DoDIG Report on "Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip"

The Department of Defense Inspector General (Do DIG) office has issued a report about the Security Force Assistance mission in Afghanistan and Iraq. The reports overall objective was to provide DoD military commanders and other stakeholders responsible for Operation Inherent Resolve a summary of lessons learned gleaned from DoD IG assessment oversight of U.S. and Coalition "Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip" efforts during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The DoD IG reviewed 30 assessment reports issued by the DoD IG between July 2008 and January 2015. These reports contained 342 observations related to U.S. and Coalition efforts to develop the national security forces of Iraq and Afghanistan. In this summary project the authors sought lessons learned that might apply to future contingency operations as well as to Operation Inherent Resolve. The report identifies five systemic challenge and problem areas, with related lessons learned.

• Training and Equipping of Partner Nation Security Forces and Ministries
• Advisory Assistance in Support of Partner Nation Security Forces and Ministries
• Logistics Development and Sustainment
• Accountability and Control of U.S.-Supplied Equipment
• U.S. Contract Management

Summary of Lessons Learned - DoD IG Assessment Oversight of "Train, Advise, Assist, and Equip" Operations by U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
Report No. DODIG-2015-093
March 31, 2015

http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2015-093.pdf

Advisor Selection and HRC

"The decisive point of any SFA mission may very well be the selection, training, and education of personnel in preparation for deployment." 

                                                                           SFA Handbook, JCISFA, June 2012
                                                                 
The United States military has had extensive experience in performing advising duties over the past decade in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in other parts of the world. Unfortunately, the United States Military has had poor results in selecting advisors to important advisory positions. This is true of all services but especially the U.S. Army. Quite simply - the personnel management system of the U.S. Army has operated in a peacetime mode while the nation was at war for over 13 years. The personnel management system is not flexible and it is not adaptable. The fault lies at Human Resources Command, FORSCOM, and the units selected to provide advisors. A recent article in Military Review entitled "Misunderstanding the Officer Personnel Management System", January 2015 defends the current system in place. However, there are many observers familiar with the SFA mission in Afghanistan that believe FORSCOM and Human Resources Command have failed in providing the right advisors for the Security Force Assistance mission in Afghanistan. This writer has personally embedded with over 120 Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs) in Afghanistan over the past three years. The number one problem with the SFA mission is poor advisor selection and pre-deployment training. Changes need to be made.

Video - Interview of UK SFAAT Team Leader

Major Bev Allen, a Security Force Assistance Advisory Team (SFAAT) commander from 1 Royal Anglian, explains about the work he does in Afghanistan in a 1 minute long video. Watch "My Job in Afghanistan: Advisory Team Commander", UK Defence Headquarters (posted on YouTube), June 13, 2012.

Paper - Advisor Influence across NSMs and ANSF

An extremely well-researched and detailed paper is available that presents valuable information about advisor influence upon the Afghan national security ministries (NSMs) and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The paper, a dissertation for a graduate student at Syracuse University with extensive military experience, ". . . is an in-depth case study of NATO advisors and their perceived influence in Afghanistan . . . " in the period of 2009-2012. The author reviews Security Sector Reform (SSR) literature, presents different theories on SSR, provides an analysis of security assistance partnering, and examines advisor influence across the Afghan security spectrum.  The paper, 370 pages long, explores a two-part question:

". . . how do foreign security actors (ministerial advisors and security force trainers, advisors, and commanders) attempt to influence their host-nation partners and what are their perceptions of these approaches on changes in local capacity, values, and security governance norms?"

The paper is entitled The Prospects of Institutional Transfer: A Within-Case Study of NATO Advisor Influence Across the Afghan Security Ministries and National Security Forces, 2009-2012, by Nicholas J. Armstrong, May 2014.
http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=etd

Advisor Selection for Afghan SFA Mission

The Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission is a difficult one. Members of ISAF are expected to deploy to Afghanistan and train, advise, and assist their Afghan counterparts in the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. The SFA mission began in early 2012 with the deployment of hundreds of Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs). Unfortunately, the most important factor that contributes to the success of an advisory mission was not considered in many cases by the United States military. That factor is the proper selection of advisor personnel. In many instances, advisors did not (and do not) have the needed attributes to be effective with their Afghan counterparts (age, experience, training, education, rank, personality, etc.).

"The decisive point of any SFA mission may very well be the selection, training, and education of personnel in preparation for deployment". SFA Handbook, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, June 2012.

