Karzai: Afghanistan's Erratic and Irrational Leader

Many of President Karzai's statements about the United States and ISAF have been highly questioned. The most recent bombshell was his charge that the United States and the Taliban were colluding to keep Afghanistan in a state of de-stabilization. This would provide an excuse for ISAF to remain in the country beyond 2014 as occupiers. Some of his more recent actions include ordering the removal of special operations Soldiers from Wardak province, forbidding his Army and police to call in ISAF close air support (CAS), and demanding the turnover of the Bagram detention center. All of these recent demands are counterproductive to helping the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) take over the lead in security operations. The ANSF continues to need ISAF air support (although their artillery is becoming more proficient), it's specialized units and the ALP need their SOF advisers, and the Afghan prison system is notorious for instances of abuse, torture, and the release of hardened Taliban fighters through corruption.

The new ISAF commander is in a difficult position. He needs to navigate the political minefield strewn about by Karzai very carefully. On one hand he needs to recognize the sovereignty of Afghanistan and on the other provide the military advise and assistance and conduct the military operations to keep the Taliban at bay until the ANSF is ready to take over 100% of the lead in security operations.

General Dunford has provided some insight into the perplexing Karzai problem in a recent news release by the U.S. Department of Defense. He cites the ongoing negotiations with the Afghans about the turnover of the detention facility in Parwan and the transition of security operations in Wardak to the Afghans that are taking place at the ministerial level. He states that ISAF relations are good with the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) and Ministry of Defense (MoD).

Dunford has concerns about the Taliban information operations campaign - and indicates that ISAF has not done well in fighting the perception that the Western nations are occupiers in Afghanistan for the long-term and that ISAF is abandoning Afghanistan with it's withdrawal (two conflicting views but widely held). Dunford believes that there is a psychological aspect to the transition that has affected some of the Afghan leadership. You can read more of his comments on this topic in "Dunford: Uncertainty Poses Greatest Risk to Transition", American Forces Press Service, March 11, 2013.

It may be that the "uncertainty" cited by General Dunford is causing a "messaging problem" with the Afghan leader. However, a more likely story is that the irrational and erratic Karzai is conducting "appeasement operations" in hopes that the Taliban who do come to the negotiation table in the next few years will look favorably upon his hostile pronouncements against the Western allies. Other Afghan leaders have swung at the end of a rope from a Kabul lamp post after their foreign backers left and Karzai may not want that same fate.

Karzai Restricts Foreign Airstrikes

President Karzai will soon issue a decree forbidding Afghan National Army (ANA) forces from asking for air strikes or close air support from ISAF. This decree comes on the heels of an airstrike recently conducted in Shigal district, Kunar province in eastern Afghanistan where it is reported several civilians were killed. The restriction on use of foreign air strikes will limit the amount of support Afghan infantry will be provided during pitched battles with insurgents. The ANA will need to rely even more heavily on its newly developed and still learning Afghan artillery units. Read more in "Karzai to Forbid Afghan Forces From Requesting Foreign Airstrikes", The New York Times, February 16, 2013.

Two More U.S. Soldiers Killed in Insider Attack at Special Forces Base in Jalrayz district, Wardak Province

Map showing location of Wardak

Two Soldiers were reported killed in an apparent insider attack by members of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) at a Special Forces base in Jalrayz district, Wardak province, Afghanistan. ISAF has released a very short official statement on the attack. Initial reports indicate that a number of other U.S. Soldiers were wounded. There were Afghan police killed and wounded in the attack. The attack comes just a few days after President Karzai has demanded the removal of U.S. Special Forces from Wardak province because of alleged atrocities committed by the SF teams and the Afghans they work with. The allegations by Karzai are unfounded and have been refuted by ISAF based on Afghan and ISAF investigations that have turned up no evidence that the alleged actions took place. The attackers were killed by other U.S. Soldiers who responded to the attack. Very little additional details on the green-on-blue attack are known at this time.

Female Engagement Team in Afghanistan

A FET team member speaks with school children
in a village in Kandahar province, Afghanistan.
(photo SSG Kristen Duus)

Female Engagement Teams or FETs have been in use in Afghanistan for a couple of years now. Fifty per cent of the Afghan population is female but cultural restrictions make it almost impossible for military men to talk to them - which limits the amount of information one can gather from the Afghan public. The FETs provide an opportunity for the military to engage with the women of Afghanistan - whether it be to gather information or atmospherics, provide medical care, promote economic activities to benefit women, or to conduct searches of Afghan women for security purposes. Learn more about the FETs in an online news report entitled "Life on COP Jannat: through a FET's eyes", DVIDS, March 2, 2013.

www.dvidshub.net/news/102809/life-cop-jannat-through-fets-eyes

Afghan Air Force - 379th Rotary Wing Squadron Now Operational

The Afghan Air Force is finally getting there - sort of. Plagued with a late start, incompetence, corruption, poor leadership, drug smuggling scandals, barely literate airmen, use of aircraft to move opium and VIPs instead of wounded Soldiers and much needed supplies, failed aircraft maintenance programs - the Afghan Air Force has been the laughing stock of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). So it is good to see some good news once in a while that showcases the Afghan air capability. In this case it is the Afghan Air Force's 379th Rotary Wing Squadron. It is working on operations with the Afghan Army Commandos. Read more in "Afghan air force conducts air assault with Afghan special ops", USAF, March 7, 2013.

