- the drawdown of western forces affected the morale of the ANSF;The paper (transcript) was published December 7, 2014 and is available at the following link (Adobe Acrobat PDF, 22 pages, 1.3 MBs):
- the ANSF realizes they don't have the financial resources needed;
- Kabul military leaders don't have good ground truth of tactical situation;
- the ANSF realized they underestimated the strength of the Taliban;
- the Taliban enhancement of village-level operations;
- concern of ANSF to hold on next two years;
- high level of desertions from ANSF;
- higher level of ANA corruption than previously thought;
- 63% of ANA fuel is stolen;
- 2/3s of ANA food is stolen;
- poor quality of boots for the ANA;
- lack of foreign advisors and mentors means higher levels of "ghost soldiers";
- lack of advisors at kandak / brigade may increase non-judicial killings;
- a worry that ANA cdrs will use fires instead of sound SUTs;
- a lack of middle-class Afghans participating in the ANSF;
- lack of educated Afghans in ministries working budgets, etc.;
- ISAFs maintenance failures on the 11 Mi-24 combat helicopters;
- inability to field the 20 A-29 Tucano close support aircraft on time;
- ISAF fumbling of the C-27 maintenance plan;
- inability of ANSF to conduct aerial MEDEVACs affects morale;
- ANA commanders forming "truce pacts" with Taliban;
- lack of ANA doctrine (current manuals are translated US manuals);
- concern that Afghanistan could follow Iraq's present situation;
- senior Afghan military leaders and commanders "not up to the task";
- dismal prospects of reconciliation with the Taliban;
- optimistic narrative "everything is fine" of ISAF is counterproductive
"The Afghan National Army: Sustainability Challenges beyond Financial Aspects".
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