Our Mistakes in Afghanistan

After so many years of fighting in Afghanistan there are a host of critics who would tell us how we could have done better. Foreign Policy has posted an article on its website that tells us just that - providing input from important observers (and participants) of the conflict are Rory Stewart, Pervez Musharraf, Seth Jones, Amrullah Saleh, Sarah Chayes, and Fred Kagan.

Rory Stewart, a member of British Parliament and author, says we should have limited our goals in Afghanistan to the success achieved in 2002/2003, that nation-building required a legitimate government (not present under Karzai), and Afghanistan was not a good place to try and install a modern society and democratic western-style government.

Pervez Musharraf, the former president of Pakistan, says the United States blundered and committed three major errors: abandoning Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat in 1989, attempting to isolate the Taliban once they reached power in 1996, and failing to convert military victory in the early 2000s to a political victory by backing Karzai and not including a significant number of Pashtuns in the new government.

Seth Jones, noted author and former advisor to CFSOCC-A commander, says that allowing the Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan was a huge mistake. He cites three contributing factors: a lack of a regional security agreement post Bonn conference (Dec 2001), a failure by the U.S. and Pakistan to target the senior Taliban leaders operating in Baluchistan province, Pakistan, and not enough effort in reaching out to the Taliban early in the war to bring them into the political process.

Amrullah Saleh, the former head of the Afghan intelligence service, says we were mistaken in thinking Pakistan could change in its ways of providing support and money to the Taliban insurgency.

Sherard Cowper-Coles, a British special representative to Afghanistan, says we never developed a political strategy within which a military campaign could be successful. In addition, the imposition of a constitution ensuring a strong central government was at odds with the history of Afghanistan.

Sarah Chayes, a one-time resident of Afghanistan for several years and former advisor to military commanders, says that the U.S. aided the growth of the Taliban when it supported the return of corrupt warlords to power in concert with Karzai. This was compounded with turning a blind eye to the corruption that slowly grew in the Afghan government and to Karzai's use of a vast political and criminal patronage network to keep himself in power.

Two authors on Afghanistan, Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, says we continued to send military members to Afghanistan who did not have an understanding of the country, language, culture, or the complexity of the conflict.

Frederick Kagan, of the American Enterprise Institute and frequent visitor and observer of Afghanistan, thinks that we are not leaving enough troops in Afghanistan after 2014 and sees the future plans of withdrawal of the Obama administration as a mistake.

A lot of good information and differing opinions of what went wrong in Afghanistan. One of the best reads in a long time on the war. Read more in "What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?", Foreign Policy, March/April 2013.

NATO Chief Recommends 352,000 Afghans in Uniform Until 2018

The NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has recommended that the Afghan force should be funded at the 352,000 level until 2018 to ensure that it has the capability to fight the Taliban. Over the past year many have been indicating that the combined force of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) should shrink to 230,000 in an effort to save money. What many have not considered is that the difference between 230,000 and 352,000 is only $700 million dollars per year. While that sounds like a lot it is a drop in the bucket when one considers what we have been spending there. It has cost an average of $1 million per deployed U.S. serviceperson. In another comparison the war has cost the U.S. on average $6 billion a month. So it is much cheaper to finance the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) than keeping U.S. servicemen in that country.

To read more about the NATO chief's recommendations see "NATO chief backs larger Afghan force through 2018", Yahoo! News, March 5, 2013.
http://news.yahoo.com/nato-chief-backs-larger-afghan-force-2018-142543132.html

For more information on the cost of the Afghan war see "Pentagon Says Afghanistan War Costs Dip as Surge Troops Leave", Bloomberg Businessweek, February 8, 2012.
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-08/pentagon-says-afghanistan-war-costs-dip-as-surge-troops-leave.html

White House and Karzai in Talks about Special Forces Operating in Wardak

According to Marine General James Mattis, CENTCOM commander, the White House is now in talks with President Karzai on his irrational and devastating order to remove U.S. Special Forces from their advisory and training mission in Wardak province. This order by Karzai is yet again one more example of how winning of the war in Afghanistan has not been easy; the U.S. and NATO forces have been dealing with an incompetent President leading Afghanistan for quite a while . . . since we helped put him in power in 2002 over ten years ago!

Transfer of Security Responsibilities Continues in Afghanistan

Village Elders in Khak-e-Sayfed district
attend Shura on security transition
(photo Sgt Chadwick de Bree)

Across Afghanistan districts and provinces are continuing the process of security transition. What this means is that coalition forces are taking a back seat as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) step into the lead for security. Security transition is accompanied by a decrease of coalition forces in the area, ANSF taking the lead in combat operations, and the transfer to ANSF or closing of small combat outposts manned by coalition forces. Usually this transfer for the security lead takes place district by district. Khak-e-Sayfed district in Farah province is one of the latest districts to undergo the security transition. You can read more in "Authority of district transferred to ANSF in Farah province", DVIDS, February 28, 2013.

www.dvidshub.net/news/102698/authority-district-transferred-ansf-farah-province

PRTs Closing Down in Afghanistan

ANP graduates of an academy in Bamyan practice
their skills. New Zealand  members of the
Bamyan PRT taught  the students police tactics.
(Photo SGT Chris Bonbrake Mar 1, 2013)

As ISAF withdraws its forces from Afghanistan it is methodically shutting down the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that have been in existence for a number of years. The first PRT was established in Gardez, Afghanistan in early 2003 around the nucleus of a Special Forces Operational Detachment A (SFODA) from 20th Special Forces Group. The twelve-man ODA provided the medical, combat, communications, intelligence, and engineer skills that allowed other specialities such as Civil Affairs, Psyops, and medical specialists to start working development, governance, security, and ANSF training issues. A second PRT was established in Bamyan under the same construct commanded by a Special Forces major. Eventually many provinces would have a PRT - many of them manned by different ISAF nations. These PRTs had an average assigned strength of 100 personnel although some were quite larger.

