Paper - Pakistani Unconventional Warfare Against Afghanistan (Douglas Livermore)

Map of Pakistan

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is steadily decreasing its troop levels in Afghanistan as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) become more capable. During the 2013 fighting season the ANSF held its own although it suffered terrible casualties. However, the Taliban are not defeated and while they did not gain much territory in 2013 they certainly did not lose much territory. The Taliban enjoy significant support (whether by coercion or other means in the south and parts of the east). In addition, the sanctuaries provided in Pakistan ensure the long-term survival of the insurgents.  An interesting paper has been published that provides us with a valuable insight to the support that the Taliban enjoy. The paper looks at the Taliban and the support provided by the government of Pakistan from an unconventional warfare perspective. Read "Pakistani Unconventional Warfare Against Afghanistan: A Case Study of the Taliban as an Unconventional Warfare Proxy Force", Small Wars Journal, February 4, 2014 by Douglas A. Livermore.

DoD Contractors Serving in Afghanistan Screwed Over by Customs and Border Protection Officials Upon Arriving in the U.S.

Seal of U.S. Customs Border Protection
"One Team - One Fight" (most of the time)

The U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers working at Bangor International Airport in Bangor, Maine screwed over about 200 military service members and defense contractors returning from Afghanistan. The customs officials wanted to see "import documentation" for helmets, body armor, and gas masks that the DoD contractors had in their luggage. By regulation all DoD contractors must have these items as mandatory equipment in Afghanistan and wear the helmets and body armor when flying or driving off military bases. The military members and contractors spent an extra day in Bangor while the customs officials confiscated the equipment and then . . . eventually returned it. Quite a welcome home to the troops and contractors who just spent a long deployment in Afghanistan. The contractors and military service members had to delay their long-awaited reunion with their families by one day; disrupting many planned celebrations and travel plans. The seal (see image to left) of the Customs Border Protection has the words "One Team - One Fight"; well, not exactly - at least not all the time. You have to admire our brave men and women of the Customs and Border Protection organization as they have proven they will go to any lengths to protect our nation from those dangerous members of the military and contracting force who are returning from the war in Afghanistan. Read more in "Military flight delayed at BIA as Customs seeks documentation for contractor's for Kevlar vests, gas masks, and helmets", Bangor Daily News, February 3, 2014.

Lessons Observed vs Lessons Learned: How We Fail to Properly Train Advisers

Jason Fritz, a senior editor at War on the Rocks blog has published online an article about the difference between "lessons observed" and "lessons learned". The writer served as an adviser in Iraq a few years back and compares his preparation and training with those advisers from the Vietnam era. No lessons learned there; although there was plenty of lessons observed. Of course this adviser selection and training problem exists even today with the selection for the SFAATs for the Security Force Assistance mission in Afghanistan. Read more in "Lessons Observed on Lessons Observed: IEDs, Advising, and Armor", War on the Rocks, February 3, 2014.

Report: Taliban to Regain Territory and Influence Post-2014

A recent report states that the Taliban will increase its influence in rural areas of Afghanistan and regain territory in the east and south of the country once foreign forces have completely withdrawn from the country. The report says the country has been undermined by endemic corruption and the opium drug industry. The report was written for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute by a former intelligence adviser and defense official (Ian Dudgeon). See "Taliban will move in as global forces withdraw from Afghanistan, warns report", The Sydney Morning Herald, February 5, 2014.

Karzai Secretly Talking With the Taliban

News reports are coming out that Karzai has been secretly talking with the Taliban over the past several months. The peace talks have not involved western allies (including the United States). Karzai has been behaving strangely lately - releasing hardened Taliban members from detention and refusing to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement. Perhaps his secret talks with the Taliban explains those actions. Read more in "Karzai Arranged Secret Contacts With the Taliban", The New York Times, February 3, 2014.

Lunar New Year Celebrated by Mongolians at Camp Marmal, Afghanistan

Members of the Mongolian armed forces stationed at Camp Marmal in Regional Command North celebrated the Lunar New Year on January 31st. Read the article and watch the video at "Ringing in the Lunar New Year in Afghanistan Mongolian Style", Stars and Stripes, February 1, 2014.

