for controlling the capital and connecting the city with the rest of Afghanistan.

Commentary: Success in Afghanistan

Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Graham have penned an opinion piece that points out the U.S. national security interests at stake in Afghanistan and defines the path to success in the Afghan War. They state that "significant progress" has been made in Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have increased in capacity and capability, and that the U.S. should not abandon Afghanistan as we have in the past. Read the article in "Sustaining success in Afghanistan", The Washington Post, March 21, 2012.

ISAF's Future Strategic Plan for Afghanistan

General Allen, in his testimony before Congress this past week, revealed parts of the "new" ISAF strategic plan for Afghanistan. Prior to President Obama's announcement that the U.S. would speed its withdrawal plans up from 2014 to mid-2013 the plan was supposed to be:

ISAF consolidates its hold in southern Afghanistan in 2010 and 2011. Then in 2012 (we are now at the beginning of the 2012 fighting season) US forces would be shifted to East Afghanistan to defeat (or disrupt) the insurgency along the Afghan-Pak border.

But . . . along came President Obama's "early withdrawal" plan. Instead of moving troops from Southern Afghanistan to Eastern Afghanistan - they are to come home.

So who does the fighting to secure the East of Afghanistan? According to General Allen - the new plan is for the Afghan security forces to accomplish this. So it appears that U.S. troops will concentrate on Southeastern Afghanistan - or the "Southern" RC-East area while the ANSF will be responsible for Northeastern Afghanistan - or the "Northern" RC-East area.

This new plan involves no small measure of "risk taking". In other words, leaving the "Northern RC-East" territory to the Afghans probably means that the insurgents (Taliban and Haqqani Network) will continue to maintain their grasp on this area and perhaps gain even more territory. The south of Afghanistan (where much progress has been made over the past two years due to the 30,000 troop surge) are to be handed over to the Afghan security forces as well (we shall see how that works out).

CJ Radin of The Long War Journal explains this more fully in his article "ISAF's new plan for Afghanistan" posted on March 22, 2012.  He has a handy map of Afghanistan depicting the areas of RC East as well.

Rebuilding Trust in Afghanistan

The recent events in Afghanistan have sharpened the levels of mis-trust between Afghanistan and the United States. Karzai's erratic rhetoric and hard-line stances on negotiations for the strategic partnership have prompted many in the U.S. to decide that leaving Afghanistan sooner is better. Recent blunders by the U.S. such as the Koran burning, Panjwai killings, and other events have some in Afghanistan asking for a speedier transfer of security responsibilities, end of night raids, transfer of authority for running detention centers, and other moving ISAF forces from Afghan villages to the big bases.

Omar Samad, a Senior Afghanistan Expert at the United States Institute of Peace, has wrote a column that explores this mistrust and states that we have to rebuild mutual respect to achieve our objectives in Afghanistan. See "Facing the Afghan obstacle course", The AFPAK Channel on Foreign Policy, March 20, 2012.

Afghanistan: Descent Into Chaos

Read an online posting by Jeff Smith on the failure in Afghanistan. Smith is the Director of the South Asia Program at the American Foreign Policy Council and author of numerous articles on Asian security affairs.

Smith believes that Afghanistan is intent to return to a state of chaos and ethnic conflict. He puts much of the blame on Pakistan for allowing the Taliban sanctuaries and providing aid and assistance to the Taliban. He then says the U.S. leadership should have recognized that the war could not be properly prosecuted unless Pakistan cooperated; and without that cooperation we should have withdrawn our troops from Afghanistan.

Read the post in "Afghanistan Seems Fixed on a Return to Chaos", U.S. News and World Report, March 16, 2012.

Counterterrorism vs. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan

There are lots of folks out there who think we should be using a counterterrorism vice counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. Add the columnist Fareed Zakaria to those folks. Read "Afghan counterterrorism strategy needed", CNN World, March 16, 2012.

One Viewpoint: U.S. Leaders Not Setting Achievable Objectives for Afghanistan

Jeremi Suri, a professor of history and public affairs at the University of Texas, provides his viewpoint on the situation in Afghanistan. He tells us that the last month has been very difficult for U.S. forces in Afghanistan (Quran burning, Panjwai massacre, etc.), that there are parallels to Vietnam in 1968 (My Lai), and that it is difficult to do nation-building at the same time that you are drawing down troop levels and implementing an exit strategy. Read his column in "America's self-defeating cycle in Afghanistan", CNN Opinion, March 12, 2012.