Many personnel were attached to the PRT to include USAID, agricultural specialists, Afghan Hands, State Department, law enforcement professionals (LEPs), and others. Much of the aid money flowed through the PRTs much to the dismay of Karzai and the ministries (MRRD, MAIL, DAIL, etc.) who wanted to be able to skim money off the top of much of the aid money at the national level before the provincial and district Afghans could get to it.

Within the last year many of these PRTs have been closed down. see "U.S. Winds Down Afghanistan Aid Program", The Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2012.

Peace Talks with Taliban Still Stalled

There is a renewed effort to engage the Taliban in peace talks. The withdrawal of Western nations from the fight over the next two years and the acknowledgment that the insurgency will not be defeated by the Afghan security forces has worried many who are concerned about regional stability in the area. Thus the push for reaching an agreement with the Taliban through a reconciliation process.

The biggest hindrance to an agreement with the Taliban is . . . of course, the Taliban. They are and can afford to play a waiting game. In December 2014 the United States will have between zero to 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. That is not a lot of combat power. Foreign aid to the government of Afghanistan will shrink. The oversight on what aid does go to Afghanistan will be administered by corrupt Afghan government officials. At the moment the Taliban refuse to negotiate with President Karzai and the High Peace Council stating they are puppets of the United States. Why should the Taliban agree to a political framework that includes them when they feel they can have it all in a few years?

Another constraint are the major players in the proposed peace agreement - Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and the Western powers. Each nation(s) has their own concept of a post-war political settlement for Afghanistan. Pakistan has the most to gain and lose as a chaotic Afghanistan is in their backyard. Pakistan is hedging and playing both sides of the fence - taking part in peace talks on one hand and then providing supplies, intelligence, support, and sanctuary to insurgent groups on the other.

Read more about the problems associated with proposed peace talks in "Renewed Push for Afghans to Make Peace With Taliban", The New York Times, February 16, 2013.

www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/world/asia/pressure-for-peace-with-taliban-is-renewed.html

New Zealand PRT in Bamyan Province

New Zealand Light Armored Vehicles travel through  a Bamyan
 mountain pass in Feb 2013. (photo by SGT Chris Bonebrake)

The New Zealand PRT located in Bamyan province, Afghanistan has the good fortune to be in one of the more beautiful regions of Afghanistan. Bamyam is located in the center mountainous region of Afghanistan and for a long time has been considered a very secure province. It does have some security concerns in some of the districts. The NZ PRT is tasked with maintaining security in Bamyan province. The PRT conducts presence patrols, provides advice and assistance to the Provincial Governor, the district sub-governors, and the Afghan National Police (ANP). In addition, the NZ PRT oversees aid projects which provide services and employment in the region. Learn more about the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team at the link below found at the New Zealand Defence Force website.

www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/overseas-deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/default.htm

Good Performers Initiative (GPI) Awards Given to Afghan Provinces that Showed Progress in Counternarcotics Efforts

(Photo by SGT Chris McCullough)

The U.S. Embassy and Afghanistan's Minister for Counter Narcotics recently (Feb 13) signed an agreement allocating $18.2 million for programs supported by the Good Performers Initiative (GPI) awards. "GPI awards have been presented to 21 provinces that achieved poppy-free status in 2012, reduced poppy cultivation by more than ten percent from the previous year, or made other exceptional counter narcotics efforts during the cultivation season." Some provinces received $1 million awards for being poppy-free. The use of the funds hopefully will drive down the currently high level of poppy cultivation. You can read the entire U.S. Embassy press release entitled "U.S. Embassy and Ministry of Counter Narcotics Sign Good Performers Initiative Agreement".

Afghan Local Police (ALP) to Expand

The Afghan Local Police or ALP program in Afghanistan may expand in the future. The U.S. military is looking for additional funding that will extend the ALP program for an additional five years and increase the number of ALP members to 45,000. The plan, which is backed by the U.S. Special Operations Command, will cost $1.2 billion to train, arm, and equip the ALP. The ALP, based on a village defense model, comes under the control of the Ministry of Interior and is supervised by the local Afghan National Police District Chiefs of Police and Provincial Chiefs of Police. The Special Operations Joint Task Force -Afghanistan or SOJTF-A has the overall responsibility for advising, training, and mentoring the MoI and the ANP in regards to the ALP. This includes training and embedding with the ALP in conjunction with the SOJTF-A Village Stability Operations or VSO program. Learn more about the ALP expansion at the link below (LA Times, Feb 10, 2013).

http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/10/world/la-fg-afghan-police-20130211

SFAAT Helps District Chief of Police Become More Effective

Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams or SFAATs are doing great work in Afghanistan helping the Afghan National Police (ANP) get better at their jobs. One example of this great work is seen in Chorah district, Uruzgan province, Afghanistan where the SFAAT is helping the District Chief of Police or DCoP reorganize and train his AUP to become a more professional force. Read more in "Chorah Valley safer with rise of district chief of police", DVIDS, March 3, 2013. Read more news articles about SFAATs.

