RS IO Machine at Odds with Reality

In the seminal 1230 report that is delivered to Congress every six months the status of the fight in Afghanistan is provided. This past 1230 report from October 2014 provided a favorable outlook on the situation in Afghanistan and the ability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to defeat the Taliban. Except . . . most long-term observers of the conflict say otherwise. Read more in "Experts dispute upbeat views on Afghan fight", Stars and Stripes, February 19, 2015.

Paper - Taliban Movement

A new paper by Michael Semple on the Taliban has been published. Semple is a peace practitioner and scholar who focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan. He is currently a visiting professor at the Institute for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice at Queen's University Belfast. He previously worked as a political officer for the UN mission and the European Union for Afghanistan. In addition, he was a fellow at Harvard with the Kennedy School's Carr Center for Human Rights Policy.

His report offers insights into the Taliban movement's doctrine, organization, and rhetoric and is intended to inform efforts to end the Taliban violence. This report examines the evolution of the Taliban case for armed struggle and the adjustments the Taliban rhetoricians made to cope with the impending political change in Afghanistan in 2014. It considers how the Taliban might make a case for peace, should they take the political decision to engage in negotiations.

Read "Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement", United States Institute of Peace (USIP), January 5, 2015.

PSYOP Tab Now Awarded

Photo courtesy of Duffel Blog

Members of the Psychological Operations community are celebrating the long-awaited recognition that they deserve for being part of the Special Operations community. The PSYOP community has always been associated with the Special Warfare mission - going back to the early 1950s. Those individuals who are graduates of a recognized PSYOP course - the PSYOP correspondence course counts - are eligible to wear the "Psychological Operations" tab. Current service members can start wearing the tab once they have by-name orders published - the personnel action is initiated by their unit S1. Former members of the Army can send a letter (with an attached DD 214) to the S1 of the 4th Military Information Support Group for award of the PSYOP tab. The award of a tab for completion of a specialized Army course is not without precedent. Members of Special Forces who have undergone Special Forces training are awarded the 'Special Forces' tab for completion of the SF qualification course. This is often informally referred to as the 'long tab'. However, SF dudes are now calling the PSYOP tab 'the longest tab' because of the number of letters required (see picture at left). In the tabbed world there are a lot of changes afoot - from the establishment of the PSYOP tab to the soon-to-be seen spectacle of women wearing the Ranger Tab. Get ready for it! Progress is unstoppable! Read more in "Psychological Operations Debuts New 'Longest Tab'", Duffel Blog, December 29, 2014.

U.S. is "Horrible in Influence Operations"

The U.S. is horrible in conducting influence operations. This is something that I have posted about for the last couple of years. But don't listen to me. None other than the head of the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), LTG Cleveland, says as much (see the news article linked to below). It is worth noting that the United States had three lines of effort in countering the Taliban insurgency: security, governance and development. USASOC is closely tied in with all three of these lines of effort with its seven Special Forces Groups, schoolhouse for Unconventional Warfare (SWCS), Ranger Regiment, SOF Aviation, and its 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. The CA bubbas being "experts" at governance and development and the SF dudes knowing a whole lot about establishing security; and a little bit about governance and development with their experience in Village Stability Operations (VSO).

To a degree, there was a lot accomplished in all of three areas (security, development and governance) despite the obvious obstacles (Karzai, corruption, drug trade, sanctuaries in Pakistan, etc.). Where there was inadequate effort put forth was in the Information Operations arena - now referred to as "Inform and Influence and Activities".  Of course, USASOC plays a big role in this field as well - since it commands the 4th Military Information Support Group.

An online news article explores this topic (the importance of IO or IAA) in greater detail. Read more in "Killing is Not Enough: Special Operators", by Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr, in Breaking Defense, December 16, 2014.

Counter-Narrative Important in Counter-Insurgency

Captain Robert A. Newson, a Navy SEAL, has published an article entitled "In Recent Battles, the U.S. Has Forgotten How to Tell Its Side of the Story. It must Remember" (December 3, 2014). It is posted on the Defense in Depth Blog of Janine Davidson (Council of Foreign Relations). Newson argues that ". . . the United States has effectively ceded the information domain without a fight." He states that "an effective information operations strategy will hinge on both long-term commitment and a willingness to expose audiences to the full complexity of political issues rather than resorting to misinformation and simplification." One of his observations is that the United States lost a significant information operations (IO) capability (is it now called inform and influence activities?) when it disestablished the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1999. He states that the U.S. Army Special Operations Command is looking hard at this problem; citing the release of a white paper entitled Cognitive Joint Force Entry.