For instance, if one traveled through Regional Command East in 2012 and met the Intelligence officers serving as advisors on SFAATs you would find that almost 50% of them were Infantry Lieutenants with less than two years in the U.S. Army. While these young men were undoubtedly intelligent, smart, physically fit, and motivated they had (maybe) six months experience as an Infantry platoon leader, no previous combat deployment, and knew very little about the importance and role of intelligence in a counterinsurgency environment. An Infantry Lieutenant, age 24, with no previous combat deployment, and no Intel training or experience was expected to establish rapport with, develop a relationship with, and train, advise and assist an Afghan Intelligence officer (Captain, Major, or Colonel) for an ANA kandak (battalion), who may already have Intelligence training and experience, who likely had ten to 30 years of combat experience, and who was in the range of 30 to 50 years old. A tough job for a young inexperienced Infantry Lieutenant. Probably the only thing the Infantry Lieutenant could offer of importance to the senior Afghan Intelligence officer were maps, printer cartridges, and fuel.

In 2013 the Intelligence advisors to the 201st and 203rd ANA Corps in Regional Command East were Captains (fortunately with an Intel MOS and both very capable, smart, and motivated). However, these young Captains were advising Afghan Corps G2 staff officers with the rank of senior Colonel or General, more than 30 years in the Afghan Army, and with over 20 years of combat experience. A difficult task for any Captain; even our best. So this is an example of the U.S. Army's best effort in personnel assignments to important advisor positions.

Contrast the experience level of the U.S. Army Intel Advisors to the 201st and 203rd ANA Corps in 2013 with the current Intelligence advisor to the 205th ANA Corps in southern Afghanistan - Australian Army Major Mich Hahn. Major Hahn works in Train Advise and Assist Command - South (formerly Regional Command South). Read more in "Finding credibility through experience: Australian Intel officer brings 30 years of intelligence experience to TAAC-South", DVIDS, October 28, 2014.

Guidance on Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance (SFA) (DoD January 2014)

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness has published "Guidance on Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance (SFA),  dated January 2014. The training standards are issued to assist the general purpose forces in sustaining the capability to perform the security force assistance or SFA mission. The pub was put together with the cooperation of USSOCOM and other defense organizations and agencies.

The primary purpose of the training standards are to: 1) "Provide a list of skills related to SAF that are common across the force and can be used as guidelines, with standards for measuring the qualifications of individuals and collective forces"; 2) "Offer a set of benchmarks for the Services to use to identify, train, and track individuals and collective forces conducting SFA"; 3) "Serve as a menu of SFA skills to help joint force commanders and planners articulate required capabilities when requesting forces".

You can read online or download the document at the link below:

Guidance on Common Training Standards for Security Force Assistance (SFA)

SFA and Human Rights: Leahy Law Report

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has published a report entitled "Leahy Law Human Rights Provisions and Security Assistance: Issue Overview", dated January 29, 2014. The Adobe Acrobat PDF is available here.

Army to Keep 162nd SFAB

The Army has decided not to shut down the 162nd Brigade at Fort Polk. The 162nd is the training brigade responsible for training up the Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs) that deploy to Afghanistan for the ISAF Security Force Assistance mission. There were plans to shut the brigade down at the beginning of 2014. It would have been interesting to know where the Army planned on training up their SFAATs for Afghan deployments if they had shut down the 162nd. Things that make you go "Hmmmm". Read more in "Fort Polk to keep 162nd SFAB for 2014", Leesville Daily Leader, January 31, 2014.

Watching COIN Fail in Afghanistan

A U.S. Marine Corps officer, who served as an advisor in Afghanistan, writes a contemplative piece on how we should help the Afghans conduct counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. He states that the United States has pushed a U.S. version of counterinsurgency on the Afghans that does not work for the Afghans and thus we have prevented the Afghans from making the necessary progress to defeat the insurgents. Our (the U.S. model) method of a strong centralized government exerting its control through the MoD and MoI into the rural Pashtun areas just doesn't work. The author proposes some novel changes to the current construct that are worth consideration. Read more in "Front Row Seat: Watching COIN Fail in Afghanistan", War on the Rocks, January 28, 2014.

Briefing on Functionally-based Security Force Assistance

A video entitled Functionally-based Security Force Assistance (SFA) by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The briefing is on the ISAF shift in mission focus from combat-oriented, unit-based Security Force Assistance to functionally-based, multi-echelon Security Force Assistance. The video can be viewed at the below link:

https://youtu.be/DfwHQiKyxVs

Selection and Training of Advisors

The conflict in Afghanistan has evolved from population-centric counterinsurgency and partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to Security Force Assistance (SFA). The conduct of SFA means that advisers are mentoring, training, assisting, and advising their Afghan counterparts. The success of the SFA mission depends on the quality and training of the adviser. Read more about this in "Giving Advising its Due", Small Wars Journal, January 22, 2014.