Call Me Maybe - Afghan Style

Troops in a war zone have very little outlets for fun. Sometimes they have to make their own fun. One way of having fun is to make videos of themselves singing or dancing to popular music tunes or videos. This one video is using the song "Call Me Maybe" by the artist Carly Rae Jepsen. The Miami Dolphin cheerleaders did a video to the song which became very popular. Going further, a small group of Soldiers in Afghanistan did one up in synch with the cheerleaders take on the song. Lots of rehearsal went into this video shoot for sure! You can view the video at the link below on YouTube.com.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=H96-TwrwY7M

RSOI for Afghan Hands in Afghanistan

The military has an excellent program that has been around for a couple of years which provides Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) for deployment to key positions in Afghanistan. These Afghan Hands receive language and cultural training in the United States prior to their deployment. Their training does not stop there - it continues upon their arrival in country (Afghanistan). This training is called RSOI for Reception Staging Onward-movement and Integration. Part of the RSOI training for the Afghan Hands is use of firearms on the range. View a DVIDS video that explains this in greater detail at the link below.

www.dvidshub.net/video/282973/afghan-hands-part-2-long-version

Northern Afghanistan Looking Secure (According to Admiral Stavridis)

The security situation in northern Afghanistan - also referred to as RC-North is looking quite good according to the EUCOM Commander - Admiral James Stavridis. The Admiral recently toured northern Afghanistan and has commented on his observations in a blog post on the EUCOM blog on February 28, 2013 entitled "Way Up North ...".

He opens the blog post up with his impression of a book entitled "The Afghan Campaign" by Steven Pressfield. The book is a historcal novel about soldiers fighting for Alexander the Great in Afghanistan. Stavridis says the novel's history is spot on and depicts the problems foreign armies have in conquering Afghans, eliminating corruption, and adjusting to cultural differences. I read the book a few years back and it is quite good. The Afghan Campaign: A Novel

Stavridis goes on to say that the economy of northern Afghanistan is humming along, security is doing very well (despite pockets of insurgent areas), and that even though ISAF is drawing down its strength and capabilities in the north the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will be able to handle the security situation.

Afghan Army Faces Corruption Problem in Future

The Afghan National Army (ANA) will soon be responsible for the purchase of equipment, goods, and services in the billions of dollars. Currently many foreign militaries handle these procurements but with the departure of ISAF these functions will be turned over to the Ministry of Defense (MoD). At the moment the ANA is considered one of the least corrupt institutions in Afghanistan but that could soon change once the "watchers" are gone and the MoD officials and generals see the immense amount of money that will flow through their offices.  Read more in "As Afghan army gets cash to buy its own supplies some worry about corruption", The Sacramento Bee, February 16, 2013 at this link.

M-Paisa - Mobile Banking in Afghanistan

Afghanistan, despite its backwardness and economic difficulties, is in the forefront of a new mobile-money and banking era. Money is being exchanged with customers and merchants via cellphones utilizing a service called "M-Paisa". This service also is used to pay policemen throughout Afghanistan - eliminating much of the corruption that took away almost 30% of a policeman's pay. Eventually Afghans will be able to pay their electric bills over their cell phone. One of the few bright spots in Afghanistan is the development of a robust telecommunications network that provides for a higher standard of living not only in communications but in banking and other economic services. Read more on M-Paisa in "How Afghanistan is on the Leading Edge of a Tech Revolution", Time, March 2, 2013.

Japan Provides $281 million to Afghanistan (Feb 2013)

The United Nations and Japan have announced an aid package that will finance 14 projects to be implemented by nine different United Nations agencies. The aid package is part of the commitment made by the government of Japan at the Tokyo Conference (2012) and will support the national development priorities identified by the Government of Afghanistan. The funds will support agriculture, education, health, police, reintegration process, de-mining, governance, and humanitarian assistance. Read more in "Japan and United Nations jointly announce assistance of $281 million to Afghanistan", ReliefWeb, February 28, 2013.

http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/japan-and-....

Cell Phone Towers Not Getting Blown Up As Much in Afghanistan

Some things are getting better in Afghanistan. Reportedly, according to The Wall Street Journal, cell phone towers in Afghanistan are not getting blown up as much by the Taliban. There was a period when the Taliban (and criminal gangs) would threaten to blow up cell phone towers unless the telephone companies turned them off (either all the time or during the night hours). During a short period of a few years over 300 cell phone towers were destroyed. Mobile phones are the primary means of communication in Afghanistan and the Taliban interdiction of cell phone tower operations were turning the population against the Taliban. Read more in "Fewer Cell Towers Are Shut Down in Afghanistan, Minister Says", The Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2013.

