Schoolhouse Construction in Afghanistan - Lacking Oversight

Schoolhouse in MeS - photo SIGAR Jan 14

A schoolhouse being built in Afghanistan has turned into a glaring example of how an aid project can go wrong in Afghanistan. The school has turned into a money pit - the project lasting five years and a number of contractors. The school still is yet completed with USAID in search of yet another contractor to finish the job and correct the deficiencies. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) recently published a report on this project. Unfortunately, the example in this report is not the exception but probably the rule. USAID has had some big problems in oversight of its projects. Corruption in Afghanistan is rampart and we have not seen the return we should have on the many billions of dollars pumped into Afghanistan - whether military aid or reconstruction dollars. Read a recent news article on the school in Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan entitled "5 years and 3 contractors later, Afghanistan school still deemed unsafe", Fox News, January 22, 2014. Read the SIGAR report.

Kajaki Dam Project Continues to Have Problems

Photo by Karla Marshal, 2012

The Kajaki Dam in Helmand province, Afghanistan continues to be a symbol of the United States government's failed attempts to complete major projects involving millions of dollars and to provide proper oversight on the money that flows into Afghan hands to fund these projects. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is currently looking hard at the Kajaki Dam project. This dam has continued to be a problem area do to lack of security, delayed construction, and improper management. The current issue is that another $75 million is being pumped into this project to install an additional turbine at the site but the U.S. will have a lack of access to the site and very little vetting power over the project as the money has been handed over to the Afghans with very little strings attached. The Kajaki Dam was originally built in the 1950s by the United States. The third turbine was initially budgeted for $18 million and to be installed in 2005 but never completed. Now USAID has decided to spend an additional $75 million on the project and turn over completion of the project to the Afghans. Read more in "US watchdog issues alert over Afghan dam project oversight", Stars and Stripes, January 8, 2014. You can read the SIGAR letter to the USAID Mission Director in Afghanistan here.

Aid to Afghanistan Likely to Diminish with Withdrawal of U.S. Troops

The future of aid to Afghanistan is uncertain as U.S. troops continue their withdrawal. Without the protection that U.S. bases and troops provide to those administering (and checking on) aid projects the likelihood of aid money going to its intended purpose is slight. Corruption with the aid projects from Afghan government officials is horrible already. With the diminished ability of aid project managers to inspect progress of aid projects this Afghan corruption will only increase. It may be time to curtail some of these aid projects due to a lack of future oversight. Read more in "As Troops Leave, and Uncertain Future for U.S. Aid in Afghanistan", The New York Times, February 14, 2013.

APPF To Drive up Security Costs of USAID Projects

The costs of security for USAID projects by using the APPF is sure to go up according to observers who are trying to tabulate costs.  See "Consensus On Afghanistan: Transitioning to the Afghan Public Protection Force Will Cost More", Afghanistan Study Group, April 4, 2012.

USAID Projects Threatened by Use of APPF Guards

The Professional Services Council (PSC) warned Congress that a mandatory shift from private security contractors to the Afghan Public Protection Force or APPF will jeopardize USAID development projects in Afghanistan and put USAID personnel at risk. This warning took place during a Congressional hearing on the APPF. The PSC provided a written statement and oral testimony. See "New Security Paradigm in Afghanistan Could Jeopardize USAID Projects", Professional Services Council, March 29, 2012.

APPF Profits On USAID Projects Offend US Lawmakers

The increased costs for security associated with the use of the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) for USAID development projects has offended a number of US lawmakers. The lawmakers feel we are being held hostage by the Afghan government and that we should just say "NO" to paying for the increased cost of security and just cancel the USAID projects. Read more in "US lawmakers offended by spike in Afghan guards' costs", Reuters.com, March 29, 2012.

Will USAID Workers Be at Greater Risk With Switch to APPF Security?

Officials in Washington are concerned about the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) assuming the security for USAID projects and workers.  President Karzai has mandated the use of APPF security personnel for all development projects.  Learn more about the APPF here and USAID's switch to the APPF for security here.

District Development Plans - USAID in Afghanistan

In an attempt to prioritize and coordinate infrastructure repairs at the district level in Afghanistan the Afghan government prepares District Development Plans (DDP).  Unfortunately, the Afghan government does not have the money or the capacity to implement these plans.  The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), using implementing partners such as the Central Asia Development Group (CADG), collaborates with district and provincial leaders to identify and fill gaps in the DDP. Typical projects might include drainage ditches, road construction or improvement, or erosion protection.  Read more about how USAID's support of District Development Plans support governance and development in Afghanistan in "Bringing Government Plans to Life", USAID, February 9, 2012.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and USAID: Some Background

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) located in 26 regional areas across Afghanistan are an interagency effort to deliver governance and development to rural areas.  The PRTs assist the Afghan government, coalition military and the international community in delivering assistance at the provincial and district levels.

USAID plays a major role with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams.  Read a fact sheet on USAID and the PRTs at the link below:

http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.PRT.aspx