Read the article on the Defense in Depth Blog by Captain Newson:
". . . the U.S. Has Forgotten How to Tell Its Side of the Story. . ."

Read the white paper by the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), 26 September 2014. Cognitive Joint Force Entry

Public Affairs Shura - Nangarhar Province

Information Operations plays an important role in the counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan. Representatives of various Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) organizations held a provincial (Nangarhar) Public Affairs Shura at Operation Base Fenty on November 12, 2014. The Afghan representatives in attendance were public affairs officers from the Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), the spokesman for the Nangarhar provincial governor, and other elements of the ANSF. In addition, U.S. advisors and Public Affairs Officers (PAO) were in attendance. The PAO shura provides an opportunity for the ANSF to synchronize messages and create more transparency among the different government, military, and police organizations. It is hoped that future media conferences (possibly held monthly) will provide a steady flow of information to the different media outlets (radio, TV, newspaper, social media, etc.) and provide a central location and/or organization for journalists to obtain information. One concern expressed during the conference was the transfer of a "Radio in the Box" to the control of Afghan information operation officers. This would seem to indicate a disconnect between the Afghan PAOs and the Afghan IO organizations in the region. Of course, this is not surprising as within our own military community there is a misunderstanding (at least to the outsider) of the different roles and responsibilities involving Public Affairs, Information Operations, Inform and Influence Activities, Military Information Support Operations, and Psychological Operations personnel. Read more in "Nangarhar public affairs shura includes ANSF pillars and provincial government", DVIDS, November 17, 2014.

Afghan Information Dissemination Operations (AIDO) Course

Some Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers from the 203rd Corps, 215th Corps, and Commando units recently graduated from the Afghan Information Dissemination Operations (AIDO) course. The course is a three-week program that teaches the principles of effective tactical and operational messaging. Information Operations or Inform and Influence Activities (pick your term) is an important aspect of strategic communications within the counterinsurgency environment of Afghanistan. For too long, developing the Afghan IO capability was ignored - started too late by ISAF and considered not important by the MoD. The soldiers who graduate from AIDO will provide an increased capability to their units by strengthening local understanding of, and support for, anti-insurgent missions and other tactical operations. While ISAF's Combined Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (CJPOTF) currently supports the AIDO course it remains to be seen what type of support will be offered under Resolute Support. Seeing how the Taliban insurgency has not been defeated and recognizing the importance of IO (IIA or PSYOP) to counterinsurgency one would hope that NATO maintains some type of residual mentoring, advising, and training for the AIDO course after 2014. One of the most productive programs in the IO field in past years was the introduction of the "Radio in a Box" or RIABs; perhaps this endeavor could be revitalized but under Afghan administration. Read more in "Afghan soldiers honored at graduation", ISAF News, November 11, 2014.

Afghan Social Media

In a counterinsurgency environment information operations (IO) is key. IO can sway public perception to support the government or it can generate support for the insurgents. Proper messaging (defined themes that resonate) along with the means of getting a message out (TV, print, radio, etc.) are important. With the rapid technological advances in communications social media has been taking a bigger and bigger role. This is true of Afghanistan as well. Almost three million Afghans have Internet access and almost two million use social media. Over 70% of the population has access to cell phones. Read more in "Afghan Social Media Summit 2014 becomes talk of town", Central Asia Online, October 27, 2014.

COMISAF's Facebook Page

Don't you wish you could sit in the ISAF commander's office for a day to find out what is really going on? Well, you can . . . sort of. General John Campbell, COMISAF, wants you to know what is going on in the ISAF world. While he can't meet with you personally each and every day he will take some time out of his busy schedule to let you know what's up. You can like his facebook account and check out his daily activities. There are at least two posts a day and it is very informative. If you are stationed in Mazar-e-Sharif, BAF, KAF, Herat, Jalalabad, or Gamberi this is one way to stay informed on the activities taking place in Kabul on the ISAF compound. Photo to the left was a post by General Campbell on October 18, 2014 where he was meeting with a delegation from . . . hmmmm, doesn't say. Check out COMISAF's Facebook account at www.facebook.com/GENJohnCampbell.