Withdrawal Difficult at Some Afghan Outposts

The draw down and withdrawal of U.S. forces is forging ahead in Afghanistan. This is happening whether some areas are considered "secure" or not. In many parts of Helmand and Kandahar some remote areas are still contested and plans to hand-over security to the Afghans as U.S. forces depart are just that - "plans". In reality many of these areas will be ceded to Taliban control because the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are not good enough (at least not yet) to keep the Taliban in check. Read a recent newspaper account about how the "withdrawal process" is going at one outpost in southern Afghanistan. See "U.S. Military Faces Fire as It Pulls Out of Afghanistan", The New York Times, February 15, 2013 at this link.

A-29 Super Tocano Chosen as Afghan's COIN Aircraft

Photo from Embraer Image Gallery

The Embraer A-29 Super Tucano has been chosen as Afghanistan's counterinsurgency aircraft. The U.S. Air Force announced the award to Embraer in a recent announcement (see Brazilian Firm to Provide Aircraft to Afghan Air Force, American Forces Press Service, February 27, 2013). The $437 million contract will provide twenty of the light air support aircraft, maintenance services, spare parts, and training. Deliveries will start in the summer of 2014. The aircraft will conduct advanced flight training, surveillance, close air support, and air interdiction missions. Read more details of the contract award in Super Tucano Wins Afghanistan Light Air Support Bid, DefenseNews, February 27, 2013. View an Embraer video of the A-29 on YouTube.com here www.youtube.com/watch?v=sgKt8GRDG4s

Afghan Transition - A Report Card at the Halfway Point

In July 2011 NATO and the Afghan government started the security transition process which entailed the handover of security responsibilities from ISAF to the ANSF in selected areas of the country over time. This security transition is supposed to be finished by December 2014. Over 75% of the country's population has transitioned thus far - meaning 75% of the population lives in areas where the ANSF are in the lead for security.

There were five major areas where improvements had to be made in order to accomplish this security transition. These areas are establishing the ANA and ANP as viable forces, providing good governance (without overwhelming corruption), forging ahead with reconciliation with insurgents, developing regional cooperation, and improvement in economic development.

A recent report by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs entitled "Afghanistan Halfway through the Transition Phase" (January 2013) provides an evaluation of the progress made in these five areas. You can view the report at the link below.

www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2013C02_wmr.pdf

NATO Confused by Karzai over Expulsion of SF from Wardak Province

News reports continue to come out on the drama behind President Karzai's order to kick out Special Forces from Wardak province. ISAF is still trying to sort out the facts (if they know the facts they are not saying!) and the Afghan government is not releasing much information either. Read more background on this event in:

"Yankee beards go home", The Economist, March 1, 2013.
www.economist.com/news/asia/21572835-afghan-president-talks-tough-role-american-special-forces-yankee-beards-go-home

"Did U.S. Special Forces Commit Atrocities in a Key Afghan Province?", Time.com, Feb 28, 2013.
http://world.time.com/2013/02/28/did-u-s-special-forces-commit-atrocities-in-a-key-afghan-province/

SF and Wardak Province News Update

Not a lot of news, unsurprisingly, has come out in the last day or so in reference to President Karzai ordering out all Special Forces from Wardak province. He ordered the SF teams removal based on allegations that the SF teams (or Afghan military and police units they were working with) are abusing the local population. Most certainly Karzai is attributing acts the Taliban or other nefarious groups are doing to the SF teams and their Afghan partners.

Karzai's true reasons for demanding the removal of the SF teams most likely involve his political posturing for 2014 - his probable intent is to get political groups in Wardak (to include moderate insurgents) aligned with him in a bid to further consolidate his political power. By diminishing the ability of coalition (and Afghan security forces) to weed out and neutralize segments of the insurgency - Karzai can build support with these moderate forces in a future power-sharing arrangement. A likely side effect of this latest attack on NATO by Karzai is to set conditions for the relationship with the new ISAF commander.

ISAF has been very quiet so far on this affair - no doubt recoiling from another unwarranted, unanticipated, and unfathomable attack from Karzai. Naturally ISAF will jump through hoops to keep Karzai happy with meetings (see "General Dunford and President Karzai meet to discuss security in Wardak", DVIDs, February 27, 2013); it will establish a joint commission with the Afghans to review the allegations and conduct an investigation (see "Joint Commission Reviews Wardak Province Allegations", American Forces Press Conference, February 26, 2013); and it will reject the accusations of abuse as false (see a video where "NATO Rejects Misconduct Claims", DVIDS, February 25, 2013).

While ISAF's news releases provide sparse statements with little info others are speculating on the Wardak situation. One report provides some background information on the happenings in the province - see "Did U.S. Special Forces Commit Atrocities in a Key Afghan Province?", Time, February 28, 2013.

There is certainly a lot of uncertainty as to how this latest drama with Karzai will resolve. A lot is at stake here - ISAF's relationship with Karzai, the outcome of the COIN fight in Wardak, and post-2014 involvement of SOF in Afghanistan.

Aid to Afghanistan Likely to Diminish with Withdrawal of U.S. Troops

The future of aid to Afghanistan is uncertain as U.S. troops continue their withdrawal. Without the protection that U.S. bases and troops provide to those administering (and checking on) aid projects the likelihood of aid money going to its intended purpose is slight. Corruption with the aid projects from Afghan government officials is horrible already. With the diminished ability of aid project managers to inspect progress of aid projects this Afghan corruption will only increase. It may be time to curtail some of these aid projects due to a lack of future oversight. Read more in "As Troops Leave, and Uncertain Future for U.S. Aid in Afghanistan", The New York Times, February 14, 2013.