CIVCAS Incidents Down in Afghanistan according to UN

According to a United Nations report civilian casualties (CIVCAS) have declined for the first time in six years in Afghanistan. Many reasons were cited for the decline in civilians killed to include less kinetic actions, more Afghan troops doing the fighting, and intense efforts by ISAF to lower the number of civilian casualties. 81 per cent of the civilian casualties were caused by the Taliban. Read more in "U.N. Report Shows Fewer Killings of Afghan Civilians, Suggesting Shift in War", The New York Times, February 19, 2013.

The Life of an SFAAT in Afghanistan

A recent online post by RC East provides a glimpse at the life of an SFAAT. An SFAAT is a Security Force Assistance Advisory Team deployed to Afghanistan to advise and assist an Afghan police or army unit. The article is provided by a member of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Field Artillery Regiment, 10th Mountain Division at Forward Operating Base Sharana in Paktika province. View the article in "The life of an SFAAT", Regional Command East, March 10, 2013.

Karzai Slams U.S. - Says U.S. and Taliban are Conspiring

Karzai has once again come out with strong statements against the United States. This time he says that the Taliban and the United States are conspiring to keep Afghanistan in a state of turmoil. As silly as that sounds there are those out there that try to explain Karzai's outlandish behavior. For instance, The New York Times has a news article that says Karzai is offended and embarrassed by the stalled turnover of the Bagram detention facility in Parwan province and the U.S. insistence that special operations forces continue to operate in Afghanistan post-2014. The Times also points out that Karzai sees the Taliban as a real player post-2014 long after ISAF pulls out - so he has to say the right things to appease them. Read more in "Afghan Leader Says U.S. Abets Taliban's Goal", The New York Times, March 11, 2013.

Success Against Afghan Corruption - Once in a While a Small Success

Every once in a while we stumble across a good news story about defeating corruption in Afghanistan. Here is one that gives us a warm glow - if only for a little while. A National Guard Soldier (and his boss) from Iowa (got there in August 2012) uncovered a fuel corruption scheme in Mazar-I-Sharif that was making some Afghan officials rich and depriving the Army of needed fuel to conduct operations against the enemy. Read more of the story here in "Local National Guard Soldier Helps Uncover Corruption in Afghanistan", Oskaloosa News, February 18, 2013.

Bamyan Province is Safe Yet Vulnerable

Ruins in Bamyan province, Afghanistan
photo by SGT Christopher Bonebrake

The New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) mission will soon come to an end in Bamyan province, Afghanistan. While the province enjoys relative peace and safety when compared to other provinces in Afghanistan there is still cause for concern about the future. The province is poor and isolated in high mountains and although not far in miles from Kabul it seems to be remote in terms of services, aid, and in the number of Afghan security forces that are deployed there. Read more in "Bamyan: A province in the eye of a storm", DVIDS, March 8, 2013.

Romania and the New Silk Road

Romania, as a troop-contributing-nation of ISAF, has been a staunch ally of the United States in the Afghan conflict. Currently Romania has special operations forces and Military Advisor Teams (SFAATs) deployed in Afghanistan. Along with the fight in Afghanistan, Romania is also involved in the larger stabilization effort of the greater Central Asia region (which indirectly will benefit Afghanistan). Notable among these efforts is Romania's involvement with the New Silk Road. See more on this topic in "The New Silk Road - The Role of a U.S. Strategic Partner: Romania", George Marshall Fund, March 4, 2013.

Hagel Comments on Special Forces Removal from Wardak Province

U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel says that there is hope the U.S. and Afghanistan (that would be Karzai) will come to an agreement to keep U.S. Special Forces teams in Wardak province. A few weeks back President Karzai accused the SF teams of atrocities and ordered them out of Wardak province by Monday, March 11, 2013. Naturally there was no proof or evidence presented by the Afghans to prove this and subsequent ISAF investigations found there to be no such acts committed by the Special Forces Soldiers. This is just Karzai being Karzai, showing who is boss to the new COMISAF, playing domestic politics, and appeasing the moderate insurgents who will soon be at the negotiating table in the months to come. The U.S. and ISAF have worked at the highest levels (COMISAF and others) to get the order rescinded or revised. Read more in "Hagel optimistic on Afghan commando agreement", Army Times, March 9, 2013.