U.S. Senator Wants Better Oversight on Construction Projects in Afghanistan

Senator Shaheen from New Hampshire is joining the many congressional representatives who want more oversight on reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Read "Shaheen calls for oversight on Afghanistan reconstruction", The Hill Blog, February 3, 2014.

Medical Services Mean Fewer Child Deaths in Afghanistan

The growth of medical services and clinics in Afghanistan has made remarkable strides in the decrease of child deaths. In 2001 one in four children died before the age of five. In 2014 only one in ten die before the age of five. While still a very high death rate among children it is obvious that some gains have been made. Read more in "An Afghan Success Story: Fewer Child Deaths", NPR, February 4, 2014.

Afghans Looking for Results From Presidential Elections

In April 2014 the Afghans will once again vote for a president - replacing Karzai who has held the position way too long. There are 11 presidential candidates who are looking for support in the election. A key issue will be the future deployment of foreign troops in Afghanistan after December 2014. The two top priorities for Afghans are security and economic gains. Read more in "As campaign begins, Afghans look for results, not promises", Stars and Stripes, February 2, 2014.

U.S. has failed in Afghan Counternarcotics Fight

A recent new report sheds light on the failure of the U.S. to counter the narcotics industry in Afghanistan. Read more in "U.S. has 'failed' narcotics fight in Afghanistan, says inspector general", CNN, February 3, 2014.

Afghan Interpreters: Trusted With a Gun but Not a Visa

Afghan interpreters who are seeking a U.S. visa continue to be stone-walled by the United States Department of State. Read more in "The US trusted them with a gun, but not a visa", Brisbane Times, February 4, 2014.

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Kentucky Guard Trains Afghan Army in RC North

Photo LTJG Bryan Mitchell Jan 2014

Members of the Kentucky National Guard are training Afghan Soldiers at Camp Marmal in Regional Command North (RC North). They are part of the Kentucky National Guard 1103rd Military Police Detachment. Many of the military police units belonging to the Army National Guard are also members of the civilian police and law enforcement community. There are many observers and critics who feel that the training of the Afghan National Police (ANP) fell way behind the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA). That is considered by some as one of the most likely of the reasons that the ANA is considered a professional institution when compared to the corrupt and mostly ineffective ANP. When the Army deployed its initial Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAAT) in early 2012 many of these teams were assigned to advise and assist the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) in the district centers. However, most of the SFAATs did not have the one Military Policeman assigned as required by ISAF Joint Command (IJC); in fact most of the SFAAT advisor teams had no one with a military police background. The SFAATs advising the police were supposed to have four Embedded Police Mentors (EPMs) but many would only have one or two. This was a shortfall that could have been readily corrected with the addition of some U.S. Army National Guard police members but . . .  it didn't happen. Some counterinsurgency experts consider the police to be the tip of the spear in the fight against an insurgency but this principle of COIN was largely ignored by the International Security Assistance Command. Read more in "Kentucky National Guardsmen train Afghan soldiers", DVIDS, January 31, 2014.

SIGAR Report: USAID Report Card 2002-2013

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has pumped over $13.3 billion dollars into Afghanistan between 2002 and 2013. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has completed a report on where the money went, how it was spent, and who spent the money for use. The date of the report is January 23, 2014. USAID awarded funds to implementing partners including multilateral organizations, non-governmental organizations, for-profit corporations, Afghan government entities, and U.S. government entities. The report provides a concise yet detailed accounting of where the money went and the scope of the USAID programs. You can read the report online or download it on the SIGAR website at www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/14-27-SP.pdf.

Paper - Hurdles to U.S. Stabilization Operations

A former defense analyst, Renanah Miles, writes a paper explaining why civilian agencies were unable to develop effective programs to assist the military in stabilization and counterinsurgency efforts in the Iraq and Afghan wars. The paper is entitled "The (Many) Hurdles to U.S. Stabilization Operations". You can read the paper posted on the Lawfare Blog here.