Afghanistan: Year in Review (Video by NATO Channel TV)

The year 2012 has seen some ups and downs in Afghanistan. Corruption still is a huge problem, the Taliban have not gone away (and unfortunately neither has Karzai), and the population is still supporting the insurgency in many areas of the country. However, the Afghan security forces have become more competent, Afghan forces are in the lead for security in many areas of the country, and the U.S. forces have finally realized that the Afghans need to do the fighting rather than U.S. units in a counterinsurgency war. NATO has produced a video by NATO Channel TV that has been posted on YouTube.com that summarizes some of the progress made in Afghanistan in 2012. You can view the video "Afghanistan: 2012 Year in Review" at the link below.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=5N-kvLo7pVM

Special Forces Kicked Out of Wardak by Karzai

Not a lot of news has developed in the past 24 hours about President Karzai accusing U.S. Special Forces of abuse and directing them to leave Wardak province within a couple of weeks. In fact, ISAF has been very quiet about the development. See "The Pentagon Remains Deadly Silent About Karzai Booting US Special Forces From Afghanistan", Business Insider, Feb 26, 2013.

Wardak province is one of the most kinetic provinces within RC East if not the entire country. As U.S. conventional forces (in Wardak that means the 173rd Airborne Brigade) have been closing down battalion and company sized combat outposts (COPs) the lead for security has been turned over to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Assisting the ANSF in taking the security lead are small detachments of U.S. Special Forces who are working the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) programs and conducting operations with the Afghan National Army Special Forces (ANASF), Afghan National Army Commandos, and the Provincial Response Companies or PRCs. In addition to the Special Forces ODAs there are a number of Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams or SFAATs aligned with ANA and ANP units with the aim to advise and assist the ANSF as they take the security lead.

Many observers familiar with the current situation in Wardak believe that the directed departure of Special Forces in Wardak province is not related at all to beheadings and kidnappings by forces under the control or direction of SF. Any abuses that are taking place are most likely that of the Taliban and its shadow government. The Taliban have a powerful Information Operations capability that overmatches ISAF's futile attempts at "influence operations". No doubt this insurgent IO campaign is on the verge of winning another victory if it manages to oust Special Forces from Wardak. In addition, Karzai is doing a lot of political maneuvering to position himself for the inevitable - negotiating with the Taliban for a post-2014 government in Afghanistan. There are "moderate" insurgents in Wardak that Karzai may be playing to who are currently suffering from attacks by ANSF advised by Special Forces.

The big question here is will ISAF fold and pull the SF teams out of Wardak or will they stand up to Karzai and keep one of the most productive units in the war fully engaged in one of the most important and at risk provinces in RC East?

Report - Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues (Feb 13)

The GAO has released a report entitled "Afghanistan: Key Oversight Issues" dated February 2013. The report to Congress provides updates on Afghanistan's security environment, the transition of lead security to Afghan security forces, future cost and sustainability of Afghan security forces, DoD planning for the draw down of equipment in Afghanistan, Afghanistan's donor dependence, oversight of accountability of U.S. funds to support Afghanistan, and more.

Afghan Hands Program Receive Months of Language and Specialized Training

The Afghan Hands program has proven itself to be one of the most successful endeavors in Afghanistan. Selected members of the U.S. military forces are entered into an intensive language and cultural training program in the U.S. and then deploy to Afghanistan for one-year to work with Afghan counterparts. View a recent video (Feb 13) about the Afghan Hands who are selected to work with the Special Operations Joint Task Force - Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) at the link below:

www.dvidshub.net/video/282499/afghan-hands-part-1-full-story

Seabees Assist CSOTF-10 With New JOC Construction

The war in Afghanistan has a lot of different military units supporting each other. This requires much planning and coordination. As the U.S and NATO forces draw down there is constant movement of units to different and new locations. Some of these moves require new construction. One example of this new construction is the Seabees support to Special Operations Forces. CSOTF-10, a SOF unit working with the Afghan Special Police Units (SPUs) and the Provincial Response Company elements, is establishing a new Joint Operations Center or JOC in the Kabul area and the Seabees are instrumental in helping with this construction. Read more in "Navy Seabees provide critical support to Special Operations Task Force", DVIDS, February 25, 2013.

Special Forces in Wardak Told to Leave by Karzai

The story about Karzai telling the MoD to order U.S. Special Forces out of Wardak province continues to evolve. There are now reports that the eviction also includes the adjacent Logar province. Both provinces have experienced an uptick in fighting and an increased insurgent presence. Reports of abuses by special operations forces continue to be cited as the reason for the eviction (see "Afghan officials say NATO ignored complaints of abuses by U.S. Special Operations forces", The Washington Post, February 25, 2013). Coalition spokesmen have adopted their very predictable "conciliatory tone" (New York Times, 26 Feb 13) with Karzai and say that they will cooperate in an investigation. Karzai continues to assert his authority and power but in ways that diminish the coalitions ability to shape events to ensure a successful transition of Afghan security forces taking the lead for security within the entire country.

