ISAF Reports on ANSF Now Classified

The International Security Assistance Force is now classifying one of the reports that previously were available to the public. The reports were produced to provide a status of the ANSF each month. Read more in "Classified: Military Suddenly Doesn't Want You to Know How $61B Afghan Training is Going", ABC News, October 30, 2014.

Afghan Oversight

A writer comments of the importance of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) report provided to Congress on 30 October, 2014. See "A Big Week in Washington War Oversight", Just Security, October 30, 2014.

SIGAR Quarterly Report October 2014

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has released its Quarterly Report to Congress dated October 30, 2014. The ". . . report provides a summary of SIGAR's oversight work and an update on developments in the three major sectors of Afghanistan's reconstruction effort from July 1 to September 30, 2014. It also includes a discussion of U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. During this reporting period, SIGAR published 31 audits, inspections, alert letters, and other products assessing the U.S. efforts to build the Afghan security forces, improve governance, and facilitate economic and social development." 

www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2014-10-30qr.pdf

ISAF Now Classifying ANSF Assessments

According to recent news reports the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is now classifying assessments of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). ISAF uses the Regional ANSF Status Report (RASR) to rate the various elements of the Afghan National Security Forces. The RASR is a monthly report that provides an update on the readiness, long-term sustainability, and associated shortfalls of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Local Police (ANP). The RASR executive summary provides a high-level overview of the ANSF corps-level units across several operational effectiveness pillars and up until now has been unclassified. The bulk of the RASR that deals with units at the operational and tactical level was always classified.

The ANSF has some serious capability gaps (intelligence, close air support, logistics, aviation, MEDEVAC, aerial ISR, etc.). ISAF feels that sharing information about those capability gaps and vulnerabilities could harm the operational effort. Of course, the classification of the reports (capability ratings of the ANSF) denies the United States public an accurate picture of what is really going on with the development of the ANSF. There are many ongoing assessments of the ANSF that are available, but the ISAF assessments generally are more revealing and accurate.

Whether the classification of the general high-level overview is truly warranted is hard to determine. It seems that the general shortfalls of the ANSF are well-known so what "classified" information is ISAF really trying to protect? Sometimes the protection of information is truly warranted on an intelligence and operational basis and sometimes it is part of the "information operations" campaign of ISAF. Hard telling not knowing.

Read more in "U.S. Military Classifying Assessments of Afghan Military", Bloomberg Businessweek, October 30, 2014. See also "The Capabilities of the Afghan Military are Suddenly a Secret", Time.com, October 30, 2014.

SIGAR - State Dept Wastes $3.6 Million on Three Trucks

A State Department contract for three mobile television production trucks that are to be donated to Afghan television networks is under investigation by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). The trucks, delivered two years late, are still not in use. The trucks are reported to be in Kabul sitting under tarps. The trucks were satellite / microwave television broadcast trucks to be used for live sporting events such as football (soccer), cricket, buzkashi, and other sports. The cost of two of the trucks tripled in price. Read more in a letter from SIGAR to the Secretary of State John Kerry requesting clarification (dated October 15, 2014).

Afghan Corruption Tougher Than Mafia

The head of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Mr. John Sopko says that it was easier to take on the mafia in Ohio than corruption in Afghanistan. Sopko's organization, SIGAR, has issued over 160 reports during his two years on the job that point to tens of billions of U.S. dollars being squandered due to Afghan corruption or inept oversight on the part of the U.S. military, USAID, and the State Department. Read more in "Afghan Corruption a Tougher Job After Taking on the Mafia", Bloomberg News, October 23, 2014.

SIGAR - Poppy Cultivation Rises in Afghanistan

A report issued in October 2104 states that after a decade of reconstruction and over $7 billion in counter narcotics efforts, poppy cultivation levels in Afghanistan are at an all-time high. Afghan farmers grew an unprecedented 209,000 hectares of opium poppy in 2013, surpassing the previous peak of 193,000 hectares in 2007. Further increases in poppy cultivation is expected in 2014. The value of opium and its derivative products produced in Afghanistan rose from 2012 to 2013 by 50 per cent; and increase from $2 billion to $3 billion. Nangarhar province, once designated "poppy free" in 2008 saw an increase in poppy cultivation between 2012 and 2013. The former governor of Nangarhar, Gul Agha Sherzai, was not known for his anti-drug stance; in fact, he is well-known as a supporter and beneficiary of the drug trade. ISAF chose to ignore the criminal patronage network in the Nangarhar region as Sherzai was a political appointee of Hamid Karzai. See "Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 2012 and 2013", Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Report SIGAR-15-10-SP, October 2014.

