The commander of the ISAF Joint Command, sometimes called IJC for short, provided an update on the Afghan War in a teleconference with Pentagon reporters. Army LTG Joseph Anderson said that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are winning. He stated that the ANSF is ". . . the most trusted government organization in Afghanistan" and that it is ". . . a hugely capable fighting force that has been holding its ground against the enemy". The Afghan forces number about 352,000 - 156,000 in the army and 155,000 in the police.
In the transition from the ISAF mission to the Resolute Support mission there has been a steady decline in the number of Coalition forces in Afghanistan. Currently (early November 2014) there are 38,000 soldiers from 44 nations; with a planned strength of 12,500 Coalition members by the end of December 2014. The number of Coalition bases has decreased from 86 bases in January 2014 to a current number of 26 (as of early November 2014). There are no more Regional Commands. All of the RCs have transitioned to "Train Advise and Assist Commands" or TAACs. The last RC to transition was RC East (to TAAC East). The new mission, Resolute Support, is all about advising and assisting the Afghans at the corps, institutional, and ministerial levels to work systems and processes. The advisory effort is focused along Eight Essential Functions (the "8 EF's are the follow-on to the "Five Functional Pillars") which encompasses everything from planning, programming, budgeting and execution to sustainment and planning. Some of the capability gaps of the ANSF include aviation, intelligence, logistics, and medical.
Read more in "Afghan Forces Winning, ISAF Joint Command Chief Says", DoD News, November 5, 2014.
Wednesday, November 5, 2014
Ghani Removes "Handcuffs"
General John Campbell, the commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) says that President Ghani has been very cooperative with ISAF and will likely lift some of the restriction imposed upon ISAF by President Karzai. Campbell says "Since about 2009, the security forces in some instances almost had handcuffs on them because of some of the policies that Karzai had". Read more in "New Afghan President Improves Ties with U.S.-led Forces", The Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2014.
ANASF Trains for Future after U.S. Exit
The Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASF) are hopeful that they will be ready once the United States military finally leaves. While many of the U.S. SOF units have significantly trimmed down their force structure in Afghanistan - there is still an advisor capacity in country. This commitment will continue to scale back as time goes on. But the ANASF leadership is hopeful. Read more in "Afghan National Army trains to hold off Taliban after U.S. exit", The Washington Times, October 28, 2014.
Tuesday, November 4, 2014
Paper - Advisor Influence across NSMs and ANSF
An extremely well-researched and detailed paper is available that presents valuable information about advisor influence upon the Afghan national security ministries (NSMs) and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). The paper, a dissertation for a graduate student at Syracuse University with extensive military experience, ". . . is an in-depth case study of NATO advisors and their perceived influence in Afghanistan . . . " in the period of 2009-2012. The author reviews Security Sector Reform (SSR) literature, presents different theories on SSR, provides an analysis of security assistance partnering, and examines advisor influence across the Afghan security spectrum. The paper, 370 pages long, explores a two-part question:
http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=etd
". . . how do foreign security actors (ministerial advisors and security force trainers, advisors, and commanders) attempt to influence their host-nation partners and what are their perceptions of these approaches on changes in local capacity, values, and security governance norms?"The paper is entitled The Prospects of Institutional Transfer: A Within-Case Study of NATO Advisor Influence Across the Afghan Security Ministries and National Security Forces, 2009-2012, by Nicholas J. Armstrong, May 2014.
http://surface.syr.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=etd
Report - "Afghanistan in Transition"
The Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate has published a report entitled Afghanistan in Transition: U.S. Civilian Presence and Assistance Post-2014, dated October 27, 2014. The report is 31 pages long and consists of three sections: "Enhanced Accountability for U.S. Assistance", "A Refined U.S. Civilian Assistance Approach", and "Robust U.S. Diplomatic Posture and Civilian Presence". Topics include TMAF as a mechanism for incentivized assistance, improving Afghanistan's capacity to budget and collect revenue, enhancing women's rights, stemming corruption, sustainability of U.S. investments, lessons learned, interagency information sharing, monitoring program implementation, and the New Silk Road Initiative.
