SIGAR: $488 Million at Risk - TFBSO

A recent report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) says that the Department of State (DoS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Department of Defense's Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) have failed to coordinate and prioritize their extractives activities. This failure has resulted in divergent strategies and poor working relationships - with the end result of creating potential sustainability problems. The Afghan Ministry of Mines and Petroleum (MoMP) still lacks the technical capacity to research, award, and manage new contracts without external support.

Read the SIGAR report here.
Afghanistan's Mineral, Oil, and Gas Industries: Unless U.S. Agencies Act Soon to Sustain Investments Made, $488 Million in Funding is at Risk, SIGAR 15-55 Audit Report, April 2015.
www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-55-AR.pdf

See Wikipedia's webpage for more information about the TFBSO.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Task_Force_for_Business_and_Stability_Operations

Read a news report on this topic by Siobhan O'Grady in The Cable - Foreign Policy, April 28, 2015 - "Afghanistan Watchdog: Poor U.S. Planning Puts $488 Million at Risk".

Learn more about Afghanistan's mineral potential.
www.afghanwarnews.info/development/minerals.htm

SIGAR Report: Vacant Kandahar Industrial Park

During an inspection SIGAR found one active business in the $7.8 million Shorandam Industrial Park in Kandahar. It was originally planned to accommodate 48 businesses. It appears that the set up of a power generator by U.S. forces on the industrial compound causes Afghan businesses to shy away from the site. The power generator is no longer there but the site still remains largely vacant. Read Shorandam Industrial Park: Poor Recordkeeping and Lack of Electricity Prevented a Full Inspection of this $7.8 Million Facility, SIGAR 15-50 Inspection Report, April 2015.

www.sigar.mil/pdf/inspections/SIGAR-15-50-IP.pdf

SIGAR Sidelined?

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was replaced by Operation Freedom's Sentinel. The Department of Defense (DoD) has named a new Inspector General for the re-named operation in Afghanistan. The DoD maintains that this is a new contingency operation and therefore they need an IG. However, some in Congress are crying foul - saying this is an attempt to sideline the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). SIGAR has made enemies within the Pentagon with its very factual and hard-hitting reports about the waste involved in the billions of dollars spent on Afghan reconstruction and the corruption within the Afghan government, Afghan National Security Forces, and ministries. The Pentagon would love to get rid of SIGAR as they continue to receive a beating from that organization.

SIGAR Report on DoD Contracts for Afghanistan

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released a report looking at the Department of Defense's contracts for Afghanistan reconstruction funding. The report notes that DoD contracts for Afghanistan reconstruction comprised $21 billion (out of $66 billion appropriated to DoD) through the award of 18,962 contracts to 2,542 vendors. The Afghan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) accounted for $17.3 billion in contracts. The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) accounted for $795 million in contracts. The Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities Fund (DoD CN) accounted for $1.8 billion in contracts. The top recipient of DoD CN contracts was Academi Training Center (formerly known as Blackwater). You can read the full report on SIGAR's website at the link below.

Department of Defense Spending on Afghanistan Reconstruction: 2002 - May 2014, SIGAR, March 2015. http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-15-40-SP.pdf

Pessimism vs. Optimism

SIGAR (pessimism) and RS HQs (optimism). If ever there was a difference in reporting on the situation in Afghanistan it is found in the differing accounts of how things are going in Afghanistan according to SIGAR and RS HQs. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has consistently pounded ISAF and now RS HQs on the reconstruction effort while Resolute Support HQs (formerly ISAF) has always seemed to paint a 'sunny' picture. Having spent part or most of 2010-2014 in Afghanistan in both Kabul (ISAF HQs) and on the ground at COP and FOB level with tactical units I can say that my perspective is somewhere in between the two outlooks provided by SIGAR and RS HQs. The staff at RS HQs, in many cases, are clearly out of touch with what is happening within the ANSF below corps level (ANA) and regional level (ANP); while SIGARs reports are sometimes a little off the mark. Read more in "IG hints at command cover up of shrinking forces", Washington Times,  March 3, 2015 and "Campbell-Sopko feud on public Afghan audits spills to hearing", The Washington Times, March 4, 2015.

Afghan MoD Rejects SIGAR Report

A recent report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has revealed some alarming statistics about the Afghan National Army (ANA). In January 2015 SIGAR released its quarterly report to Congress on the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. SIGAR relies on ISAF (now called Resolute Support) to provide statistics on the ANSF. Last fall ISAF provided some ANSF information but - for the first time in years - some important data was classified. The news media and Congress questioned this new practice of classifying information that in years prior was released to the public. Resolute Support HQs reversed itself and released the data in early 2015. SIGAR has now issued a supplement to the January 2015 report to Congress which includes the updated, once classified figures.