Commanders Testify Before Congress About Afghanistan

"Two senior American military commanders spent the past two days putting into context recent negative news about the U.S. effort in Afghanistan. At the same time, they tried to get members of the Senate and House Armed Services committees to realize that U.S. units will remain in that country long after combat troops depart in 2014."

Read the rest of the article here at "Key commanders have their say on Afghanistan", The Washington Post, March 7, 2012.

Reality of Situation in Afghanistan

Fareed Zakaria writes an opinion piece in The Washington Post (February 29, 2012) about the "unsustainable aspect of America's Afghan policy". He states that while President Obama wants to withdraw troops he also wants to transition the fighting to an Afghan army and police while helping form a government in Kabul that can run the country and further develop its economy. Zakaria calls this a fantasy; points out factors that stand in the way of America's Afghan policy, and suggests that we recognize the reality of the Afghan situation.

He states that the Afghan government does not have the support of the Pashtuns - who comprise a good part (40%) of the population and many of whom support the Taliban. The national army, made up of Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks, does not have a proportionate representation of Pashtuns. For this reason support by the Pashtun areas of the country for the Afghan army is minimal. He believes that the Afghan economy will soon fail with the withdrawal of foreign troops and the excessive money spent in Afghanistan to support those troops. With a downsizing of the economy there will be no way to pay for a large Afghan army or police force. He sees no defeat of the Taliban in the near future as they have the support of the Pashtun population and sanctuaries in Pakistan.

In a concluding paragraph Zakaria suggests we accept reality and provides a way ahead:

"Accepting reality in Afghanistan would not leave America without options. Even with a smaller troop presence, we can pursue robust counterterrorism operations. We will be able to prevent the Taliban from again taking over the country. The north and east — populated by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras — will stay staunchly opposed to the Taliban. We should support those groups and, more crucially, ally with the neighboring countries that support them. The natural, and historic, allies of the Northern Alliance are India, Iran and Russia; they have permanent interests that will keep them involved in the region. We should try to align our strategy with those countries’ strategies (obviously, the alignment will be tacit with Iran)."

Read his entire article here -  "Fantasy and reality in Afghanistan", The Washington Post, February 29, 2012.

Washington Post Editorial - Continue the Mission in Afghanistan

The Washington Post has published an editorial about the way forward on the Afghanistan war.  With the recent riots and demonstrations in the streets of Afghanistan - and the killing of NATO troops by Afghan security force personnel - many observers of the war feel that we should accelerate our departure from an ungrateful nation which has cost us so much money and so many lives. Not so quick says the editorial board of the Post in a recent article on their website - see "Despite the deepening crisis, the Afghan strategy is worth saving", February 28, 2012.

Senator Carl Levin Provides His Perspective on the Afghanistan War

Senator Carl Levin of Michigan visited Afghanistan in early 2011.  He recently delivered a speech to the World Affairs Council of Western Michigan at the Grand Rapids Community College about his trip.  Read his perspective on the state of affairs in Afghanistan in "Prospects for Success in Afghanistan", February 21, 2011.

Troop Cuts Could Set Back Gains in Afghanistan

An international organization has recommended that troop levels remain the same in Afghanistan until July 2012.  The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) has released a report stating that an early withdrawal would set back gains made in southern Afghanistan.  Read more in the links below:

"U.S. troop cut could set back Afghan gains - thinktank", Reuters, February 10, 2011.

"Afghanistan Transition: Dangers of a Summer Drawdown", International Council on Security and Development Press Release, February 9, 2011.

Here is an abstract of the report:

"This report looks at the current dynamics in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, southern Afghanistan, in the context of the United States' announced plan to begin drawing down military forces in Afghanistan in five months. The surge of 30,000 additional US forces has changed the security dynamics on the ground significantly, with the additional troops making major gains in clearing districts previously held by the Taliban.

The total troops on the ground in Afghanistan have gone from approximately 89,000 NATO- ISAF troops and 215,000 Afghan security forces in March 2010, to a current total of 131,000 NATO-ISAF troops and 266,000 Afghan police and army, an overall increase of 93,000. The Afghan security forces are also more visible and arguably more professional and better equipped than before.

This progress at the military level will hopefully create an enabling environment for analogous improvement in the fields of aid, development, governance and counter-narcotics which still require significant work. Without that, the military gains will be undermined and unsustainable. The urgent needs of people displaced by the fighting, the chronic grinding poverty and unemployment, and the grassroots political dynamics are not being addressed in southern Afghanistan. It is not at all clear what strategies will be used to tackle these vital issues."

The report can be downloaded at the link below.  It is an Adobe Acrobat PDF file.

http://www.icosgroup.net/documents/afghanistan_dangers_drawdown.pdf