Ghani, Abdullah, and DC Lobbyists

An interesting article on the lobbying efforts of Ghani (the new PoA) and Abdullah (new 'CEO') to work the PR machine in DC. Both candidates have been spending thousands of dollars per month to curry the favor of influence makers among Congress, the media, and think-tanks. Read more in "Afghan president-elect seeks favor in Washington", Kansas City Star, September 23, 2014.

DoD Press Releases - No Afghan News

The Department of Defense press machine has virtually ignored Afghanistan but is providing a mountain of information about Iraq (and Syria). Although there are still over 20,000 (?) U.S. troops still in Afghanistan and only 1,600 (?) in Iraq. This, of course, is intentional. The military and the administration want the public's focus to be on building support for intervention in Iraq (and Syria) and want to push Afghanistan into the background. Read more in "DOD highlights information from Iraq as emphasis shifts away from Afghanistan", Stars and Stripes, September 21, 2014.

USAID Conducting Propaganda on US Public?

Some questions are being raised on a recent USAID solicitation for independent professional photographers to visit and photograph recent USAID projects in an attempt to provide pro-USAID photos that depict the projects in a positive light. It seems that the USAID cannot visit the sites and take their own photos because of security concerns. The same security concerns that prevent USAID from taking their own photographs probably hamper the oversight USAID is supposed to provide on these expensive projects. And therein lies the problem. It isn't a public perception problem; it is a poor oversight problem. But I guess USAID doesn't get it. Read more in "USAID cancels contract for good news from Afghanistan", USA Today, February 13, 2014.

ISAF / USAID and Messaging

Some wars are won in the public arena not on the battlefield. The Vietnam conflict in the 60s and early 70s is ample proof of that. Unfortunately - when looking at Afghanistan, the U.S. military and evidently, USAID, is not that adapt at messaging. They both have been getting hammered by all sorts of sources to include Karzai, the Taliban, the press, Congress, SIGAR, and others. A key tenet of public relations and information operations (or inform and influence activities) is to base your message on the facts - and there is the rub. Read more in "No news is good news from Afghanistan", USA Today, February 13, 2014.

ISAF PR Campaign Against SIGAR

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has been writing reports that raise a lot of questions on the oversight the U.S. military, State Department, and USAID have on the billions of dollars flowing into the Afghan ministries. ISAF and USAID are fighting back - not so much by fixing the problems - but with an Information Operations campaign against SIGAR. Read more in "The Pentagon's PR War Against SIGAR", POGO Blog, February 4, 2012. View a PowerPoint presentation that General Dunford's staff prepared to depict how ISAF can deflect that SIGAR report findings here in the CAG Audit Plan of Action for SIGAR.

SIGAR and ISAF: Who Is Winning the IO Battle?

Warfare is more than just about fighting. It has a lot to do with the public perception of who is just and who is winning. One can study the Vietnam War and come to that conclusion. While the U.S. military won almost every tactical battle in Vietnam it lost the "strategic battle" - the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese population and of the United States public. Public sentiment against the war in the states rose steadily in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The military's use of the information and media world was woeful. A key ingredient was the "five o'clock follies" where military spokesmen would spout off the "party line" every afternoon in Saigon. Unfortunately, the information provided by the military spokesmen at the follies did not reflect the reality of what was happening on the ground, the reporters who had been on the ground knew it, and the U.S. military public relations machine lost all credibility.

However, there was a lot going right in the Vietnam War but folks heard mostly bad news. The Nixon administration was able to conduct "Vietnamization" of the war by increasing the professionalism of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), providing modern equipment, and providing the logistics and supplies needed. By 1974 the South Vietnamese were doing the vast majority of the fighting and  the U.S. military was helping out with advisers and support efforts. The South Vietnamese government had a decent chance of surviving. Where the war was lost is when the U.S. Congress voted to cut off funding for the South Vietnamese government. Morale plummeted in South Vietnam and the ARVN lost the ability to fight because funding for fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts, etc. dried up. Those who could afford it fled Saigon for the U.S., Paris, and other destinations taking their money with them. The lack of funds for the Army and lower morale resulted in an inability of the South Vietnamese to fight a prolonged war. The North Vietnamese and its allies recognized victory served up by the U.S. Congress and quickly exploited it in early 1975.

