JTAC - A Tough Job

B-1B Bomber

Joint Terminal Attack Controllers or JTACs in the Air Force have a very demanding, complex, and important job. JTACs are Air Force personnel who are assigned to ground combat units to direct close air support. The Afghans have a similar job specialty called the Afghan Air Tactical Coordinator or ATAC. Over the past decade or more the Air Force has reserved the function of JTACs for Air Force only personnel - much to the dismay of the Army and Marines. The Air Force controls the selection, training, and assignments of JTACs but they fail to meet the needs of the Army combat units in terms of the number of JTACs (this has been true ever since 2001 in Afghanistan and 2003 in Iraq).

The JTACs have a high operational tempo - with frequent deployments overseas into combat zones. While they sign up for the Air Force they spend most of their time with the Army on combat operations. The frequent deployments have caused a high rate of attrition - many JTACs are opting out and leaving the service. This attrition rate causes a perpetual shortage of JTACs and a lowering of the overall experience level.

There are limited opportunities for personnel of other services to achieve a JTAC rating. One is the Special Operations Terminal Attack Controller Course (SOTACC) which teaches special operations personnel from the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps the conduct of close air support missions and fully certify them as qualified Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC). However, the SOTTAC course has a limited capacity to train personnel - so most special operations teams must rely on a JTAC provided by the Air Force.

The latest 'friendly fire' incident in which five Army personnel were killed (mid-2014 in Zabul province) in a Special Forces operation is partly the result of a JTAC who had a mediocre record of performance. In addition, the B-1B crew has been grounded. Read more in "Attrition: A Rare Friendly Fire Incident Explained", Strategy Page, November 14, 2014.

Afghans Request UK Air Support

The Afghan government has requested continued air support from the United Kingdom for its ground troops during the Resolute Support mission. Kabul's air force does not currently have the capacity to deliver close air support; but hopefully, it will in the future once it receives its twenty A-29 super Tucano light strike aircraft (2016?). Read more in "UK ponders Afghan request for air support", IHS Jane's 360, October 30, 2014.

NATO Promises Afghans Air Support After 2014

The A-29 Tucano was supposed to be in the AAF by
now but Congressional meddling held up the program.

The international military coalition says it will continue to provide air support to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) after the last combat troops leave Afghanistan in December 2014. According to General Zahir Azimi, a spokesman for the Afghan Defense Ministry, there was a recent agreement between Afghanistan and NATO on continued aviation support until the Afghan Air Force (AAF) has the sufficient capacity - likely to occur at the end of 2016. Some observers might make note that this is a bit of a reversal by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). During the past two years (2013 and 2014) ISAF's stand was that the Afghan security forces need to be able to conduct operations without air support (close air support, movement of equipment and personnel, and MEDEVAC) and that the Afghan Air Force would be able to support the ANSF by itself after ISAF departs (December 2014). A few factors have probably altered that stance. The Afghan Air Force is taking a lot longer to stand up. The AAF has been plagued by misuse drug running, corruption and illiteracy, and mismanagement by the United States Air Force. One of the few bright spots has been the Special Mission Wing (SMW). Despite the promise of air support many feel that it is a hollow promise; the lack of a robust ISAF air support presence will limit ISAF's ability to provide the air support needed by the ANSF. (See "NATO Defense Spending Cutbacks May Hurt Afghanistan As Air Support Dwindles", International Business Times, October 29, 2014).

Transport Capability of AAF. The Mi-17 helicopter program is just now coming up to the 87 ship strength but the crews (flying and maintenance) are still not able to conduct all-weather and night-flying operations (only a few can, like the SMW) and maintain the aircraft. In addition, the U.S. Congress is hot about the use of Russian helicopters in the AAF. The Afghans are still not able to maintain their own helicopters to a sufficient degree and will need help in the future years in this area. The C-27A program of 20 light transport aircraft has been an extreme embarrassment to the U.S. Air Force - 16 of the 20 were recently scrapped for 6 cents a pound; four are still at an airbase in Germany yet to deploy to Afghanistan. Plans to replace the 20 C-27As with four C-130s have fallen into question - the first two delivered had a utilization rate of 48% because of the lack of Afghan crews. The third was just delivered and delivery of the fourth C-130 is now on hold.

Close Air Support. The ability of the AAF to support the ANSF is very limited. There are about 11 Mi-35 Attack Helicopters of which only a few can fly; and those crews are not very experienced. The Mi-35s are to be replaced by the A-29 Tucano but that deployment was stalled for two years by Congressional members who favored a U.S. built aircraft from a competing company. The first Tucano arrived at Moody Air Force Base in September 2014 to start the initial training. Recent news reports indicate that the U.S. is going to "weaponize" the MD 530F helicopters currently in the AAF; good news but a little late.