Report - Social Outreach Program, USAID and SIGAR

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has provided a report entitled USAID's Afghanistan Social Outreach Program: Audit of Costs Incurred by AECOM International Development, Inc. The report, SIGAR 14-94 Financial Audit, was published in September 2014.

"USAID signed a contract with AECOM International Development to establish community councils (shuras) at the district level and promote communication and collaboration between the Afghan government and communities. This support to the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program (ASOP) was intended to expand the role of the traditional shuras, overcome corruption, and increase participation in the political process by woman, youth, and other marginalized groups". 

SIGAR Report - DoS Demining Activities in Afghanistan

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has published a report - Department of State's Demining Activities in Afghanistan: Audit of Incurred Costs by Mine Clearance Planning Agency - (SIGAR Report 14-95 Financial Audit) published in September 2014. There were four internal control deficiencies and one instance of noncompliance in the audit of costs incurred by the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA). The MCPA is an Afghanistan-based international humanitarian demining organization. The MCP received over $13 million in grands to provide support for the removal of land mines and unexploded ordnance in Afghanistan. The report finds that there was $688,206 in unsupported costs that should be scrutinized and possibly recovered.

Video "The Future of Afghanistan" (Sopko)

"The Future of Afghanistan" is presented by Georgetown University Center for Security Studies. This video, published on September 17, 2014 features Special Inspector General for Reconstruction (SIGAR) John F. Sopko speaking about the future of Afghanistan. (video on YouTube, 77 minutes).
www.youtube.com/watch?v=32y-tfIaFYY

SIGAR Says Afghanistan's Future is Bleak

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), John Sopko, provided his thoughts on the future of Afghanistan to an audience at Georgetown University on Friday, September 12, 2014. He says that the United States has $16 billion in the pipeline for Afghan reconstruction and aid but that there is inadequate monitoring and oversight mechanisms in place to ensure that it will be spent properly. Sopko states that the United States has to get a handle on sustainability, corruption and narcotics trafficking if it is going to be successful in future efforts to rebuild Afghanistan. Read more about Sopko's presentation at "Afghanistan's Reconstruction Future Looks Very Bleak, IG Warns", Defense One, September 16, 2014.

Remarks by John Sopko (SIGAR) on Afghanistan

John F. Sopko, the head of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), presented some prepared remarks to an audience at Georgetown University on September 12, 2014. In his remarks he describes the mission of SIGAR, the immense reconstruction effort underway in Afghanistan, the vast amounts of money spent and to be spent, the problem of Afghan corruption, the lack of oversight in the past, and the challenges of monitoring billions of dollars in aid in the future. He provides an argument on why oversight of reconstruction aid is mission-critical and provides recommendations for the future. You can read his speech online.

ISAF Embarrassed Over False Statements Made about Afghan Hospital

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has been hammering the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) for its inability to oversee the expenditure of funds associated with reconstruction and development projects and the build up of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). SIGAR has released report after report over the past few years documenting oversight failures on the part of ISAF. In one specific report SIGAR recently cited the lack of oversight on the Salang Hospital in eastern Afghanistan built with U.S. money that was sub-standard and did not meet the requirements of the contract - clearly demonstrating a lack of oversight by ISAF. ISAF tried to counter the report with a "feel good story" of its own stating that the hospital was build to standard and everything was "just fine" to include that solar panels had been installed to augment the hospitals generator. Well . . . SIGAR found out in a subsequent investigation (substantiated by an by an NBC News crew) that there was no solar power unit (utilizing the GeoSpatial Agency's satellite coverage - something you would think that ISAF could do). In fact, ISAF has not sent an inspection team to look at the hospital because it is in a 'non-secure' area. Read more in "IG raps military's inspection of Afghan hospital", USA Today, February 26, 2014. It would appear that ISAF is losing the information operations battle with SIGAR.

SIGAR Continues Watch on Afghan Reconstruction

A news report on the activities of the Special Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan (SIGAR) provides the operating principles adopted by the agency to ensure that development projects are provided proper oversight. Read more in "Watchdog Taps Contractors for Lessons on Rebuilding Afghanistan", Government Executive, February 18, 2014.

SIGAR Warns About Corruption as Drawdown Looms

The Special Inspector General for Reconstruction in Afghanistan (SIGAR) is warning the U.S. public and members of Congress that a good portion of the $5 billion plus we will likely send to Afghanistan each year for the next few years may go to waste. Currently the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) have inadequate safeguards to ensure the money is used for the designated purpose. As there will be less and less troops on the ground (as of February 2014 there are 32,000) as time goes on it will become harder and harder to provide the proper oversight needed to inspect development projects and place advisers in the proper places to ensure money is used properly. Compounding this problem of inability to provide oversight (because bad security prevents observers to go out to over 80% of the country side) is the immense corruption found within the highest reaches of the Afghan government to include the current president - Hamid Karzai. Read more in "As Afghanistan Drawdown Looms, Inspector General Warns of Graft", The Huffington Post, February 18, 2014.