Base Closures in Afghanistan Continue as Withdrawal Proceeds toward 2014 - FOB Altimur Latest to Close

Bulldozer leveling FOB Altimur,
Logar province in early Jan 2013
as part of base closures in Afghanistan.
(photo SSG John Cockrell)

The closing of Combat Outposts (COPs) and Forward Operations Bases (FOBs) continue throughout Afghanistan. As the ISAF and U.S. troops withdraw, consolidate onto larger bases and go home many of the smaller COPs and FOBs are being vacated. In some instances they are being dismantled completely and in other instances part or all of the base is turned over to the Afghans. One of the latest to close is FOB Altimur located in the south of Logar province. FOB Altimur at various times in the last several years was home to either battalions or companies and the occasional SFAAT. Currently, with the closing of the U.S. side of the base, the primary tenant is an ANA kandak. The kandak is responsible for security in southern Logar province with companies located at Baraki Barak, Charkh, and Kherwar districts. Read more about the closing of FOB Altimur in "Afghan army assumes control of formerly joint base", DVIDS, March 9, 2013.

What is the Future of US in Central Asia After Afghanistan?

Some observers of Central Asia are speculating on what the United States commitment to the region will be once the Afghan war concludes (or at least when ISAF departs in 2014). There is concern that the U.S. will leave a gap by forgetting about Central Asia. The U.S. State Department has been promoting its future involvement through the New Silk Road Strategy (NSRS). Some academics and others have been wondering what this really means. Read on article on the topic in "The US in Central Asia: Beyond Afghanistan?", By Dr Stephen Blank, ISN.ethz.ch, March 8, 2013.

Traffic Police and Corruption

A look at how corruption works in the traffic department is indicative of the problem of corruption at large in Afghan society. Corruption takes place in Afghanistan at all levels and comes in all sizes. One reason the government enjoys very little support from the Afghan population is the large-scale corruption found in all government offices. Some Afghans feel a return to Taliban rule would be better than living under the current government. Read more in "To cut Afghan red tape, bribery is the norm", The Washington Post, February 17, 2013.

Capability Set 13 (CS 13) - a Comms Package to Aid SFAATs in Afghan Mission

A new "on-the-move communications" network will deploy with soon-to deploy SFABs (BCTs) to Afghanistan. The comms package, called Capability Set 13 (CS 13) will allow Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs) to stay in contact with adjacent and higher units while staying mobile across the battlefield with their Afghan units they are advising. The first two BCTs to use the comms network will be 3rd and 4th Brigades of the 10th Mountain Division.

Learn more about CS-17 in "First unit readies for Afghanistan with new network", Army.mil, March 7, 2013. Learn more about the Capability Set 13 here: www.bctmod.army.mil/CS13/index.html.

Afghan Govt Stance on Peace Talks

There is a lot of discussion about what the Afghans want to accomplish in the stalled peace talks with the Taliban. This is difficult to ascertain based on conflicting statements and actions by Afghan government officials. One key document does shed light on the Afghan government approach. It is the "Peace Process Roadmap to 2015" released by the High Peace Council in November 2012. The document starts with a vision of what the political environment looks like in 2015, outlines a five-step approach to the peace talks to reach that vision, and provides some principles that need to be followed during the conduct of the peace talks. The insurgency will not be beaten by ISAF prior to its departure in December 2014. There is little hope that the Afghans security forces will be able to beat the Taliban in some of their strongholds in parts of the east and south (Kunar, Nuristan, Helmand, and Nangarhar). So the peace talks with the Taliban are key to resolving the conflict.

Patriot Brigade Prepares for SFAB and SFAAT Mission with Intensive Language Training

Patriot Brigade Soldiers in language training class
preparing for SFAAT mission in Afghanistan
(photo SSG Kulani Lakanaria Feb 2013)

The Patriot Brigade - more formally known as 4th Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division - has been taking great steps in providing language training to selected members of its unit. The brigade will soon deploy to Afghanistan in the role of a Security Force Assistance Brigade or SFAB with the mission of supporting Security Forces Assistance Advisor Teams or SFAATs. In advising and assisting Afghan security forces it is widely recognized that a basic proficiency in language (Dari or Pashto) and knowledge of culture goes a long way to understanding the conflict, interacting with Afghan counterparts, and building rapport with the advised Afghan unit. The intensive language and cultural training is in synch with Security Force Assistance Principle Number 11 - "Do not allow cultural differences to divide us".

With the assistance of the Defense Language Institute (DLI) the brigade has been conducting a 16-week long language training course to prepare its Soldiers for the SFAAT mission. Read more in "Patriot soldiers learn critical language skills", DVIDS, March 6, 2013.

CI Training to Afghans Reduces Insider Threat Incidents

In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Marine Corps Gen. Mattis said that "green-on-blue" attacks have decreased significantly in 2013 in Afghanistan. The attacks - called "insider attacks" - by ISAF have been reduced because the Afghan security forces have received a lot of training in counterintelligence and have become more vigilant in their efforts to spot disaffected members of the security force and Taliban infiltrators. Read more in "Training Reduces Insider Attacks", Mattis Says", American Forces Press Service, March 6, 2013. Read more news articles on insider threat.

Land, People, and the State in Afghanistan - AREU Feb 2013

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) has released a new publication that deals with land governance in Afghanistan. The publication is entitled "Land, People, and the State in Afghanistan: 2002-2012". Liz Alden Wily is the author and a brief description of the document is provided in quotes below:

"This case study carefully documents the changes in land relations and land governance since the signing of the Bonn Agreement in December 2001. The decade began and ended with rhetoric against land grabbing. However, it now seems too entrenched, too tacitly supported politically, and too expedient for private wealth creation by elites, to be halted."