U.S. Police Advisory Team (PAT) Members Talk About Training AUP

Police mentors from Task Force Centurion have developed strong mentor-mentee relationships while working on a Police Advisory Team or PAT. While the Soldiers were training for their Afghan deployment in the states the 'green-on-blue' incidents were hitting their peak; so there was a little apprehension about their mission. Their job is to advise the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) Quick Reaction Force in Kabul. Read more on their mission in "Police mentors share their thoughts of Afghanistan deployment", DVIDS, February 24, 2013.

Logistical Nightmare: Removing Excess Gear and Equipment from Afghanistan before 2014

A huge task that lies ahead of the U.S. military and other ISAF troop contributing nations as well is the removal of vast amounts of military equipment that has accumulated in Afghanistan over the last decade. According to some reports that equipment is valued at over $28 billion. There are thousands of armored and heavy vehicles in Afghanistan that need moving back to the states. The cheapest way to move them is via the land-route through Pakistan to some seaports but this route is subject to heavy tariffs, stolen equipment, Afghan corruption, labor disputes, and the political whims of a Pakistan bureaucracy and government.

An alternative land route is termed the "Northern Distribution Net" - which runs along part of the Old Silk Road. However, this land route is longer, traverses several countries, is subject to restrictions on shipping lethal weapons, and has different railway gauges. In addition, the route goes through northern Afghanistan which has the infamous Salang Tunnel and where the U.S. presence on the ground is minimal. In fact, the ISAF bases in the north are collapsing into one or two enduring bases so the security on the ground will be deteriorating soon.

Some equipment may just be left behind. The UK is leaving over 45% of their equipment behind and it will be signed over to the Afghans. Some equipment we need to leave behind or sign over to the Afghans as it is useless to us sitting in a metal container on some Army post in the states where it will rust away (the RIABs, for instance). The logisticians certainly have their work cut out for them.  Good luck with that!

Afghan Economy Looks Okay Says USAID Advisor

A Senior Economic Advisor who works for the USAID Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs stated in a recent online article in the Huffington Post (Feb 24, 2013) that the Afghan economy will survive the departure of the international presence (with its deep pockets). She believes that Afghans will find a way to make the economy survive as we edge towards 2014. Read more in "Economic Resilience in Afghanistan".

Drone Strikes Increased in Afghanistan in 2012

The use of drone strikes by aircraft such as the armed Predator and Reaper rose by 72% last year in Afghanistan. The remotely-controlled unmanned aircraft launched 506 strikes in 2012 according to U.S. military data. Targets are identified on the ground by a host of intelligence assets to include live video feed from the attack drones and other supporting unmanned aerial vehicles. Read more on this topic in "U.S. drone strikes up sharply in Afghanistan", LA Times, February 21, 2013.

U.S. Support of Afghan Railroads to Cut Russia's Influence

The United States is sinking a lot of money to build up Afghanistan's railroad system. The going is slow but progress is being made. This railway system will help increase trade and provide a transportation network for the export of the vast minerals that are found in Afghanistan. The railroads will tie into the New Silk Road that has the backing of the United States and other countries. However, Russia is an unhappy player in all of this as it feels that it is being marginalized in favor of Iran, India, China, and the 'stans. Read more in "US, Chinese Plans for Rail Links with Central Asia Triggering 'Railroad War' and Reducing Russia's Influence", by Paul Goble, The Jamestown Foundation, February 19, 2013.

Official Karzai Statement on Ordered Departure of Special Forces from Wardak Province

The text below in quotes is from the website of the "Office of the President". It was posted on February 24, 2013 and is primarily about the order of Karzai for U.S. Special Forces to depart Wardak province.

"February 24, 2013 - The meeting of the National Security Council chaired by President Hamid Karzai on Sunday discussed as per agenda the security situation in the provinces of Logar and Maidan Wardak, the presence of the international forces beyond 2014 and the issue of land seizures in Afghanistan.

The meeting began by hearing briefings by the Minister of Interior, Director General for the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), chairman of the Transition Commission, Chief of Army Staff and the respective governors on the security situation as well as on the findings by a delegation that had been assigned to investigate the causes of insecurity in the two provinces.

After a thorough discussion, it became clear that armed individuals named as US special force stationed in Wardak province engage in harassing, annoying, torturing and even murdering innocent people. A recent example in the province is an incident in which nine people were disappeared in an operation by this suspicious force and in a separate incident a student was taken away at night from his home, whose tortured body with throat cut was found two days later under a bridge. However, Americans reject having conducted any such operation and any involvement of their special force.

The meeting strongly noted that such actions have caused local public resentment and hatred.

In view of the above situation, the meeting made the following decisions:

1. The Ministry of Defense was assigned to make sure all US special forces are out of the province within two weeks;

2. All the Afghan national security forces are duty bound to protect the life and property of people in Maidan Wardak province by effectively stopping and bringing to justice any groups that enter peoples’ homes in the name of special force and who engage in annoying, harassing and murdering innocent people; and

3. Effective from February 24, 2013 onward, the ISAF has to stop all its special force operations in Maidan Wardak province;

The Meeting also called on the local people to cooperate with the governor and security forces in identifying such groups and inform local authorities. The Wardak governor was also tasked to form community councils to engage people in preventing such destructive actions by irresponsible armed groups.

The meeting then heard and endorsed a security operational plan presented by Logar governor for the province.

