ANP doing ANA's Job

The outgoing head of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL) had some insightful comments about the current state of security in Afghanistan. Karl Ake Roghe (Sweden) has led the EUPOL mission for over 2 1/2 years. He stated that the main problem for Afghanistan is how the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is dividing the responsibilities for fighting the insurgency. He states that the police are bearing the brunt of the counterinsurgency fight; more so than the Afghan National Army. Afghanistan has 157,000 police that were created, trained and funded (partially) by the European Union. These police are under attack every day from the Taliban; especially in remote districts centers, outlying checkpoints, and in rural areas. The police receive little backup from the army and do not enjoy air support, medical evacuation, and hospitals. The emphasis given to police training is almost insignificant when compared to the money, training, and equipment provided to the Afghan National Army.

Of course, everyone familiar with counterinsurgency tactics, techniques, and procedures knows that the police are in the lead in a counterinsurgency effort (read FM 3-24 if you didn't and see note 1 below). Unfortunately, the Ministry of Interior was terribly corrupt and incompetent for many years (probably still is), and the Afghan National Police ill-trained, under-equipped, and also very corrupt. ISAF's efforts (as opposed to EUPOL) in improving the MoI and Afghan National Police (ANP) suffered from over emphasis on the Afghan National Army (ANA) and less than effective police training programs (see note 2 below). Read more in "Head of Afghan police training says high casualties are deadly cost of doing the army's job", Fox News, December 28, 2014.

Note 1: According to FM 3-24, para 6-90, page 6-19, (15 Dec 2006) "The primary frontline COIN force is often the police - not the military" . . . "Because of their frequent contact with populace, police often are the best force for countering small insurgent bands supported by the local populace." However, the police need the support of other government institutions (judicial, prosecutors, government officials, etc.) and the army. In Afghanistan, these institutions were poorly developed or corrupt.

Note 2: In the 2012-2013 period the United States deployed hundreds of Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs). Some of these teams were tasked with advising police district centers. The SFAATS advising the police were supposed to have a senior U.S. Army Military Police NCO on the adviser team - but rarely did this happen. In addition, the police advisor teams were supposed to be augmented with four Embedded Police Mentors (EMPs) - contract civilian policemen from the U.S. - but the contract for the EPMs was not amended in a timely manner to provide the required number of EPMs. The experience level of some EPMs left a lot to be desired. In addition, the SFAATs received very little training in police operations in a COIN environment and knew very little about the ANP prior to deploying to Afghanistan. In effect, the U.S. Army's attempt to professionalize the ANP was not at the level needed; the U.S. Army expended a lot of time, money, effort and personnel on the police training effort but not in a coherent and wise manner.

Australia Pre-Deployment Handbook

The Australia Department of Defense has published a useful publication that will assist Security Force Assistance advisors who are deploying to Afghanistan. It is entitled Pre-Deployment Handbook: Afghanistan (post 2014). The handbook provides information that will assist in understanding the complex environment that is Afghanistan in 2014 and beyond. The research and analysis supports Australian Defence Force (ADF) personnel operating in Afghanistan as part of the NATO mission Op Resolute Support. The authors, David Matthews and Raspal Khosa, are part of the Joint and Operations Analysis Division of the Defence Science and Technology Organisation. The code for the handbook is DSTO-GD-0909 and it is dated May 2014. It is an Adobe Acrobat PDF, is 141 pages long, and is 9 MBs big.

www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a605161.pdf

Polish Advisors now with TAAC East

After several months of preparation in Poland a unit of advisors has arrived at Tactical Base Gamberi to take part in the Resolute Support Mission as an element of the Train, Advise, Assist Command - East (TAAC East). They arrived on December 19, 2014 and are part of a larger Polish contingent known as Task Force White Eagle. The advisors are detailed to the Military Advisory Team and Police Advisory Team and are conducting a transition with the current advisors from the U.S. Army's 3d Cavalry Regiment. Read more in "Polish advisers ready for Resolute Support in Afghanistan", DVIDS, December 27, 2014.

ANA Logistics Still Broke

Despite an intense effort over the past two years to fix the Afghan National Army logistics and supply system prior to the departure of ISAF at the end of 2014 the ANA log system is broke, units are suffering from lack of ammunition, supplies, and material, and vehicles sit in boneyards broke and unusable. Read more on this deplorable situation in "Uh-oh in Afghanistan", by David Wood, Senior Military Correspondent, The Huffington Post.

DoD IG Report - ANA Logistics

The Department of Defense Inspector General has issued a report (December 19, 2014) entitled Assessment of U.S. Government and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National Army, Report No. DODIG-2015-047. The primary focus of the report was to evaluate the progress made by U.S. and Coalition forces to train, advise, and assist in the development of an enduring logistics sustainment capability for the ANA. The specific objective was to assess the planning and execution of logistical processes developed and implemented by the U.S. and Coalition Force in Afghanistan for the ANA.

