ISR: More than Just Air Assets

The military community (including the Intel folks out there) have mistakenly re-defined "ISR" to mean air surveillance assets (usually drones). This is true across the entire spectrum of warfare as well as intelligence support to a counterinsurgency (the Afghan construct). A recent online article on this topic provides more information on the meaning of ISR. Read "Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance is Greater than Aerial Surveillance", Small Wars Journal, February 18, 2014.

Snowden and Manning Treachery: Lasting Damage to Intelligence Capability

A former CIA operative discusses the treacherous actions of Snowden and Manning and the long-term effect on the capability to gather intelligence. Read "Tinker, Tailor, Leaker, Spy: The Future Costs of Mass Leaks", The National Interest, January 7, 2014.

Afghan Border Police Learn Map Reading

Photo by CPL Mariah Best, Feb 8, 2014

Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAAT) continue to work with their counterparts in Afghanistan to improve their capabilities. Intelligence is an important aspect of the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan. One of the key functions of an intelligence analyst is being able to plot a grid coordinate on a map. This is one of the many areas where the intelligence advisor on a SFAAT can provide assistance - facilitating map reading classes for the advised Afghan National Security Force unit to improve its intelligence skills. A recent news release by the military provides us with a great example of this - recently 1LT Jonathan Ramey of 3rd BCT, 1st Infantry Division assisted his Afghan counterpart in running a map reading class for members of the 3rd Zone Afghan Border Police in Kandahar. Read more in "Map-reading course brings success to ANP operations", DVIDS, February 10, 2014.

MC-12W ISR Provides Find, Fix Capability to ISAF

The MC-12 W Liberty aircraft has been providing a find, fix, and finish capability to ISAF since December 2009 in Afghanistan. The MC-12 aircraft is well-suited for providing critical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance for U.S. forces. The aircraft has tactical systems on board such as cameras and other sensors. In a counterinsurgency fight the development of intelligence to find and fix the enemy is key. Read more in "MC-12s find, fix and finish in Afghanistan", DVIDS, February 10, 2014. (Photo by Senior Airman Newman).

Soldiers Say DCGS-A Too Difficult

A news article provides insight into the difficulties that Soldiers are having working with the Distributed Common Ground System in Afghanistan. Most intelligence analysts are using Palantir - a less expensive but more user-friendly and useful software application. Read more in "Soldiers say intel tool is too difficult", The Washington Times, February 9, 2014.

201st ANA Corps Receives Training on "Wolfhound"

In January 2014 the 201st ANA Corps located at Forward Operating Base Gamberi received training and fielding of the Wolfhound signal intelligence gathering system. The Wolfhound will allow ANA soldier's to hear enemy radio communications. The Wolfhound is augmenting the AR 8200 scanner. Intelligence drives operations in a counterinsurgency and the Wolfhound will increase the ability of the ANA to conduct COIN. Soon the Wolfhound training will be available to intelligence soldiers undergoing training at the ANA intelligence school at Sia Sang. The ANA soldiers being trained are from the 201st ANA Corps' Military Intelligence Kandak. Read more in "Afghan National Army: Picking up the intelligence signal", DVIDS, January 28, 2014.

DCGS-A versus Palantir?

The Distributed Common Ground System - Army (DCGS-A) has come under constant criticism from the Intel community that has been forced to use the intelligence network. Many intelligence sections within the Army opt to use a more user-friendly system called Palantir. According to critics DCGS-A is prone to failure, is too complicated and has too many drawbacks to be an effective intelligence tool. In addition, Palantir - an off-the-shelf product - is relatively cheap compared to DCGS-A. A recent news report adds more to the debate between DCGS-A and Palantir critics and supporters. Read more in "Army Units in Afghanistan Slam Intel System", DoD Buzz, February 6, 2014.

Funding for DCGS-A Intel Network Cut

Congress drastically cut funding for the Army's Distributed Common Ground System or DCGS-A. This controversial program has failed over the last several years and cost the U.S. taxpayers millions of dollars. Despite constant questioning by Congress about military intelligence personnel stating that the system is failed and beyond repair the Army continues to request more funding to fix the broke intelligence network. With the cuts in defense budget Congress finally took action and reduced funding for the dismal program by 60%. Instead of the $267 million for the DCGS requested by the Army; only $110 million was received. Still that is about $110 million wasted. Should have went with Palantir. Read more in "Army mulls funding for controversial intel network", The Washington Times, February 4, 2014.

Contract Intel Workers Provide an Assist in Afghanistan

Link Analysis Diagram

An interesting news article on the contribution that contract intelligence workers provide in Afghanistan. Many of the Army intelligence officers and NCOs (and other intel government officials) who deploy to Afghanistan on seven-month rotations once, twice or maybe three times in their careers are simply outclassed by the many retired-military contract intelligence operatives and analysts who spend years working in Afghanistan. Read more in "Hold Your Applause, It wasn't the CIA Alone Who Found Osama Bin Laden", Business Insider, January 21, 2014.

Accusations of Leaked NIE on Afghanistan

A former high-level intelligence official believes that the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) leaked in December 2013 was intentionally put out on the street by White House officials who want to paint a dismal picture of the situation in Afghanistan. The motive behind the leak is to prepare the U.S. public for an eventual "zero option" for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan; meaning that all troops will be removed by December 2014. It is believed that staffers working for Obama want to see the U.S. completely out of Afghanistan as soon as possible and the NIE provided an intelligence report that says the situation is very bad. Is this Iraq all over again? Read the story entitled "Cranked Up Intelligence", Newsweek, January 10, 2014.

NIE on Afghanistan

A National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Afghanistan was issued by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The purpose of NIEs is to warn about potential issues related to U.S. foreign policy. This latest NIE on Afghanistan predicts that gains made in Afghanistan in recent years will erode significantly over the next several years. Read more about the NIE in "Afghanistan gains will be lost quickly after drawdown, U.S. intelligence estimate warns", The Washington Post, December 28, 2013.

U.S. Intelligence Officials Not so Optimistic on Afghanistan

A recent news article indicates that U.S. intelligence officials are less optimistic than operational commanders about the how the war is going in Afghanistan.  Read "U.S. intelligence officials offer grim words on Afghanistan", Los Angeles Times, February 16, 2012.