You can learn more about this document at the link below:
www.areu.org.af/EditionDetails.aspx?EditionId=622&ContentId=7&ParentId=7

Sequester Won't Affect Afghan Drawdown

The head of the U.S. Transportation Command told Congress that the budget sequester should not have an impact on the withdrawal of personnel and equipment from Afghanistan. His statement would seem to contradict early administration reports that troops in Afghanistan would have their tours lengthened due to sequestration. He did indicate that the budget cuts will have an overall general impact on his command. Read more in "Transcom Chief: Sequester Won't Affect Afghan Drawdown", American Forces Press Service, March 6, 2013.

Uzbekistan Offers Withdrawal Corridor from Afghanistan for ISAF - With a Some Strings Attached

The movement of immense amounts of military supplies, vehicles and equipment from Afghanistan will be time consuming and costly for the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). Pakistan has been a pain in the rear - at times closing its land routes to the Pakistan seaports for as long a six months at a time. In addition, corruption, labor strikes, high costs, theft, and clogged seaports have hindered the movement of equipment and supplies over the years through Pakistan. Moving vast amounts of heavy equipment by air is costly (and we don't have enough air transport). One way out is through the land routes by truck and rail in central Asia across the 'stans along the Old Silk Road (or is it the New Silk Road?) into Europe and ultimately to seaports along the Baltic, Mediterranean, or Atlantic waters. However, movement through the 'stans has its own host of problems.

Uzbekistan has offered to help solve this difficult problem - with some give and take (or mostly taking on their part). They wouldn't terribly mind if along the way out we dropped off some military equipment such as armored vehicles, helicopters, etc. for Uzbekistan to keep. Read more in "As NATO Prepares for Afghan Withdrawal, Uzbekistan Seeks War's Leftovers", The New York Times, January 31, 2013.

No Evidence of Abuse by SF Teams in Wardak

According to a report by the Los Angeles Times there is no evidence of abuse by Special Forces teams working in Wardak province, Afghanistan. The U.S. has completed its investigations - as have the Afghans. No heads were cut off, five of the nine people reported "disappeared" are actually in an Afghan prison for insurgent activities, the one student who was killed by "someone" had ties to the Taliban and was killed in an inter-insurgent dispute, and the citizen complaints can be traced back to a Taliban information operations (IO) campaign. So the allegations are unfounded.

However, the real problem still remains. That problem is an incompetent President Karzai reacting to an very effective Taliban IO campaign to get Special Forces removed from one of the key provinces defending the roads into Kabul. The SF teams are doing great work with the Afghan forces there to include the ALP, ANASF, Commandos, and PRC.

The order to remove SF from Wardak has not been lifted. It remains to be seen if Karzai can be brought to his senses by his advisers or if ISAF folds under this latest attempt by Karzai to appease moderate Taliban forces that he will be negotiating with in the near future.

Read the LA Times article here: "Afghan dynamics altering U.S. efforts to wind down war", Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2013.

Hungarian Special Operations Forces Training Afghan Special Police Units (SPU)

Members of the 34th Laszlo Bercsenyi Special Forces Battalion (KMZ) were recognized for their contributions to training Afghan security forces. They have been training and advising the Afghan Special Police Units (SPUs) over the past several years in civil order security and high-risk arrests. The Hungarian SOF have been in Afghanistan for the last five years on this specific mission. The Hungarian SOF unit is part of the newly established (2012) NATO Special Operations Component Command - Afghanistan or NSOCC-A.

Patriot Brigade Trains at Fort Polk - 4/10 Mountain BCT Prepares for SFAB Deployment to Afghanistan

The Patriot Brigade - 4th Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division - has been training at Fort Polk in preparation for its deployment to Afghanistan as a Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB). The brigade's mission in Afghanistan will be to ensure that the SFAATs receive the support they need to advise and assist the Afghan National Security Forces or ANSF. The SFAATs (usually 9, 12, or 18 man teams) work with their Afghan counterparts to improve their logistics, intelligence, maintenance, administration, rule of law, fires support, and training capabilities. Read more in "Training to win", DVIDS, March 5, 2013.

15 Principles of Security Force Assistance (SFA)

General John Allen served as COMISAF for over 18 months in Afghanistan. One of his big achievements was moving the U.S. forces from combat operations to conducting Security Force Assistance or SFA. This involved a mind-set shift for many U.S. company, battalion, and brigade commanders who saw their primary objective as engaging the enemy - not getting the Afghan National Security Forces to start doing combat operations. One tool that Gen Allen used to influence the commanders working at all levels to get into the SFA frame of mind was the issuing of the "Principles of Security Force Assistance". These 15 principles helped put the SFA mission into the proper perspective in the minds of the U.S. commanders. You can read the principles and view videos on the principles at the link below:

http://www.afghanwarnews.info/sfa/15principlesofsfa.htm

Kajaki Dam Project Turned Over to Afghans by USAID

The Kajaki Dam project in Helmand province is being turned over to the Afghan government by USAID. A lot of money and lives were spent and lost in an attempt to get this project finished up. USAID is now turning this critical project over to the Afghan state-run electricity company (DABS). Many are questioning whether DABS has the expertise to install the hydropower turbine and get the electricity flowing. It seems that the Obama administration is keen to push more and more projects off to the Afghans and that Karzai is pushing for the same. What is at stake in regards to the dam is the technical and operational ability to finish the job that USAID started and the great fear that much of the money will be siphoned off by the Afghans due to corruption. Read more in "Dam and other Afghanistan projects being scaled back as U.S. picks up pace of withdrawal", By Rajiv Chandrasekaran, The Washington Post, March 4, 2013.