An Effective Drone Program for Targets in Pakistan

Michael McBride writes an article posted on the Small Wars Journal dated January 31, 2014 entitled "The Art of Restraining the Knife: Understanding the Limits of Drone Strikes in Pakistan".
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-art-of-restraining-the-knife

Harsh Report Points Out Miss-management of Funds by Afghan Ministries

A report by SIGAR says that 0 out of 16 Afghan ministries do not manage aid money correctly and all of the ministries are corrupt. See "Harsh Inspector General Report Says 0 out of 16 Afghan Agencies Can Be Trusted With U.S. Aid", AllGov.com, February 1, 2014.

Presidential Election Campaign Opens But With Violence

The presidential campaign in Afghanistan is now in full swing. The elections will be held in April 2014. The Taliban have vowed to disrupt the elections in an effort to discredit the results. The violence has started against the campaign workers - the most recent was the assassination of two workers for Abdullah Abdullah in the city of Herat in western Afghanistan. Read more in "Afghanistan presidential campaign opens, marred by violence", Los Angeles Times, February 2, 2014.

Lots of Roads - Little Maintenance

The United States and other international partners have built over 10,000 miles of roads in Afghanistan over the past decade. In 2001 there were only 50 miles of paved road. So a lot of money, time, and energy has been put into road construction. The massive build up of the road system was seen as a way to provide for more security, more economic growth, provide jobs, and join the various ethnically-diverse sections of the country together tying it to a strong, central government in Kabul. While billions have been poured into road construction there has not been much progress into the maintenance of these new roads. As a result of low maintenance, over use, poor construction, and the Taliban planting IEDs which leave large craters the roads of Afghanistan are quickly deteriorating. The international partners (along with the United States) would provide the Afghan Ministry of Public Works money to maintain the roads but the ministry has proven itself of disbursing the money to contracts for the repairs - much of the money goes to the Dubai bank accounts of the corrupt ministry officials. Read more in "U.S.-built roads in Afghanistan crumble for lack of care", Stars and Stripes, February 2, 2014.

Afghan Commandos Train with Afghan Helicopters

Afghan National Army commandos from the 8th Special Operations Kandak conducted tactical training with Afghan National Security forces helicopter aircrews in Pul-e-Alam district of Logar province in Afghanistan. The training was designed to sharpen skills needed while using Afghan helicopters. Tactics rehearsed included getting on and off the helicopters, providing security at helicopter landing zones, and employing helicopters to move from one location to another. Read more in "Afghan commandos, aviators perfect battlefield helicopter capability", DVIDS, February 2, 2014. (Photo by Bill Mesta, CJSOTF-A, January 20, 2014)

Planning for Resolute Support Mission Continues Despite Lack of Bilateral Security Agreement

It appears that NATO and the U.S. military are conducting parallel planning. One is for the "zero-option" of no troops in Afghanistan beyond December 2014. The second is for 10K of U.S. and 6K of NATO to be in Afghanistan beyond December 2014; providing the Bilateral Security Agreement is signed. This force of 16K would be conducting the Resolute Support mission providing Security Force Assistance in the form of advisers and trainers but also conducting counter terrorism missions against remnants of al Qaeda that remain in Afghanistan. Read more in "Military Plans Reflect Afghanistan Uncertainty", The New York Times, January 29, 2014.

Advisor to Karzai Says BSA Could be Signed

An advisor to Karzai (his national security advisor) is now hinting that the Bilateral Security Agreement could be signed by Karzai prior to him leaving office. Why bother. The April elections are around the corner. The newly elected president will most likely sign the BSA. ISAF should ignore Karzai, continue to parallel plan for either the "zero option" or leaving 10K in Afghanistan post-2014. How hard is that? (I do pity the LTC that has that job). So treat Karzai like the lame duck he is, ignore him, and move on. He shouldn't matter anymore.