Also on agenda for the meeting was the issue of land seizure in various provinces in Afghanistan. The meeting directed the Ministry of Interior, the Attorney General Office as well as the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) to develop an orderly plan to handle the issue of the land seizure and restitute the lands illegally grabbed by powerful individuals by misuse of authority and official position.

The meeting also held an in-depth discussion on the military presence some countries are seeking beyond 2014 in Afghanistan. The meeting decided that any military presence any country may be seeking to retain under the international coalition after 2014 may be allowed only after Afghan government’s formal agreement and discretion, to be achieved bilaterally.

The meeting underlined that the number, location, scope and the nature of operations of such troops, if agreed, would be determined through direct negotiations with Afghan government."

http://president.gov.af/en/news/17740
 

ANASF Integrates Women Into Force

The Afghan National Army Special Forces or ANASF is integrating women into its force. One of the greatest benefits of having ANASF women members is having a female who can segregate and question Afghan women during night rights by the special operations forces. Night raids conducted by Afghan and ISAF forces are generally disliked by the Afghan population. More important, it is culturally insensitive for Afghan men to talk with or question Afghan women. So the addition of women to the ANASF to help out during these night raids is a big plus.  Read more in "Afghan army trains women as special forces soldiers to fill vacuum when foreign troops leave", Fox News, February 14, 2013.

Women Still Lacking in Basic Rights in Afghanistan

Women experience a life of hardship in Afghanistan. They are faced with strife in the home, sent off in arranged marriages at a young age, barred from going to schools, denied proper medical treatment, and faced with discriminatory practices throughout Afghan society. With the fall of the Taliban the plight of women in Afghanistan improved significantly; however, with the withdrawal of NATO forces and diminished influence of Western nations there is a fear that the success of women in Afghanistan will quickly backslide. Read more in "The plight of the Afghan woman" by Nelofar Farhang on Varsity.co.uk dated February 25, 2013.

Afghan President Karzai Orders U.S. Special Forces out of Wardak Province

ALP training in Kajran district, Daykundi
province. (photo PO Matthew Leistikow)

The Long War Journal is reporting that President Karzai has given the order to the Ministry of Defense to order all U.S. Special Forces out of Wardak province, Afghanistan. The SF teams (sometimes referred to as Green Berets) are currently deployed in several areas of Wardak working with the Afghan Local Police (ALP) as part of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. If this development is true then it is very bad news. As the conventional forces of the United States and other troop contributing nations pull out of Afghanistan SOF will remain to work with ANA, ANP, and especially with the ALP. SOF will be one of the few organizations left in the country to influence the ANSF toward a more professional and competent force once we hit the December 2014 mark.

Karzai has always been reluctant to give the ALP his full support because they are usually less corrupt than other ANSF entities due to the oversight and influence of the SOF teams that live and train with the ALP; thus he cannot include them in his nefarious activities as much as he can other ANSF elements. With the departure of General Allen and the arrival of a new ISAF commander Karzai may be feeling his oats - first he orders his ANSF not to call in ISAF air strikes to support their operations and now he is seeking the removal of SF teams from one of the most successful programs in the country. One could think that he is setting the framework for his relationship with the new ISAF commander and prepping for when he has to sit down with the Taliban for a power-sharing arrangement post-2014. The Taliban have a great fear of the ALP and are pressing hard to have them neutralized. Read more in "Afghan president orders US Special Forces to leave Wardak province", The Long War Journal, February 24, 2013.

Task Force Iron Ranger and VSO in Afghanistan

In 2010 1st Battalion 16th Infantry was assigned the mission of deploying to Afghanistan to augment the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) and assist in the Village Stability Operations (VSO) program. The battalion deployed in January 2011 and very quickly sent out platoon and squad-sized elements across Afghanistan to work with Special Forces ODAs, Navy SEAL elements, and MARSOC teams who were training the Afghan Local Police (ALP) and establishing Village Stability Platforms (VSPs). This augmentation by conventional troops allowed the special operations forces to further expand its VSO / ALP program to additional locations in Afghanistan.

The twelve man Special Forces ODAs (and other special operations teams) were split into two 6-man elements and augmented with squads from the 1/16 Infantry. They were then assigned to multiple locations throughout Afghanistan. It soon became apparent that the division of SF teams into two elements and then pairing with conventional infantry units was a workable solution to expanding the VSO program. A second infantry battalion was soon deployed to Afghanistan to continue the program. 1-505 Parachute Infantry from Fort Bragg soon followed 1-16 Infantry into Afghanistan for further augmentation of the CJSOTF-A.

The command and staff of Task Force Iron Ranger (1-16th) was widely dispersed. The battalion commander became the Director of the Village Stability Coordination Center (VSCC) North - which provided oversight of Provincial and District Augmentation Teams (PATs and DATs) fielded by the Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command - Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) and in coordination with the Village Stability National Coordination Center (VSNCC) located on the ISAF HQs compound in Kabul. The PATs and DATs, assigned to provincial and district centers provided the conduit from the VSPs to the various Afghan government officials and other actors to provide governance and development to the local areas. Staff members of Task Force Iron Ranger were used as PATs, DATs, in the VSCC-North, or in augmentation roles for the CJSOTF-A.

An article recently posted on the Small Wars Journal goes into great depth describing the integration of Task Force Iron Ranger into the CJSOTF-A to augment special operations teams conducting VSO and ALP training. Read "Innovation in Integration: Task Force Iron Ranger and Village Stability Operations in Afghanistan 2010-11" by Craig Whiteside, Small Wars Journal, February 7, 2013.