Video - Counter IED School in Afghanistan

The Afghan Army's Counter-IED school is located in northern Afghanistan. The school has been slowly transitioning the instruction from ISAF trainers and civilian contract instructors to ANA instructors. Watch a video with more info on the Afghan National Army (ANA) taking the lead at the C-IED school at the link below.

www.dvidshub.net/video/282779/cied-school-long-version

U.K, Afghan, and Pakistan Officials Gather for Peace Talk Coordination

Officials from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United Kingdom gathered in London recently to coordinate future peace talks with the Taliban. In the past the three nations had been at odds as to how to encourage the Taliban into reconciliation talks and who was to have a leading role in the peace talk discussions. Reportedly this latest meeting held in the UK helps smooth over some of the differences. Read more in "David Cameron invites Taliban to talks over Afghanistan's future", The Guardian, February 4, 2013.

Our Mistakes in Afghanistan

After so many years of fighting in Afghanistan there are a host of critics who would tell us how we could have done better. Foreign Policy has posted an article on its website that tells us just that - providing input from important observers (and participants) of the conflict are Rory Stewart, Pervez Musharraf, Seth Jones, Amrullah Saleh, Sarah Chayes, and Fred Kagan.

Rory Stewart, a member of British Parliament and author, says we should have limited our goals in Afghanistan to the success achieved in 2002/2003, that nation-building required a legitimate government (not present under Karzai), and Afghanistan was not a good place to try and install a modern society and democratic western-style government.

Pervez Musharraf, the former president of Pakistan, says the United States blundered and committed three major errors: abandoning Afghanistan after the Soviet defeat in 1989, attempting to isolate the Taliban once they reached power in 1996, and failing to convert military victory in the early 2000s to a political victory by backing Karzai and not including a significant number of Pashtuns in the new government.

Seth Jones, noted author and former advisor to CFSOCC-A commander, says that allowing the Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan was a huge mistake. He cites three contributing factors: a lack of a regional security agreement post Bonn conference (Dec 2001), a failure by the U.S. and Pakistan to target the senior Taliban leaders operating in Baluchistan province, Pakistan, and not enough effort in reaching out to the Taliban early in the war to bring them into the political process.

Amrullah Saleh, the former head of the Afghan intelligence service, says we were mistaken in thinking Pakistan could change in its ways of providing support and money to the Taliban insurgency.

Sherard Cowper-Coles, a British special representative to Afghanistan, says we never developed a political strategy within which a military campaign could be successful. In addition, the imposition of a constitution ensuring a strong central government was at odds with the history of Afghanistan.

Sarah Chayes, a one-time resident of Afghanistan for several years and former advisor to military commanders, says that the U.S. aided the growth of the Taliban when it supported the return of corrupt warlords to power in concert with Karzai. This was compounded with turning a blind eye to the corruption that slowly grew in the Afghan government and to Karzai's use of a vast political and criminal patronage network to keep himself in power.

Two authors on Afghanistan, Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, says we continued to send military members to Afghanistan who did not have an understanding of the country, language, culture, or the complexity of the conflict.

Frederick Kagan, of the American Enterprise Institute and frequent visitor and observer of Afghanistan, thinks that we are not leaving enough troops in Afghanistan after 2014 and sees the future plans of withdrawal of the Obama administration as a mistake.

A lot of good information and differing opinions of what went wrong in Afghanistan. One of the best reads in a long time on the war. Read more in "What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?", Foreign Policy, March/April 2013.

NATO Chief Recommends 352,000 Afghans in Uniform Until 2018

The NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has recommended that the Afghan force should be funded at the 352,000 level until 2018 to ensure that it has the capability to fight the Taliban. Over the past year many have been indicating that the combined force of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) should shrink to 230,000 in an effort to save money. What many have not considered is that the difference between 230,000 and 352,000 is only $700 million dollars per year. While that sounds like a lot it is a drop in the bucket when one considers what we have been spending there. It has cost an average of $1 million per deployed U.S. serviceperson. In another comparison the war has cost the U.S. on average $6 billion a month. So it is much cheaper to finance the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) than keeping U.S. servicemen in that country.