ISAF Asked by Senator to Explain IO Campaign Against SIGAR

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has been getting hammered by reports by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). SIGAR reports have highlighted many failures in the Afghan Conflict relating to oversight of construction and development projects and of funding for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Basically ISAF (and USAID) have not had enough accountants to follow the money and not enough contract specialists to ensure that projects and programs are implemented properly. A lot of money has gone south (actually it is in Dubai bank accounts). In response to the very damaging SIGAR reports ISAF developed an information operations campaign to counter the bad image it was receiving. Once this campaign was exposed it attracted a lot of attention. Read "Senator presses Afghanistan commander on critical audits", USA Today, February 13, 2014.

ISAF PR Campaign Against SIGAR

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has been writing reports that raise a lot of questions on the oversight the U.S. military, State Department, and USAID have on the billions of dollars flowing into the Afghan ministries. ISAF and USAID are fighting back - not so much by fixing the problems - but with an Information Operations campaign against SIGAR. Read more in "The Pentagon's PR War Against SIGAR", POGO Blog, February 4, 2012. View a PowerPoint presentation that General Dunford's staff prepared to depict how ISAF can deflect that SIGAR report findings here in the CAG Audit Plan of Action for SIGAR.

SIGAR Report: USAID Report Card 2002-2013

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has pumped over $13.3 billion dollars into Afghanistan between 2002 and 2013. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has completed a report on where the money went, how it was spent, and who spent the money for use. The date of the report is January 23, 2014. USAID awarded funds to implementing partners including multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations, for-profit corporations, Afghan government entities, and U.S. government entities. The report provides a concise yet detailed accounting of where the money went and the scope of the USAID programs. You can read the report online or download it on the SIGAR website at www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/14-27-SP.pdf.

SIGAR and ISAF: Who Is Winning the IO Battle?

Warfare is more than just about fighting. It has a lot to do with the public perception of who is just and who is winning. One can study the Vietnam War and come to that conclusion. While the U.S. military won almost every tactical battle in Vietnam it lost the "strategic battle" - the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese population and of the United States public. Public sentiment against the war in the states rose steadily in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The military's use of the information and media world was woeful. A key ingredient was the "five o'clock follies" where military spokesmen would spout off the "party line" every afternoon in Saigon. Unfortunately, the information provided by the military spokesmen at the follies did not reflect the reality of what was happening on the ground, the reporters who had been on the ground knew it, and the U.S. military public relations machine lost all credibility.

However, there was a lot going right in the Vietnam War but folks heard mostly bad news. The Nixon administration was able to conduct "Vietnamization" of the war by increasing the professionalism of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), providing modern equipment, and providing the logistics and supplies needed. By 1974 the South Vietnamese were doing the vast majority of the fighting and  the U.S. military was helping out with advisers and support efforts. The South Vietnamese government had a decent chance of surviving. Where the war was lost is when the U.S. Congress voted to cut off funding for the South Vietnamese government. Morale plummeted in South Vietnam and the ARVN lost the ability to fight because funding for fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts, etc. dried up. Those who could afford it fled Saigon for the U.S., Paris, and other destinations taking their money with them. The lack of funds for the Army and lower morale resulted in an inability of the South Vietnamese to fight a prolonged war. The North Vietnamese and its allies recognized victory served up by the U.S. Congress and quickly exploited it in early 1975.

Today's conflict in Afghanistan has some similar characteristics at play. We have turned over security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). According to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) the ANSF did a fair job in holding their own during the 2013 fighting season despite suffering horrendous casualties. While the ANSF didn't gain much territory it didn't loose much either. The ANSF is much more professional and capable. It is large enough to hold the major cities and main lines of communication (being able to conduct counterinsurgency is a different story, let's not go there). With continued advice and enabling assistance (and more money) the ANSF should be able to hold its own into the coming years (the results of the elections have a lot to do with this).

However . . . separate from the tactical successes on the battlefield is the fight in the "Information Operations" arena sometimes abbreviated to IO. IO is now referred to as Inform and Influence Activities. This is where the biggest danger lurks. The winning or loosing of Afghanistan may well pivot on who wins the info war. Since General Dunford took over he has been very attuned to this facet of the conflict. He wants to see the ANSF perceived as coming out of the 2013 fighting season as "holding their own". He wants the ANSF to be recognized as being "in the lead for the security of Afghanistan". He wants to see the Afghan ministries able to "sustain the ANSF" over the long-term and beyond post-2014. There are a lot of "wants" there. The "wants" have to have more than just good IO working for them to become reality; in some cases the facts on the ground have to back up the ISAF IO message.