Afghanistan Has Hope for the Future

Afghanistan has some hope for the future. With the April 2014 presidential elections around the corner the country has the opportunity to elect a president who can lead Afghanistan into the future. That would require the elimination of corruption (to an acceptable level?), ensuring that foreign aid continues, tapping into the various mineral deposits, signing the Bilateral Security Agreement, reaching an agreement with the Taliban, and bringing measures to bear against Pakistan so that the Pakistanis will stop supporting the insurgents with money, explosives, and sanctuaries. Read more in "Can Afghanistan's Economy Stand on Its Own?", The Diplomat, January 30, 2014. Richard Ghiasy of the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS) in Kabul writes about the tremendous potential that Afghanistan can achieve.

Adviser to APPF Describes His Work

A member of the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) provides us insight into his duties and responsibilities as an adviser to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). Read more in "Analyst gets top honors for work in Afghanistan", Robins Air Force Base News Release, January 31, 2014.

Task Force Reaper Concludes Mission at Camp Marmal

Task Force Reaper has concluded its mission in Regional Command North. The members of the unit served a long deployment performing a diverse set of missions that included providing security to convoys and moving men and equipment throughout the regional command. The helicopters in the task force included Apaches, Black Hawks, and Chinooks. The busy OPTEMPO was due in part to the retrograde of troops from Afghanistan back to the states. Read more in "Task Force Reaper concludes successful tour at Camp Marmal", DVIDS, January 25, 2014.

CRS Report Not Optimistic on Afghanistan

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has provided a report to Congress (but not released to the public) that is very pessimistic on the outlook for Afghanistan even if the Bilateral Security Agreement is signed and the U.S. and NATO can leave 10K and 6K advisors in Afghanistan post-2014. The report is entitled "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy", by Kenneth Katzman for CRS, dated January 17, 2014. Read more in "The Afghanistan Mess: Fed Report Says We'll Pay Up The Nose Long After Troops Return", New York Daily News, January 30, 2014.

Strike (2/101st) Returns to Afghanistan

2nd Brigade Combat Team (Strike) of the 101st Airborne Division will return to Afghanistan for another deployment. They recently deployed to the North of Kabul (NoK) area in Regional Command East in 2012 where they provided a number of Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs). During this upcoming deployment they will be a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB) and also deploy some SFAATs as well. Read more in "Strike cases colors for sixth time since 9/11", Fort Campbell Courier, January 30, 2014.

Karzai Clan and the Taliban: Not That Far Apart

An interesting article is available for reading on Strategy Page. The author goes into great detail explaining how and why corruption works in Afghanistan and then ties the Karzai clan and Taliban into the overall narrative. Worth reading. See "Afghanistan: Why the Karzai Clan Supports the Taliban", January 31, 2014.

NATO and Afghanistan

Andrew A. Michta, a professor of international studies at Rhodes College, is interviewed about NATOs role in Afghanistan and what the future NATO mission looks like. Read "NATO's Post ISAF Challenges and the Danger of a Hollow Alliance", Small Wars Journal, January 23, 2014.

Army to Keep 162nd SFAB

The Army has decided not to shut down the 162nd Brigade at Fort Polk. The 162nd is the training brigade responsible for training up the Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs) that deploy to Afghanistan for the ISAF Security Force Assistance mission. There were plans to shut the brigade down at the beginning of 2014. It would have been interesting to know where the Army planned on training up their SFAATs for Afghan deployments if they had shut down the 162nd. Things that make you go "Hmmmm". Read more in "Fort Polk to keep 162nd SFAB for 2014", Leesville Daily Leader, January 31, 2014.

DynCorp to Train Up Afghan Engineers in ANA

DynCorp has won a contract to help train up the Afghan National Army Engineer Corps. The principle unit of the ANA engineer branch is the Corp Engineer Kandak or CEK. Read a news report on the DynCorp contract "DynCorp International to Provide Training to Afghan National Army Engineers", Herald Online, January 30, 2014.

Brits Worry Over Attacks During Withdrawal

The Brits are slightly concerned about the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan over the next year but figure they have things set to ensure no adverse actions take place. They recognize that the Taliban will try and attack as they withdraw and then make some public announcements about it. Read more in "Army chiefs draw up plans to fight their way out of Afghanistan if Taliban attack during troop withdrawal", Mirror News, January 26, 2014.