To read more about the NATO chief's recommendations see "NATO chief backs larger Afghan force through 2018", Yahoo! News, March 5, 2013.
http://news.yahoo.com/nato-chief-backs-larger-afghan-force-2018-142543132.html

For more information on the cost of the Afghan war see "Pentagon Says Afghanistan War Costs Dip as Surge Troops Leave", Bloomberg Businessweek, February 8, 2012.
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-08/pentagon-says-afghanistan-war-costs-dip-as-surge-troops-leave.html

White House and Karzai in Talks about Special Forces Operating in Wardak

According to Marine General James Mattis, CENTCOM commander, the White House is now in talks with President Karzai on his irrational and devastating order to remove U.S. Special Forces from their advisory and training mission in Wardak province. This order by Karzai is yet again one more example of how winning of the war in Afghanistan has not been easy; the U.S. and NATO forces have been dealing with an incompetent President leading Afghanistan for quite a while . . . since we helped put him in power in 2002 over ten years ago!

Transfer of Security Responsibilities Continues in Afghanistan

Village Elders in Khak-e-Sayfed district
attend Shura on security transition
(photo Sgt Chadwick de Bree)

Across Afghanistan districts and provinces are continuing the process of security transition. What this means is that coalition forces are taking a back seat as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) step into the lead for security. Security transition is accompanied by a decrease of coalition forces in the area, ANSF taking the lead in combat operations, and the transfer to ANSF or closing of small combat outposts manned by coalition forces. Usually this transfer for the security lead takes place district by district. Khak-e-Sayfed district in Farah province is one of the latest districts to undergo the security transition. You can read more in "Authority of district transferred to ANSF in Farah province", DVIDS, February 28, 2013.

www.dvidshub.net/news/102698/authority-district-transferred-ansf-farah-province

PRTs Closing Down in Afghanistan

ANP graduates of an academy in Bamyan practice
their skills. New Zealand  members of the
Bamyan PRT taught  the students police tactics.
(Photo SGT Chris Bonbrake Mar 1, 2013)

As ISAF withdraws its forces from Afghanistan it is methodically shutting down the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that have been in existence for a number of years. The first PRT was established in Gardez, Afghanistan in early 2003 around the nucleus of a Special Forces Operational Detachment A (SFODA) from 20th Special Forces Group. The twelve-man ODA provided the medical, combat, communications, intelligence, and engineer skills that allowed other specialities such as Civil Affairs, Psyops, and medical specialists to start working development, governance, security, and ANSF training issues. A second PRT was established in Bamyan under the same construct commanded by a Special Forces major. Eventually many provinces would have a PRT - many of them manned by different ISAF nations. These PRTs had an average assigned strength of 100 personnel although some were quite larger.

Many personnel were attached to the PRT to include USAID, agricultural specialists, Afghan Hands, State Department, law enforcement professionals (LEPs), and others. Much of the aid money flowed through the PRTs much to the dismay of Karzai and the ministries (MRRD, MAIL, DAIL, etc.) who wanted to be able to skim money off the top of much of the aid money at the national level before the provincial and district Afghans could get to it.

Within the last year many of these PRTs have been closed down. see "U.S. Winds Down Afghanistan Aid Program", The Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2012.

Peace Talks with Taliban Still Stalled

There is a renewed effort to engage the Taliban in peace talks. The withdrawal of Western nations from the fight over the next two years and the acknowledgment that the insurgency will not be defeated by the Afghan security forces has worried many who are concerned about regional stability in the area. Thus the push for reaching an agreement with the Taliban through a reconciliation process.

The biggest hindrance to an agreement with the Taliban is . . . of course, the Taliban. They are and can afford to play a waiting game. In December 2014 the United States will have between zero to 10,000 troops in Afghanistan. That is not a lot of combat power. Foreign aid to the government of Afghanistan will shrink. The oversight on what aid does go to Afghanistan will be administered by corrupt Afghan government officials. At the moment the Taliban refuse to negotiate with President Karzai and the High Peace Council stating they are puppets of the United States. Why should the Taliban agree to a political framework that includes them when they feel they can have it all in a few years?

Another constraint are the major players in the proposed peace agreement - Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and the Western powers. Each nation(s) has their own concept of a post-war political settlement for Afghanistan. Pakistan has the most to gain and lose as a chaotic Afghanistan is in their backyard. Pakistan is hedging and playing both sides of the fence - taking part in peace talks on one hand and then providing supplies, intelligence, support, and sanctuary to insurgent groups on the other.

Read more about the problems associated with proposed peace talks in "Renewed Push for Afghans to Make Peace With Taliban", The New York Times, February 16, 2013.

www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/world/asia/pressure-for-peace-with-taliban-is-renewed.html

New Zealand PRT in Bamyan Province

New Zealand Light Armored Vehicles travel through  a Bamyan
 mountain pass in Feb 2013. (photo by SGT Chris Bonebrake)

The New Zealand PRT located in Bamyan province, Afghanistan has the good fortune to be in one of the more beautiful regions of Afghanistan. Bamyam is located in the center mountainous region of Afghanistan and for a long time has been considered a very secure province. It does have some security concerns in some of the districts. The NZ PRT is tasked with maintaining security in Bamyan province. The PRT conducts presence patrols, provides advice and assistance to the Provincial Governor, the district sub-governors, and the Afghan National Police (ANP). In addition, the NZ PRT oversees aid projects which provide services and employment in the region. Learn more about the New Zealand Provincial Reconstruction Team at the link below found at the New Zealand Defence Force website.