SFA Adviser Selection Criteria Survey

Afghan War News is conducting some research on Security Force Assistance Adviser Selection Criteria. To that end we are sponsoring an online survey and request that personnel who have served as an adviser in the past (or are now presently advising) in Afghanistan take the survey. You can view more information about the survey, its purpose, and instructions at the link below. The survey is anonymous, does not collect personnel identification, and takes about 2 minutes to answer the ten easy questions.

www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/adviser-selection-criteria-survey.htm

CAAT Security Force Assistance Bibliography

The latest version (7 Dec 13) of the COMISAF (CAAT) Security Force Assistance (SFA) Bibliography is now available. The CAAT SFA Bibliography is a comprehensive listing of websites and publications that focus on the Security Force Assistance mission now taking place in Afghanistan. The 137 page document has a wealth of information on a variety of topics related to advising in Afghanistan. Some of these topics include Mission Essential Tasks, books, AARs, manuals and regulations relating to SFA, reading lists, overview of "functionally-based Security Force Assistance", C2, leadership, combined arms integration, integrated layered security, training, sustainment, ANA, ANP, pre-deployment training, insider threat, culture, use of interpreters, building rapport, and many others. You can access the PDF document at the following link - CAAT SFA Bibliography.

ISAF Security Force Assistance Guide 2.0

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) published the ISAF Security Force Assistance Guide 2.0 (or SFA Guide) in early January 2014. This comprehensive guide book provides information on Security Force Assistance, functionally-based SFA framework, advisor selection and training, the operational environment, ISAF structure and organization, Afghan Security Institutions, ISAF SFA METL, Afghan National Security Forces (charts, organization structure, mission, etc.) and other valuable information for advisors, trainers, and mentors. Included in the guidebook is a bibliography, acronym list, organization charts, and process maps. Learn more about the SFA Guide 2.0 here.

The Advisor Role in Afghanistan in 2014

Each ISAF Commander comes into his one year (sometimes a little longer) tour in Afghanistan hoping to carry the football down the road a little further . . . and to shape the war effort as he sees fit. General McCrystal brought in Counterinsurgency, General Petraeus brought with him Population-centric Counterinsurgency and Partnering, General Allen introduced Security Force Assistance, and now General Dunford has now focused ISAF on Functionally-based Security Force Assistance. So what will the small number of troops in Afghanistan be doing in 2014? Well, they will not be doing much fighting (hopefully) and they will be helping the Afghans to be able to sustain their force into the future years as the Coalition presence diminishes even further. A recent blog post spells this out quite clearly for us. See "Future of Advising in Afghanistan", Flashpoint Blog, American Security Project, December 23, 2013.

Christmas Presents for SFAATs in Afghanistan in 2013

15 Principles of Security Force Assistance (SFA)

General John Allen served as COMISAF for over 18 months in Afghanistan. One of his big achievements was moving the U.S. forces from combat operations to conducting Security Force Assistance or SFA. This involved a mind-set shift for many U.S. company, battalion, and brigade commanders who saw their primary objective as engaging the enemy - not getting the Afghan National Security Forces to start doing combat operations. One tool that Gen Allen used to influence the commanders working at all levels to get into the SFA frame of mind was the issuing of the "Principles of Security Force Assistance". These 15 principles helped put the SFA mission into the proper perspective in the minds of the U.S. commanders. You can read the principles and view videos on the principles at the link below:

http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/15principlesofsfa.htm

SFAAT Team Leaders and Company Commanders in the SFA Mission

A recent magazine article in Army Magazine published in the February 2013 issue entitled "SFAA: Creating New Challenges & Opportunities for Army Units" has captured the ongoing dilemma of fielding SFAAT teams to Afghanistan from standing Brigade Combat Teams or BCTs. The Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams or SFAATs are taken out of a brigade using commanders and staff. For instance, a team leader of an SFAAT advising an ANA kandak (battalion) is supposed to be a major (0-4). Frequently, the 0-4 position is filled with a captain. This captain is usually a company commander. The captain most times hand-picks the remaining 11 members of his SFAAT from within his company. If his team deploys to Afghanistan and his company stays home (Fort Hood, Fort Campbell, or wherever) he is most likely turning his company command and platoon leadership to junior officers and NCOs. If the SFAAT deploys to Afghanistan with the brigade (the bde deploys as an SFAB) then his company is likely to deploy to another location (COP or FOB) than where his SFAAT goes.  Just think of the C2 and support problems either scenario poses (brigade deploys or stays in U.S.). You can read more about the challenges facing company commanders who are assigned as SFAAT team leaders in the magazine article at the link below.

www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/...