Dev Aid as Negotiating Tool for BSA Signing

Karzai continues to stonewall the United States on the signing of the Bilateral Security Agreement. He insists that the signing will take place with the new president of Afghanistan who will be elected in the April 2014 elections. One writer thinks we should force Karzai's hand by putting a freeze on development and aid funds going into Kabul's coffers until the Bilateral Security Agreement is signed. The writer also thinks we need to 'track' the money to ensure it is spent on the intended purpose and to attach some 'conditionality'. He provides some recommendations that merit consideration. In addition to the conditionality, he recommends increasing funding through Afghan systems (isn't this part of the problem?), spending only where there already is security, consolidate donor funds, providing more assistance directly to the provinces, focus on fiscal sustainability, unleash the private sector, and get tough on corruption. Read "Changing the Game in Afghanistan", War on the Rocks, January 22, 2014.

NATO Leaders Say Afghan Forces Need More Training

At a NATO conference many of the leading officials of NATO have again pointed out the need for continued training of the Afghan forces. The officials state that although the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have come a long way and held their own during the 2013 fighting season there are some things that they still need assistance with. That assistance would be provided by 10,000 U.S. military and 6,000 NATO troops.Read more in "NATO leaders say Afghan troops need more training", Stars and Stripes, February 1, 2014.

Afghan Interpreters Still Getting Screwed Over by State Department

It appears that the State Department is not taking Congress and its critics seriously on the State Departments inability to process visas to deserving Afghan interpreters who have put their lives at risk to aid our military. The State Department has been heavily criticized the past year for not processing visas in a timely manner (if at all). One would think that with the heavy public pressure the State Department would respond to fix their failure but evidently they are so insulated from reality they are not aware of it - or maybe they just don't care about the Afghan interpreters. I have been told the problem resides within the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. Perhaps a little less time in the "Duck and Cover" and more time behind the computer would achieve better results. Read more on this topic in "U.S. backlog for visas leaves Afghan interpreters in limbo", Los Angeles Times, January 31, 2014.

The Great Game - 2014 Plus

An article entitled "Karzai's Great Game Gamble" by Gawdat Bahgat and Robert Sharp has been posted on The Small Wars Journal (January 24, 2014). The writers provide us a little history on "The Great Game" played by England and Russia and then apply that to current times (2014 plus) as it relates to the Central Asian nations development of oil and gas resources (and pipelines) and the U.S. "pivot" to a naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Pacific. They then tie in the need for continued U.S. support to Afghanistan with the strategic picture and discuss the refusal of Karzai to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). They conclude with the thought that we need to wait out Karzai and recognize that signing the BSA later is better than not at all even though it will complicate the life of ISAF and Pentagon planners working the retrograde.

SIGAR and ISAF: Who Is Winning the IO Battle?

Warfare is more than just about fighting. It has a lot to do with the public perception of who is just and who is winning. One can study the Vietnam War and come to that conclusion. While the U.S. military won almost every tactical battle in Vietnam it lost the "strategic battle" - the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese population and of the United States public. Public sentiment against the war in the states rose steadily in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The military's use of the information and media world was woeful. A key ingredient was the "five o'clock follies" where military spokesmen would spout off the "party line" every afternoon in Saigon. Unfortunately, the information provided by the military spokesmen at the follies did not reflect the reality of what was happening on the ground, the reporters who had been on the ground knew it, and the U.S. military public relations machine lost all credibility.

However, there was a lot going right in the Vietnam War but folks heard mostly bad news. The Nixon administration was able to conduct "Vietnamization" of the war by increasing the professionalism of the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN), providing modern equipment, and providing the logistics and supplies needed. By 1974 the South Vietnamese were doing the vast majority of the fighting and  the U.S. military was helping out with advisers and support efforts. The South Vietnamese government had a decent chance of surviving. Where the war was lost is when the U.S. Congress voted to cut off funding for the South Vietnamese government. Morale plummeted in South Vietnam and the ARVN lost the ability to fight because funding for fuel, food, ammunition, spare parts, etc. dried up. Those who could afford it fled Saigon for the U.S., Paris, and other destinations taking their money with them. The lack of funds for the Army and lower morale resulted in an inability of the South Vietnamese to fight a prolonged war. The North Vietnamese and its allies recognized victory served up by the U.S. Congress and quickly exploited it in early 1975.