The statistics provided in the updated SIGAR supplemental report are troublesome. ANA desertions, casualties, and discharges among its personnel is at an all-time high - and the ANA personnel strength is down almost 20,000. The ANA strength is now at 2011 levels (4 years ago). This is an alarming statistic. Couple this report about the ANA with a recent report about the personnel strength of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and its numerous "ghost policemen" and there would seem to be a big problem in the ANSF - one that Resolute Support Headquarters must be aware of but does not seem to be raising alarms about - at least publicly.

The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) issued a statement on March 4, 2015 rejecting the SIGAR report that indicated ANA soldiers were deserting en mass. But it did acknowledge a significant decline in its ranks. MoD claims it is exploring solutions to fix the problem. It should start with a review of its leadership and reduce corruption.

Leadership. The ANA has at all levels too many commanders who are ill-suited to be in leadership positions. Many do not take proper care of the soldiers in their units. Food is marginal, living conditions inadequate, medical care sometimes slow or non-existent, pay is erratic, and leave policies not followed. If ANA soldiers were treated better by their commanders then many would opt to stay in beyond their contracts and some less would be likely to desert.

Corruption. This remains one of the biggest problems in the ANA. Pay is taken from soldiers, food and fuel diverted to markets and the profits go to commander's pockets, and equipment meant for the ANA (vehicle repair parts) find their way into the bazaars. If corruption within the army was reduced more soldiers may be tempted to remain in the service of their country.

SIGAR Prompts Contract Review by Ghani

It appears that President Ghani is following through on some of his campaign promises. He stressed that the massive corruption within the Afghan government and Afghan National Security Forces has to be addressed. Officials from the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) recently met with President Ghani to discuss concerns about reports of corruption. Twelve logistics contracts - from uniforms, rice, fuel, and more are being scrutinized in an inquiry. Read more in "Afghan leader orders graft review for all army supply contracts", Reuters, March 4, 2015.

SIGAR Quarterly Report to Congress (Jan 2015)

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has published its quarterly report to Congress. This latest report is dated 30 January 2015. This report covers the activities of the last three months for SIGAR - listing audits, inspections, and other activities. The report has several sections. The report is over 200 pages long and contains some updated information on the ASIs and ANSF.

Section 1 - Coordinating Aid: An Elusive Goal
Section 2 - SIGAR Oversight Activities
Section 3 - Reconstruction Update
Section 4 - Other Agency Oversight

www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2015-01-30qr.pdf

ISAF Data on ANSF Now Declassified

ISAF HQs (now Resolute Support) had unexpectedly classified data about the Afghan National Security  Forces (ANSF) that for over a decade had been unclassified. After criticism from Congress and the media the Resolute Support HQs declassified the data so it is now once again available to Congress and the public. Read the newly declassified material in a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), published in late February 2014. One key graphic in the now unclassified report depicts a decline in end strength for the ANA force levels. In February 2014 the total for ANA personnel was almost 185,000. The figures for November 2014 show a figure of 169,000 - a significant drop in personnel.

www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Supplement_2015-01-30qr.pdf

SIGAR Report - Testimony for Senate

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has provided a 17 page transcript on its testimony before a committee of the U.S. Senate about the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. The testimony was present to the committee for its upcoming deliberations for the Department of State Fiscal Year 2016 budget request for Afghanistan. The statement entitled Improving the Effectiveness of U.S. Reconstruction Efforts in Afghanistan by Enhancing Oversight and Addressing Key Areas of High Risk was published on February 24, 2015 and is available at the link below.

www.sigar.mil/pdf/testimony/SIGAR-15-36-TY.pdf

Oversight for Aid Projects Diminishes

A few years back there were over 100,000 U.S. military personnel in Afghanistan. USAID could use these personnel scattered across hundreds of FOBs and COPs as a set of eyes to provide oversight over aid projects that were being implemented by various humanitarian organizations and contractors. However, in 2015 there are only 11,000 U.S. military personnel confined to a few relatively large bases (Herat, Mes-e Sharif, Bagram, Gamberi, and Kandahar) and oversight on aid projects is problematic. Alone with the diminished oversight is a likely growth in corruption and failed aid projects. Read more in "US agencies adjust to shifting landscape in Afghanistan", Stars and Stripes, February 14, 2015.

Report - SIGAR Assessment on Burn Pits

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has published a report entitled Final Assessment: What We Have Learned From Our Inspections of Incinerators and Use of Burn Pits in Afghanistan, SIGAR 15-33-AL, February 2015.

www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/SIGAR-15-33-AL.pdf

SIGAR - Problems with ANP Pay

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has released a report criticizing the oversight on the pay and personnel processes of the Afghan National Police (ANP). One of the targets of the report is the administration of the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) administered by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Missy Ryan of The Washington Post writes about the report in a January 12, 2015 news report. Some of the problems highlighted include:

- There is little assurance that the funds are going to active police personnel (ghost policemen) or that the amounts are correct (skimming off the top of each policeman's pay).
- Electronic human resources systems still not successfully implemented.
- Twice as many ANP ID cards as there are policemen.
- Inflated police rosters, inflated salaries.
- UNDPs independent monitoring inflates figures of verified ANP personnel.
- Limited visibility over ANP data collection processes.
- Great risk of funds being diverted for corrupt purposes.