The report contains 14 observations resulting in 28 recommendations. Some of the issues identified include the lack of ANA logistics planning capability, ANA equipment disposal processes, issues with the unity of effort among the Coalition staff, obtaining the required number of logistic advisors with the right experience and expertise, and planning for post-2014 contractor support.

There were a number of recommendations to include ensuring functional Security Force Assistance teams have the capability and resources required to continue effective development of ANA logistics, assist the ANA in procurement of contractor support, and providing oversight on the Regional Military Training Centers.

Read or download the report at the link below (Adobe Acrobat, 114 pages, 5 MBs).

www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2015-047.pdf

"Cold Base" and Advising from Afar

SFA Advisor, CPT Jeff Burgett from 10th Mountain, interacts

with 203rd Corps counterparts in Feb 2014. At this time the

203rd Corps was still advised on a daily basis. (Photo by 

PFC Dixie Rae Liwanag).

The Coalition has shrunk its force in Afghanistan in preparation for the Resolute Support mission that will begin on January 1, 2014. In an attempt to reduce the force footprint to around 12,000 by the beginning of 2015 some decisions had to be made on where to place advisor teams. ISAF planners decided to pull advisory teams off two of the six Afghan National Army Corps - leaving no advisors in those regions to interact with the ANA corps, Afghan Border Police, Afghan National Police, and the Operational Coordination Centers (OCCs). Those two regions were the 215th Corps in Helmand province and the 203rd Corps in southeastern Afghanistan. Both regions are highly contested by the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

Naturally, the experienced SFA advisor would prefer to be "embedded" full-time on a permanent basis with the Afghan unit to maintain constant day-to-day contact with the advised unit. This would entail living and working on a Coalition base adjacent to or 'embedded' within an Afghan installation or base. But with the limited number of advisors in country and the counter-productive "risk adverse" attitude of higher command this is not always possible.

Efforts to maintain some type of communications (and influence?) with these two corps (203rd and 215th) are problematic. The ability to interact, influence, train, advise, and maintain situational awareness through emails and cell phone calls with an Afghan counterpart is extremely limited. So periodic visits to the corps are utilized. The Coalition attempts to stay in touch with the 203rd Corps utilizing what used to be called Level II Advising and now is referred to (at least informally) as a "Fly to Advise" methodology or "expeditionary advisory package". Apparently that is called an "EAP" for short; so another acronym for the glossary gets added.

However, flying into an Afghan base and staying for hours or days requires a support mechanism and facility to set up radios, a work center, and living / sleeping areas. Enter the "Cold Base" concept for advisors. In lieu of embedding with the Afghan unit or co-locating with an adjacent Coalition unit the advisors utilize the EAPs and Cold Base concept described in "A reduced presence does not equal a reduced commitment", DVIDS, December 13, 2014.

ATP 3-07.10 Advising Foreign Security Forces (Nov 14)

The Army has updated ATP 3-07.10, Advising Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Advising Foreign Security Forces, November 1, 2014. It is a PDF file and available at the below link:

http://armypubs.army.mil/doctrine/ATP_1.html

Book - "Worth Dying For"

Terry Gould, an investigative reporter from Canada, has wrote a book entitled "Worth Dying For". The book is about a unit of the Canadian police who work overseas as civilian police advisors. The program is run by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Thousands of Canadian police have worked overseas in areas such as Afghanistan, Haiti, Palestine, etc. helping to advise and support local police departments in conflict prone areas. The author views these police trainers as humanitarian idealists who believe in their mission to mentor police in the universal principles of civilized law enforcement. Read the book review in "B.C. journalist Terry Gould offers an intimate portrait of idealism amid war and devastation", The Vancouver Sun, November 28, 2014. The book is available on Amazon.com.

Paper - Lessons Learned on Advising

Lt. Col. Remi Hajjar of the U.S. Army has published an article entitled "What Lessons Did We Learn (or Re-Learn) about Military Advising After 9/11?", Military Review, November-December 2014, pages 63-75. Hajjar is an academy professor at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point). His paper takes a look at the history of the U.S. military advising mission, recounts relevant lessons from the Korean and Vietnam Wars to the present, provides several major advisory lessons learned or re-learned since 9/11, lists conditions that characterize the U.S. military advising mission, defining military advisory success, and he provides a conclusion and recommendations for future advisory missions.

http://www.afghanwarnews.info/documents/LL-MilAdvisingMilRev20141231.pdf

"Fly to Advise"