Today's conflict in Afghanistan has some similar characteristics at play. We have turned over security to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). According to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) the ANSF did a fair job in holding their own during the 2013 fighting season despite suffering horrendous casualties. While the ANSF didn't gain much territory it didn't loose much either. The ANSF is much more professional and capable. It is large enough to hold the major cities and main lines of communication (being able to conduct counterinsurgency is a different story, let's not go there). With continued advice and enabling assistance (and more money) the ANSF should be able to hold its own into the coming years (the results of the elections have a lot to do with this).

However . . . separate from the tactical successes on the battlefield is the fight in the "Information Operations" arena sometimes abbreviated to IO. IO is now referred to as Inform and Influence Activities. This is where the biggest danger lurks. The winning or loosing of Afghanistan may well pivot on who wins the info war. Since General Dunford took over he has been very attuned to this facet of the conflict. He wants to see the ANSF perceived as coming out of the 2013 fighting season as "holding their own". He wants the ANSF to be recognized as being "in the lead for the security of Afghanistan". He wants to see the Afghan ministries able to "sustain the ANSF" over the long-term and beyond post-2014. There are a lot of "wants" there. The "wants" have to have more than just good IO working for them to become reality; in some cases the facts on the ground have to back up the ISAF IO message.

General Dunfords' adversaries in the IO world are numerous.

The Taliban. First of all there is the Taliban who have simply out-matched the Afghan IO machine and the ISAF Public Affairs Office (PAO). While the Afghan government (and in some cases ISAF) has access to the Afghan media (print, TV, and radio) in the major cities, the Taliban have access to the rural areas where insurgencies historically thrive and where their support base happens to live. If you are a villager in a remote rural area of Afghanistan are you going to listen to a "voice" over the radio talking about government services and development that never arrives (unless it is in the form of corrupt payments to the District Governor and his cronies) or to the Taliban who comes to your local village armed with weapons and demands for food, shelter, and information about the ANSF? Night letters carry more impact than radio messages in rural Afghanistan.

Media. The press (all methods of TV, radio, Internet, and newspapers) carry a lot of weight. Historically the press looks for bad news. Reporters are always suspected by the military (as they should be). They are not the military's friend. The media is not hurting ISAF too badly as of late because Afghanistan is so rarely in the news these days. However the damage has been done. U.S. public support for the Afghan war is at the lowest ever.

International Community. There are some agencies and organizations out there that don't help the cause very much - and this is specifically true of some of the Non-Governmental Organizations or NGOs. Human Rights Watch comes to mind. While the NGOs provide a tremendous service to the Afghan people many of them will constantly deplore the military for civilian casualties or mismanagement of situations. This is not to disparage the bulk of the international community that is helpful to ISAF (EUPOL, European Community, NATO, NGOs, etc.). But organizations like Human Rights Watch (that slant the news) or Transparency International (that report the facts) hurt the ISAF IO effort.

Karzai. This guy needs to go. As one informed ISAF general once said when discussing the possible results of the Afghan election - "It can only get better". Karzai's info ops campaign is hurting ISAF's efforts. In addition, Karzai is hurting Afghanistan. The number one opponent to ISAF in the IO world is Karzai (not the Taliban, IC, or media). In addition, the number one source of support to the insurgents is corruption - and guess where that starts from (helpful clue: PoA)?

There are other IO opponents that ISAF has to contend with out there - too numerous to mention. Of late, one such organization has emerged to cause considerable damage to ISAF.

SIGAR. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has provided numerous (and very accurate reports) about some of the failures of the reconstruction effort. SIGAR has highlighted month after month cases of Afghan corruption or U.S. mismanagement of funds and programs that has cost the United States taxpayers billions of dollars. The reports by SIGAR are so accurate and damaging that ISAF decided to fight back against SIGAR with an IO effort to combat SIGAR. (You can read more about this in a USA Today news article).