The report can be viewed and downloaded at the link below:
www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/89860.pdf
The report can be viewed and downloaded at the link below:
www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/89860.pdf
State Department - Little Afghan War News
A few days ago Afghan War News posted a blurb about how the Department of Defense seems to be ignoring news about Afghanistan. An examination of a Daily Press Briefing by the U.S. State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki held on October 27, 2014 provides the same result. The graphic to the left is a snip of the contents of the briefing for Oct 27th. Topics covered in the briefing include Lebanon, ISIL, Canada, Ebola, Syria, Israel, Ukraine, Tunisia, China, Hong Kong, Turkey, Indonesia, Russia, Iran and Egypt. Afghanistan? No where to be found. Afghanistan: The War that the Defense Department and State Department forgot!
History of Marines in Helmand Province
The Marines have handed over Camp Leatherneck to the Afghan National Army. Only a few hundred Marines remain to do the final packing . . . and they too, will soon depart. What was once a sprawling base is a ghost town. A recently posted account of the Marines time in Helmand province can be found in "Marines leave Afghanistan after tough years", Stars and Stripes, October 27, 2014.
Afghan Social Media
In a counterinsurgency environment information operations (IO) is key. IO can sway public perception to support the government or it can generate support for the insurgents. Proper messaging (defined themes that resonate) along with the means of getting a message out (TV, print, radio, etc.) are important. With the rapid technological advances in communications social media has been taking a bigger and bigger role. This is true of Afghanistan as well. Almost three million Afghans have Internet access and almost two million use social media. Over 70% of the population has access to cell phones. Read more in "Afghan Social Media Summit 2014 becomes talk of town", Central Asia Online, October 27, 2014.
ISAF Fails at COIN
Our counter-insurgency doctrine states that for COIN forces to win the insurgents have to be defeated; for the insurgents to win, they have to survive. It is quite evident, based on the high level of insurgent activity in the 2014 fighting season, that Hekmatyar's Hizbi-Islami, the Haqqani Network, and the Taliban have survived the long 13-year long counterinsurgency effort mounted by NATO / ISAF in Afghanistan. Some observers believe that NATO is more suited for strategic level interventions and a cold war environment than a counterinsurgency environment. They believe the NATO organization (ISAF) is not structured for and does not do counterinsurgency well. Read more in "In Afghanistan the west suffered from institutional failure. Let's learn from it", by Afzal Amin, The Guardian, October 28, 2014.
Taliban Efforts Hurt by ANSF in October
According to a recent news report the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) enjoyed some success against the Taliban during the last part of October (2014). Read more in "Afghan security forces cut into Taliban efforts in October", Central Asia Online, November 3, 2014.
ISAF Reports on ANSF Now Classified
The International Security Assistance Force is now classifying one of the reports that previously were available to the public. The reports were produced to provide a status of the ANSF each month. Read more in "Classified: Military Suddenly Doesn't Want You to Know How $61B Afghan Training is Going", ABC News, October 30, 2014.
Romanian NSE Reaches End of Mission at KAF
The Romanian National Service Element at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan reached the end of their mission in October 2014. Read more in "Romanian NSE celebrates Armed Service Day and end of mission at KAF", DVIDS, October 27, 2014.
Afghan Opium War a Failure
The United States and other nations as well have spent billions of dollars attempting to stem the export of opium from Afghanistan. The end result is an increase of the drug trade over the past 13 years. Learn more in "Down the Afghan opium rathole", Chicago Sun-Times, October 28, 2014.
Video - ANA Training at KMTC
One of the largest training centers for the Afghan National Army (ANA) is at the Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). The subjects taught by ANA instructors at KMTC range from house clearing, convoy operations, medical training and more. Watch a short video (2 mins) produced by NATO TV entitled "Afghan army learns from the battlefield", October 15, 2014.
1569th Trans Company Completes Retrograde Mission
The 1569th Transportation Company of the New York Army National Guard has returned to the United States after a 10-month long deployment to Afghanistan. The company helped coalition forces consolidate and close operating bases in Afghanistan. The Soldiers were stationed in Regional Command North at Camp Marmal just outside of Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. Read more in "New York Army National Guard Soldiers return to United States following Afghan deployment", DVIDS, October 27, 2014.
Afghan Deputy Gov Killed in Attack
A deputy provincial governor was killed in an attack in southern Kandahar while attending a university class. Read more in "Attacks Kill Afghan Deputy Governor, Judge", The New York Times, November 3, 2014.