You can read the actual report at the link below.

SIGAR 15-26 Audit Report, Afghan National Police: More than $300 Million in Annual, U.S.-funded Salary Payments is Based on Partially Verified or Reconciled Data, January 2015.
http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-26-AR.pdf

SIGAR Report on Afghan Women

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has issued a report entitled Afghan Women:  Comprehensive Assessments Needed to Determine and Measure DOD, State, and USAID Progress, SIGAR 15-24 Audit Report, December 2014. The report states that there is no comprehensive assessment available to confirm that gains have been made in the status of women as a direct result of U.S. efforts. Together, DoD, State, and USAID spent over $64 million on over 650 projects, programs, and initiatives to support Afghan women from 2011 to 2013. SIGAR found there is a lack of accountability in the programs because none of the three agencies (DOD, State, and USAID) have effective mechanisms for tracking the funding associated with the women's projects. The report contains a number of recommendations on the way forward. Read the report at the link below:

www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-24-AR.pdf

SIGAR "High-Risk List" Dec 2014

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has published a new document that highlights areas of concern for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The new publication is called the High-Risk List and the first issue is dated December 2014. SIGAR created the High-Risk List to call attention to program areas and elements of the U.S.-funded reconstruction effort in Afghanistan that are especially vulnerable to significant waste, fraud, and abuse. With the list, SIGAR seeks to identify and address systemic problems facing U.S. funded efforts. The list will highlight program areas on which SIGAR believes the implementing agencies need to focus and will discuss how specific agencies are failing to mitigate risks in areas that involve their operations. Although 48 page report covers a variety of topics it is of value to Security Force Assistance advisors - specifically the sections on "ANSF Sustainability" and "High-Risk Area: ANSF Capacity and Capabilities".  You can read or download the report online at High-Risk List, SIGAR.

LAS Program for Afghanistan Under Investigation

The Light Air Support (LAS) aircraft program for Afghanistan is currently under investigation by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). The LAS program is intended to help develop the Afghan Air Force's advanced flight program, aerial reconnaissance, and air support capabilities. SIGAR is concerned that this LAS program could be affected by training and maintenance problems that have hampered earlier programs that the U.S. Air Force has tried on behalf of the Afghan Air Force. The U.S. Air Force has a less than favorable record of implementing programs with the Afghan Air Force - so this oversight is probably needed. See a letter form SIGAR requesting more information from General Austin (CENTCOM Commander) and General Campbell (COMISAF).
www.sigar.mil/pdf/special%20projects/SIGAR-15-18-SP.pdf

SIGAR - Afghan Development Effort a Failure

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) - John Sopko - has called America's development effort in Afghanistan a failure. Read more in "Sopko faults leadership for 'abysmal failure' in Afghanistan nation-building", Stars and Stripes, November 18, 2014.

Congressional Oversight of Afghan War

The corruption with the Afghan government and national security forces (especially the police) is just as bad now as it has been since Karzai's "reign of corruption". President Ghani has an uphill battle to wage in trying to fix the corrupt Afghan government. In addition, the U.S. military and the civilian governmental agencies lack the will and (in some cases) the ability to perform oversight on the billions of dollars that will be provided to the Afghan government over the next ten years. There seems to be little interest in Congress in the tightening up of oversight procedures; their attention is diverted elsewhere. Read more in "As Afghanistan War Ends, Congressional Appetite for Oversight Wanes", Defense One, October 31, 2014.

Pol-i-Charkhi Prison - "Incomplete Project"

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has released a report entitled Pol-i-Charkhi Prison: After 5 Years and $18.5 Million, Renovation Project Remains Incomplete, SIGAR 15-11 Inspection Report, October 2014. The Department of State paid the Al-Watan Construction Company (AWCC) $18.5 million for work performed on a contract (awarded in June 2009) valued at $20.2 million. Unfortunately AWCC only completed 50% of the required work. The prison was designed and built in 1973 for 5,000 inmates but currently houses about 7, 400 in crowded conditions. The State Department says that it will fix the problem with another $11 million to finish renovations and $5 million to remedy waste water disposal. Hopefully they will assign a state employee (with some contracting, accounting, and construction experience) who will provide proper oversight on the project. You can read or download the report at the link below off SIGAR's website:
www.sigar.mil/pdf/inspections/SIGAR-15-11-IP.pdf

U.S. Funding Goes to Afghan Insurgency

According to a recent report (October 2014) by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) the United States refuses to 'suspend or debar' supporters of the Afghan insurgency from receiving lucrative government contracts because the information about these individuals is classified. Read more in "U.S. Refuses to Stop Giving Contracts to Backers of Afghan Insurgency", The Washington Free Beacon, October 30, 2014.