White House Releases Updated Fact Sheet on Afghanistan

The White House Office of the Press Secretary has updated it's "Fact Sheet: Afghanistan" page to reflect recent decisions by President Obama and a look at the future involvement of the United States in Afghanistan. Topics explained include Afghans in the Lead, Planning for post-2014, the Security Transition Process, Supporting Political Transition, and The U.S. Role after 2014. The fact sheet was updated on February 12, 2013.  You can view it at the link below:

 www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/fact-sheet-afghanistan

ALP "Part of the Solution; Not the Problem"

In a recent online report, Luke Coffey - a writer on defense and security matters - offers recommendations for supporting the ANSF over the next few years. He says that the U.S. should ensure the ANSF remains at a force level of 352,000 for the foreseeable future, international partners need to provide their fair share of the load (that would be money), that the ANSF remains capable in areas of importance to include C-IED and aviation, and that the Afghan Local Police continue to exist and expand. Read more in "U.S. Should Back a Robust Afghan National Security Force", Heritage Foundation, February 22, 2013.

Taliban Fighters Freed by Pakistan Return to Battlefield

In 2012 the High Peace Council of Afghanistan requested that Pakistan free 24 Afghan Taliban prisoners in an attempt to get the Quetta Shura Taliban to engage in peace talks with the government of Afghanistan. Unfortunately it appears that many of these released prisoners have simply returned to the battlefield to continue the fight against the ISAF coalition and the Afghan government. Currently about 100 Afghan Taliban remain in Pakistan custody. Read more in "Freed Afghan Taliban fighters return to insurgency", Google News AP, February 22, 2013.

Afghan Civilians Killed by Drone Attacks Rise

A United Nations report says that the number of civilians killed in drone attacks in the Afghan war rose in 2012. Read more in "More Afghan civilians killed by drones in 2012, U.N. says", CBS News, February 19, 2013.

Recommendations for Long Term Afghan Strategy

Michael O'Hanlon, a researcher and writer of foreign policy, has provided President Obama (and others) with four recommendations for long-term strategy in Afghanistan.

1. Force levels should remain at 65,000 through the 2013 fighting season.
2. Post December 2014 force levels should be closer to 20,000 rather than 10,000.
3. Improve Afghanistan's governance by concentrating less on the President and more on other Afghan political and government institutions.
4. Reinvigorate the reconciliation process with the Taliban - and including Pakistan in the process.

Read his recommendations in "The Strategy for Afghanistan", Brookings Institute, February 11, 2013.

SFAATs from 1AD Return from Deployment to Afghanistan

A number of Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams or SFAATs from 1st Armor Division have returned home to the United States after a nine-month long deployment to Afghanistan. Watch a video of their return to their families.

www.dvidshub.net/video/282257/sfaat-1st-ad-homecoming-ceremony

Factors to Consider for Peace in Afghanistan

A recent news article wrote by Edward Girardet for The Christian Science Monitor entitled "5 factors for peace in Afghanistan" provides us with some insight on how to conduct a successful reconciliation with the Taliban. The five factors include:

1. All Afghans must be represented
2. Peace talks must be Afghan-led and US-backed
3. Talks must be transparent
4. Talks should be overseen by a neutral, non-NATO country
5. The West cannot abandon Afghanistan

Torture Widespread in Afghan Prisons

An Afghan government panel investigating claims of a United Nations report detailing widespread torture in Afghanistan prisons has determined that there are rampant abuses occurring. Many of the abuses are perpetrated by the Afghan National Police (ANP). Read more in "Government Panel in Afghanistan Confirms Widespread Torture of Detainees", The New York Times, February 11, 2013.

Troop Levels in Afghanistan to Steadily Decrease

Reportedly there is now a "schedule" for the phased withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan over the next 20 months. According to one recent news report ("Decision on Afghan Troop Levels Calculates Political and Military Interests"), The New York Times, February 13, 2013) only 34,000 troops will be in Afghanistan at the beginning of 2014.

As of February 2013 there are 66,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Many of these troops will remain in-country through the 2013 fighting season (April-October). In November (the start of the so-called "non-fighting season") we would start to see a big movement of troops out of country to get to the desired February 2014 level. The timeline below may be the troop levels over the couple of years.

Projected Troop Level Timeline

66,000 - February 2013
60,500 - May 2013
52,000 - November 2013
32,000 - February 2014
 9,000 - December 2014

Afghan Democratic Policing Project (ADPP)

The Afghan Democratic Policing Project (ADPP) is being implemented by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) with US $4.5 million funding provided by the Government of Netherlands. The 3-year project will support Afghanistan's Police-e-Mardumi (also known as community police) and the UNDP's Women Police Mentoring Programme.

Afghan Middle Class in Kabul Worries about Future

The influx of billions of dollars into Afghanistan by donor nations has created wealth for a small segment of Afghan society. The capital of Afghanistan - Kabul - has grown to 5 million people, many who moved to Kabul to try and get a piece of the economic pie. Some Kabul residents have done well but that comfortable life may very well fall apart in the next few years. Read more in "Fears of the Future Haunt a Budding Generation of Afghan Strivers", The New York Times, February 11, 2013.