General Dunfords' adversaries in the IO world are numerous.

The Taliban. First of all there is the Taliban who have simply out-matched the Afghan IO machine and the ISAF Public Affairs Office (PAO). While the Afghan government (and in some cases ISAF) has access to the Afghan media (print, TV, and radio) in the major cities, the Taliban have access to the rural areas where insurgencies historically thrive and where their support base happens to live. If you are a villager in a remote rural area of Afghanistan are you going to listen to a "voice" over the radio talking about government services and development that never arrives (unless it is in the form of corrupt payments to the District Governor and his cronies) or to the Taliban who comes to your local village armed with weapons and demands for food, shelter, and information about the ANSF? Night letters carry more impact than radio messages in rural Afghanistan.

Media. The press (all methods of TV, radio, Internet, and newspapers) carry a lot of weight. Historically the press looks for bad news. Reporters are always suspected by the military (as they should be). They are not the military's friend. The media is not hurting ISAF too badly as of late because Afghanistan is so rarely in the news these days. However the damage has been done. U.S. public support for the Afghan war is at the lowest ever.

International Community. There are some agencies and organizations out there that don't help the cause very much - and this is specifically true of some of the Non-Governmental Organizations or NGOs. Human Rights Watch comes to mind. While the NGOs provide a tremendous service to the Afghan people many of them will constantly deplore the military for civilian casualties or mismanagement of situations. This is not to disparage the bulk of the international community that is helpful to ISAF (EUPOL, European Community, NATO, NGOs, etc.). But organizations like Human Rights Watch (that slant the news) or Transparency International (that report the facts) hurt the ISAF IO effort.

Karzai. This guy needs to go. As one informed ISAF general once said when discussing the possible results of the Afghan election - "It can only get better". Karzai's info ops campaign is hurting ISAF's efforts. In addition, Karzai is hurting Afghanistan. The number one opponent to ISAF in the IO world is Karzai (not the Taliban, IC, or media). In addition, the number one source of support to the insurgents is corruption - and guess where that starts from (helpful clue: PoA)?

There are other IO opponents that ISAF has to contend with out there - too numerous to mention. Of late, one such organization has emerged to cause considerable damage to ISAF.

SIGAR. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has provided numerous (and very accurate reports) about some of the failures of the reconstruction effort. SIGAR has highlighted month after month cases of Afghan corruption or U.S. mismanagement of funds and programs that has cost the United States taxpayers billions of dollars. The reports by SIGAR are so accurate and damaging that ISAF decided to fight back against SIGAR with an IO effort to combat SIGAR. (You can read more about this in a USA Today news article).

For every report that SIGAR issues highlighting an ISAF failure - the ISAF PR folks issue a report saying how well ISAF is doing in that particular endeavor highlighting its successes. For example SIGAR recently reported on the mismanagement of the $200 million Afghan literacy program and ISAF sent out its "feel good" message on how the literacy program has seen improved oversight procedures implemented. So you can read the discouraging facts provided by SIGAR or "feel good" reading ISAF's press releases.

The ISAF effort to counter SIGAR probably came from an initiative called the "Audit Plan of Action" - which recommends ISAF releasing news of how the military has addressed problems cited by SIGAR before SIGAR releases its report to Congress and the media. The initiative was probably cooked up by the Commander's Action Group (CAG) or the ISAF IO (DCoS Communications) folks. SIGAR's position is that ISAF should spend less time writing miss-leading press releases and more time fixing the problems cited in the reports and audits. (see the USA Today article linked to above for more).

Unfortunately, armed with the facts, SIGAR has the ISAF IO machine outclassed and over-matched. ISAF would be better off taking the very detailed and astute recommendations in the SIGAR reports and implementing them. ISAF could then fix some of the problems instead of applying decorative window dressing and attacking the messenger. Congress, in the humongous budget bill recently passed, cut reconstruction and military aid funds for Afghanistan by a huge amount. Does 1975 come to mind?

I wonder who Congress was listening to? ISAF or SIGAR?

Learn more about SIGAR here at www.sigar.mil.

SIGAR Report: Future Counternarcotics Efforts

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has published a report entitled Future U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Afghanistan dated January 15, 2014. The report is a statement by the head of SIGAR, John Sopko, who testified before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. In his opening comments he says that ". . . the situation in Afghanistan is dire with little prospect for improvement in 2014 or beyond. Afghan farmers are growing more opium poppies today than at any time in their modern history". Mr. Sopko raises the possibility that instead of Afghanistan evolving into a successful democratic state or an insurgent state; that it may instead evolve into a failed narco-criminal state. The report can be accessed from the SIGAR website to read online or download at the link below:
http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-14-21-TY.pdf