2014 Fighting Season. In addition, the ANSF had its worst fighting season ever in terms of numbers of casualties and the Taliban threatened some districts with fighter formations in the hundreds. ISAF was forced to assist the Afghans during August and September 2014 with a significant number of air sorties; a large increase over support provided over the past two years. So . . . we now see a reversal on the decreased use of air support which is the right thing to do; we should never had withheld the air support in 2013 and 2014. We do want the Afghans to win; don't we?

B-1B Bomber Blamed for Friendly Fire Incident

A newspaper report has stated that a B1 Bomber played a role in the deaths of five U.S. Army personnel in Zabul province. According to the report "The B-1B's sheer size required it to fly a wide orbit of five miles for optimum bombing as it made right turns over the nighttime battle site. This put it outside the range of night vision goggles. The goggles were the only equipment the bomber had to identify the infrared strobe lights worn by U.S. troops to distinguish them from the enemy and to keep them safe". News accounts like this one will likely generate support in Congress for keeping the A-10 Thunderbolt in the U.S. Air Force inventory; as it is the best suited aircraft for close air support. Read more in "Budget cuts, errant B1 bomber blamed in deadly 'friendly fire' accident in Afghan war", The Washington Times, October 29, 2014.

Paper - Airpower and COIN in Afghanistan

Jason Lyall of Yale University has wrote a paper entitled Bombing to Lose? Airpower and the Dynamics of Violence in Counterinsurgency Wars (August 9, 2014). The use of close air support during an insurgency is vital if used properly. Lyall's paper is posted on the Social Science Research Network at the link below. An abstract of his paper follows:

"Are airstrikes an effective tool against insurgent organizations? Despite the question's historical and contemporary relevance, we have few dedicated studies, and even less consensus, about airpower's effectiveness in counterinsurgency wars. To answer this question, I draw on declassified United States Air Force records of nearly 23,000 airstrikes and non-lethal shows of force in Afghanistan (2006-11), satellite imagery, and a new SQL-enabled form of dynamic matching to estimate the causal effects of airstrikes on insurgent attacks over variable temporal and spatial windows. Evidence consistently indicates that airstrikes markedly increase insurgent attacks relative to non-bombed locations for at least 90 days after a strike. Civilian casualties play little role in explaining post-strike insurgent responses, however. Instead, these attacks appear driven by reputational concerns, as insurgent organizations step up their violence after air operations to maintain their reputations for resolve in the eyes of local populations."

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422170

A-10 Thunderbolt Provides CAS for Troops Below

The A-10 Thunderbolts, a 43 thousand pound machine, operate out of Bagram Air Field in Afghanistan. The jets provide close air support and overwatch for ground forces operating below. In the hyperlink article an A-10 pilot, Maj Vincent Sherer, describes mission preparation and the daily life he experiences in Afghanistan flying his aircraft. See "Safeguarding ground troops from above", DVIDS, October 6, 2014. (photo by Staff Sgt. Evelyn Chavez).

A-10s Returning to Afghanistan

More A-10 Warthogs are being deployed to Bagram Air Field (BAF) located just north of Kabul, Afghanistan.This is part of a six-month deployment of the 122nd Fighter Wing of the Indiana Air National Guard. The A-10 is revered by ground troops because of its ability to withstand ground fire (it has titanium armor), fly low (enabling it to identity ground targets), loiter in an area for longer periods of time, and carry a heavier bomb load. There are 283 A-10s in the Air Force and the fighter jocks are trying their best to retire the extremely effective aircraft because . . . well, because it is not sexy and does close air support. Instead, the Air Force wants to field the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to do what the A-10 does very well. Read more in "U.S. Sending A-10 Plane to Combat While Trying to Kill It", Bloomberg News, October 2, 2014.

A-10 Being Phased Out? Let's Hope Not!

The Air Force (once again) would like to phase out their extremely effective close air support platform. The A-10 Warthog has been the favorite CAS platform for ground troops for many years. The A-10 has proven to be a workhorse in Afghanistan close air support missions. It carries a great payload, has a gun for "really close air support", can loiter in the vicinity for long periods of time, and the pilots are 'ground force friendly'. However, the Air Force would rather assign 300 F-35As to the CAS mission and scrap the A-10s. However the cost of those 300 F-35As (part of the 1,700 F-35As to be purchased) is about $37 billion; the cost of retaining the current A-10 fleet is $3.7 billion. Do the math. The Air Force is meeting some opposition on this issue. Perhaps it is time that the A-10 is given to the Army? Read more in "Is Precision the Future of CAS?", Defense News, January 21, 2014.