CPT Katherine Zamperini inspects
xray machine at FOB Gamberi
(photo SSG Houston)

The draw down of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 9,800 by the end of December 2014 forced ISAF to make some difficult decisions on force structure and the overall mission. The two primary missions for the U.S. and ISAF in Resolute Support will be Security Force Assistance and counter-terrorism. Unfortunately, the planners at IJC and ISAF decided to leave two Afghan National Army corps uncovered - the 203rd in the southeast and the 215th in the southwest - citing manpower, medical, force protection, and support constraints. Both of these corps are in very conflict ridden areas. But according to ISAF the corps are still being covered by advisors - from a distance. For instance, the 203rd Corps is being 'advised' - but only through occasional visits by advisors (once a month?) and contact through email and cellphone. The ISAF Security Force Assistance Guide refers to this as either "Level 2" or "Level 3" advising. Some advisors are referring to this type of advising as "fly to advise". Read about how a medical doctor "flies to advise" her medical counterpart in the 203rd Corps in "Brave Rifles medical officer ensures Afghan medical facilities are sustainable", DVIDS, November 27, 2014.

Paper - Foreign Culture and Train, Advise FSF

The United States is conducting train, advise, and assist missions in areas of the world where foreign cultures are sometimes perplexing and will complicate the mission. In many of these locations the private sector and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have experience that DoD should learn from and adapt into its training and education programs. This paper presents some of those lessons gained in the non-security development sector that could be useful in future training and advising missions for foreign security forces. Read "Foreign Culture and its Effect on US Department of Defense Efforts to Train and Advise Foreign Security Forces", Small Wars Journal, November 26, 2014.

French RAID Unit Trains ANP

A unit of the French RAID has been training and advising elements of the Afghan National Police (ANP). RAID is short for Recherche Assistance Intervention Dissuasion - learn more about RAID on Wikipedia. Read about the training efforts of RAID with the ANP in "As casualties soar, Afghan police taught how to stay alive", Mail Online, November 26, 2014.

Paper - "Blind Leading the Blind"

The United States is not the first nation that has attempted to wage a counterinsurgency campaign, train up a host nation army, and conduct nation-building in Afghanistan for a decade. The Soviet Union attempted this very feat from 1979 to 1989 - and were far from successful. The Soviets were quick to realize that the insurgency would not be defeated through military means alone; and that development and governance needed to improve to provide stability, popular support for the Afghan government, and pull support from the insurgents. The paper provides insight into the lack of training and preparation of Soviet advisor prior to deployment to Afghanistan; to include little cultural training, knowledge of the country's religion, and the aspects of the human terrain. Read The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan, by Artemy Kalinovsky, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Working Paper #60, Cold War International History Project, January 2010.
www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/WP60_Web_Final.pdf

Video - Interview of UK SFAAT Team Leader

Major Bev Allen, a Security Force Assistance Advisory Team (SFAAT) commander from 1 Royal Anglian, explains about the work he does in Afghanistan in a 1 minute long video. Watch "My Job in Afghanistan: Advisory Team Commander", UK Defence Headquarters (posted on YouTube), June 13, 2012.

Paper - "American Advisors" by Joshua Potter

If you are on your way to Afghanistan (or Iraq . . . or anywhere) to be a military advisor then a paper wrote by LTC Joshua Potter (US Army) will be very useful. American Advisors: Security Force Assistance Model in the Long War, Combat Studies Institute Press, Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (2011) is a good education and should be a must for pre-deployment training for advisors heading overseas. You can view or download the paper at the following link:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/AmericanAdvisors.pdf

Paper - Advisor Influence across NSMs and ANSF

An extremely well-researched and detailed paper is available that presents valuable information about advisor influence upon the Afghan national security ministries (NSMs) and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The paper, a dissertation for a graduate student at Syracuse University with extensive military experience, ". . . is an in-depth case study of NATO advisors and their perceived influence in Afghanistan . . . " in the period of 2009-2012. The author reviews Security Sector Reform (SSR) literature, presents different theories on SSR, provides an analysis of security assistance partnering, and examines advisor influence across the Afghan security spectrum.  The paper, 370 pages long, explores a two-part question:

". . . how do foreign security actors (ministerial advisors and security force trainers, advisors, and commanders) attempt to influence their host-nation partners and what are their perceptions of these approaches on changes in local capacity, values, and security governance norms?"