Monday, November 3, 2014
Advisor Selection for Afghan SFA Mission
The Security Force Assistance (SFA) mission is a difficult one. Members of ISAF are expected to deploy to Afghanistan and train, advise, and assist their Afghan counterparts in the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police. The SFA mission began in early 2012 with the deployment of hundreds of Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAATs). Unfortunately, the most important factor that contributes to the success of an advisory mission was not considered in many cases by the United States military. That factor is the proper selection of advisor personnel. In many instances, advisors did not (and do not) have the needed attributes to be effective with their Afghan counterparts (age, experience, training, education, rank, personality, etc.).
In 2013 the Intelligence advisors to the 201st and 203rd ANA Corps in Regional Command East were Captains (fortunately with an Intel MOS and both very capable, smart, and motivated). However, these young Captains were advising Afghan Corps G2 staff officers with the rank of senior Colonel or General, more than 30 years in the Afghan Army, and with over 20 years of combat experience. A difficult task for any Captain; even our best. So this is an example of the U.S. Army's best effort in personnel assignments to important advisor positions.
Contrast the experience level of the U.S. Army Intel Advisors to the 201st and 203rd ANA Corps in 2013 with the current Intelligence advisor to the 205th ANA Corps in southern Afghanistan - Australian Army Major Mich Hahn. Major Hahn works in Train Advise and Assist Command - South (formerly Regional Command South). Read more in "Finding credibility through experience: Australian Intel officer brings 30 years of intelligence experience to TAAC-South", DVIDS, October 28, 2014.
"The decisive point of any SFA mission may very well be the selection, training, and education of personnel in preparation for deployment". SFA Handbook, Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, June 2012.For instance, if one traveled through Regional Command East in 2012 and met the Intelligence officers serving as advisors on SFAATs you would find that almost 50% of them were Infantry Lieutenants with less than two years in the U.S. Army. While these young men were undoubtedly intelligent, smart, physically fit, and motivated they had (maybe) six months experience as an Infantry platoon leader, no previous combat deployment, and knew very little about the importance and role of intelligence in a counterinsurgency environment. An Infantry Lieutenant, age 24, with no previous combat deployment, and no Intel training or experience was expected to establish rapport with, develop a relationship with, and train, advise and assist an Afghan Intelligence officer (Captain, Major, or Colonel) for an ANA kandak (battalion), who may already have Intelligence training and experience, who likely had ten to 30 years of combat experience, and who was in the range of 30 to 50 years old. A tough job for a young inexperienced Infantry Lieutenant. Probably the only thing the Infantry Lieutenant could offer of importance to the senior Afghan Intelligence officer were maps, printer cartridges, and fuel.
In 2013 the Intelligence advisors to the 201st and 203rd ANA Corps in Regional Command East were Captains (fortunately with an Intel MOS and both very capable, smart, and motivated). However, these young Captains were advising Afghan Corps G2 staff officers with the rank of senior Colonel or General, more than 30 years in the Afghan Army, and with over 20 years of combat experience. A difficult task for any Captain; even our best. So this is an example of the U.S. Army's best effort in personnel assignments to important advisor positions.
Contrast the experience level of the U.S. Army Intel Advisors to the 201st and 203rd ANA Corps in 2013 with the current Intelligence advisor to the 205th ANA Corps in southern Afghanistan - Australian Army Major Mich Hahn. Major Hahn works in Train Advise and Assist Command - South (formerly Regional Command South). Read more in "Finding credibility through experience: Australian Intel officer brings 30 years of intelligence experience to TAAC-South", DVIDS, October 28, 2014.
Burnout of SOF Operators
The last 13 years has seen multiple deployments for those in the U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF). However, just as things look like it would ease up (Iraq War ended in 2011 and Afghanistan is closing down in December 2014) trouble spots are erupting (Ukraine, North Africa, and Middle East). A very important factor in this ongoing, never-ending fight is "burnout" among the special operators of SOCOM. Read more in "Special Operations: SOCOM Operators Flee the House of Lies", Strategy Page, October 28, 2014.
Ghani on Security, Peace, and Corruption
President Ghani has returned from his trip to China. Upon his return to Afghanistan he made some comments about security, peace, and corruption. He promises to pursue corrupt officials (citing the reopening of the Kabul Bank investigation), increase security, and to bring the Taliban to the peace table. Read more in "Afghan President: Corruption, Security Top Issues", ABC News, November 1, 2014.
Afghan Economy is Suffering
The business climate in Afghanistan is suffering with the prospect of ISAF departing in December 2014. The business community in Kabul is worried and optimism is falling. Read more in "Afghan economy struggles amid security fears as U.S. troops pull out", The Washington Times, October 27, 2014.
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