www.nzdf.mil.nz/operations/overseas-deployments/afghanistan/nz-prt/default.htm

Good Performers Initiative (GPI) Awards Given to Afghan Provinces that Showed Progress in Counternarcotics Efforts

(Photo by SGT Chris McCullough)

The U.S. Embassy and Afghanistan's Minister for Counter Narcotics recently (Feb 13) signed an agreement allocating $18.2 million for programs supported by the Good Performers Initiative (GPI) awards. "GPI awards have been presented to 21 provinces that achieved poppy-free status in 2012, reduced poppy cultivation by more than ten percent from the previous year, or made other exceptional counter narcotics efforts during the cultivation season." Some provinces received $1 million awards for being poppy-free. The use of the funds hopefully will drive down the currently high level of poppy cultivation. You can read the entire U.S. Embassy press release entitled "U.S. Embassy and Ministry of Counter Narcotics Sign Good Performers Initiative Agreement".

Afghan Local Police (ALP) to Expand

The Afghan Local Police or ALP program in Afghanistan may expand in the future. The U.S. military is looking for additional funding that will extend the ALP program for an additional five years and increase the number of ALP members to 45,000. The plan, which is backed by the U.S. Special Operations Command, will cost $1.2 billion to train, arm, and equip the ALP. The ALP, based on a village defense model, comes under the control of the Ministry of Interior and is supervised by the local Afghan National Police District Chiefs of Police and Provincial Chiefs of Police. The Special Operations Joint Task Force -Afghanistan or SOJTF-A has the overall responsibility for advising, training, and mentoring the MoI and the ANP in regards to the ALP. This includes training and embedding with the ALP in conjunction with the SOJTF-A Village Stability Operations or VSO program. Learn more about the ALP expansion at the link below (LA Times, Feb 10, 2013).

http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/10/world/la-fg-afghan-police-20130211

SFAAT Helps District Chief of Police Become More Effective

Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams or SFAATs are doing great work in Afghanistan helping the Afghan National Police (ANP) get better at their jobs. One example of this great work is seen in Chorah district, Uruzgan province, Afghanistan where the SFAAT is helping the District Chief of Police or DCoP reorganize and train his AUP to become a more professional force. Read more in "Chorah Valley safer with rise of district chief of police", DVIDS, March 3, 2013. Read more news articles about SFAATs.

Call Me Maybe - Afghan Style

Troops in a war zone have very little outlets for fun. Sometimes they have to make their own fun. One way of having fun is to make videos of themselves singing or dancing to popular music tunes or videos. This one video is using the song "Call Me Maybe" by the artist Carly Rae Jepsen. The Miami Dolphin cheerleaders did a video to the song which became very popular. Going further, a small group of Soldiers in Afghanistan did one up in synch with the cheerleaders take on the song. Lots of rehearsal went into this video shoot for sure! You can view the video at the link below on YouTube.com.

www.youtube.com/watch?v=H96-TwrwY7M

RSOI for Afghan Hands in Afghanistan

The military has an excellent program that has been around for a couple of years which provides Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) for deployment to key positions in Afghanistan. These Afghan Hands receive language and cultural training in the United States prior to their deployment. Their training does not stop there - it continues upon their arrival in country (Afghanistan). This training is called RSOI for Reception Staging Onward-movement and Integration. Part of the RSOI training for the Afghan Hands is use of firearms on the range. View a DVIDS video that explains this in greater detail at the link below.

www.dvidshub.net/video/282973/afghan-hands-part-2-long-version

Northern Afghanistan Looking Secure (According to Admiral Stavridis)

The security situation in northern Afghanistan - also referred to as RC-North is looking quite good according to the EUCOM Commander - Admiral James Stavridis. The Admiral recently toured northern Afghanistan and has commented on his observations in a blog post on the EUCOM blog on February 28, 2013 entitled "Way Up North ...".

He opens the blog post up with his impression of a book entitled "The Afghan Campaign" by Steven Pressfield. The book is a historcal novel about soldiers fighting for Alexander the Great in Afghanistan. Stavridis says the novel's history is spot on and depicts the problems foreign armies have in conquering Afghans, eliminating corruption, and adjusting to cultural differences. I read the book a few years back and it is quite good. The Afghan Campaign: A Novel

Stavridis goes on to say that the economy of northern Afghanistan is humming along, security is doing very well (despite pockets of insurgent areas), and that even though ISAF is drawing down its strength and capabilities in the north the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will be able to handle the security situation.

Afghan Army Faces Corruption Problem in Future

The Afghan National Army (ANA) will soon be responsible for the purchase of equipment, goods, and services in the billions of dollars. Currently many foreign militaries handle these procurements but with the departure of ISAF these functions will be turned over to the Ministry of Defense (MoD). At the moment the ANA is considered one of the least corrupt institutions in Afghanistan but that could soon change once the "watchers" are gone and the MoD officials and generals see the immense amount of money that will flow through their offices.  Read more in "As Afghan army gets cash to buy its own supplies some worry about corruption", The Sacramento Bee, February 16, 2013 at this link.