The paper is entitled The Prospects of Institutional Transfer: A Within-Case Study of NATO Advisor Influence Across the Afghan Security Ministries and National Security Forces, 2009-2012, by Nicholas J. Armstrong, May 2014.
http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=etd

Advisor Selection for Afghan SFA Mission

The Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission is a difficult one. Members of ISAF are expected to deploy to Afghanistan and train, advise, and assist their Afghan counterparts in the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. The SFA mission began in early 2012 with the deployment of hundreds of Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs). Unfortunately, the most important factor that contributes to the success of an advisory mission was not considered in many cases by the United States military. That factor is the proper selection of advisor personnel. In many instances, advisors did not (and do not) have the needed attributes to be effective with their Afghan counterparts (age, experience, training, education, rank, personality, etc.).

"The decisive point of any SFA mission may very well be the selection, training, and education of personnel in preparation for deployment". SFA Handbook, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, June 2012.

For instance, if one traveled through Regional Command East in 2012 and met the Intelligence officers serving as advisors on SFAATs you would find that almost 50% of them were Infantry Lieutenants with less than two years in the U.S. Army. While these young men were undoubtedly intelligent, smart, physically fit, and motivated they had (maybe) six months experience as an Infantry platoon leader, no previous combat deployment, and knew very little about the importance and role of intelligence in a counterinsurgency environment. An Infantry Lieutenant, age 24, with no previous combat deployment, and no Intel training or experience was expected to establish rapport with, develop a relationship with, and train, advise and assist an Afghan Intelligence officer (Captain, Major, or Colonel) for an ANA kandak (battalion), who may already have Intelligence training and experience, who likely had ten to 30 years of combat experience, and who was in the range of 30 to 50 years old. A tough job for a young inexperienced Infantry Lieutenant. Probably the only thing the Infantry Lieutenant could offer of importance to the senior Afghan Intelligence officer were maps, printer cartridges, and fuel.

In 2013 the Intelligence advisors to the 201st and 203rd ANA Corps in Regional Command East were Captains (fortunately with an Intel MOS and both very capable, smart, and motivated). However, these young Captains were advising Afghan Corps G2 staff officers with the rank of senior Colonel or General, more than 30 years in the Afghan Army, and with over 20 years of combat experience. A difficult task for any Captain; even our best. So this is an example of the U.S. Army's best effort in personnel assignments to important advisor positions.

Contrast the experience level of the U.S. Army Intel Advisors to the 201st and 203rd ANA Corps in 2013 with the current Intelligence advisor to the 205th ANA Corps in southern Afghanistan - Australian Army Major Mich Hahn. Major Hahn works in Train Advise and Assist Command - South (formerly Regional Command South). Read more in "Finding credibility through experience: Australian Intel officer brings 30 years of intelligence experience to TAAC-South", DVIDS, October 28, 2014.

Story on Woman Police Advisor from India

There are a lot of countries providing advisors to Afghanistan. India is one of them. Shakti Devi, is a female police inspector from India serving with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA). She was awarded the 2014 International Female Peacekeeper Award for her "Exceptional Achievements". Read more in "From village girl to international peacekeeper", Thomson Reuters Foundation, October 22, 2014.

How do Combat Aviation Advisors Train?

The current mission of the United States (and ISAF) in Afghanistan is Security Force Assistance; which primarily Train, Advise, and Assist (TAA). There are many types of advisors in Afghanistan to include members of the United States Air Force who are advising, training, and mentoring the Afghan Air Force (AAF). So what is it that ensures a good advisor is assigned to training the AAF? It starts with the proper selection of advisors. In addition, prior to deployment an advisor should receive some specialized training in instructional techniques, culture, force protection, counterinsurgency, and much more. For the air advisor to the AAF this probably occurs at the U.S. Air Force Air Advisors Academy located at Joint Base McGuire-Dix in Lakehurst, New Jersey.

A preferred method is to have advisors already selected and assigned to units that have an advising and training mission. One such unit in the U.S. Air Force is the 919th Special Operations Wing located at Duke Field, Florida. The 919th provides Combat Aviation Advisors (CAA) as part of its Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID) mission. Read about one type of training event that CAA teams undergo to become proficient as air advisors in "Combat Aviation Advisors attend large-scale Army exercise", DVIDS, September 16, 2014.

Adviser Assists Combat Engineer Kandak (CEK) of 203rd ANA Corps in Paktya Province

Members of the U.S. Army are serving as advisors to the Afghan National Army (ANA). The advisors provide advice and assistance to a variety of ANA units. Every Afghan Corps has a Corps Engineer Kandak (CEK) that provides horizontal and vertical construction capability to the corps. In the photo at left U.S. Army CPT Joshua Synder, an advisor on a Security Force Assistance Advisor Team, observes vehicles of the 203rd Corp CEK during a weekly maintenance inspection at Forward Operating Base Thunder, in Paktya province. (U.S. Army photo by PFC Dixie Rae Liwanag, February 20, 2014).