For every report that SIGAR issues highlighting an ISAF failure - the ISAF PR folks issue a report saying how well ISAF is doing in that particular endeavor highlighting its successes. For example SIGAR recently reported on the mismanagement of the $200 million Afghan literacy program and ISAF sent out its "feel good" message on how the literacy program has seen improved oversight procedures implemented. So you can read the discouraging facts provided by SIGAR or "feel good" reading ISAF's press releases.

The ISAF effort to counter SIGAR probably came from an initiative called the "Audit Plan of Action" - which recommends ISAF releasing news of how the military has addressed problems cited by SIGAR before SIGAR releases its report to Congress and the media. The initiative was probably cooked up by the Commander's Action Group (CAG) or the ISAF IO (DCoS Communications) folks. SIGAR's position is that ISAF should spend less time writing miss-leading press releases and more time fixing the problems cited in the reports and audits. (see the USA Today article linked to above for more).

Unfortunately, armed with the facts, SIGAR has the ISAF IO machine outclassed and over-matched. ISAF would be better off taking the very detailed and astute recommendations in the SIGAR reports and implementing them. ISAF could then fix some of the problems instead of applying decorative window dressing and attacking the messenger. Congress, in the humongous budget bill recently passed, cut reconstruction and military aid funds for Afghanistan by a huge amount. Does 1975 come to mind?

I wonder who Congress was listening to? ISAF or SIGAR?

Learn more about SIGAR here at www.sigar.mil.

Rethinking Pakistan

Over the past twelve years our relationship with Pakistan has usually been in the context of "AfPak" - the lumping together of Afghanistan and Pakistan into one complex problem. There are some (see a report by the Council on Foreign Relations) who think we need to change this outlook and separate the two countries in our regional outlook. We are asked to rethink our Pakistan strategy; a revised approach to Pakistan would help the U.S. advance its interests in Asia. (I guess we are supposed to overlook the fact that Pakistan is supporting the Afghan insurgents and providing sanctuary to the Haqqani Network). Read more in "As Afghan Pullout Looms, U.S. Urged to Rethink Pakistan Ties", Inter Press Service, January 23, 2014.

No BSA Blow to Afghan Army

The lack of a Bilateral Security Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan could not only result in a "zero option" for foreign troops (mostly advisors) in Afghanistan after December 2014 but also put at risk further financial aid that would bankroll the Afghan security forces, governance, and development. If the foreign aid is reduced (just as Congress slashed funds for Afghanistan in recent budget talks) then it will be almost impossible for the MoI and MoD to pay for its police and Soldiers. Read more in "Lack of bilateral agreement would be blow to Afghan army, NATO chief says", Stars and Stripes, January 27, 2014.

Medical Supplies Turned Over to ANSF

A unique team of individuals have rescued expensive medical supplies and equipment destined to be destroyed or shipped back to the United States to sit in metal containers or in warehouses unused. MAJ Elizabeth Gum of the 1st Theater Sustainment Command and her team of medical logistic specialists are helping to provide needed training aides and supplies by salvaging medical supplies in theater. The team is finding medical material in good condition and reintroducing the materiel to support medical units, civilian entities, and the ANSF. The teams sort through the retrosort yards at Bagram and Kandahar to find the materials for the free issue program. Read more in "Life saving money", DVIDS, January 25, 2014.

Watching COIN Fail in Afghanistan

A U.S. Marine Corps officer, who served as an advisor in Afghanistan, writes a contemplative piece on how we should help the Afghans conduct counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. He states that the United States has pushed a U.S. version of counterinsurgency on the Afghans that does not work for the Afghans and thus we have prevented the Afghans from making the necessary progress to defeat the insurgents. Our (the U.S. model) method of a strong centralized government exerting its control through the MoD and MoI into the rural Pashtun areas just doesn't work. The author proposes some novel changes to the current construct that are worth consideration. Read more in "Front Row Seat: Watching COIN Fail in Afghanistan", War on the Rocks, January 28, 2014.

