The COIN Curve

Reading a recent news article this morning I was introduced to a new phrase - "The COIN Curve".  It appears, based on the explanation provided in the article, that in a counterinsurgency the level of violence will increase before it gets better - meaning the violence level goes down.  This is caused by a number of factors - and in Afghanistan can be attributed to two major factors (I am sure there are more than two but these come to mind right now).  New troops - "the surge" - are introduced into traditional Taliban sanctuaries and the level of fighting increases.  As the pressure mounts on the Taliban as a result of an increased optempo the level of violence increases across the board - more Taliban are being engaged more frequently. An example of the increase in violence, as the article points out, is the increase in security incidents during January - a month where the "winter recess" means the Taliban return to their safe havens in Pakistan or to their homes in Afghanistan.

Level of Security Incidents in January:

January 2008 - 100
January 2009 - 200
January 2010 - 400
January 2011 - 700 (this is just in the first week of January)

So, there you have it.  "The COIN Curve" explained.  Hopefully in January 2012 we will see the downward trend begin?

See "Petraeus blames 75% increase in violence on mild Afghan winter", The Examiner, January 15, 2011.

Counterinsurgency Training Center in Afghanistan to Change Focus

The Counterinsurgency Training Center in Afghanistan has a new focus - shifting training directed at coalition troops to Afghan security forces. 

"Established May 2007, the Counterinsurgency Training Center Afghanistan focused on training coalition forces in Afghanistan.  The CTC-A held a monthly Counterinsurgency Leaders Course to train coalition forces in COIN. The CTC-A would also send out Mobile Training Teams to train a two- to four-day COIN Priority of Instructions to groups out in the regions, when requested. Effectively the CTC-A was training 75 percent coalition forces and 25 percent Afghan National Security Force.

Curriculum was developed and adapted using an observe, learn and adapt method. The CTC-A observed International Security Assistance Force guidance, ANSF numbers, and in-theatre training requirements. The CTC-A learned what the Afghan National Army Training Center was doing and conducted after action reviews with former trainees to see what parts of the CTC-A’s training were useful. With this knowledge the CTC-A then adapted what they were training to who and where they were training them. The CTC-A functioned this way until September of 2010, when the commander of ISAF instructed the CTC-A to start focusing more on ANSF as opposed to training coalition forces".

Read more of the article in "New Focus for Counterinsurgency Training Center Afghanistan", NTM-A, January 8, 2011.

Report on Counterinsurgency Effort in Kandahar (2010 Hamkari Campaign)

The Institute for the Study of War has issued a comprehensive report on the counterinsurgency effort in Kandahar known as the Hamkari Campaign.  The link below will take you to an Executive Summary and also give you access to the entire document.  See "Counterinsurgency in Kandahar: Evaluating the 2010 Hamkari Campaign" (December 2010).

Nawa, Afghanistan - A COIN Success

One of the counterinsurgency success stories in Afghanistan is the situation in Nawa, Afghanistan.  Read more in "Nawa turns into proving ground for U.S. strategy in Afghan War", The Washington Post, December 12, 2010.

Whose COIN? Joint Force Quarterly Article is Illuminating

An article published in 1st Quarter 2011 Joint Force Quarterly and posted on the National Defense University (NDU) website provides a critique of counterinsurgency doctrine.  The article is penned by Amitai Etzioni, a renowned academic, who writes on a variety of issues concerning foreign policy, security, and more.  See the article at the link below:

"Whose COIN", by Amitai Etzioni, NDU Press, 2011.

http://www.ndu.edu/press/whose-COIN.html

COIN Qualification Standards Established for Afghanistan

The DoD has established a checklist of essential counterinsurgency skills needed by troops deployed to Afghanistan.  They are called the "COIN Qualification Standards".  The standards are a list of nine major skill areas with roughly 52 sub tasks that will focus a units' training before they deploy to Afghanistan.  Read more in "COIN standards for Afghanistan approved", Marine Corps Times, December 2, 2010.

Counterinsurgency Leaders Course Attendees Learn about Village Stability Operations (VSO)

Students attending the Counterinsurgency Training Center in Afghanistan are learning about how the Village Stability Operations (VSO) concept is implemented in rural villages outside of the Afghan government control. The Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative, a part of VSO, was also presented by speakers from CFSOCC-A.  Read more on this topic in "COIN Leadership Course Students Gain Insight", NTM-A, December 1, 2010.

Counterinsurgency - Suddenly Out of Favor?

There is a push among leading officers of the Army to abandon counterinsurgency or COIN in favor of something called "full spectrum operations" or FSO.  Many generals did not embrace COIN as a major training requirement nor did they recognize that we had two counterinsurgency fights on our hands in Iraq and Afghanistan until it was way too late.  Now, with the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq (so they say) and a looming deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan (next summer) it appears these leading military visionaries are ready to dump COIN and move on to doing something worthwhile! Like getting ready for the next war.  What happened to the war we are fighting now?

Read more in "U.S military training adjusts its aim", LA Times, September 26, 2010.