Today's conflict in Afghanistan has some similar characteristics at play. We have turned over security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). According to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) the ANSF did a fair job in holding their own during the 2013 fighting season despite suffering horrendous casualties. While the ANSF didn't gain much territory it didn't loose much either. The ANSF is much more professional and capable. It is large enough to hold the major cities and main lines of communication (being able to conduct counterinsurgency is a different story, let's not go there). With continued advice and enabling assistance (and more money) the ANSF should be able to hold its own into the coming years (the results of the elections have a lot to do with this).

However . . . separate from the tactical successes on the battlefield is the fight in the "Information Operations" arena sometimes abbreviated to IO. IO is now referred to as Inform and Influence Activities. This is where the biggest danger lurks. The winning or loosing of Afghanistan may well pivot on who wins the info war. Since General Dunford took over he has been very attuned to this facet of the conflict. He wants to see the ANSF perceived as coming out of the 2013 fighting season as "holding their own". He wants the ANSF to be recognized as being "in the lead for the security of Afghanistan". He wants to see the Afghan ministries able to "sustain the ANSF" over the long-term and beyond post-2014. There are a lot of "wants" there. The "wants" have to have more than just good IO working for them to become reality; in some cases the facts on the ground have to back up the ISAF IO message.

General Dunfords' adversaries in the IO world are numerous.

The Taliban. First of all there is the Taliban who have simply out-matched the Afghan IO machine and the ISAF Public Affairs Office (PAO). While the Afghan government (and in some cases ISAF) has access to the Afghan media (print, TV, and radio) in the major cities, the Taliban have access to the rural areas where insurgencies historically thrive and where their support base happens to live. If you are a villager in a remote rural area of Afghanistan are you going to listen to a "voice" over the radio talking about government services and development that never arrives (unless it is in the form of corrupt payments to the District Governor and his cronies) or to the Taliban who comes to your local village armed with weapons and demands for food, shelter, and information about the ANSF? Night letters carry more impact than radio messages in rural Afghanistan.

Media. The press (all methods of TV, radio, Internet, and newspapers) carry a lot of weight. Historically the press looks for bad news. Reporters are always suspected by the military (as they should be). They are not the military's friend. The media is not hurting ISAF too badly as of late because Afghanistan is so rarely in the news these days. However the damage has been done. U.S. public support for the Afghan war is at the lowest ever.

International Community. There are some agencies and organizations out there that don't help the cause very much - and this is specifically true of some of the Non-Governmental Organizations or NGOs. Human Rights Watch comes to mind. While the NGOs provide a tremendous service to the Afghan people many of them will constantly deplore the military for civilian casualties or mismanagement of situations. This is not to disparage the bulk of the international community that is helpful to ISAF (EUPOL, European Community, NATO, NGOs, etc.). But organizations like Human Rights Watch (that slant the news) or Transparency International (that report the facts) hurt the ISAF IO effort.

Karzai. This guy needs to go. As one informed ISAF general once said when discussing the possible results of the Afghan election - "It can only get better". Karzai's info ops campaign is hurting ISAF's efforts. In addition, Karzai is hurting Afghanistan. The number one opponent to ISAF in the IO world is Karzai (not the Taliban, IC, or media). In addition, the number one source of support to the insurgents is corruption - and guess where that starts from (helpful clue: PoA)?

There are other IO opponents that ISAF has to contend with out there - too numerous to mention. Of late, one such organization has emerged to cause considerable damage to ISAF.

SIGAR. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has provided numerous (and very accurate reports) about some of the failures of the reconstruction effort. SIGAR has highlighted month after month cases of Afghan corruption or U.S. mismanagement of funds and programs that has cost the United States taxpayers billions of dollars. The reports by SIGAR are so accurate and damaging that ISAF decided to fight back against SIGAR with an IO effort to combat SIGAR. (You can read more about this in a USA Today news article).

For every report that SIGAR issues highlighting an ISAF failure - the ISAF PR folks issue a report saying how well ISAF is doing in that particular endeavor highlighting its successes. For example SIGAR recently reported on the mismanagement of the $200 million Afghan literacy program and ISAF sent out its "feel good" message on how the literacy program has seen improved oversight procedures implemented. So you can read the discouraging facts provided by SIGAR or "feel good" reading ISAF's press releases.