Afghan Ministries Incapable of Managing Aid Money

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has issued a report stating that there are no Afghan ministries that are capable of managing the billions of AID dollars that are transferred directly into the coffers of the Afghan treasury. Two different well-known accounting firms have conducted audits and found the ministries wanting. We are probably several years late but our military would probably have been better off sending a few thousand accountants to Afghanistan to help with management of the money and less tactical advisors to help the Afghans fight battles on the ground. Read more in "Report: No Afghan ministry capable of managing aid", Stars and Stripes, January 30, 2014.

Book - "The Pomegranate Peace"

A new book has been published called "The Pomegranate Peace" by Rashmee Roshan Lall. The novel is about the failure of the United States reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan - how we threw money away on big and small projects with a lack of expertise and oversight. This story centers around a woman sent by the State Department to run a project that will increase the export of pomegranates to develop the economy, eradicate poppy cultivation, improve the lives of Afghans, and pull support away from the Taliban. The author spent some time in Kabul and relates the life of an American working the war effort on the development front. A recent book review has more "Book Review: The Pomegranate Peace", Fire Dog Lake.com, January 24, 2014. The book is available at Amazon.com - The Pomegranate Peace.

Book Review: "Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror", by Barnett R. Rubin

Barnett R. Rubin, a noted observer (and participant), of the nation building effort in Afghanistan has wrote a book entitled "Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror", Oxford University Press, April 2013. It is a good read (according to the book review linked to below) for those interested in the socio-economic and political history of Afghanistan. It also will be of interest to those who look at the effect foreign powers have on a state. Some of the essays in the book cover human rights, security, narcotics trade, and post-conflict state building. Read a book review here located on the London School of Economics Review of Books website (review by Samay Borom). You can learn more about the book from Amazon.com (or purchase it) at this link: Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror

Obama's State of Union Speech Says Little About Afghanistan

The State of the Union speech by Obama provided little new information about Afghanistan. In fact, Afghanistan was hardly mentioned at all. Read more in "For Afghans, Obama's SOTU message on troops was loud and clear", Stars and Stripes, January 30, 2014.

Interpreter Dodges Taliban and Waits Out State Department

Read the story of an interpreter who survived retaliation by the Taliban for his assistance to the U.S. Marines and who frustratingly waited for the State Department to get its act together so he could get a visa to the United States. The State Department has done a horrible job granting visas to Afghans who put their lives on the line for U.S. military personnel. See "Left Behind: Afghan translator dodges Taliban on long road to America", NBC News, January 23, 2014.

The Case for Optimism in Afghanistan

Sharif Azami, a Program Officer for the Fetzer Institute, writes "Afghanistan Can Use a Strong Dose of Morale Optimism", on The Huffington Post, January 23, 2014. He believes that the United States would be wrong to walk away from Afghanistan on the basis that President Karzai does not want to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement. He feels that Afghanistan has made too much progress and that there is a lot to lose if the international community cuts aid and military assistance to Afghanistan. He has an optimistic outlook (not shared by this blogger) on the future of Afghanistan if only the international community will stay on task.

Afghan Election Poll Funds Canceled by U.S.

The U.S. has cancelled the funding to conduct some pre-election polling prior to the Afghan elections. Relations between the U.S. and Karzai have been deteriorating and now it appears that Karzai (among other things) is accusing the U.S. of trying to influence the Afghan elections through the polls. Read more in "U.S. cancels funds for Afghan polls ahead of election", Reuters, January 30, 2014.

Ad Village - Karzai Stops the Airing of Ads Encouraging Him to Sign BSA

President Karzai has stopped the ads bought by ISAF (or USAID) and provided by a little-known firm called "Ad Village" (website now unavailable) and aired on Afghan television and radio. The ads were designed to encourage President Karzai to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement. Read more in "Afghanistan Cracks Down on TV Campaign Promoting U.S. Troops Presence in Country", The Huffington Post, January 22, 2014.

Post-2014 10K Force to be SOF Heavy

The residual force to remain in Afghanistan post-2014 (if the Bilateral Security Agreement is signed) will be very special operations heavy. Learn more in "Special ops key in Afghanistan presence, local members say", The Tampa Tribune, January 30, 2014.