Gen Allen Prepares to Depart Afghanistan

General Allen, COMISAF
photo by SGT K. Summerhill

After serving almost 19 months as COMISAF, General Allen is leaving Afghanistan. He has accomplished a lot during this tenure and put out a lot of fires while ensuring that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are in the lead in the fight against the Taliban. 

Many of his achievements include cutting the size of the ISAF (and U.S.) force, transitioning from ISAF fighting on the battlefield to the Afghans in the lead for combat operations, instituting the Security Force Assistance (SFA) concept with the fielding of Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams or SFAATs.

Along the way he had to constantly develop and repair relationships with the Afghans every time something bad happened that would set back our mission (burning of Korans, Marines urinating on Taliban corpses, a Soldier killing 16 civilians in the Panjwai massacre, etc.). Other challenges he faced was keeping the coalition focused and committed to the effort - a difficult task in the face of events like the Insider Threat problem.

His biggest failure, perhaps, may be the lack of resolve when dealing with Karzai on the issue of Afghan corruption and the failure of ISAF to help establish a more legitimate government that is respected by the Afghan population. But perhaps we are playing a waiting game until the Afghan election to see if they step up and elect a less corrupt and more competent president.

General Allen deserves our thanks for his service and fine job. Read more about his tenure as ISAF commander in a recent news article entitled "For U.S. Leader in Afghan War, Much Time Making Peace", The New York Times, February 6, 2013.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/world/asia/general-allen-departing-afghan-war-commander-saw-as-much-diplomacy-as-combat.html

Training for Security Force Assistance Teams for Afghanistan

The U.S. military will soon deploy to Afghanistan over 1,400 Soldiers who will be split into 18-person training teams.  These training teams will be much like the MiTT or training teams deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Their mission falls into the "advise and assist" world - attached to Afghan security forces to provide advise, access to enablers (air support, medevac), and provide battlefield situational awareness for ISAF. To prepare for the mission the Soldiers will complete a three-week training course at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, La.  Hmmmmmm.  Is three weeks enough?  Read more in "Army Details Afghan Transition Deployment Plans", Military.com, February 17, 2012.

I wonder what the process is for selecting, training and organizing the advisors who will have an extremely important role in this advisory effort. The early Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) in Iraq and Embedded Transition Teams (ETTs) in Afghanistan were less than optimum as a result of poor selection and training of the advisors. Learn more about these advisory teams during the early years of the Iraq and Afghanistan War.

The U.S. military has a history of not selecting and training military advisors properly (outside of the Special Forces ranks).  This happened during the Vietnam War (although reportedly the Marines did better than the Army).  Many times advisors were assigned with little cultural training, very basic language skills (3 weeks language training), and with no regard to military occupational specialty.  Initially the language training for an advisor heading to Vietnam was three or four weeks of French, not Vietnamese.

During the Vietnam War some U.S. military advisors were sent to a training school at the U.S. Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, NC where they learned culture, language, how to call for artillery, air support, and medevac, and about the responsibilities, roles and duties of an advisor.  They would then be assigned to South Vietnamese Army units to aid in the counterinsurgency fight.  The Military Assistance Training Advisor course (MATA) course was established in 1962 and taught by Special Forces officers and NCOs. It was initially 4-weeks long and later increased to a longer course. In 1970 the Marines established a three-month long advisor course.

Some handbooks were published to assist the advisors to South Vietnam units. One was entitled the MATA Handbook or FM 3-73 - also called the Advisors Handbook for Stability Operations.  There was also a MATA Handbook for Vietnam, ST 31-179, January 1966.  (Found here on Small Wars Journal). The Army also published FM 31-73, Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations. The current handbook for advisors is entitled TC 31-73, Special Forces Advisor Guide, 2008.

There were some lessons learned about the Vietnam War advisory effort. These are captured in a paper entitled "Lessons Learned from Advising and Training the Republic of South Vietnam's Armed Forces", by MAJ Thomas Clinton, USMC, 2007. Accessed here on DTIC.mil.

Those lessons learned from the Vietnam War advisory effort are briefly related here.  The careful selection of individuals to be advisors is extremely important. Some officers and NCOs are just not cut out for the job.  In addition, the training of the advisors is critical and should include:

Intensive language and cultural training
Training and certification in tactical communications equipment
Training and certification in controlling close air support
Training and certification in indirect fire support
Training in coordinating medical evacuation support
Training in how to be an effective liaison officer