The ISAF effort to counter SIGAR probably came from an initiative called the "Audit Plan of Action" - which recommends ISAF releasing news of how the military has addressed problems cited by SIGAR before SIGAR releases its report to Congress and the media. The initiative was probably cooked up by the Commander's Action Group (CAG) or the ISAF IO (DCoS Communications) folks. SIGAR's position is that ISAF should spend less time writing miss-leading press releases and more time fixing the problems cited in the reports and audits. (see the USA Today article linked to above for more).

Unfortunately, armed with the facts, SIGAR has the ISAF IO machine outclassed and over-matched. ISAF would be better off taking the very detailed and astute recommendations in the SIGAR reports and implementing them. ISAF could then fix some of the problems instead of applying decorative window dressing and attacking the messenger. Congress, in the humongous budget bill recently passed, cut reconstruction and military aid funds for Afghanistan by a huge amount. Does 1975 come to mind?

I wonder who Congress was listening to? ISAF or SIGAR?

Learn more about SIGAR here at www.sigar.mil.

Ad Village - Karzai Stops the Airing of Ads Encouraging Him to Sign BSA

President Karzai has stopped the ads bought by ISAF (or USAID) and provided by a little-known firm called "Ad Village" (website now unavailable) and aired on Afghan television and radio. The ads were designed to encourage President Karzai to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement. Read more in "Afghanistan Cracks Down on TV Campaign Promoting U.S. Troops Presence in Country", The Huffington Post, January 22, 2014.

U.S. Targeted by Taliban and GIRoA IO Campaign

The United States is currently engaged with two adversaries in the information operations (IO) arena. One, of course, is the engagement with the Taliban in the media market place. The Taliban seem to get their message out quick and to great effect utilizing spokesmen, email, tweets, and websites. The Taliban also distribute their "night letters" throughout the rural countryside with the obvious coercive and intimidation capability amplifying the night letter themes. While ISAF - by way of DVIDS, PAOs, and other means - is quick to get its message out it has a defensive and reactive quality. Its' use of Afghan TV and radio outlets may be effective (until Karzai has ads pulled) but the reach beyond the Kabul area is not widespread.

ISAF also seems to be waging battle in the IO arena with the Kabul government (GIRoA). While the Afghans IO might be tainted with inaccuracies and untruths it is still a powerful voice. Lately one has to wonder whose side GIRoA is on? Are they siding with ISAF or with the Taliban? Read "False Claims in Afghan Accusations on U.S. Raid Add to Doubts on Karzai", The New York Times, January 25, 2014.

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TV Ads in Afghanistan - GIRoA Looking Closer

The Afghan government has ordered an investigation into some of the television ads that have aired recently in Afghanistan. The Attorney General's office is looking into some TV ads that have been running on private television stations in recent weeks that endorse the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement. Read more in "Afghan Government Investigates Ads Supporting US Security Deal", Voice of America, January 17, 2014.

German Defense Ministry Mum on Security Incidents

Following the lead of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) the German Defense Ministry is putting a lid on information pertaining to security incidents in northern Afghanistan citing the lack of accurate reporting from Afghan National Security Forces. However there are some skeptics that think this is more of a "report only good news" whenever possible and "avoid bad news". In addition, there is the 'information operations' aspect to only reporting good news. As part of the withdrawal process ISAF and its Coalition partners want to advance the narrative that troops are being pulled out of Afghanistan because the lead for security has been successfully transferred to the ANSF and the ANSF is doing well enough at this point in time. Bleak assessments of the security situation don't support the ISAF narrative. Read more in "German Defense Ministry closes files on Afghan security incidents", DW DE, January 8, 2014.

IO - Discredited Tool or User Failure?

A paper has been recently published by the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) entitled "U.S. Governmental Information Operations and Strategic Communications: A Discredited Tool or User Failure? Implications for Future Conflict", by Steve Tatham, December 2013. The manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War College External Research Associates Program. The author uses the experience of information operations (IO) in Afghanistan "to identify the shortcomings of U.S. strategic communications - particularly the tendency to rely on contractors using methods drawn from advertising and marketing". The document can be read online or download (Adobe Acrobat PDF) from the SSI website at this link.