M-Paisa - Mobile Banking in Afghanistan

Afghanistan, despite its backwardness and economic difficulties, is in the forefront of a new mobile-money and banking era. Money is being exchanged with customers and merchants via cellphones utilizing a service called "M-Paisa". This service also is used to pay policemen throughout Afghanistan - eliminating much of the corruption that took away almost 30% of a policeman's pay. Eventually Afghans will be able to pay their electric bills over their cell phone. One of the few bright spots in Afghanistan is the development of a robust telecommunications network that provides for a higher standard of living not only in communications but in banking and other economic services. Read more on M-Paisa in "How Afghanistan is on the Leading Edge of a Tech Revolution", Time, March 2, 2013.

Japan Provides $281 million to Afghanistan (Feb 2013)

The United Nations and Japan have announced an aid package that will finance 14 projects to be implemented by nine different United Nations agencies. The aid package is part of the commitment made by the government of Japan at the Tokyo Conference (2012) and will support the national development priorities identified by the Government of Afghanistan. The funds will support agriculture, education, health, police, reintegration process, de-mining, governance, and humanitarian assistance. Read more in "Japan and United Nations jointly announce assistance of $281 million to Afghanistan", ReliefWeb, February 28, 2013.

http://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/japan-and-....

Cell Phone Towers Not Getting Blown Up As Much in Afghanistan

Some things are getting better in Afghanistan. Reportedly, according to The Wall Street Journal, cell phone towers in Afghanistan are not getting blown up as much by the Taliban. There was a period when the Taliban (and criminal gangs) would threaten to blow up cell phone towers unless the telephone companies turned them off (either all the time or during the night hours). During a short period of a few years over 300 cell phone towers were destroyed. Mobile phones are the primary means of communication in Afghanistan and the Taliban interdiction of cell phone tower operations were turning the population against the Taliban. Read more in "Fewer Cell Towers Are Shut Down in Afghanistan, Minister Says", The Wall Street Journal, February 28, 2013.

Withdrawal Difficult at Some Afghan Outposts

The draw down and withdrawal of U.S. forces is forging ahead in Afghanistan. This is happening whether some areas are considered "secure" or not. In many parts of Helmand and Kandahar some remote areas are still contested and plans to hand-over security to the Afghans as U.S. forces depart are just that - "plans". In reality many of these areas will be ceded to Taliban control because the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are not good enough (at least not yet) to keep the Taliban in check. Read a recent newspaper account about how the "withdrawal process" is going at one outpost in southern Afghanistan. See "U.S. Military Faces Fire as It Pulls Out of Afghanistan", The New York Times, February 15, 2013 at this link.

A-29 Super Tocano Chosen as Afghan's COIN Aircraft

Photo from Embraer Image Gallery

The Embraer A-29 Super Tucano has been chosen as Afghanistan's counterinsurgency aircraft. The U.S. Air Force announced the award to Embraer in a recent announcement (see Brazilian Firm to Provide Aircraft to Afghan Air Force, American Forces Press Service, February 27, 2013). The $437 million contract will provide twenty of the light air support aircraft, maintenance services, spare parts, and training. Deliveries will start in the summer of 2014. The aircraft will conduct advanced flight training, surveillance, close air support, and air interdiction missions. Read more details of the contract award in Super Tucano Wins Afghanistan Light Air Support Bid, DefenseNews, February 27, 2013. View an Embraer video of the A-29 on YouTube.com here www.youtube.com/watch?v=sgKt8GRDG4s

Afghan Transition - A Report Card at the Halfway Point

In July 2011 NATO and the Afghan government started the security transition process which entailed the handover of security responsibilities from ISAF to the ANSF in selected areas of the country over time. This security transition is supposed to be finished by December 2014. Over 75% of the country's population has transitioned thus far - meaning 75% of the population lives in areas where the ANSF are in the lead for security.

There were five major areas where improvements had to be made in order to accomplish this security transition. These areas are establishing the ANA and ANP as viable forces, providing good governance (without overwhelming corruption), forging ahead with reconciliation with insurgents, developing regional cooperation, and improvement in economic development.

A recent report by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs entitled "Afghanistan Halfway through the Transition Phase" (January 2013) provides an evaluation of the progress made in these five areas. You can view the report at the link below.

www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2013C02_wmr.pdf

NATO Confused by Karzai over Expulsion of SF from Wardak Province

News reports continue to come out on the drama behind President Karzai's order to kick out Special Forces from Wardak province. ISAF is still trying to sort out the facts (if they know the facts they are not saying!) and the Afghan government is not releasing much information either. Read more background on this event in:

"Yankee beards go home", The Economist, March 1, 2013.
www.economist.com/news/asia/21572835-afghan-president-talks-tough-role-american-special-forces-yankee-beards-go-home

"Did U.S. Special Forces Commit Atrocities in a Key Afghan Province?", Time.com, Feb 28, 2013.
http://world.time.com/2013/02/28/did-u-s-special-forces-commit-atrocities-in-a-key-afghan-province/